# Woods v. Harry

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · February 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10814801

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10814801

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of 8th Amendment claims on, among other things, denial of toilet paper
- explaining that analysis of a Section 1983 claim requires “identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged” conduct

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BARRY GEORGE WOODS, ) CIVIL NO. 4:21-CV-1052-WIA
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
) (ARBUCKLE, M.J.)
SUPERINTENDENT LAUREL )
HARRY, et. al., )
Defendants )
MEMORANDUM OPINION pursuant to Rule 52(a)

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Barry Woods, (Woods or Plaintiff) filed a pro se complaint1 alleging
mistreatment while confined in the Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) at SCI Camphill
in 2019. This case comes before me on the consent of the parties.2 Plaintiff was
granted leave to file an amended complaint3 and did so on October 3, 2022.4
Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss5 which resulted in the dismissal of all

1 (Doc. 1).The original Complaint names Superintendent Laurel Harry, DSFM
Michael Gourley, Security Captain Mark Becker, Lieutenant Warner, Lieutenant
Troutman, LPN Stacy Nolan, Three John Doe Corrections Officers, C.O. Kiner,
PREA Coordinator David Radziewicz, BII Director James Barnacle, and BII
Lieutenant Beth Evans.
2 Docs. 13, 74.
3 Doc. 46.
4 Doc. 48. The amended complaint names James Barnacle, Mark Becker, Beth
Evans, DSFM Michael Gourley, Superintendent Harry, Officer J. Kiner, Stacy
Nolan, David Radziewicz, Lieutenant Troutman, Officer Remy R Reid, Officer
Damian Iagovino, Officer Robert Donald Roth and Officer Derrick A Zimmerman.
5 Doc. 53.
but five of the Defendants.6 On November 20, 2024 Plaintiff filed a Rule 41
Dismissal of Defendants David Roth and Remy Reid and Plaintiff’s claim under

Pennsylvania’s “Hate Crime” law.7
The remaining three Defendants are: C.O. Damian Iagovino; C.O. Jerry
Kiner; and Sgt. Derrick Zimmerman. The remaining claims are: (1) Under 42 U. S.

C. § 1983 for violations of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights to be free from
excessive force (assault and battery) and inhumane conditions of confinement (the
denial of nine meals in five days, and the denial of toilet paper, eating and drinking
utensils, blanket, soap, toothbrush and toothpaste, showers, and a towel); (2) Under

42 U. S. C. § 1983 for violations of plaintiff’s First Amendment right to be free from
retaliation (for asking for protective custody and complaining about mistreatment);
and (3) State law claims for the torts of Assault, Battery, and Civil Rights Violations

under 42 Pa.C.S. §8309. As remedies Plaintiff seeks damages, attorney’s fees, and
costs.

6 The dismissed defendants were Beth Evans (Staff Member of BII in
Mechanicsburg, PA), DSFM Michael Gourley (Deputy Superintendent of Facilities
Management ), Superintendent Harry (Superintendent SCI-Camp Hill), Stacy Nolan
(LPN Medical Department SCI-Camp Hill ), David Radziewicz (PREA Coordinator
for DOC Central Office Mechanicsburg, PA ), Lieutenant Troutman (Staff Member
at SCI-Camp Hill ), James Barnacle (Director for DOC Central Office (BII) Bureau
of Investigations and Intelligence in Mechanicsburg, PA ) and Mark Becker (Security
Captain for SCI-Camp Hill)
7 (Doc. 129). The amended complaint alleged violation of 18 Pa. C. S. § 2010 (Doc.
48, p 27).
At trial Defendants offered three (3) defenses: (1) The offensive acts by the
officers did not occur; (2) The Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity; and

(3) The Plaintiff’s physical injuries, if any, do not meet the seriousness level required
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
A non-jury trial was held before me on Tuesday, February 4, 2025. Pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) I make the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiff was incarcerated at SCI-

Camp Hill and housed in the RHU, also known as E Block, in cell E-
C-1006 (E Block, C Pod, Cell 6). (Stipulation, Doc. 130, ¶ 1).
2. At all times relevant to this matter, Defendants Iagovino, Kiner, and

Zimmerman were employed by the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (DOC) at SCI-Camp Hill and assigned to the RHU also
known as E Block. (Stipulation, Doc. 130, ¶ 2).
3. The front vestibule area of the RHU, where the alleged assault occurred,

was not covered by CCTV cameras. (Stipulation, Doc. 130, ¶ 4).
4. Plaintiff was charged in 2002, pled guilty in 2003, and was sentenced
to state prison for sex crimes involving two of his daughters. He was

originally paroled in 2011. (Plaintiff’s testimony).
5. Plaintiff was sent back to prison for a parole violation in 2019. He
arrived at the SCI Camp Hill for classification and assignment on

November 23, 2019. (Doc. 1, p. 4. ¶ C and Plaintiff’s testimony).
6. Plaintiff was 67 years old in December 2019. (Plaintiff’s testimony).
7. Plaintiff requested and received a transfer from general population to

the RHU for his own protection. He feared assault from other prisoners
because of his original conviction in 2003 as a child sex offender and
the conduct of other inmates against him while in general population at
SCI Camp Hill. Plaintiff arrived in the RHU on at 20:34 hours on

Monday, December 23, 2019. (Plaintiff’s testimony).
8. Plaintiff was placed in Cell 6 in C Pod in E Block. (Stipulation Doc.
130, J. Ex. 35).

9. When placed in Cell 6 the “RHU Package” (Joint. Ex. 15) with 20 items
was not present. The only “package” items he received were a jump
suit, canvas slides and a Styrofoam cup with the bottom torn out. When
Plaintiff asked for toilet paper (one of the package items) on December

23, 2019, he was told not to speak to the officer ever again. The general
regulations for E Block (the RHU) specify that inmates will receive
regular showers and three meals a day along with the package items.

Plaintiff did not get any toilet paper until late Wednesday, did not ever
receive the other package items such as soap, a towel or a blanket and
was not provided a shower for six days. (Plaintiff’s testimony and Joint.

Ex. 15).
10. Cell 6 is one of only two cells in C Pod equipped with a double door
wicket food box. (Exhibits J21-28). Instead of the more traditional meal

slot or plain opening in a cell door, the wicket box has a lid on the top
and a sliding door called a “ratchet door” into the cell. For food to be
given to the prisoner, the person serving the tray unlatches and opens
the lid, placing the tray and any other items in the box. The lid is then

closed and latched. The food server then releases a second latch and
opens the sliding ratchet door to allow the prisoner to take the tray and
any other items. The sliding ratchet door to the box is then closed and

latched. The procedure is reversed after the meal to retrieve the tray and
any other trash items. In 2019 the RHU only used Styrofoam trays to
feed the inmates. (Ex. J. 35, p. 2) (Testimony of Plaintiff and Defendant
Iagovino).

11. On Tuesday, December 24, 2019, Plaintiff was taken from his Cell in C
Pod to the lieutenant’s office in B Pod for a Psychology Team Review
(PRT) conducted by two psychologists. (Testimony of Plaintiff and

Defendant Iagovino).
12. There is a short hallway under the “bubble” between pods B & C. There
is an electronic sliding metal door with a half window on the top at each

end of the hallway. The doors are opened and closed by the “bubble”
officer in response to shouted requests from staff at the doors.
(Testimony of Plaintiff, all three Defendants and Joint Ex. 36).

13. Plaintiff testified as follows about an assault that took place in the B-C
hallway when he was returning from his PRT meeting. He was escorted
by two officers to the Lieutenant’s Office in B pod. While out of his cell
he was always constrained by Level 5 restraints (handcuffs and tether

or leash). During the return trip the officers were not wearing nametags
and he did not know their identity at that time. A third officer joined
them in the hallway on the return trip. He also was not wearing a

nametag. When both doors were closed the officer behind him punched
him in the back and asked, “Why are you here?’ Plaintiff replied, “A
parole violation.” The same officer struck him in the back again and
said, “try again.” Plaintiff repeated “A parole violation.” Plaintiff was

punched in the back a third time and an officer said, “Your daughters,
really?” During this time Plaintiff was kicked in the leg multiple times.
An officer then said, “If you don’t check yourself out, I am going to kill

you.” The officer repeated the threat and said, “Do you understand?”
Plaintiff responded, “Yes, I understand.” Plaintiff was then returned to
his cell. While in his cell he yelled, demanding to see a lieutenant. None

came and he was not provided lunch. Eventually Liutenant Troutman,
Officer Tobias and Nurse Nolan came to his cell. He told them what
happened, nurse Nolan looked at his leg and took pictures. Troutman

said he did not have immediate access to the videos, but he would
review them later and get back to Plaintiff. He also told Plaintiff that he
would get him some toilet paper. He never returned. Plaintiff testified
that the nurse did not treat his wound or provide any other first aid and

that he ripped a piece of his bedsheet and used it to clean the blood. His
leg hurt for several days. He has no scarring on his leg from the kicks.
Plaintiff was angry, confused, and afraid after this assault. (Plaintiff’s

testimony).
14. Regarding denial of meals Plaintiff testified that he did not receive
lunch on December 24th. He did receive dinner from the second shift
officers that night and every night while in the RHU. For the next four

days he did not receive Breakfast or Lunch from the first shift officers,
but he did receive dinner every day from the second shift officers.
Plaintiff reviewed the eight videos of mealtime (Joint. Exhibits J21 to

J28) during his testimony. He stated categorically that he did not receive
any food for those eight meals because either: no food was placed in
the box (breakfast on December 24, 2019, and December 28, 2019); he

was provided an empty tray (December 27, 2019) at breakfast); or that
the ratchet sliding door was never opened long enough for him to
retrieve his food. Plaintiff recalled the following comments made by

the officers that denied him meals. At breakfast, (December 25, 2019)
“You think your pretty slick don’t you.” At breakfast (December 26,
2019) “You have to be quicker than that.” At breakfast on December
28, 2019 “He must be on a hunger strike.” Plaintiff tried to complain

on December 25, 2019, but no officer would respond to his shouting.
He gave up trying to complain about denied meals but was concerned
because he did not know how long he would be at Camp Hill, and he

was very hungry during the day. (Plaintiff’s testimony).
15. Plaintiff testified that he believed the officers knew about his 2003 child
sex offense conviction and treated him the way they did because of it.
(Plaintiff’s testimony).

16. Plaintiff did not file a grievance or make a formal complaint until he
was transferred to SCI Phoenix. He did not complain after he spoke to
Lieutenant Troutman while at SCI Camp Hill because he feared
retaliation, a fear that was confirmed by the denial of meals on first shift
for four straight days. (Plaintiff’s testimony).

17. Officer Damian Iagovino (hereafter Iagovino) testified that he has
worked in the SCI Camp Hill RHU for over eight years, he has also
worked in general population and CDCC.8 He has had training as a

CERT Team member, pepper ball usage, and in Level 5 custody
procedures. His assignments when in the RHU consists of feeding,
showering and exercise yard supervision and escorting inmates to
appointments outside the RHU. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, he

worked the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift.
18. Iagovino described the procedures in the RHU as follows. Inmates are
assigned to the RHU for either discipline or administrative purposes, in

other words, either for protection or investigation. When assigned to the
RHU, a lieutenant interviews the inmate and fills out a questionnaire, a
sergeant searches the inmate, and the inmate is then given a “set up.“
Iagovino testified that the inmates do not have to say why they are in

the RHU. All inmates in the RHU are moved the same way, cuffed, with
a belly belt and leash and two officers accompanying.9 This is true, even

8 The terms CDCC and CERT Team were not further defined during the trial.
9 This is known as “Level Five restraints.”
if an inmate is only in protective custody. (Defendant Iagovino’s
testimony).

19. The officers rotate working shifts either on the floor or “in the bubble.“
The bubble officer works a full shift in the bubble and runs the controls
for the doors and other electronic items from the bubble. Regarding

meals, when the food cart arrives, there is a tone and an announcement
from the bubble officer. The food arrives in a hot box from the kitchen
brought in by the kitchen staff. In the RHU in 2019, all food was served
in Styrofoam containers. When inmates are scheduled for the

psychology review team (PRT) they are escorted into B-pod where they
meet with the PRT team in the lieutenant’s office. (Defendant
Iagovino’s testimony).

20. On December 24, 2019, Iagovino escorted Woods into B-pod for his
PRT evaluation. Video Exhibit J-19 shows Iagovino and Woods coming
out of the B-pod lieutenant’s office. Officer Reid is standing in the
doorway as a part of the escort. They leave the frame of “camera 10” at

09:47.19. Iagovino positively identified himself and Woods.
(Defendant Iagovino’s testimony).
21. Video Exhibit J-20 shows them entering the C-pod side of E Block into
the cell area at 09:49.56 and escorting Woods to his cell. Woods does

not appear to be limping.
22. Iagovino was behind Woods always holding the tether during this
escort. Iagovino specifically denied kicking Woods at any time.

(Defendant Iagovino’s testimony).
23. On cross examination, Iagovino explained that in 2019 the electronic
inmate information system was called “Doc-Info” but it is now called
“Capture.” In 2019 the corrections officers in E block would have

access to “Doc-Info” and that system would include both the initial
reason for the inmate being in jail and his “write up history” while in
custody. (Defendant Iagovino’s testimony).

24. Iagovino was cross examined about exhibit J-37 an excerpt from the
inmate handbook dated 2017. The handbook specifically says that
denial of food is not to be used as a disciplinary measure. Iagovino also
testified that he did not have any reason to use force against Woods as

force is defined in J-37.
25. Iagovino admitted that inmates convicted of sex crimes are treated
differently by the other inmates. He denied that he personally did so.

(Defendant Iagovino’s testimony).
26. Iagovino also explained that Exhibit J-16 is a Confidential Level 5
Housing policy statement and that it applies to E-Block. Inmates who

fail to follow the prescribed meal procedure will be treated as a
voluntary refusal. All inmate activity is logged into a sheet called a
17X.10 This would include a form for Woods. Each meal shower,

exercise and escort should be logged in the 17X. Iagovino logged every
inmate’s information on every shift, including Woods.
27. Iagovino testified that if an inmate did not follow the correct meal
procedure, as outlined in Exhibit J-15, the action would be treated as a

“voluntary refusal of the meal.” (Defendant Iagovino’s testimony).
28. Exhibit J-15 (General Rules and Regulations Governing the RHU,
issued September 17, 2019, regarding meals states in relevant part:

11. Three (3) meals are served in the RHU per day. Each
inmate shall receive a Lexan or Styrofoam tray at each
mealtime. An announcement will be made that meals are
being passed out. Inmates are directed to have the light on
and be standing at the rear of the cell facing the cell door
with their hands, visible, and fully dressed. Any behaviors
that create a safety or security risk to the opening of the
food aperture will result in a voluntary refusal of the meal.
. . . (emphasis added).

29. Stacy Nolan, LPN, testified that she has worked a SCI Camp Hill for
seven years and was working the second shift (2:00 p.m. – 10:30 p.m.)

10 A Sample DC-17X is contained in Exhibit J-16.
on December 24, 2019. She has been an LPN since 2014. She was
making afternoon rounds when she was asked to examine Woods. She

was told that he had an injury, so she went back to medical to get a
camera before examining Woods. She examined Woods, took five
photos (Exhibit J-14), and later prepared a DC-457 medical injury

report (Exhibit J-12). She described the wound on Woods’ shin as a
“small abrasion” less than 2” across. She did not observe any bruising
and could not say how long the dried blood, visible in the photos, was
present. She indicated that she did not think the injury came from being

kicked. (LPN Nolan’s testimony).
30. In her report (Exhibit J-12, p. 3) she completed this question and
answer: “Describe exactly what happened, why it happened, and

actions(s) taken: Individual reports being kicked.” Nowhere in the
report or in her testimony did she answer the rest of the question.
(Exhibit J-12).
31. LPN Nolan displayed a complete lack of curiosity as to how the injury

could have happened (in both her testimony and report) or when exactly
it happened. Her opinion that the injury could not be from a kick is not
based upon any medically identified criteria and will be evaluated as

her personal as opposed to professional opinion.
32. She admitted on cross examination that she did not ask Woods to stand
and walk so she could not opine if his gait was affected. She did not

know when the injury occurred. She did not provide any medical
treatment to the wound or clean off the dried blood. (LPN Nolan’s and
Plaintiff’s testimony).

33. C.O. Jerry Lee Kiner (hereafter Kiner) testified that he has worked at
SCI Camp Hill for eleven (11) years and is currently assigned to the
visiting room on day shift (8-4). In December of 2019 he was working
first shift (6:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m.) in the RHU. He testified that the

DocNet system provided only a stability Code A-D and that other
details about an inmate and his crimes would be in a different system.
He testified that he does not remember Woods and does not remember

doing his intake for the RHU in 2019. It was his experience that the
meal announcement was always made before the trays were passed.
(Defendant Kiner’s testimony).
34. Kiner reviewed each of the meal videos (EX.J – 21 to J – 28) while

testifying. Kiner is seen passing the trays on December 25 lunch,
December 26 breakfast and lunch, December 27 breakfast and lunch,
and December 28 breakfast and lunch. He admits that he did not serve

Woods a meal on the December 25, 2019, (lunch) or December 28,
2019, (breakfast) because Woods was not following protocol. But he
testified that he served Woods all his other meals. He also testified that

he “never played games with the wicket,” that he never denied Woods
a meal because of his charges, and that he did not know why Woods
was incarcerated. He testified that he would have entered the “refusal”

of the meals on December 25, 2019, and December 28, 2019, in the
17X log. (Defendant Kiner’s testimony).
35. The final witness at the trial was Sgt. Derrick Zimmerman (hereafter
Zimmerman). He testified that he has worked at SCI Camp Hill for 25

years. In 2019 he worked in the RHU and saw himself in the meal
videos only once (J-21, the December 25, 2019, breakfast). He testified
that he did not serve Woods because Woods did not comply with the

security protocol to stand at the back of the cell with his hands exposed.
He testified that Woods was standing but had his hands tucked under
his armpits. He provided a written report dated February 26, 2020, as
a part of an internal DOC investigation. (Doc. 17). In that report he

states that he did not receive any information that Woods was assaulted.
Zimmerman testified on cross examination that staff do share stories
about problem inmates but denied talking about Woods with others. He

admitted that in 2019 he would have had access to the full information
about Woods, including his original conviction. (Defendant
Zimmerman’s testimony).

36. There is no evidence that Woods ever received the “block rules”
covering items like how to stand for meals and Woods denied receiving
them.

37. All three officers testified that if an inmate did not stand at the back of
the cell with his hands exposed, they would treat this action as a
voluntary refusal of the meal and log it in the DC-17X. However,
Exhibit J-15, (the RHU rules), states that: “Any behaviors that create a

safety or security risk to the opening of the food aperture will result in
a voluntary refusal of the meal.” The food aperture on Wood’s cell was
a box with two secure openings between the inmate and the officer. No

officer explained how Wood’s actions created a safety or security risk
to the opening of the food aperture when it was boxed in the way it was
in Cell 6.
38. Woods’ testimony that he was assaulted in the short hallway by guards

who were not wearing nametags and his description of what they said
to him was credible and has been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. The only officer positively identified as one of the three

involved was Iagovino.
39. Woods’ testimony that he did not receive nine meals over five days was
credible. His description of the use of the inner wicket slide to deny him

meals was credible and has been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.
40. RHU Policy requires three showers per week and those showers were

to be done on first shift in C Pod where Woods was housed. (Ex. J-16,
p. 1-23; Ex. J-15, p. 1).
41. Although the DOC regulations require the completion of a DC-17X log
for each inmate in the RHU and the officers testified that they

completed them for Woods during the week of December 24, 2019, they
were not produced by either party.
III. DISCUSSION

In this case the Court is called upon to reconcile competing narratives about
what occurred in the SCI Camp Hill RHU between December 24th to 28th, 2019. On
one side is the Plaintiff, a convicted sex offender back in prison on a parole violation,
on the other three defendant prison guards and a prison nurse. The standard of proof

in civil litigation is preponderance of the evidence.11 The preponderance of the
evidence standard is simply: “Is it more likely that something happened than not?”12

11 E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, 145 S. Ct. 34, 37 (2025).
12 United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Stimpson, 113 F.4th 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2024)
Plaintiff testified credibly. His testimony establishes that he was assaulted and
threatened with harm (in the vestibule between C-Block and B-Block) if he did not

sign himself out of the RHU. The officers who assaulted him in the vestibule clearly
knew that he was a convicted child sex offender, with his crimes involving his
daughters. Other than Iagovino, who testified that he was holding the tether during

the PRT move, no other officers were positively identified in the vestibule.
Following the battery and threats in the vestibule, the first shift guards denied Woods
showers and nine meals over five days. The videos of eight of the nine mealtimes do
not conclusively show that Plaintiff was in fact fed.13 There was no video offered for

lunchtime on December 24, 2019, right after the vestibule incident.
Plaintiff denied being the inmate in the J-19 video, but Iagovino said the
inmate was Woods and that he was right behind him. I believe that Woods was the

escorted inmate shown in exhibits J-19 and J-20. The time computation between
Woods leaving the frame in video J-20 and arriving in frame in video J-21 is short,
two minutes and thirty-seven seconds, but long enough for the events Plaintiff
described to occur in the vestibule. There was no camera in the vestibule in 2019

and the bubble officer does not have a view of the inside of the vestibule. There are
windows above waist height on both doors of the vestibule, but there was no

13 Joint Exhibits J19 to J28.
evidence that any officer was standing on the outside of either door looking in while
the assault took place.

In short, I believe that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that Woods
was threatened, assaulted, and denied meals and showers while in the RHU because
he exercised his First Amendment Right to ask for protection in the RHU.

The policies of the DOC are laid out in Exhibit J-16. These policies would not
permit unnecessary threats, assaults, battery, or the denial of meals and showers. In
fact, physical safety, three meals a day, and three showers a week are the official
policy of the DOC in the RHU. (Exhibit J-16).

A. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
Claims for constitutional violations are enforced under § 1983. “Section 1983
imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law,

deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.”14 “It is well settled that § 1983 does not
confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred.’”15 To prove a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

establish two things: (1) a deprivation of a federally protected right; and (2) that the

14 Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Gruenke
v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000)).
15 Williams v. Pa. Human Rel. Comm’n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)).
deprivation was committed by a person or persons acting under color of state law.16
Plaintiff brings two distinct Eighth Amendment Claims: one for the use of

excessive force and one for the conditions of confinement. I will address each in
turn.
1. Use of Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that the incident in the vestibule constituted the use of
excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment, protects convicted prisoners from malicious and sadistic uses of

physical force by prison officials.
“To demonstrate that a prison official defendant has violated the Eighth
Amendment, a plaintiff must establish two (2) elements: a subjective and an
objective element.”17

“First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.”18 “Where a prison official is alleged to have used excessive
force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the pertinent inquiry for the subjective

16 Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Lake v.
Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997)). In this case the parties agree that the
Defendants were acting under color of state law. (Stipulation, Doc. 130, Joint Exhibit
35).
17 Blair v. Carl, No. 1:24-CV-00211, 2024 WL 3850444, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 15,
2024) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
18 Id. citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
element is whether [the] force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”19

“Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was objectively
sufficiently serious[.]”20 “The pertinent inquiry for the objective element is whether
the prison official's actions were harmful enough, or sufficiently serious”21 “The

Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of force that offends contemporary standards
of decency[,] regardless of whether significant injury is evident[;] although, the
extent of injury may provide some indication of the amount of force applied or
whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular

situation.”22 “To establish an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, an inmate
does not need to show that he suffered a significant, or even a more than de minimis,
injury. Rather, the central issue is the force used by the officer, not the resultant
injury.”23

19 Id. At p. 8. Citing Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S.1 at 7; Chavarriaga v. N.JU. Dept
of Corr., 806 F.3d 210 at 231 (explaining that “[w]hen prison officials maliciously
and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always
are violated[,]” and “[t]his is true whether or not significant injury is evident”).
20 Id. Citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
21 Id.
22 Id. Citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010).
23 Warrick v. Harry, No. 3:23-CV-591, 2024 WL 2059084, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 8,
2024) (citing Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37; Flood v. Schaefer, 439 F. App’x 179, 182 (3d
Cir. 2011)).
Applying these factors in this case, there was no need for any force. Plaintiff
was not actively making any verbal or physical threats. He was attempting to escape.

He was shackled in a belly chain with a tether surrounded by three officers in a
confined space.24 “Punching and kicking someone who is handcuffed behind his
back ... is ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind,’ absent the extraordinary
circumstances necessary to justify that kind of force.” 25

The use of force by Iagovino in the vestibule, in the context of the conduct of
the other officers, was malicious and evidenced a delight in cruelty. There was no
legitimate reason for the use of force or the accompanying threats. Plaintiff was in

fact physically injured as evidenced by his bleeding. He has met his burden to show
that he was the victim of excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights. Officer Iagovino participated in the assault and battery in the vestibule and is

personally responsible for his role in the incident.
2. Conditions of Confinement
In the context of a prison conditions of confinement claim, Judge Eddy from
the Western District of Pennsylvania has described the legal standard succinctly:

The Eighth Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”
It prohibits deprivations suffered during incarceration “that constitute an

24 Testimony of both Woods and Iagovino.
25 Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 at 10), Gordon v. Garvin, No. 24-CV-6365, 2025 WL
209179, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2025).
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ including ‘those that are
totally without penological justification.’ ” A successful Eighth
Amendment claim based on a prisoner's conditions of confinement has
two components. “First, ‘the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,
sufficiently serious,’ resulting in ‘the denial of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities.’ ” This is a totality-of-the circumstances
analysis. “Conditions ... alone or in combination[ ] may deprive inmates
of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” and “[s]ome
conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment
violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only
when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the
deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth,
or exercise.”
That said, the Supreme Court has recognized that not every discomfort
or inconvenience experienced by prisoners implicates the Eighth
Amendment. Thus, “only those deprivations denying the minimalized
civilized measures of life's necessities ‘are sufficiently grave to form the
basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.’ ” (all citations omitted).26

The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
demands that prison officials do not house inmates under conditions that deprive
them of one or more basic human needs, such as the basic human need for reasonable
safety, adequate physical space, and the need for some degree of ventilation and
fresh air.27 However, the Eighth Amendment does not mandate that prisons be free
of discomfort.28 “No static test determines whether conditions of confinement are

26 Lee v. Janosko, No. 18-CV-1297, 2021 WL 877761, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2021).
27 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).
28 Farmer v. Brennan,511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).
‘cruel and unusual.’ These terms must ‘draw [their] meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ ” 29

Conditions of confinement claim has two main elements or prongs.
Conditions-of-confinement claims have two prongs: (1) an objective
prong, under which the alleged injury must be sufficiently serious, and
(2) a subjective prong, under which the prison official who imposed the
condition must have done so with deliberate indifference. See, e.g.,
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d
811 (1994).
An official acts with deliberate indifference when he “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.30

To establish an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, an
inmate must show that he was deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.”31 This includes showing that the conditions of his confinement pose “a
substantial risk of serious harm” to his health or safety.32 In reviewing this type of
claim, courts have stressed the duration of the complainant's exposure to the alleged
unconstitutional conditions and the “totality of the circumstances” as critical to a
finding of cruel and inhumane treatment.33

29 Tillery v. Owens, 719 F.Supp. 1256, 1261 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 346).
30 Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 936 (10th Cir. 2018)
31 Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997).
32 Farmer, supra, 511 U.S. at 834.
33 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362–63.
In this case, the denial of nine meals (all on the first shift) over five days,
coupled with the taunts at mealtime and the denial of showers and “kit” items34 like

soap, towel, blanket, cup, and eating utensils are a “totality of circumstances” that
presented a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff’s health, justify a finding of
cruel and inhumane treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The need for

food is a basic human need. The denial here was deliberate indifference designed to
both deprive and taunt Woods. Officers Zimmerman and Kiner personally
participated in at least some but not all this conduct. They must have realized the
effect on Woods, were deliberately indifferent to it, and are personally responsible

for their roles.
B. PLRA PHYSICAL INJURY REQUIREMENT FOR MENTAL OR
EMOTIONAL INJURY:

A prisoner’s ability to recover compensatory damages for mental or emotional
injury is specifically limited by the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act. The PLRA
states in relevant part that:

34 Regarding the denial of toilet paper, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
held that the temporary denial of toilet paper does not ordinarily violate the Eighth
Amendment. Brooks v. Bledsoe, 682 F.Appx. 164, 170 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming
dismissal of 8th Amendment claims on, among other things, denial of toilet paper).
In 2015 the Circuit held that that the denial of toilet paper for approximately seven
days did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Freeman v. Miller, 615 Fed. Appx. 72,
77 (3d Cird. 2015). In this case the denial was one or two days. This denial, alone,
would not be enough to state an 8th Amendment claim, but it is a factor in my
conclusion that the totality of the circumstances of the conditions of confinement in
the RHU violated Plaintiff’s 8th Amendment rights.
(e) Limitation on recovery

No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or
the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).35

The Third Circuit has adopted a more than de minimis standard when a
prisoner seeks damages for mental or emotional injuries. In applying the PLRA to a
claim for damages the court stated:
We believe that reading 1997e(e) to allow a plaintiff to allege any
physical injury, no matter how minor, would produce an unintended
(indeed absurd) result. Were we not to read 1997(e) as requiring more
than a de minimis physical injury, we would turn its physical injury
prerequisite into a mere pleading requirement, thereby rendering the
requirement meaningless as a practical matter. Another prisoner might
be able to assert an emotional injury by pleading that he received a
paper cut, for example. This result runs counter to Congress's intent “to
curtail frivolous and abusive prisoner litigation.” 36

The physical injury requirement of § 1997e requires a plaintiff to establish “a
less-than significant-but more-than-de minimis physical injury as a predicate to
allegations of emotional injury.”37 “The Third Circuit has not provided a bright line
rule for district courts to follow when applying this test to prisoner claims.”

35 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (emphasis added).

36 Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535 (3d Cir. 2003)
37 Id.
Nevertheless, “[d]istrict courts have been hesitant to find that an identifiable bodily
injury was de minimis as a matter of law.”38

Two district court cases in this circuit illustrate the type of injuries that courts
will recognize as de minimis as a matter of law.39 In Knight v. Walton, correctional
officers placed the prisoner plaintiff face down on his bed and grabbed him by his
wrists during a search of his cell.40 As they continued to search the cell, the officers

removed the plaintiff from his cell, placed him in a restraint chair, and strapped him
to the chair. The plaintiff was subsequently removed from the restraint chair and
then strapped back into it twice more before being returned to his cell. The plaintiff

raised claims for mental and emotional injuries from the incident.41 The court held
that the plaintiff's physical injuries “if they existed at all, were de minimis” because
“the numbness and lacerations resolved within sixteen days.”42

38 Hyman v. Giorla, No. 10-CV-00499, 2014 WL 881137, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5,
2014).
39 Powell v. Pennsylvania Dept of Corr., No. 1:12-CV-02455, 2019 WL 8510289,
at *9 (M.D. Pa. July 15, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:12-CV-
02455, 2020 WL 1922639 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2020).
40 Knight v. Walton, No. 2:12-CV-00984, 2015 WL 9243902, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept.
24, 2015), report and recommendation adopted 2:12-CV-00984, 2015 WL 9239003,
at *1., aff'd, 660 F. App'x 110 (3d Cir. 2016).
41 Id. at *9.
42 Id. at *6.
In In re Bayside Prison Litigation43 the prisoner plaintiff was called into the
internal affairs office of the prison to be interviewed by internal affairs personnel

about his possible involvement in the murder of a prison official. After the plaintiff
arrived in the office, two officers forced him to face a wall and one of the officers
told him to place his left hand above his head and tell the officers everything he
knew. The officer then grabbed the plaintiff's hand and hit it with a stick.44 The

plaintiff brought claims for the mental and emotional injuries he suffered from the
incident, but the court found that the plaintiff's physical injuries were de minimis
where the plaintiff suffered “pain and swelling in his pinky finger for approximately

two days” which “eventually subsided” and led to no “significant restriction of his
activities.”45
While these cases do not set bright lines (injuries that resolved in two or

sixteen days), they do inform my decision that the damages from the “punches and
kicks” Woods received are not “serious injuries” and are not “more than de minimis”
specifically for the purposes of meeting the limitations set out by the PLRA. What
happened to Woods in the vestibule was wrong, but it does not rise to the PLRA

injury standard to allow damages for mental or emotional distress.

43 In re Bayside Prison Litigation, No. 09-CV-02365, 2010 WL 4916716, at *1
(D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2010).
44 Id. at *1.
45 Id. at *3.
The PLRA bars the Eighth amendment use of force claim in this case for
mental or emotional distress in this case. Likewise, the denial of nine meals on first

shift over five consecutive days as a condition of confinement under the Eighth
Amendment, as suffered by Plaintiff, is not the type of physical injury required by
the PLRA to recover for mental or emotional injury.

C. RETALIATION
The First Amendment protects from government retaliation for exercising the
right to free speech. Retaliation for free speech is a violation of the Constitution. To
state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must prove that (1) “he was

engaged in constitutionally protected conduct,” (2) he suffered an “adverse action”
by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
his First Amendment rights, and (3) the inmate's protected conduct was a

“substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials' decision to take the adverse
action.46
To determine if a prisoner has a § 1983 complaint, the court must first identify
the claimed constitutional violations.47 In this case Plaintiff alleges that his

46 Ramey v. Marsh, 4:21-CV-01018, 2022 WL 363854, (M.D. Pa. February 7, 2022)
(citations omitted).
47 See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (“The first step in any [Section
1983] claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.”);
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (explaining that analysis of a Section
1983 claim requires “identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed
by the challenged” conduct).
constitutionally protected conduct was twofold, first, asking for a transfer to the
RHU to be protected from other inmates and second, complaining to Lieutenant

Troutman and LPN Nolan about the assault in the vestibule. Plaintiff has shown with
both instances of speech that he engaged in “protected conduct.”
Next Plaintiff must show that he suffered an “adverse action” by prison

officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First
Amendment rights. Here Plaintiff alleges two distinct “adverse actions.”
The first adverse action occurred less than fifteen hours after he was
transferred to the RHU and during the first time he was out of his cell. He was

punched, kicked, threatened, and told by a guard that he must ask to be transferred
out of the RHU or he would be killed. This incident in the vestibule was an “adverse
action.” 48 Plaintiff had a continuing right to request protection in the RHU. A person

of ordinary firmness would be deterred from exercising their right to speech by
asking for RHU protection under those circumstances.
The second “adverse action” was the denial of meals, showers, and “kit” items
while in the RHU.49 None of these incidents, in isolation, would be an adverse action.

However, taken collectively they do. All the actors that participated in these denials
were first shift officers. I conclude that a person of ordinary firmness would be

48 See Findings of Fact # 13, 38 (supra).
49 See Findings of Fact # 9, 14, 36, 37, 39, and 40.
deterred from exercising their right to speech (by asking for RHU protection or
complaining about the assault) under those circumstances. An inmate cannot be

expected to freely exercise his First Amendment rights when facing a concerted
effort by a group of guards to shut him up. I find, based on the evidence presented
at trial, that is what the guards did.

Next, we must decide if the inmate's protected conduct was a “substantial or
motivating factor” in the prison officials' decision to take the adverse action.50 This
is sometimes referred to as a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional
rights and the adverse action.51

Defendant Iagovino participated in the vestibule incident. Defendants Kiner
and Zimmerman denied Plaintiff nine meals over five days. None of them provided
him with the “kit” items or showers. The motive or link for the vestibule incident is

explicit. The denials over the next five days are more circumstantial.
1. Substantial or motivating factor during the vestibule incident
The substantial or motivating factor of the officers during the assault and
battery in the vestibule is obvious to me by their collective conduct. I have found

50 Ramey v. Marsh, 4:21-CV-01018, 2022 WL3 63854 (M.D. Pa. February 7, 2022)
(citations omitted).
51 Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)). See, Lee v.
Janosko, No. 18-CV-1297, 2021 WL 877761, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2021).
that the description provided by Woods52 is more persuasive than the denial provided
by Iagovino53 and proven by a preponderance of the evidence The combination of

punching, kicking, and threatening a shackled inmate with death if he did not comply
with the officer’s demand to give up his right to request protection in the RHU shows
their improper motivation. He was asked twice if he understood that he had to ask to

leave the RHU. The fact that he is a convicted pedophile may have inspired their
hatred, but they expressed that disdain by telling him he could not ask for protection,
a right clearly protected by the First Amendment.
2. Substantial or motivating factor during the denial of meals,
etc.
To satisfy the adverse action requirement, a plaintiff must show that,
objectively, the action “was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from

exercising his First Amendment rights.” Here, Woods was threatened and told to
check himself out of the RHU. He believed he was denied meals because he asked
to be put into the RHU and would not leave voluntarily and because he complained

about the assault. Denying him meals, showers, and kit items was an adverse action,
wrong, and in violation of the prison rules. It was the type of conduct that would
deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising a constitutional right. Regarding
the third part of the test, I find Woods’ request to be in the RHU, and his later

52 Findings of Fact ¶¶ 11, 12, 13, 20, and 38.
53 Findings of Fact ¶ 38.
complaint about the assault, was a “substantial or motivating factor” for Zimmerman
and Kiner to deny him first shift meals. The fact that Woods was a convicted sex

offender, by itself, could have been the motive behind their torment, but there is no
fact in this record to support that interpretation. The only evidence about their motive
comes from the Plaintiff. His belief is supported by the timing and circumstances of

the taunts and manipulation of the food slot that I have found was proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. There simply is no other explanation for the lack of
showers, soap, a towel, cup, or utensils for eating. Plaintiff has met his burden.
D. STATE LAW ASSAULT AND BATTERY

The tort of assault requires that the defendant act with the intent to place the
plaintiff in apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive bodily contact and that
the plaintiff actually experience such apprehension.54 Battery requires proof that the

defendant acted with the intent to cause harmful or offensive bodily contact with the
person of the plaintiff and that such contact actually followed.55 The conduct of the
officers in the vestibule on December 24, 2019 was both assault and battery.

54 See Heverly v. Simcox, No. 4:05–1370, 2006 WL 2927262, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Oct.
11, 2006); D'Errico v. DeFazio, 763 A.2d 424, 431 n.2 (Pa. Super Ct.2000); Dull
v. W. Manchester Twp. Police Dept, 604 F. Supp. 2d 739, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
55 See Fulks ex rel. Daniel v. Gasper, 439 F.Supp.2d 372, 379 (M.D. Pa. 2006);
Montgomery v. Bazaz–Sehgal, 742 A.2d 1125, 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); Dull v.
W. Manchester Twp. Police Dept, 604 F. Supp. 2d 739, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
Defendants, in their Statement of Defenses and Elements56 correctly define
the torts of assault and battery. They go on to assert that “Importantly, the harmful

and offensive contact element of assault and battery claims against corrections
officers is expanded by state law. “A staff member may not use any greater force
against an inmate than is necessary to protect the staff member or others from bodily

harm or to protect property from damage or destruction or to prevent a criminal act
or to effect compliance with rules when other methods of control are ineffective.”57
I agree that corrections officers are permitted to use force, but only when necessary
to protect or secure. The legal principle cited by Defense counsel does not connect

to the facts of this case. There is no allegation anywhere that Woods was threatening
bodily harm or damage to property or attempting to flee. Simply put, there was no
reason to exert force or threats while the officers and Woods were in the vestibule.

Since the officers deny any use of force or threats, the line of cases describing
justifiable use of force by officers cannot apply. In this case, Plaintiff has proven
that Iagovino kicked him multiple times, while other officers were punching and
threatening him. That is both assault and battery.

56 (Doc. 126, pp. 7-8).
57 (Doc. 126, p. 8, citing cases).
E. IMMUNITY FROM STATE TORTS

The Defendants claim sovereign immunity and argue that is not waived for
intentional torts, citing Mitchell v. Luckenbill:
Under Pennsylvania law, an action falls within the scope of
employment if it: (1) is the kind that the employee is employed to
perform; (2) occurs substantially within the job’s authorized time and
space limits; (3) is motivated at least in part by a desire to serve the
employer; and (4) if force was used by the employee against another,
the use of force is not unexpectable by the employer.58

While the conduct at issue in the vestibule arguably meets the first three
elements (i.e. escorting a prisoner within the jail), it cannot be argued that the DOC
expects officers to strike and threaten prisoners who are compliant with all
commands and not threatening anyone’s safety.
Judge Nealon has summarized this exception to sovereign immunity in a case
where he found that the correction officers’ conduct was immune because it was
necessary to their employment. In explaining the difference in the case before him
to three earlier cases of officer’s assaultive conduct he said:
This Court finds Plaintiff's reliance on these three cases is misplaced. In
Velykis, Robus, and Savage, the use of force by corrections officers was
unprovoked, unnecessary and unjustified by security concerns or
penological goals, and, therefore, did not, as a matter of law, fall within
the scope of employment.59

58 Mitchell v. Luckenbill, 680 F. Supp.2d 672, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
59 Gray v. Wakefield, No. 3:CV-09-0979, 2014 WL 2526619, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June
4, 2014).
The Commonwealth Court has taken a similar position on immunity regarding
assault and battery on prisoners by prison employees. For purposes of sovereign

immunity, a prison guard acts outside the scope of his duties when he or she uses
deliberate and unjustified force on an inmate totally divorced from any need of the
officer to exert control over the prisoner.60

Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense. An employee claiming
sovereign immunity carries the burden at trial of proving that his conduct was within
the scope of his employment.61 The Defendants have not done so. The request for
sovereign immunity for the actions of Defendant Iagovino in the vestibule is denied.

The request for sovereign immunity for the actions of defendants Kiner and
Zimmerman is denied.
F. CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Defendants have conceded that punitive damages are available under § 198362

citing a Middle District employment case.63 According to that case, the conduct
complained of in a § 1983 case must be at a minimum reckless or callous.
Under Pennsylvania tort law, punitive damages may be awarded “when the

plaintiff has established that the defendant has acted in an outrageous fashion due to

60 Minor v. Kraynak, 155 A.3d 114 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017).
61 Justice v. Lombardo, 208 A.3d 1057 (Pa. 2019).
62 Defendant’s Statement of Defenses and Elements (Doc. 126, p. 3).
63 Judge v. Shikellamy Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp.3d 284, 298–99 (M.D. Pa. 2015),
aff'd on other grounds, 905 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2018).
either the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others.”64 A plaintiff may be entitled to punitive damages when she adduces

evidence showing that “the defendant's acts amounted to intentional, willful, wanton
or reckless conduct.” Reckless indifference is characterized by conduct that “creates
an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another [that is] substantially greater than
that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.”65

I find that under both federal and state standards Defendant Iagovino’s
conduct merits punitive damages. The kicking and threatening of an unarmed man,
in handcuffs secured with a tether, surrounded by three guards, while he is not

resisting or even mouthing off creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm. Such
an assault and battery, while not rising to the level of a severe beating or murder, is
still outrageous. The officers’ actions were malicious, wanton, willful and
oppressive and showed a reckless indifference the interests of others.66 The fact that

the injuries do not qualify for recovery for mental or emotional damages under the
limitations imposed by the PLRA does not preclude nominal or punitive damages.67

64 Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005).
65 Miller v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. CV 19-252, 2019 WL 1168120, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 12, 2019)
66 PA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 8.00 - Punitive Damages
(2024) and cases cited in the subcommittee note.
67 Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2000); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34,
130 S. Ct. 1175, 175 L. Ed. 2d 995 (2010).
IV. MISCELLANEOUS RULINGS
A. MOTION TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL WITNESSES

At the conclusion of Plaintiff’s case at trial the Plaintiff asked the court to
consider the testimony of two witnesses, Remy Reid and Robert Roth, who were
only subpoenaed the day before by delivering their subpoenas to the counsel for the

remaining defendants. Counsel for the Defendants objected based on the “five-day”
local rule.68 The Plaintiff proffered that the two witnesses would explain the
procedure for feeding inmates in the Special Housing Unit, which was relevant to
his conditions of confinement claim. The Defendants responded that the procedure

was not in dispute and that the three remaining named defendants would all testify
about the procedure. The court deferred ruling on the motion until after the close of
the evidence. Since the testimony of the Plaintiff and the three Defendants on this

issue agreed on what the procedure was, the Plaintiff’s motion for two additional
witnesses is denied.
B. DEFENDANT’S RULE 50 MOTION
At the close of the Plaintiff’s case in chief the Defendants made an oral motion

for a Directed Verdict under F. R. Civ. P. 50. The court deferred ruling on the motion

68 Local Rule 83.10.4 Subpoena Requirement, states in part that: “No trial shall be
continued on account of the absence of any witness unless a subpoena for the
attendance of such witness has been served at least seven (7) days prior to the date
set for trial.”
for the reasons stated on the record at the time of the motion. The defendant’s motion
for a judgment as a matter of law is denied.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. At all times relevant to this matter, Defendants Iagovino, Kiner, and
Zimmerman acted within the scope of their employment and acted
under color of state law. Stipulation, Doc. 130, ¶ 3. This general
stipulation by the parties does not preclude the Court from finding that
one or more of the officers acted “outside” the scope of their
employment while they were at their job and on the clock. I do not read

the stipulation as a concession by Plaintiff’s counsel that all conduct by
the Defendant’s was lawful, I read it only that they were working at
their jobs when the conduct occurred.

2. Plaintiff’s claim for mental and emotional damages for being subject to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence to meet the PLRA
standard.

3. Plaintiff’s claim for mental and emotional damages for suffering
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment as limited by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act was not proven by a preponderance of the

evidence.
4. Plaintiff’s claim for Assault and Battery in the B-Pod/C-Pod vestibule
on December 24, 2019, (Amended Complaint, Doc. 48, pp. 16-17, ¶ 5-

10) was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The use of force
by Officer Iagovino and the two unidentified officers was outside the
scope of their employment.

5. Defendant’s reliance on Mitchel v. Luckenbill, 680 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682
(M.D. PA 2010)69 for their sovereign immunity defense is misplaced.
While it is true that sovereign immunity is not waived for intentional
torts, like assault & battery, the difference here is that, unlike the force

used by the state police attempting to arrest Mitchel in his home, an
unprovoked assault and battery of this kind (threatening, kicking, or
punching a shackled compliant prisoner), was not within the scope of

Iagovino’s employment. Defendant Iagovino was not acting within the
scope of his employment at the time of the assault and battery and is
not entitled to sovereign immunity.
6. Plaintiff’s claim under the Pennsylvania civil rights statute, 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 8309 must fail because the conduct alleged and proven here does not
fall within the scope of the predicate offenses (i.e. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2710,

69 Doc. 126, pp. 10-11.
relating to ethnic intimidation or 18 Pa.C.S. § 3307, relating to
institutional vandalism) required to violate the statute.

7. Plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages against Iagovino under § 1983
for the assault and battery in the vestibule in the amount of one ($1.00)
dollar.

8. Plaintiff is entitled to Nominal Damages under § 1983 for Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement violations against Defendants
Kiner (7) & Zimmerman (2) for the denial of meals in the amount of
nine ($9.00) dollars, one for each meal.

9. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for the torts of assault and
battery committed in the vestibule by Defendant Iagovino in the amount
three hundred ($300) dollars. Plaintiff suffered no financial loss for

medical treatment, or permanent disfigurement, but he did experience
pain from the deliberate kicks administered by Iagovino.
10. Plaintiff is entitled to Punitive Damages against Defendant Iagovino
under both § 1983 and Pennsylvania tort law in the amount of fifteen

thousand ($15,000) dollars. The amount reflects the short but serious
nature of his misconduct, that it was outrageous under state law, and is
in amount designed to deter others from similar misbehavior.
An appropriate Judgment and Order will be entered in accordance with this
opinion.

Date: February 28, 2025 BY THE COURT

s/William I. Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10814801. Public record. Not legal advice.