# KELLEY v. REYES

> District Court, D. New Jersey · February 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10813018

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** February 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming magistrate judge’s sua sponte recommendation of qualified immunity

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ERIC KELLEY,
Plaintiff, Civ. No. 2:19-cy-17911 (WIM)
Vv.
RICHARD REYES, LOUIS STELL,
ROBERT SMITH, ESTATE OF MICHAEL
FINER, ALEX NIEVES, PETER IURATO,
TIMOTHY JORDAN, RAYMOND REID,
ALBERT CLARK, in their individual
capacities, RICHARD MUNSEY and
VINCENT AMORESANO, in their official
capacities, and THE CITY OF PATERSON,
Defendants.

RALPH LEF,
Plaintiff, Civ. No. 2:19-cv-17936 (WJM)
Vv.
ALBERT CLARK, ESTATE OF MICHAEL OPINION
FINER, PETER ILURATO, TIMOTHY
JORDAN, ALEX NIEVES, RAYMOND
REID, RICHARD REYES, ROBERT
SMITH, LOUIS STELL, and JOHN DOES
#1-10, in their individual capacities,
RICHARD MUNSEY and VINCENT
AMORESANO, in their official capacities,
and THE CITY OF PATERSON,
Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINL U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiffs Eric Kelley and Ralph Lee, Jr. (“Plaintiffs”) spent 24 years incarcerated
for the robbery of a video store in Paterson, New Jersey and murder of the store clerk—
crimes that they contend they did not commit, After DNA testing in 2014 proved that the
distinctive green plaid baseball hat left at the crime scene was worn by Eric Dixon,
Plaintiffs Kelley and Lee in separate actions, filed various civil rights and related claims
against the City of Paterson (“Paterson” or “City”) and members of the Paterson Police
Department (“PPD”) in their individual capacities—Lieutenant Albert Clark, the Estate of
Detective Michael Finer,! Detectives Peter lurato, Timothy Jordan, Alex Nieves, Richard
Reyes, Robert Smith, Sergeants Raymond Reid, and Louis Stell (“individual
Defendants”).’ Before the Court are ten separate motions for summary judgment filed in
each case by:
1. City of Paterson, Kelley ECF No. 226, Lee ECF No. 200;
2. Sgt. Reid, Kelley ECF No. 216, Lee ECF No. 192;
3. Estate of Finer, Kelley ECF No. 217, Lee ECF No. 193;
4A. Lt. Clark, Kelly ECF No, 218, Lee ECF No. 194;
». Reyes, Kelly ECF No. 219, Lee ECF No, 195;
6. — [urato Goins in Reyes’ motion), Kelly ECF No. 222, Lee ECF No. 197;
7. Jordan, Kelly ECF No, 221, Lee ECF No. 196;
8. Smith, Kelly ECF No, 223, Lee ECF No. 198;
9, Set. Stell, Kelly ECF No. 220, Lee ECF No. 237;
10. Nieves, Kelly ECF No. 224, Lee ECF No. 235,
The Court decides these motions without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For
the reasons stated below, the motions are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I, BACKGROUND
Around 1:30 p.m. on July 28, 1993, Plaintiffs claim that Eric Dixon robbed Victoria’s
Video in Paterson, New Jersey and murdered the store clerk, Tito Dante Merino. See Pls,
Stmt. Of Add’l Material Facts (PSAMEF) § 1, Kelly ECF No. 234; Lee ECF No. 208. Lt.
Clark and Sgt. Stell assigned Det. Reyes to be lead detective for the homicide and Sgt.
Reid, Finer, Smith, Iurato, Nieves, and Jordan to assist. Reyes Stmt, of Material Facts
(SUMF), 4 5, Kelley ECF No. 219-2, Lee ECF No. 195-2; City of Paterson Stmt. Of
Material Undisputed Facts (Paterson SUMF) 4 6, Kelley ECF No. 226-1, Lee ECF No.
200-1. Initial interviews with three witnesses who stopped by the store around the time of
the murder - Majdi Mousa, Carmen Paredes, and James Thompson - supported the theory
that the perpetrator was a lone medium-built Black man wearing a green plaid hat. PSAMEF
' Finer passed away on May 23, 2018. Finer Stmt. Of Material Facts, § 15, Kelley ECF No. 217; Lee ECF No. 193.
* The claims against Vincent Amoresano and Richard Munsey have been dismissed. See July 1, 2020 Op., Kelley
ECF No, 81; Lee ECF No. 68.

4. In a statement to the police that day, Mr. Mousa stated he saw a Black man coming out
from the back room of the store bleeding from his right ear and with blood on both his arms. -
and shirt. fd. at ¥] 4b.
On July 30, 1993, Jordan and Sgt. Reid, who were assigned to canvas the
neighborhood in search of possible witnesses to the homicide, received information from
a “confidential source”? claiming to have observed two Black males (one identified as “the
son of Mr. Lee” and the other as “K.C.”), and a white male (“the son of Mrs. Rose”) in
front of the video store around the time of the homicide. PSAME, 4ff 131-132; Jordan Stmt.
Of Undisputed Material Facts Jordan SUMF) {f 7-9, Kelley ECF No. 221-2, Lee ECF No.
196-2. In addition to the anonymous source, according to Reyes, the PPD purportedly
received corroborating information from a woman at a laundromat who overheard that two
Black men and one white man were seen outside Victoria’s Video around the time of the
murder, City of Paterson Stmt. Of Undisputed Material Facts (Paterson SUMF) ¥ 34,
Kelley ECF No. 226-1, Lee ECF No. 200-1.
Set. Reid’s handwritten notes show the last name “Lee” with first name “Travis”
and “yes” next to it and first name “Ralph” crossed out, PSAMF § 133. The notes also
indicate that “K.C.” or “Kasey” was seen hours earlier wearing “green shorts/gray top”
with a scratch on his right cheek area, fd. The third person identified by the confidential
source was Greg McCourt, but Mr. McCourt turned out to have an alibi. /d. at 9 141. While
not reflected in Sgt. Reid’s contemporancous notes, the source allegedly informed police
that the two Black males were “in the brick building on the corner of Jasper and Union
Avenue up on the balcony.” Paterson SUMF § 24, Jordan SUMF § 10. Upon receiving a
radio transmission of a male that Defendants claim fit the description of KC nearing his
detective vehicle, Sgt. Reid stopped Mr. Kelley. Paterson SUMF §f 26-27.
Sgt. Reid, Jordan, and Sgt. Stell found Mr. Lee in the stairwell of the brick apartment
building, 7d. at § 31; Jordan SUMF § 11. Mr. Lee does not dispute that he agreed to go to
the police station for an interview. Jordan SUMF § 11. Iurato, Nieves, and Set. Stell
transported Mr. Lee to the police station in the back ofa police car. PSAMF 4 41. Mr. Lee
maintains he was handcuffed, but he does not know by whom. /d.; Lee Dep. 13:18-21, Pls.
Ex, 134, Kelley ECF No. 234-135, Lee ECF No. 208-135,
Mr. Kelley was nearby but not in the building at Jasper and Union; Set. Reid stopped
him because he “fit the description” given by the confidential source, see PSAMF § 151,
even though at the time, Mr, Kelley did not have a scratch on his face and was not wearing
a gray top. Jd. at {] 136-137, 155. Plaintiffs dispute that Mr. Kelley has ever gone by the
nickname “KC,” “Kasey,” or “Kasey.” Pls. Resp. to Paterson SUMF 28, Kelley ECF No.
235, Lee ECF No. 209; PSAMF § 135. At Set, Reid’s request, Mr. Kelley agreed to go to
the police station. Pls. Resp. to Paterson SUMF § 29, According to the PPD Supplemental
Report (PPD Report) written by Reyes, Mr. Kelley was transported to the police bureau by
Reyes and Finer, PPD Report at Kelley Police 014, Pls. Ex. 6, Kelley ECF No. 237-2, Lee
3 The unknown source was not identified, located, or asked to view photographs or a live lineup, PSAMF ¥ 164,

ECF No. 211-2. There, Mr. Kelley and Mr. Lee were separately interrogated for hours.
PSAME 4ff 57, 87. □

A. Kelley’s Confession
Sat. Stell, Reyes, Smith, Finer, and Jordan were in the room with Mr. Kelley at some
point during the July 30 interrogation. Jd. at § 31,4 Mr. Kelley, who had a severe heroin
addiction as well as serious cognitive limitations, denied any knowledge of the murder. Jd.
at 21, 28, 32. Refusing to accept that, Sgt. Stell got angry and struck Mr. Kelley on the
head with an open hand, which Reyes and Jordan witnessed. fd. at 35, 37; Kelley Dep.
32:22-33:5, Pls. Ex. 135, Kelley ECF No. 234-136, Lee ECF No. 208-136. Reyes and Set.
Stell insisted that Mr. Kelley committed the murder and demanded that he tell the truth.
PSAMEF 4 33; Kelley Dep. 22:15-25. Reyes promised Mr. Kelley that ifhe gave Defendants
the statement they wanted, he would be allowed to go home. /d. at 4/34; Kelley Dep. 23:1-
4, According to Reyes, Finer remarked that he would call Mr. Kelley’s mother to let her
where he was and then, Mr. Kelley began his “free-flowing narrative” confession at about
3:35 or 3:40 p.m. fd. at ¥ 89; Reyes Dep. 350:19-22, 356:3-13, 357:4-10, Pls. Ex. 126,
Kelley ECF No. 234-127, Lee ECF No. 208-127. Mr. Kelley’s waiver of Miranda rights
form indicates it was taken at 3:30 p.m. and is signed by Jordan and Set. Stell as witnesses.
PPD Report at Kelley Police 078-085 (Kelley Miranda Waiver). After the unrecorded oral
confession, at 4:20 p.m., Smith assisted Reyes in taking Mr. Kelley’s formal six-page
written statement. PPD Report at Kelley Police 080-085 (Kelley Confession); see PSPAMF
89. Mr, Kelley claims he agreed to give a confession under duress and before being
read his Miranda rights. PSAMF 4 39.
In the written confession, which also implicated Mr. Lee, Mr, Kelley admitted
stabbing the store clerk and stated that the green cap he wore on the day of the murder
belonged to him. Kelley Confession at Kelley Police 082; Paterson SUMP, 4 44. Between
4:20 and 5 pm, Mr. Kelley identified a photograph of David Hancock, even though that
photo was purportedly not taken until about 7 p.m. that night. PSAMF § 91. Mr. Kelley
then consented to a search of his home. /d. at ] 90. He stated that the clothes he wore at the
time of the murder had blood on them and that he had put the clothes in a hamper at home.
id, at § 70. Those clothes were collected during the search but when tested, showed no
blood on them. Jd.
Mr, Kelley’s confession incorporated other facts that were never corroborated such
as details regarding the sale of some of the stolen goods to Bob’s Supermarket and
elsewhere. /d. at 60-63, 68. Defendants were not able to find the murder weapon that
according to Reyes’ PPD Report, Mr. Kelley stated he threw in an alleyway on Wayne Ave
and Union Ave, /d. at 4 67. Other details in both Mr. Kelley and Mr. Lee’s confessions also
later proved incorrect including whether a yellow chair with blood on it was moved before
or after the victim died and whether the victim walked to the back of the store or his body
‘ Paragraph 31 of PSAMF states Defendants were in the interrogation room with Mr, Kelley on June 30, 1996,
which the Court assumes is a typographical error.

was carried there after he died. Jd. at 9] 62, 63.
B. Lee’s Confession
Mr. Lee, who also had serious cognitive limitations and a severe heroin addiction at
the time, see PSAME {Jf 21, 28, recalls that seven to nine officers, including Nieves, beat
him and repeatedly insisted that he was lying. /d. at ¢ 46; Lee Dep. 19:25-20:23; Lee Aff.,
Pls. Ex. 150, Kelley ECF No, 234-151, Lee ECF No. 208-151. In addition to accusing him
of lying, Mr. Lee also contends Nieves gestured menacingly toward his gun and punched
him in the nose. PSAMF 46, 47; Lee Dep. 76:3-14; Lee Aff. Mr. Lee’s nose continued
to bleed while he was screaming that he did not do anything but officers continued to
declare that he was lying. Lee Dep, 20:24-22:8; Lee Aff. Eventually, officers told him that
Mr. Kelley had confessed. Jd. at 20:20-23; Lee Aff. Despite denying any involvement in
the homicide, Mr. Lee agreed to sign a statement confessing to the crime. PSAMF ¥ 48.
Nieves and Jurato took Lee’s statement while Sgt. Stell was going back and forth between
the two interrogations. Jd. at PPD Report at Kelley Police 086-092 (Lee Confession).
Turato typed up Mr, Lee’s written statement. Iurato Dep. 167:22-168:1; 179:13-14, Pls. Ex.
145; Kelley ECF No. 234-146, Lee ECF No. 208-146; Paterson SUMF 4§ 49, 50. Iurato
and Nieves signed as witnesses to Mr. Lee’s confession, as well as to Mr. Lee’s waiver of
Miranda rights. Lee Confession at Kelley Police 092; PPD Report at Kelley Police 070.
Mr. Lee’s five-page confession statement depicts how Mr. Lee tried to wipe away
blood from the crime scene using a “rag” that he left in the back room where the victim
was found. PSAMF 4 69; PPD Report at Kelley Police 090, Defendants never found that
rag. PSAMF { 69, Mr, Lee’s confession also contains a description of the clothes Mr.
Kelley was wearing at the time of the crime. Jd. at | 70. Contrary to PPD procedure on
confessions, which was to type questions and answers verbatim as they are being given,
see id. at | 74, in the notes file maintained by Reyes, there was a handwritten script of Mr.
Lee’s confession. Pls. Resp. to Jordan SUMEF { 2q., Kelley ECF No. 236, Lee ECF No.
210; Handwritten Confession, Pls. Ex. 70, Kelley ECF No. 234-71, Lee ECF No. 208-71.
The handwritten confession is substantially the same as the typed confession. PSAMF §
78. The existence of handwritten Q and A’s would be a “red flag” that the confession could
have been fabricated. Reid Dep, at 135:18-22, 136:7-137:16, Pls. Ex. 131, Kelley ECF No.
234-132, Lee ECF No. 208-132; PSAMF {ff 74-79.
C. Witnesses and Other Evidence
On July 31, 1993, after Plaintiffs were arrested, James Thompson, one of the
witnesses who had stopped by the video store around the time of the murder, viewed two
photo lineups that included photos of Mr, Kelley and Mr. Lee. PSAMF 101, 106. Mr.
Thompson, who had seen a medium-built Black man behind the counter, was unable to
identify the perpetrator, but told Reyes the man in the store was someone he had never seen
before and that he recognized Messrs. Kelley and Lee from the neighborhood. Jd. at 4
103-106, Reyes excluded that statement in the PPD Report and instead wrote that
Thompson “had not had a good look at the person in the store and could not identify him.”

Id. at | 108. Sgt. Reid wrote in his notes: “concerned with Thompson.” Jd. at ¢ 107.
Another witness, Mr. Mousa, viewed two series of photo lineups on July 31, 1993,
but could not identify anyone. PPD Report at Kelley Police 019.
On August 4, Carmen Paredes identified Mr. Lee in a photo lineup as the man she
saw in the video store. PSAMF at § 124. Her written statement was taken by Reyes and
Jurato. /d. Although Ms. Paredes reported seeing only one Black man in the store, Iurato
and Reyes showed her an additional 8-person lineup featuring Mr. Kelley. Jd. at | 129.
Reyes and Iurato took a statement on August 11, 1993 from Dennis Williams that
he saw both Plaintiffs together near the murder scene and overheard Mr. Kelley say “why
did we kill that guy if we wanted a bag of dope we didn’t have to kill that guy for it.”
Paterson Ex. U, Kelley ECF No, 260-37, Lee ECF No. 234-38; PPD Report at
Kelley Police 022.
David Hancock is a white man whom both Plaintiffs separately implicated as the
third participant in the robbery. PSAMF 4 64. Mr. Kelley purportedly stated during his
interrogation, that after the robbery, he and Mr. Hancock sold some of the stolen goods,
including the VCR, to Bob’s Supermarket. Jd. at | 117. According to the PPD Report, on
August 1, 1993, the owner of Bob’s Supermarket told Reid that “a white male” had tried
to sell the VCR to a cashier named Carmen who had left for Peru on vacation for three
weeks. /d, at 9§ 118-119. Sgt. Reid’s contemporaneous handwritten notes, however,
indicate that Sgt. Reid spoke to Carmen who told him that t#ree white men had tried to sell
her a VCR, and questioned: “what are we doing with Carmen from Bobs.” /d. at 121-
122; Pls. Ex, 9 at CITY 001335; Kelley ECF No. 234-10, Lee ECF No. 208-10, 211-5; Pls.
Ex. 7 at CITY 001353, Kelley ECF No. 237-3, Lee ECF No. 211-3. The charges against
Mr. Hancock were dropped after both Plaintiffs refused to testify against him at trial.
D. Conviction and Post-Conviction Evidence
Plaintiffs were indicted on October 26, 1993. Paterson SUMF § 54. At their
respective trials, Mir. Kelley and Mr. Lee attempted to suppress their confessions as
involuntary but those motions were denied. PSAMF § 174. Mr. Lee’s motion to suppress
the photo identification by Ms. Paredes was also denied, Lee Compl. § 84, Lee ECF No. 1.
On February 7, 1996, a jury acquitted Mr. Kelley of murder, but found him guilty of felony
murder, conspiracy, robbery, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. Kelley
Compl. { 86, Kelley ECF No. 1, Lee Compl. 82. On March 15, 1996, he was sentenced
to life in prison with a mandatory 30 years of parole ineligibility. /d. On April 10, 1996,
Mr. Lee was convicted of murder, felony murder, robbery of the first degree, conspiracy,
possession of a weapon. Kelley Compl. § 88, Lee Compl. □ 87. Mr. Lee was sentenced to
life in prison with a mandatory 30 years of parole ineligibility followed consecutively by
20 years in prison with 10 years of parole ineligibility. fd.
Results of the 1993 DNA testing by the FBI of the green plaid hat had been
inconclusive. Paterson SUME § 67. In 2014, additional DNA testing established that Eric
Dixon was the habitual wearer of the green plaid hat. /d. at § 68. Based on this new

evidence, Mr. Kelley and Mr. Lee moved for a new trial. /d. at 9 69. The state court granted
that application on September 15, 2017, but specifically noted that its decision was “in no
way, shape, or form” a finding as to Plaintiffs’ innocence which would still need to be
determined by a jury. /d at | 70. Thereafter, the State dismissed the indictments and
abandoned plans to retry Plaintiffs. fd at 71.
E, Procedural History
Mr. Lee filed suit on September 11, 2019, and Mr, Kelley filed suit the next day on
September 12, 2019, Each of the Defendants has crossclaitns against the other Defendants
for contribution and indemnification, On July 1, 2020, Defendants’ motions to dismiss
were denied except as to the claims Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss—the state law malicious
prosecution claim against Paterson and claims against Defendants Richard Munsey and
Vincent Anoresano. July 1, 2020 Op., Kelley ECF No. 81, Lee ECF No. 68. The cases
were consolidated for discovery purposes only. Oct. 24, 2019 Order, Kelley ECF No. 10,
Lee ECF No. 12.
F. Defendants
Reyes was the lead detective on the investigation. He received and reviewed all
handwritten notes, including those taken by other officers, and compiled it into a
typewritten report. PSAMF § 107; Reyes Dep. 129:11-130:7. The PPD Report omits Mr.
Thompsons’ exculpatory statement. PSAMF 4 103-106, 108. During Mr. Kelley’s
interrogation, Reyes told Mr. Kelley that he would be allowed to go home ifhe gave police
the statement they wanted. He and Jordan also witnessed Sgt. Stell hitting Mr. Kelley.
Reyes was present for the entirety of Mr. Kelley’s admissions. /d. at 31. Although Reyes
disputes being involved in Mr. Lee’s interview, Plaintiffs contend that during Mr, Lee’s
interrogation, Reyes informed Stell that Mr. Kelley had confessed and what he purportedly
said; Stell then told Iurato and Nieves of Kelley’s confession. Pils. Resp. to Reyes SUMF 4
6, Kelley ECF No. 236, Lee ECF No. 210; Jordan SUME at § 20; PSAME 4 59, Reyes did
not disclose to prosecutors the scripted handwritten version of Mr. Lee’s confession.
Set. Stell was the supervisor in charge of the murder investigation and closely
monitored the interrogations. PSAMF {| 169. He participated in the interview and
confession of Mr. Kelley. Stell Stmt. Of Material Facts (Stell SUMF) □ 1, Kelley ECF No.
220, Lee ECF No. 237. Sgt. Stell struck Mr. Kelley on the head with an open hand and
threatened bodily harm. PSAMF 4 35. While Stell denies participating in Mr. Lee’s
interview and interrogation, he did go back and forth between the two interrogations. Pls.
Resp. to Stell SUMF 4] 2, Kelley ECF No. 236, Lee ECF No. 210; PSAMEF 4) 38, 42.
Sgt. Reid and Jordan received the tip from the unknown source. Sgt. Reid denies
having had a supervisory role in the investigation because Set. Stell was the assigned
supervisor. Reid Stmt. Of Undisputed Material Facts (Reid SUMF) § 4, Kelley ECF No,
216-2, Lee ECF No. 192-2. However, Sgt. Reid was Reyes’ direct supervisor and reviewed
and signed Reyes’ PPD Report regarding the investigation and discovery disclosed to the
defense. Jd. at ¢ 19; Pls. Resp. to Jordan SUMF {[ 4. Sgt. Reid testified that he did not
participate in the interrogations of Messrs. Kelley and Lee. Reid SUMF 16.

Jordan was assigned certain investigative tasks to assist in Merino’s homicide,
including collecting clothing, pictures, information, and other evidence related to the -
investigation, Jordan SUMF {| 3-6. Jordan and Set. Reid received the tip from the
unknown source as to the location and identity of the two Black males and a white male
observed in front of the video store around the time of the homicide. Jordan was not
involved in Mr. Lee’s transport to the police station for questioning or his arrest. Jd. at [
13-14. Reyes and Jordan witnessed Set. Stell hit Mr. Kelley. Jordan is retired from the
PPD. Id. at 25.
Nieves accused Mr. Lee of lying, threatened and punched him, and also gestured
menacingly toward his gun. [urato and Nieves signed Mr. Lee’s confession statement as
witnesses. Nieves only interviewed Mr. Lee and was not involved in Mr. Kelley’s
interview. Nieves Stmt. Of Material Facts (Nieves SUMF) ff 5-6, Kelley ECF No. 224,
Lee ECF No. 235.
Turato joins in the arguments raised by Reyes and provides no separate statement
of facts. Turato was in Mr. Lee’s interview room for the duration of Mr, Lee’s typed
confession. He and Reyes took Carmen Paredes’s statement identifying Mr. Lee in a photo
lineup as the man she saw in the video store and then showed Ms, Paredes a second 8-
person photo lineup featuring Mr. Kelley whom she could not identify.
Smith arrived at the interrogation after Mr. Kelley was assaulted and Set. Stell and
Jordan had left the room, which Plaintiffs have not disputed. Pls. Resp. to Stmt. Of Facts
(Smith SUMF) { 11, Kelley ECF No, 236, Lee ECF No, 210. Smith assisted Reyes in
taking Mr. Kelley’s statement. PSAMF {ff 31, 89. Reyes and Smith signed Mr. Kelley’s
confession as witnesses, and Stell notarized it. Jd. at | 98. Smith is retired from the PPD
and was not capable of being deposed because he suffers from dementia. Smith SUMF 4]
8-9, Kelley ECF No, 223, Lee ECF No. 198.
Finer conducted the interviews of witnesses Felix Nieves and Miguel Victoria, see
Finer Exs. C and D, Kelley ECF Nos. 217-5, 217-6, Lee ECF Nos. 193-5, 193-6, and
authored July 28, 1993 reports containing descriptions of items stolen from the crime scene,
see Ex, F, Kelley ECF Nos. 217-8, Lee ECF No. 193-8, and a suspect identification, see
Ex, E, Kelley ECF No. 217-7, Lee ECF 193-7. Finer was in Mr. Kelley’s interrogation
room when Mr, Kelley purportedly confessed. PSAMF 31. Just prior to Mr. Kelley’s
confession, Finer told Mr. Kelley that he would contact his mother to let her know where
he was.
Lt. Clark reviewed the typed reports during and at the end of the case as well as
witness statements after the sergeant reviewed them. /d. at 9 171. Supplemental reports
would be reviewed by the sergeant and then by the lieutenant. Jd. Stell, Reid, as well as
other sergeants would have communicated with Lt. Clark to update him on developments
in investigations. fd. Lt. Clark did not participate in the interviews of either Mr. Kelley or
Mr. Lee, which Plaintiffs have not disputed. Clark Dep. 96:11-16, Clark Ex. A, Kelley ECF
No. 218-3, Lee ECF No. 194-3.
Paterson is a municipality in New Jersey where store clerk Tito Merino was

murdered on July 28, 1993. Pls. Resp. to Paterson SUMEF 4 1. At all relevant times, Paterson
was the employer of the individual Defendant officers who investigated the homicide.
Kelley Compl. § 24, Lee Compl. 25. Richard Munsey (“Chief Munsey”) served as PPD’s
Chief of Police from approximately May 1990 to January 1995 and has since retired from
the department. Pls. Resp. to Paterson SUMF 4 2; Munsey Dep. 7:11-14, Pls, Ex, 138,
Kelley ECF No. 234-139, Lee ECF No. 208-139, Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief Munsey
have been dismissed, but he is the final “policymaker” for Paterson in this case for purposes
of nwnicipal liability. See Kelley Compl. § 22, Lee Compl. § 23; Paterson Mot. 6-7, Kelley
ECF No. 225, Lee ECF No. 199; Munsey Dep. 35:2-7, Pls. Ex. 138 (testifying that
policymaking for supervision and discipline at the PPD was shared between the Chief of
Police and Director of Public Safety).
G. Twelve Causes of Action
1. Federal Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
e Deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denial of a fair trial by
fabricating evidence and withholding material exculpatory and impeachment
evidence against all individual Defendants: Count I for Mr. Kelley, Count II for
Mr. Lee includes claim for deliberately failing to conduct a constitutionally
adequate investigation
Malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
against all individual Defendants: Count J for Mr. Lee, Count IIT for Mr. Kelley
e Violation of right against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments: Count II for Mr. Kelley against Reyes, Stell, Smith, Jordan, and
Finer, Count HI for Mr. Lee, against Reyes, Stell, Iurato, and Nieves
e Civil rights conspiracy against all individual Defendants: Count IV for both
Failure to intervene against all individual Defendants: Count V for both
e Supervisory liability against Lt. Clark, Set. Stell, and Set. Reid: Count VI_for
both
Municipal liability against Paterson: Count VII for both

2. New Jersey State Law Claims

e Malicious prosecution against all individual Defendants:? Count VIII for both

As noted, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ state law malicious prosecution claim against Paterson. See Kelley ECF
No, 81, Lee ECF No. 68,

Intentional infliction of emotional distress against all individual Defendants
and Paterson:® Count IX for both

e Negligence and gross negligence against all individual Defendants and
Paterson: Count _X for both

e Negligent supervision and training against Lt. Clark, Sgt. Stell, Sgt. Reid, and
Paterson: Count_XI for both

e Violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJICRA”) against all individual
Defendants and Paterson: Count XH for both
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is proper
when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “A fact is ‘material’... if its existence
or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.”
Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 Gd Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
477 US. 242, 248 (1986)), “A dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Jd. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), If the
moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “come
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” United States
y, Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S, 574, 586-87 (1986)) (emphasis in original and internal
quotation marks omitted). In other words, “unsupported assertions, speculation, or
conclusory allegations” are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Longstreet
vy. Holy Spirit Hosp., 67 F. App’x 123, 126 3d. Cir. 2003). “[T]here must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The Court’s role at the summary judgment stage “is ‘not... to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 3d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court must view
all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587; Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998),

6 Plaintiffs agreed to drop their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Paterson. Pls. Opp. Br. at 51.
10

Hil DISCUSSION
The following discussion proceeds in three parts. First, the Court addresses
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants (“Part A”) before turning to
the issue of municipal liability against Paterson (“Part B”). Finally, the Court addresses
the series of New Jersey state law claims against both the individual Defendants and
Paterson (“Part C”).

A. 42 U.S.C, § 1983 Claims Against the Individual Defendants
I, Personal Involvement
“A defendant in a § 1983 action ‘must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.’”
Crosland v. City of Philadelphia, 676 F, Supp, 3d 364, 379 (E.D., Pa. 2023) (citing Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). “Personal involvement can be shown
through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.
Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, |], must be made with
appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Hence “a plaintiff alleging that one or
more officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the ‘personal
involvement’ of each named defendant to survive summary judgment and take that
defendant to trial.” Jutrowski vy. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2018).
Section 1983 liability does not attach to an “individual's cohorts who happen to be in the
immediate vicinity.” fd. at 290. “Although a court can infer that a defendant had
contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a
case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of
Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 Gd Cir, 2015) (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194
(3d Cir.1995) and Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n. 6). Rather than argue that there are no genuine
issues of material fact to establish the elements of each constitutional violation, each
Defendant primarily argues that he had no participation in or knowledge of any
wrongdoing,
Because it is undisputed that Lt. Clark did not personally participate in the
interviews of either Plaintiff or in the actual investigation of the murder, his potential
liability is based solely on his supervisory role in reviewing and signing off on reports and
witness statements. See discussion below. Thus, Lt. Clark’s motion for summary judgment
is granted on claims except for the civil conspiracy claim in Count IV and the supervisory
liability claims in Counts VI and XI of Mr. Kelley and Mr. Lee’s Complaints. Whether the
alleged conduct of each of the other individual Defendants constitutes personal
involvement in the violation ofa constitutional violation or is entitled to qualified immunity
is addressed below.

1]

2. Qualified Immunity!
“Police officers, embodying the authority of the state, are liable under § 1983 when
they violate someone's constitutional rights, unless they are protected by qualified
immunity.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Santini v.
Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2015)). The qualified immunity analysis is a two-
prong inquiry: “(1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show the violation of a
constitutional right and (2) whether the law was clearly established at the time of the
violation [such that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful].” ° Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 80 (3d Cir. 2021); El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975
F.3d 327, 334 Gd Cir. 2020). An answer in the negative to cither prong entitles an officer
to qualified immunity. See Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223-24 3d Cir. 2010). Courts
are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the
particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
“Where a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary
Judgment, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant's conduct
violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional right.’” Donahue v. Gavin, 280
F.3d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d
Cir.1997); see Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (noting that in qualified immunity analysis, court
must decide whether “facts that a plaintiff has ... shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a
violation of a constitutional right.” (emphasis added)). Once the plaintiff carries this initial
burden, the movant asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity bears the
ultimate burden of persuasion on both prongs at the summary judgment stage. Halsey v.
Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 3d Cir. 2014); Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4" 211, 227 (3d Cir. 2023).
3. Deprivation of Liberty without Due Process, Denial of Fair Trial By
Fabricating Evidence and Withholding Exculpatory and Impeachment
Evidence Against All Individual Defendants (Kelley Count I; Lee Count I
includes Failure to Conduct Constitutionally Adequate Investigation)

? Qualified immunity under § 1983 and the NJCRA share the same standards. See Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222, n.7
(‘{t]he defenses and immunities applicable to federal constitutional claims apply with equal force to parallel New
Jersey state constitutional claims,” (citing generally N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:61 ef seq.)); see also Faragalia v. Jersey
City, No. 17-03604, 2020 WL 5812798, at *12 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2020); Brown v. State, 230 N.I. 84 (NJ. 2017).
Accordingly, the Court need not conduct a separate qualified immunity analysis regarding Count XII, which alleges
state-law constitutional claims under the NICRA,
® The individual Defendants’ briefs in support of their respective motions are largely underdeveloped and deficient in
the recitations of undisputed material facts and relevant law including whether the law was clearly established on the
constitutional violation claims at the time of the violation. Nonetheless, the Court endeavors to address both prongs
of the qualified immunity analysis because qualified immunity is “*an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability,” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237, and “tin proper cases the court may consider the question of qualified immunity
sua sponte.” Varabyev v. Wolfe, 638 F. Supp. 3d 410, 427 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (citing Doe v, Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 312
(3d Cir. 2001) (affirming magistrate judge’s sua sponte recommendation of qualified immunity)).
12

a. Suppression of Brady materials
The obligation of a police officer to disclose exculpatory materials (a corollary of
the prosecution’s duty to disclose) was not clearly recognized until 2005 in Gibson v.
Superintendent of NJ Dep’t of L. & Pub. Safety-Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 443
(3d Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 182 3d Cir, 2010); Stokes v. City of Philadelphia, No. 22-0338, 2023 WL
362006, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2023); see Hicks v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 22-977,
2023 WL 5278713, at *6 G2.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2023) (citing cases). In Gibson, the Court
found that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity because an officer’s affirmative
duty to disclose information was not clearly established at the time of the plaintiffs
conviction in 1994; in reaching that decision, it observed that “[e]ven in 2000, this Court
was only able to assume that police officers ‘have an affirmative duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence to an accused if only by informing the prosecutor that the evidence
exists.” /d. at 444) (emphasis in original) (citing Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 197 n. 14
(3d Cir, 2000)), Nonetheless, some courts interpret Gibson as holding that a police officer’s
obligation to disclose exculpatory materials was established in 1995 with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).? See e.g., Pierre v, Treasury
Dep’t, No. 18-3443, 2019 WL 2121369, at *6 (D.N.J. May 14, 2019). Given that courts
disagree whether an officer’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence was established in 1995
by Kyles or in 2005 by Gibson, the Court cannot conclude that an officer’s obligation to
disclose exculpatory materials was clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ convictions
in 1996, See Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch, Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 639 Gd Cir. 2015) (noting
clearly established right requires that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011)).
Even if an officer’s duty to disclose was clearly established by 1996, the facts
alleged by Plaintiffs fail to show that Defendants’ conduct rose to the level of a
constitutional violation. Under Brady □□□ Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” As defined by the Supreme Court,
“favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the
government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles, 514 U.S. at
433 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). The “reasonable

In Kyles, the Court stated that “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to
the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police” and settled the matter of whether
evidence held by the police could be imputed to the prosecutor; it did not address the “related duty of the police to
disclose information to the prosecutor” which was “not widely addressed until later.” Gibson, 411 F.3d at 444
(discussing Kyles, 514 U.S, at 437),
13

probability” standard does not require “demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure
of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal.” Jd.
at 434. Rather, a “reasonable probability” of a different result is when “the favorable
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.” Jd. at 434-35, Suppressed evidence is to be
“considered collectively, not item by item.” Jd. at 436. The Constitution does not demand
“an open file policy.” /d. at 437, This leaves the government with a “degree of discretion”
and a “corresponding burden” to make disclosure when “reasonable probability” is
reached. Id.
The favorable evidence that Plaintiffs allege was deliberately suppressed includes:
1) “Ralph” was crossed out in Sgt. Reid’s notes of the tip from the confidential source; 2)
Mr. Kelley, whose initials are “EI” rather than “KC,” did not have a scratch on his face
and he was not wearing a gray top as described by the unknown source at the time Reid
stopped Mr. Kelley; 3) Carmen from Bob’s Supermarket told Sgt. Reid that it was three
white men who tried to sell her a VCR; 4) Thompson commented to Reyes that he did not
know the perpetrator but recognized Plaintiffs from the neighborhood. The Court cannot
conclude that even cumulatively, this evidence is so favorable that a jury could conclude
there to be a “reasonable probability” of a different result because the suppressed evidence
puts the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the outcome of
the trial. A constitutional violation does not occur every time any evidence helpful to the
defense is not disclosed. Smith, 210 F.3d at 196. Even if Sgt. Reid and Reyes should have
disclosed such evidence under Brady, there are no facts in dispute to suggest that Jordan,
Stell, Nieves, Turato, Smith, or Finer were personally involved in suppressing any material
exculpatory evidence.
The individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and
based on qualified immunity with regard to their failure to inform the prosecutor of
exculpatory material under Brady. Summary judgment is granted as to that claim in Count
I of Mr. Kelley’s Complaint and on Count II of Mr. Lee’s Complaint.
b. Fabrication of Evidence
It is well settled that the denial ofa fair trial by fabricating evidence violates clearly
established constitutional rights to due process. See Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294 (finding to be
clearly established by 1985 stand-alone Fourteenth Amendment claim under § 1983 for
fabrication of evidence “if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that
evidence, the defendant would not have been convicted” at trial), A claim for fabrication
of evidence requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “that the allegedly fabricated evidence was
so significant that it could have affected the outcome of the criminal case” in which he was
convicted. fd. at 295 (footnote omitted), In addition to this causation requirement,
“testimony that is incorrect or simply disputed” is not fabricated “merely because it turns
out to have been wrong.” Jd. To defeat summary judgment, a plaintiff must offer
14

“persuasive evidence” of “bad faith,” that is, that Defendants “formulated or submitted
false evidence willfully, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for its truth.” Mervilus vy.
Union County, 73 F.A® 185, 194-95 (3d Cir, 2023). “Because this intent requirement is
stringent, ‘it will be an unusual case in which a police officer cannot obtain summary
judgment in a civil action charging him with having fabricated evidence.” Jd. at 194 (citing
Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295). An “’inference’ of fabrication ‘based upon a speculation or
conjecture does not create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary
judgment.’” Scott Brasher v. New Jersey State Park Police, No. 20-01351, 2025 WL
342071, at *13 (D.NJ. Jan. 30, 2025) (citing Brackbill v. Ruff, No. 22-1628, 2023 WL
5447271, at *3 3d Cir. Aug, 24, 2023)).
At the outset, there can be no dispute that the confessions were of such significance
that it could have affected the outcome of Plaintiffs’ criminal trials. Notably, any facts that
may support a coercion claim against Stell, Jordan, Reyes, or Nieves, see discussion below,
do not create an inference that those Defendants fabricated the confessions. See Brown v.
City of Chicago, 633 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1156 (N.D. Il. 2022) (“there is a difference between
fabricated evidence, which is necessarily untrue, and evidence obtained through coercion,
which may be true.”}. As evidence of fabrication, Plaintiffs note that Mr. Kelley’s
confession included nonpublic information (e.g., the green and purple plaid hat worn by
the perpetrator) and details that were never corroborated (e.g., the existence of a bloody
rag, the location where the murder weapon was disposed of, or where the stolen items could
be found). Plaintiffs also conclude that Reyes and Smith created Mr. Kelley’s written
confession and that Iurato and Nieves did so for Mr. Lee, see PSAMF § 263c, presumably
because they typed up the statements or signed as witnesses. Plaintiffs also speculate,
without citing supporting evidence in the record, that the handwritten version of Lee’s
confession is in Nieves’ handwriting and “obviously created” and fed to Mr. Lee to match
Mr. Kelley’s confession. See Pls. Resp. to Jordan’s SUMF, § 2q. While Plaintiffs do not
allege that the witness statements or reports completed by Finer were fabricated, they do
claim that Ms. Paredes’ identification of Mr. Lee was also incorrect and thus fabricated.
As evidence, Plaintiffs highlight that Ms. Paredes was shown a second photo lineup despite
having identified Mr. Lee and reported seeing only one Black man in the video store.
Assuming the confessions and Ms. Paredes’ identification were false, Plaintiffs have
not shown that each Defendant personally participated in the formulation or submission of
evidence he knew was fabricated and did so with the requisite bad intent. See e.g., PSAMF
4] 55 (Kelley testified that “they” fed him information). Even if, for instance, Reye, Smith,
lurato, and Nieves, by typing up the confessions and writing out the handwritten
confession, had personal involvement in creating false evidence, there is no “persuasive
evidence” that each Defendant knew the confessions were fabricated and formulated or
submitted them willfully, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for truth or that Iurato
and Reyes “were aware that [Ms. Paredes’ identification was incorrect, and thus, in effect,
offered the evidence in bad faith.” See Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295. Likewise, Plaintiffs have
not identified persuasive evidence, or even any evidence, that shows that Sgt, Reid and
15

Jordan formulated and submitted a false tip from the confidential source knowing it was
false and did so with the requisite intent.
Viewing all evidence in its totality and construing reasonable inferences in
Plaintiffs’ favor as the Court must, no genuine issues of material facts exist upon which a
reasonable jury could find that each of the individual Defendants had personal involvement
in formulating and submitting fabricated evidence willfully, knowingly, or with reckless
disregard for its truth. Based on the same fact issues, the individual Defendants are also
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Thus, summary judgment is granted as to the
§ 1983 fabrication of evidence claim in Count I of Mr. Kelley’s Complaint and Count I of
Mr. Lee’s Complaint.
c. Constitutionally Inadequate Investigation
No recognized constitutional right to an “adequate” investigation existed in 1996.
See Handy v. City of Philadelphia, No, 24-1905, 2024 WL 4309973, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
26, 2024) (“Courts in this district have consistently held that there is no constitutional right
to a police investigation, iet alone one that meets some threshold of “adequacy,” and no
such right was clearly established during the relevant period of 2011 to 2013.” (citing
Thomas v. City of Phila., 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 386 (E.D. Pa. 2018) and Wright v. City of
Philadelphia, 229 F. Supp. 3d 322, 332 0.3 (E.D., Pa. 2017)); Murphy v. Middlesex County,
361 F. Supp. 3d 376, 391 (D.N.J. 2019). The individual Defendants have qualified
immunity on Mr, Lee's inadequate investigation claim in Count I1.
4. Malicious Prosecution in Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"
Against All Individual Defendants (Kelley Count IH; Lee Count 2)
a. Fourteenth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claim
Between 1993 and 1996 when Plaintiffs were interrogated and convicted, a
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process right against malicious prosecution was
not clearly established. Compare Torres v, McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 173 Cir. 1998)
(“we do not read Albright [v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)] to hold that a malicious
prosecution claim can only be based in a Fourth Amendment violation.”), with Gallo v.
City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 Gd Cir.1998) (interpreting Abright to imply that
malicious prosecution claim must show deprivation of liberty consistent with Fourth
Amendment “seizure”). See also Halsey, 750 F.3d at 291, n.14 (declining to decide
viability of malicious prosecution under Fourteenth Amendment as plaintiff had abandoned

The boundary between Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims is temporal: the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unlawful scizure without probable cause extends only until trial in contrast to the guarantee of due
process which “protects defendants during an entire criminal proceeding through and after trial.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at
291.
16

that claim but noting comparison of Torres and Gallo); see, e.g, Ogrod v. City of
Philadelphia, 598 EF. Supp. 3d 253, 267 (B.D, Pa. 2022) (concluding that individual
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because between 1992 and 1996, “it was
not clearly established that the Fourteenth Amendment provided for a procedural due
process right against malicious prosecution”). Even by 2020, “[a]s reflected in Gallo,
Torres, and Halsey, there was, and continues to be, confusion amongst lower courts about
how the Supreme Court's decision in Albright impacts the ability to maintain a malicious
prosecution claim based on the right to procedural due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Lewis v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 19-2847, 2020 WL
1683451, at *8 (B.D. Pa. Apr, 6, 2020). But see Crosland v. City of Philadelphia, 676 F.
Supp. 3d 364, 376-77 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (rejecting qualified immunity as to Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim because criminal charges must be based on
probable cause and no reasonable officer could have thought otherwise). Following the
majority of decisions in the Third Cireuit, the Court finds that Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process right against malicious prosecution was not clearly established at
the time of the violation and therefore, all individual Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on that claim.
b. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claim
The right to be free from malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment,
however, was clearly established at the time of the violation and contains five elements:
(1) a defendant initiated a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without
probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing
the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with
the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d
75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007). The elements of tort claim for malicious prosecution under New
Jersey are substantially the same except that it does not require proof of the last element
(deprivation of liberty). See Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 393-94
(2009) (citing Helmy v. City of Jersey City, 178 N.J. 183, 190 (2003)).
Nieves and Reyes argue that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy each of these elements of
malicious prosecution. The Court disagrees. First, contrary to their contention that they did
not initiate criminal proceedings against Plaintiffs, “{i]f the officers influenced or
participated in the decision to institute criminal proceedings, they can be liable for
malicious prosecution.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 297. Set. Stell, Nieves, Jordan, and Reyes
arguably influenced or participated in the decision to institute criminal proceedings by
obtaining what a jury could find were coerced confessions, see discussion below. See
Nieves Dep., 91:9-92:8, Pls. Ex. 142, Kelley ECF No, 234-143, Lee ECF No. 208-143.
Second, the Court has previously ruled that the criminal proceedings against Plaintiffs
ended in their favor, see July 1, 2020 Op. at 7. Third, a reasonable jury could conclude that
the arrests lacked probable cause because Set. Stell, Nieves, Jordan, and Reyes coerced
17

Plaintiffs’ confessions, Fourth, contrary to Nieves’ and Reyes’ contention that Plaintiffs
cannot prove the element of malice, “‘malice may be inferred from lack of probable
cause.’” Evans v. City of Newark, No. 14-00120, 2023 WL 2535283, at *18 (D.NJ. Mar.
16, 2023) (citing Morales v. Busbee, 972 F. Supp. 254, 261 (D.N.J. 1997). Consequently,
Plaintiffs were clearly deprived of liberty. Summary judgment is denied as to Sgt. Stell,
Nieves, Jordan, and Reyes on the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim in Count
of Mr. Kelley’s Complaint and Count I of Mr. Lee’s Complaint.
However, evidence that Finer, Smith or Iurato were present in the interrogation
room at some point, that Smith and Iurato typed up the confessions, or that Sgt. Reid
investigated the tip from the confidential source is insufficient to establish that each of
those Defendants influenced or participated in the decision to institute criminal proceedings
or that they were involved in initiating the criminal proceeding without probable cause.
Thus, Finer, Smith, Iurato, and Sgt. Reid are entitled to summary judgment based on
qualified immunity and as a matter of law with regard to the malicious prosecution claim
under the Fourth Amendment.
5. Right Against Self-Inerimination Under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
(Kelley Count HT against Reyes, Stell, Smith, Jordan, and Finer; Lee Count
Ill against Reyes, Stell, lurato, and Nieves)
“{A]n involuntary confession may result from psychological, as well as physical,
coercion.’” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 303 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 603 (3d Cir.
1986)). A coercion inquiry requires a court to exam the totality of circumstances and
“consider the specific tactics utilized by the police in eliciting the admissions, the details
of the interrogation, and the characteristics of the accused.’” /d. (citing Miller, 796 F.2d at
604). That inquiry can include consideration of the accused’s youth, lack of education or
low intelligence, lack of advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, length of
detention, repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, and the use of physical
punishment such as food or sleep deprivation. /¢. at 303 (citing Miller, 796 F.2d at 604).
The “ultimate question” that the Court should consider is “’whether the defendant's will
was overborne when he confessed.’” /d. at 304 (citing Miller, 796 F.2d at 604). Plaintiffs
must also point to “some link between police misconduct and the confession.” Jd. at 303
(citing United States y. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 108 (d Cir. 2005)).
a. Kelley Complaint Against Reyes, Stell, Smith, Jordan, and Finer
Plaintiffs have identified material facts in dispute that if believed by a jury could
support their claims that their confessions were coerced, Mr. Kelley claims that Sgt. Stell
hit him, that Jordan and Reyes witnessed it (thus acquiescing in the coercion), and that
Reyes made promises to Mr, Kelley that he could go home if he confessed. Based on these
fact issues, including Mr. Kelley’s cognitive limitations, severe heroin addiction, and
officers’ repeated insistence that he was lying, a jury could conclude that Sgt. Stell, Jordan,
18

and Reyes crossed the line between permissible police conduct and unconstitutional
coercion. Summary judgment is denied as to Reyes, Stell, Jordan on Count II of Kelley’s
Complaint.
However, the allegation that Finer told Mr. Kelley that he would let Mr. Kelley’s
mother know where he was, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, is an
insufficient basis for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Finer personally participated
in, had actual knowledge of, and acquiesced in coercing Mr. Kelley’s confession. As for
Smith, it is undisputed that he arrived at Mr, Kelley’s interrogation after the alleged assault
occurred. Furthermore, that Smith assisted Reyes in memorializing Mr. Kelley’s statement
does not demonstrate that he was personally involved in coercing Mr. Kelley’s confession.
See e.g., Handy, 2024 WL 4309973, at *4 (noting that “mere allegation that Jenkins was
in the back of the interrogation room on his phone” during a coerced confession “does not
permit the inference that Jenkins participated in that coercion or later submitted that
confession to the prosecution,”). Because there are no genuine issues of material fact for a
jury to find that Finer or Smith participated in coercing Plaintiffs’ confessions, they are
entitled to qualified immunity and to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is
granted as to Finer and Smith on Count I of Kelley’s Complaint.
b. Lee’s Complaint Against Reyes, Stell, Turato, and Nieves
Mr. Lee’s sworn statement that officers, including Nieves, beat him and repeatedly
told him he was lying is sufficient for a jury to possibly find that Nieves participated in
violating Mr, Lee’s constitutional rights. Sgt. Stell allegedly went back and forth between
the two interrogations, was present when Mr. Lee repeatedly proclaimed his innocence,
and he and other officers informed Mr. Lee of the “bits of information” from Mr. Kelley
to convince Mr. Lee that they in knew of his participation in the murder. PSAMF 4 59;
Stell Dep. 52:5-19, Pls. Ex. 151, Kelley ECF No. 234-152, Lee ECF No, 208-151. Reyes
was the lead investigator, witnessed hitting Mr. Kelley, and gave Set. Stell a full briefing
of Mr. Kelley’s confession. PSAMF 4 59. Viewing all evidence in its totality including Mr.
Lee’s cognitive limitations and heroin addiction, it is reasonable to infer that Reyes and
Set. Stell knew of and acquiesced in the coercion of Mr. Lee’s confession. In contrast,
although Turato was in the interview room typing up Mr. Lee’s statement, that fact does not
demonstrate that Iurato personally participated in or had actual knowledge and acquiesced
in directly violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Thus,
summary judgment on Count II of Mr, Lee’s Complaint is denied as to Reyes, Nieves,
and Stell because they are not entitled to qualified immunity and because there are genuine
issues of material fact to be resolved by a jury. Summary judgment is granted as to Iurato
on the coercion claim.
6, Civil Rights Conspiracy Against All Individual Defendants (Both Counts IV)
A civil rights conspiracy claim requires that a plaintiff “prove that persons acting
19

under color of state law ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive him of his constitutional
tights.” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 293-94 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 150-52 (1970)). Plaintiffs “‘must provide some factual basis to support the
existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.’” Jd, at 295
(citing Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2009)).
“To show agreement, he must demonstrate that the state actors named as defendants in
the [ ] complaint somehow reached an understanding to deny [the plaintiff] his rights,
and in the absence of direct proof, that ‘meeting of the minds’ or ‘understanding or
agreement to conspire’ can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” /d. (cleaned up,
internal citations omitted), “Because ‘inferring mental state from circumstantial
evidence is among the chief tasks of factfinders,’ [citation omitted], an allegation of
conspiracy can only be overcome at summary judgment when ‘the moving parties'
submissions foreclose[ ] the possibility of the existence of certain facts from which” a
jury could infer that there had been a meeting of the minds.” Jd. (citing Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249). “To defeat summary judgment, a plaintiff need only point to circumstantial
evidence of an agreement and concerted action” such as distorted stories in police
reports. Sanders v. Jersey City, No. 18-01057, 2021 WL 1589464, at *21 (D.N.J. Apr.
23, 2021) (citing Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 295).
Here, Defendants have not foreclosed the possibility of the existence of certain
facts from which a jury could infer that Jordan, Stell, Nieves, Reyes, as well as Set. Reid
and Lt. Clark as supervisors, had a meeting of the minds and acted to deprive Plaintiffs
of their constitutional rights against malicious prosecution and self-incrimination.
Summary judgment on the claim for civil conspiracy is denied as to those Defendants.
However, because no underlying claims remain against Finer, Smith, and Iurato,
summary judgment is granted as to those Defendants on the conspiracy count.
7. Failure to Intervene in Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
Against All Individual Defendants (Both Counts V)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “had opportunities to intervene on behalf of [Mr.
Kelley and Mr. Lee] to prevent his false arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment,
and deprivation of liberty without due process of law, but with deliberate indifference
declined to do so,” and that such failures violated their “constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure and not to be deprived of liberty without due process of
law as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Kelley Compl. {¥ 157-158;
Lee Compl. §§ 155-156.
A police officer’s duty to intervene is clear in the Eighth Amendment excessive
force context. See El, 975 F.3d at 335; Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir.
2020) (“a police officer has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a victim from another
officer's use of excessive force, even if the excessive force is employed by a superior.”).
However, “[c]ourts in this district have consistently held that there is no clearly established

20

stand-alone right to intervention by officers to prevent malicious prosecution or deprivation
of liberty without due process, and no such right was clearly established during 2011 and
2013.”). Handy, 2024 WL 4309973, at *6; Onyiah v. City of Phila., 660 F. Supp. 3d 407,
416 (E.D. Pa, 2023) (we find that there is simply no pervasive authority on which we
could conclude that [police officers] had a clearly established duty to intervene to prevent
[p}laintiffs coerced confession or malicious prosecution.”}; Maldonado v. City of
Philadelphia, No, 22-3474, 2023 WL 4685967, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2023) (noting Third
Circuit has not “extended failure-to-intervene liability to, for example, a state actor if he
observes or has reason to know ofa false arrest and has a realistic opportunity to intervene.”
(cleaned up) (citing Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F Ath 239, 246 n.4 (3d Cir. 2021)). Thus, the
individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the failure to intervene claim.
Summary judgment is granted as to Count V.
& Supervisory Liability Against Clark, Stell, and Reid (Both Counts VI)
Plaintiffs contend that Sgts. Stell and Reid were both personally involved in the
investigations and that Stell, Reid, and Lt. Clark directly supervised the investigative acts
taken by the PPD detectives on the murder case. A supervisor may be personally liable
under § 1983 for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts is “if he or she participated in
violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge,
had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations.” 4.M. ex rel. v.
Luzerne Cnty. Juy. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). Liability based on a claim
that supervisors directed others to violate constitutional rights necessarily requires an
“actual violation at the hands of subordinates” as well as a “causal connection between the
supervisor's direction and that violation, or, in other words, proximate causation.” Santiago
v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). Another theory under which
supervisory liability may attach is where the official “with deliberate indifference to the
consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly
caused [the] constitutional harm.” 4.M. ex rel. J M.K., 372 F.3d at 586 (citing Stoneking v.
Bradford Area Sch, Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir.1989)); Neals v. Stromberg, No. 16-
7141, 2020 WL 5088226, at *16 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2020) (“failure to train” claims are
generally considered subcategory of “policy or practice liability’).
Given that Set. Stell was in charge of the murder investigation and evidence that he
struck Mr. Kelley, Stell is not entitled to qualified immunity or to summary judgment on
Mr. Kelley’s claim for § 1983 supervisory liability based on the participation theory of
supervisory liability. In addition, there are fact issues that preclude summary judgment
under the alternate theory of supervisory liability - that Clark, Stell, and Reid acted
recklessly and with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by failing to
adequately train, supervise or discipline the other Defendant detectives. Specifically,
Plaintiffs contend that supervisors did not identify and follow up on concerns or red flags
such as the absence of a formal statement from the witness, Mr. Thompson, that Carmen
Paredes’s statement was taken on August 4" after she made a photo identification rather
21

than on July 28" or 29", or the existence of a handwritten version of Mr. Lee’s confession.
See PSAMB { 172. These are triable issues of material fact precluding summary judgment
on the supervisory liability claim.
B. Municipal Liability Against Paterson (Both Counts VID
Plaintiffs seek to hold Paterson liable for the constitutional violations by its PPD
officers. Asserting a Monell claim against the City under § 1983, Plaintiffs contend that
Paterson failed to curb rampant police misconduct that fostered a departmental “culture of
impunity,” which, in turn, empowered the individual Defendants to violate Plaintiffs’ civil
rights without fear of repercussion. See generally Kelley Compl., Lee Compl.
Municipalities may be sued for depriving someone of their constitutional rights, but
are not subject to respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Monel/ v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, the municipality must itself have precipitated
the alleged violation. While a finding of municipal liability does not depend on the liability
of any one police officer, see Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292-93 (3d Cir,
1994), a Monell claim does require a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Bornstad v. Honey Brook Twp., 211 F. App’x 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs have
identified material facts in dispute that support the contention that their confessions were
coerced by certain PPD officers who violated their right against self-incrimination and
malicious prosecution. See Part A supra, As relevant to the Mone// analysis, the following
claims survive:

Malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment (Count I for Mr, Lee against
Sgt. Stell, Nieves, Jordan, and Reyes; Count Hi for Mr. Kelfley against Sgt. Stell,
Nieves, Jordan, and Reyes); and

e Self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment (Count III for Mr. Lee against Set.
Stell, Reyes, and Nieves; Count IE for Mr. Kelley against Sgt. Stell, Reyes, and
Jordan).
A. Monell claim can proceed in two ways. “A plaintiff may put forth [1] that an
unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality ied to his or her injuries, or [2] that
they were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that reflects a deliberate
or conscious choice.” Forrest vy. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (citing
Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789-99 (3d Cir. 2019) and Monell, 436 U.S. at
694). Plaintiffs advance arguments under both frameworks. They allege that, during the
1980s and 1990s, PPD had a pattern, practice, and custom of police misconduct and,
relatedly, a pattern, practice, and custom of failing to take appropriate corrective actions
against officers who engaged in misbehavior. Kelley Compl. 124-125, 167, Lee Compl.
q{] 122-123, 165; Pls. Opp. Br. 47-49, As for “failure-or-inadequacy,” Plaintiffs contend
that Paterson’s failure to train, supervise, and discipline its officers reflects deliberate
22

indifference to the “obvious possibility that PPD officers would and in fact did violate the
constitutional rights of [Plaintiffs] and many Paterson residents.” Kelley Compl. §] 125,
168, Lee Compl. {] 123, 167. As the Court previously observed, these avenues are
distinct.’ See July 1, 2020 Op., Kelley ECF No. 81, Lee ECF No. 68. A plaintiff alleging
that a policy or custom led to their injuries must reference an unconstitutional policy or
custom, while the failure to supervise, train, or discipline requires that the said failure
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those affected. Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106.
1. Plaintiffs’ Evidence
Plaintiffs produced various evidence to establish PPD’s culture of impunity that led
to the constitutional violations alleged in the Complaints.
a. Police Misconduct Documented in Newspaper Articles
Plaintiffs submitted a compendium of newspaper articles that, at the very least, paint
a picture of rampant police misconduct at the PPD in the years leading up to and following
the Merino murder investigation. A common theme emerges from these chronicles:
recurrent excessive force against citizens as well as brutality often directed at persons of
color. In 1985, The Record reported separate incidents in which white PPD officers used
unprovoked violence against two Black citizens: a high school student and a New Jersey
transit bus driver, Pls. Ex. 183. The student was allegedly beaten so severely during his
arrest that he nearly lost an eye and had to spend ten days in the hospital. Jd, That year, the
newspaper published a story about two PPD officers who arrested a man for possessing a
small quantity of marijuana and, after hauling him to the station, beat him so severely that
they broke one of his legs. Pls. Ex. 184. By 1987, The Record’s editorial board observed
that “[ijnstances of ‘excessive force’...are so common in Paterson that they’ve become a
part of the city’s fabric.” Pls. Ex, 179. The board resolved that it was “high time an outside
agency looked at the pattern of abuse that has been paid little more than lip service by local
officials.” fd. Two years later, in 1989, the same board bemoaned that “[d]espite dozens of
[misconduct] cases, city officials have been reluctant to rein in [PPD] officers who injure
citizens by force or abuse them with racial epithets.” Pis. Ex. 180. The board further
observed that Paterson officials “have refused for years to even concede that a problem
exists.” Id. As reported by The Record, between 1987 and 1995, more than 17 separate
federal civil rights suits alleging police brutality were filed against Paterson and ultimately
settled. Pls. Ex, 187.
b. PPD’s “Culture of Impunity”
Plaintiffs also furnished evidence to establish PPD’s persistent practice of tolerating
4 The Third Circuit has acknowledged the close relationship between a “custom” claim and a “failure-or-inadequacy”
claim, and the inevitable “evidentiary overlap” on a motion for summary judgment. See Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106,
23

police misconduct or at least failing to address it in a meaningful way. Representative
examples include:

Bribery Scandal. Around 1990, a federal investigation uncovered that high-ranking
PPD officers accepted bribes from organized crime outfits. PSAMF ¥ 206. When
asked about whether this matter reflected a “breakdown in supervision,” Chief
Munsey testified that it did. Munsey Dep. 33:15-22, Pls. Ex. 138. Chief Munsey
further stated that there had been “several” high-profile scandals at the PPD by the
time he took over the department in 1990 and noted that he needed to “keep tabs
on what the press was reporting about allegations of police corruption” in order to
effectively do his job. fd, at 57:10-20. When asked what systemic changes were
implemented following the arrests of the delinquent PPD officers, Chief Munsey
testified that he recruited new personnel—at least 22 new detectives, with a focus
on hiring persons of color—and transferred existing officers from the problematic
unit to another department. Jd. at 34:1-14.

e Michael Fostok. In May 1991, Michael Fostok—then Bakri Fostok—-was a 19-
yeat-old Lebanese immigrant residing in Paterson when he learned he had an
unpaid animal-control ticket related to walking an unleashed dog. PSAMF § 199.
Plaintiffs submitted a declaration of Fostok, executed on June 6, 2024, recounting
the incident. See Fostok Decl., Pls. Ex. 185.!* When Fostok arrived at the station
to handle the matter, he was subjected to intense harassment and brutality by PPD
officers. fd. After Fostok identified himself, the officers mocked his name and
Middle Eastern background. fd. at § 5. The encounter escalated, and the officers
needlessly handcuffed Fostok, took his mugshot, and threw him in a jail cell. Id.
at {| 6. Fostok was allegedly beaten by an officer, who punched him so hard in the
face—while fellow officers watched—that Fostok needed stitches (his request for
medical treatment at the station was denied). Jd. 47-11. After the incident, Fostok
filed a complaint against the offending officers with PPD’s Internal Affairs unit.
Id. § 13. Internal Affairs never interviewed Fostok, and as far as he is aware, the
officers were never disciplined. /d. In 1993, Fostok filed a civil rights suit against
the officers, and Paterson offered him a settlement to dismiss the case. /d. § 14.
Bakery Beating. In January 1993, six months prior to the Merino murder, three
PPD officers were indicted by a Passaic County grand jury for beating a citizen
suspected of breaking into a bakery truck, rupturing his spleen, and then
attempting to cover up the incident by falsifying police reports. PSAMF § 214
(citing a contemporaneous news article about the matter submitted by Plaintiffs as
Exhibit 88). The officers allegedly hauled the suspect to a remote area behind the
bakery, where the store owner could hear the suspect screaming. /d. The store
owner, who witnessed the individual curled in a fetal position on the floor, had to

2 The incident is also described in both Plaintiffs’ Complaints and in a produced news article, See Pls, Ex. 186,
24

intervene to stop the assault. Jd. Chief Munsey suspended only the officer accused
of the assault, not the two officers who observed the beating, purportedly did
nothing to stop it, and falsified subsequent incident reports. fd. They remained on
active duty. Jd. According to Paterson’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Louis Lawrence
Spagnola, had the incident occurred today, all three officers would be suspended
automatically for 30 days and then placed on administrative leave. Spagnola Dep.
157:19-160:9, Pls. Ex. 175.

Kenneth Eatman. That same year, two PPD officers attacked a substitute teacher
named Kenneth Eatman who came to the station to file a report regarding a minor
accident, PSAMF § 209 (citing a contemporaneous news article about the incident
submitted by Plaintiffs as Exhibit 188). Eatman was allegedly listening to music
on headphones while he waited at the station. Kelley Compl. § 117, Lee Compl. 4
115. After someone complained that the music was too loud, the situation
escalated, and officers allegedly attacked Eatman, pushing him down a set of stairs
and punching him in the face. PSAMF { 209. Internal Affairs claimed to have
investigated the matter, but the assigned investigator never spoke to the numerous
witnesses who corroborated Eatman’s story. /@. When a journalist questioned the
investigator about the inquiry, the investigator stated about the witnesses: “They
know where I am. If they want to be witnesses, they can come find me. I don’t
know where they are.” /d. (citing a contemporaneous news article about the
incident submitted by Plaintiffs as Exhibit 190), During his deposition, Chief
Munsey testified that, if true, the assault “would be extraordinarily serious police
misconduct.” Munsey Dep. 126:13—23, Pls. Ex. 138. Munsey also stated that he
had “no qualms” about how the investigation unfolded. /d. at 132:18-24. Paterson
stated that, if the allegations are true, the investigation procedure would not be
acceptable. Spagnola Dep. 109:1-2, Pls, Ex. 175,
e Other Incidents Reflecting Alleged Disciplinary Failures. In 1990, three white
PPD officers were charged with beating two teenagers of color in a parking lot.
PSAMF § 217 (citing a news article about the incident submitted by Plaintiffs as
Exhibit 92). A full Internal Affairs investigation of the incident did not occur, but
Paterson admitted that one shouid have transpired. Spagnola Dep. 191:2-5, 203:1—
5, Pls. Ex. 175. In 1991, an officer drunkenly drove his patrol car into an 18-year-
old civilian’s car, lied about it, and falsely blamed the teenager. PSAMF 4 211
(citing a contemporaneous news article about the incident submitted by Plaintiffs
as Exhibit 85). Even though New Jersey automatically revoked the officer’s
driver’s license, Chief Munsey did not suspend him or commit to bringing any
disciplinary charges. Jd. Paterson admitted that, today, the officer would be
removed from any proactive position. Spagnola Dep. 131:11-135:25, Pls. Ex, 175.
A year later, in 1992, a PPD officer was indicted and charged with counts of theft
by deception. PSAMEF ] 212 (citing a contemporaneous news article about the
incident submitted by Plaintiffs as Exhibit 86). Following the indictment, Chief
25

Munsey stated at the time that there were no plans to charge the officer with
official misconduct or implement a suspension since the crime was not committed
while she was working in her official capacity as a police officer-—even though
the victim was a fellow officer. /d.; see Munsey Dep. 137:18-138:18, Pls. Ex. 138.
c. The Individual Defendants
Plaintiffs produced evidence indicating at least one of the individual Defendants
engaged in allegedly tolerated misconduct while on the job. Plaintiffs also point to facts
possibly demonstrating a blue code of silence among some individual Defendants outside
the context of the Merino murder investigation.
In 1991, for example, Detective Iurato was accused of pointing his service weapon
at a civilian during a traffic stop. PSAMF § 244; Turato Dep, 105:3-110:24, Pls. Ex. 145.
PPD never investigated the incident, even though Iurato was charged with assault (the
case was ultimately dismissed), and he continued to interact with civilians and carry a
gun. fd. Lt, Clark, lurato’s superior, claimed he never had knowledge of this incident,
testifying that he was possibly on vacation when it happened. Clark Dep. 187:10—-189:8,
Pls. Ex. 140. Further, in 1996, Turato worked as a private investigator in violation of
departmental policy. PSAMF { 245 (citing a contemporaneous news article about the
incident submitted by Plaintiffs as Exhibit 105). furato allegedly misled his superiors, who
believed he was conducting sanctioned security work, not investigative matters. Jd.
Paterson stated that an Internal Affairs investigation should have occurred to determine
whether Iurato intentionally misled the PPD about the nature of the outside work.
Spagnola Dep. 312:17-314:9, Pls. Ex. 175, But no investigation seems to have been
conducted. PSAMF 4] 245. In yet another incident involving Iurato, a civilian accused him
of harassing her at a traffic stop. PSAMF 246 (citing the harassment complaint filed
against Iurato submitted by Plaintiffs as Exhibit 75, filed under seal), Lt. Clark was
assigned to investigate the incident and cleared Turato without interviewing the other
officers present during the stop. PSAMF § 245 (citing Clark Dep., Pls. Ex. 140).
Lt. Clark separately testified that while he witnessed instances of excessive force
by PPD officers, he never once reported such incidents in his 30 years on the force, and
has no knowledge of whether Internal Affairs investigated those incidents. Clark Dep.
89:17—-90:24, Pls. Ex. 140. Echoing that testimony, Set. Reid stated that, in his entire
career, he is not aware of any PPD supervisor disciplining a detective for misconduct
during an investigation, Reid Dep. 146:24—147:15, Pls. Ex. 131. Sgt, Reid also testified
that he is not aware of any supervisor disciplining a detective for failing to include critical
information in a report. Jd. at 148:1-9.
d. Additional Statements from Paterson’s Policymaker
As noted, the record includes statements and deposition testimony of Chief Munsey,
26

Paterson’s final policymaker for purposes of Monell liability. Plaintiffs contend that Chief
Munsey’s testimony, along with statements he made about the PPD during his tenure
leading the department, support their argument that PPD’s culture of impunity was widely
known and even purposefully maintained. Pis. Opp, Br. 35-36. For example, Plaintiffs
produced a newspaper article about Chief Munsey published in The Herald-News six
months after the murder of Merino that states in relevant part:
[Chief Munsey] bitterly resents anyone pointing accusing fingers at his officers
saying they are too rough and tough. Paterson cops, it has often been said—and
written—are like a Gestapo force on the loose. They are too quick in slapping people
around, too hasty in pulling law abiding citizens over, too eager to confront. “T
absolutely resent that,” Munsey snapped. “Because it is unfair. And all I ever wanted
is fairness.”
Pls. Ex. 81. In the article, Chief Munsey indicated that he resented the unique “scrutiny”
that comes with policing—scrutiny by “internal affairs, by municipal court, by civil suits,
[and] reporters.” /d He also characterized PPD as an organization unfairly “picked upon.”
id, On the other hand, the article notes that Chief Munsey, who worked in Internal Affairs
for five years before becoming chief, insisted that he was not overly protective of his
officers when they faced brutality charges, letting Internal Affairs handle investigations
before studying the findings to make a final judgment. 7d.
In his deposition, Chief Munsey testified that it was important to follow local news
coverage of the PPD, and that he did so, particularly for high profile cases. Munsey Dep.
$3:13-57:9, Pls. Ex. 138. He stated that there was “enormous pressure” on PPD to solve
the Merino murder, as there was for all homicides. at 70:10-71:20. Plaintiffs highlight
Chief Munsey’s agreement with the statement that “paying too much attention to the degree
of force police officers use, is bad for police and bad for communities.” /d. at 120:6-10.
He made that view known among the officers under his command. Jd 120:10-15.
However, as Paterson underscores, Chief Munsey was brought in to lead the PPD following
misconduct scandals and was “instrumental in removing 22 detectives from the department
in coordination with the County Prosecutor.” Paterson Stmt. Of Add’! Material Facts
(Paterson SAMF) □ 1, Kelly ECF No. 247; Lee ECF No. 221.
2. Paterson’s Response
Paterson argues that Plaintiffs’ evidence of PPD’s alleged culture of impunity is
based solely on inadmissible facts, irrelevant news articles lacking probative value, and
mischaracterizations of the record. Paterson Reply Br. 6, Kelley ECF No. 246, Lee ECF
No. 220. First, Paterson questions the propriety of the submitted news articles, reminding
the Court of the general evidence rule that articles are usually considered inadmissible
hearsay. Jd. The Court is mindful of Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and 802, but finds
statements from the abovementioned articles proper at this juncture under Rule 807 and
27

consistent with decisions of other courts that have considered facts from newspapers to
evaluate Monel! claims at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 17-4196, 2019 WL 4039575, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019)
(referencing a four-part reporting series by the Philadelphia Inquirer exposing a pattern of
misconduct by homicide detectives that mirrored the unlawful conduct in that case). The
residual hearsay exception applies when the statement at issue “is supported by sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness” and is “more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts,” Fed. R.
Evid. 807(a). Second, Paterson challenges the relevancy of such articles, arguing they lack
probative value. As the Third Circuit explained, “evidence is not irrelevant merely because
it does not show causation, does not specifically pertain to one unit of [a] police
department, or does not focus on the particular activities carried out by the officers that
were involved in [a plaintiff's] encounter, It is only irrelevant if it bears on no aspect of the
overarching theory and its underlying elements,” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 114-15. In light of
this instruction, the Court will not “unduly narrow” Plaintiffs’ evidence at this stage
because, as discussed further below, a reasonable jury may consider that certain facts from
relevant articles—in combination with other admissible evidence, including deposition
testimony—demonstrate PPD’s longstanding culture of impunity that caused Plaintiffs’
civil rights violations. See id. at 114. Finally, as to Plaintiffs’ purported mischaracterization
of the record, see Paterson Reply Br. 6-7, the Court is capable of reviewing and interpreting
deposition testimony and does not rely on either party’s description of any exhibits,
3. Municipal Liability Under a “Custom” Theory
Plaintiffs contend that, during the 1980s and 1990s, the PPD had a pattern, practice,
and custom of violating the constitutional rights of criminal suspects and citizens—
including systemic violations of the Fourth Amendment—-and, relatedly, a pattern,
practice, and custom of failing to take appropriate disciplinary or other corrective actions
against officers who engaged in such violations. Kelley Compl. 9{ 124-125, Lee Compl.
122-123, They further allege that the PPD officers, acting with impunity, “engag[ed] in
unlawful interrogation of suspects, witness detentions and interrogations, fabrication of
witness and suspect statements, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and engaging in
corruption.” Kelley Compl. { 125, Lee Compl. { 123.
A plaintiff can prevail on a “custom” claim under Mone// by (1) “showing that a
given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so
well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute Jaw” and (2) establishing an
“affirmative link” between the custom and the alleged constitutional violation. Est. of
Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quoting Bielevicz vy. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Liability based on custom, as opposed to a formal
adopted policy, proceeds on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have
the force of law. Colon v. City of Paterson, 12-1653, 2014 WL 4441503, at *5 (D.N.J.
Sept. 9, 2014) (citing Board of County Com’rs. of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
28

397, 404 (1997)). This type of liability does not require a showing of deliberate
indifference. Forrest, 903 F.3d at 105-06. Custom may instead be established by proof of
knowledge and acquiescence. Fletcher v. O’Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793 (Gd Cir. 1989).
Specifically, liability is attributed to the municipality through a policymaker’s actual or
constructive knowledge of and acquiescence in the unconstitutional custom or practice, See
Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 854, In other words, knowledge or a showing that the municipal
policymaker should have known about the pattern of constitutional misconduct is
sufficient. See Forrest, 930 F.3d at 109,
But simply establishing a custom is not enough. Est. of Roman, 914 F.3d at 789. A
plaintiff must also show the custom was the “proximate cause” of their injuries and can do
so by demonstrating a “plausible nexus or affirmative link between the municipality’s
custom and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue.” Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at
850 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Notably, causation is typically
question for the jury. Colon, 2014 WL 4441503, at *5 (citing Panas v. City of Philadelphia,
871 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378 (ED. Pa. 2012)). “As long as the causal link is not too tenuous,
the question whether the municipal policy or custom proximately caused the constitutional
infringement should be left to the jury.” Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 851.
Paterson argues that Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that the alleged
unlawful conduct was so commonplace or well-settled as to virtually constitute the law.
See Paterson Mot. at 5. The City further claims the record is “absolutely devoid” of
documentary evidence or testimony related to the Chief Munsey’s knowledge of any
pattern of similar constitutional violations. /¢@. The Court disagrees. The record evidence
shows that the PPD had a long history of overlooking or mishandling police officer
misconduct, which fostered a culture of impunity that caused the constitutional
deprivations in this case. Viewing the record in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, various
evidence cited above combine to raise disputed issues of material fact as to whether
Paterson had a custom of tacitly permitting the misconduct of officers, creating a culture
of impunity, that ultimately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. Summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
Monell claim under the custom theory is therefore denied.
4, Municipal Liability Under a “Failure-or-Inadequacy” Theory
The failure-or-inadequacy theory of municipal liability under § 1983 requires a
plaintiff to establish that a municipality’s failure to train, supervise, and discipline its
officers “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). This consists
of establishing whether “(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a
particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees
mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation
of constitutional rights.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106 (citing Carter v. City of Philadelphia,
181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)).
29

While the record contains sufficient facts supporting Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to
supervise and discipline—the record is replete with instances of open and egregious
misconduct during the relevant time period that was never subjected to meaningful
discipline—there is less evidence to bolster their failure-to-train theory. In a claim for
municipal liability based on failure-to-train, to prove deliberate indifference, a plaintiff
“needs to show that a defendant was on notice that, absent additional specialized training,
it was so predictable that failing to train the municipal employees amounted to conscious
disregard for the constitutional rights of citizens.” Diaz v. City of Philadelphia, 670 F.
Supp. 3d 174 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (cleaned up) (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71
(2011)). The alleged deficiency in a training program must be closely related to the alleged
constitutional injury because “[i]n virtually every instance where a person has had his or
her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point
to something the city ‘could have done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.” City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S, 378, 392 (1989). Typically, “[a] pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is necessary to demonstrate deliberate
indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217,
223 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Paterson has produced records indicating PPD officers underwent police training,
and Plaintiffs have not cited compelling facts within the evidentiary record regarding
specific deficiencies in the departinent’s training program. See Lapella v. City of Atlantic
City, No. 10-2454, 2012 WL 2952411, at *6 (D.NJ. July 18, 2012) (to sustain an
inadequate training theory, plaintiff must identify the precise deficiency in training).
Further, various evidence cuts against Plaintiffs’ arguments that the PPD failed to train its
officers. For example, the Herald-News profile of Chief Munsey states that he “sends his
officers, and himself, to the yearly recommended sensitive training to try to avoid the hard
edges.” Pls. Ex. 81.
In sum, on the “failure or inadequacy” theory, the Court will grant summary
judgment on the aspect of Plaintiffs’ Mone// claim dealing with failure to train, and will
deny summary judgment with respect to failure to supervise and discipline.
C. New Jersey State Law Claims
Plaintiffs bring a series of state law claims against the individual Defendants and
Paterson. As noted, Plaintiffs allege violation of the NICRA against all individual
Defendants and Paterson (Count XII for both), as well as the following common law
claims:

e Malicious prosecution against all individual Defendants (Count VIII for both);
e Intentional infliction of emotional distress against all individual Defendants
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(Count [X for both);
e Negligence and gross negligence against all individual Defendants and
Paterson (Count X for both); and

e Negligent supervision and training against Lt. Clark, Sgt. Stell, Sgt. Reid, and
Paterson (Count XI for both).
I. State Law Claims Against Individual Defendants”?
Based on the existence of genuine issues of material facts, see Part A in discussion
above, the motions for summary judgement by Defendants Sgt. Stell, Jordan, Nieves,
Reyes are denied as to Counts VII (malicious prosecution), EX (intentional infliction of
emotional distress), and X (negligence and gross negligence).!4 Summary judgment is
granted as to Finer, Smith, Iurato, Set. Reid, and Lt. Clark on Counts VIII, [IX and X;
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations against those individual Defendants show their limited
involvement in the investigation and as such, do not present genuine issues of material facts
upon which a jury could find for Plaintiffs on those claims. Summary judgment against
Set. Reid, Sgt. Stell, and Lt. Clark on Count XI (negligent supervision and training) is
denied,
2. State Law Claims Against Paterson
Under Count X, Plaintiffs seek to hold Paterson liable for negligence and gross
negligence, which involves a breach of a duty of care that causes injury. See Roccisano v.
Township of Franklin, No. 11-6558, 2013 WL 3654101, at *11 (D.N.J. July 12, 2013)
(citing Weinberg v. Dinger, 542 A.2d 366, 373 (N.J. 1987)). To establish negligence, a
plaintiff must show: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4)
damages. /d. (citation omitted). As to gross negligence, “the difference between gross and
ordinary negligence is one of degree rather than of quality.” Smith v. Kroesen, 9 F. Supp.
3d 439, 442 (D.N.J. 2014) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). Further, gross negligence refers
to behavior which constitutes “an indifference to consequences.” Banks v. Korman Assocs.,
218 NJ. Super. 370, 527 A.2d 933, 934 (NJ. App. Div. 1987). Based on the existence of
genuine issues of material facts, see Part B in discussion above, the motion for summary
2 See n.7, supra.
4 The Court does not address the issue of a public employee’s immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act,
59:1-1, ef seq. for acts in good faith, which Defendants have not raised.
NJCRA claims are analogous to their § 1983 federal counterparts and therefore analyzed “through the lens of §
1983,” Ingram v. Twp. of Deptford, 911 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D.N.J. 2012). Accordingly, the Court need not conduct a
separate analysis of Count X11 as to Paterson. As discussed above, there are genuine issues of material fact precluding
summary judgment on the corresponding Mone// claim under theories of unconstitutional custom and failure to
supervise and discipline.
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judgement by Paterson is denied as to Count X.
Plaintiffs also allege Paterson is liable for negligent supervision and training (Count
XJ). To establish this cause of action, a plaintiff must present evidence demonstrating: (1)
that the municipality “knew or had reason to know of the particular unfitness,
incompetence or dangerous attributes of the employee and could reasonably have foreseen
that such qualities created a risk of harm to other persons” and (2) “that, through the
negligence of the employer in [training or supervising] the employee, the latter’s
incompetence, unfitness or dangerous characteristics proximately caused the injury.” G.A.-
Hv, K.G.G., 210 A.3d 907, 916 (N.J. 2019) (quoting Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516
(N.J. 1982)), Plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence regarding the City’s failure to supervise
and discipline its officers, allowing the individual Defendants in this case to allegedly
violate Plaintiffs’ civil rights with impunity. Since there are genuine issues of material fact
that demonstrate that the City was negligent in the supervision of the individual
Defendants, summary judgment against Paterson on Count XT is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. Summary judgment is granted in favor of all individual Defendants on Count I of Mr.
Kelley’s Complaint and Count IL of Mr. Lee’s Complaint;
2, Summary judgment is granted in favor of all individual Defendants on the Fourteenth
Amendment malicious prosecution claims in Count II of Mr. Kelley’s Complaint and
Count I of Mr. Lee’s Complaint;
3. Summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims in Count
Til of Mr, Kelley’s Complaint and Count I of Mr. Lee’s Complaint and on the state
Jaw malicious prosecution claim in Count VIII of both Complaints is denied as to Sgt.
Stell, Nieves, Jordan, and Reyes but granted as to Sgt. Reid, Smith, Finer, Turato, and
Lt. Clark;
4. Summary judgment is denied on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
in Count IT of Mr. Kelley’s Complaint against Stell, Reyes, and Jordan, and granted
as to Finer and Smith;
5. Summary judgment is denied on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
in Count III of Mr. Lee’s Complaint against Stell, Reyes, Nieves and granted as to
Turato;
6. Summary judgment is granted in favor of all individual Defendants on the failure to
intervene claim in Count V of both Complaints;
7, Suminary judgment is denied on the civil rights conspiracy claim against all individual
Defendants in Count IV of both Complaints;
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8, Summary judgment is denied on the supervisory liability claims against Sgts. Reid,
Stell, and Lt. Clark in Counts VI and XI of both Complaints;
9, Summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence-
based state law claims in Counts IX and X is denied as to Defendants Set. Stell,
Jordan, Nieves, Reyes, but granted as to Finer, Smith, Iurato, Set. Reid, and Lt. Clark;
10, Summary judgment is denied in part and granted in part on the NJCRA claim in
Count Ali of both Complaints against the individual Defendants consistent with the
Court’s decisions on the federal constitutional claims;
11. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Paterson in Count IX is
dismissed pursuant to Plaintiffs’ agreement to drop the claim against the City;
{2, Summary judgment is denied in part and granted in part on the municipal liability
claim against Paterson in Count VII of both Complaints;
13, Summary judgment is denied on the negligence-based state law claims against
Paterson in Count X of both Complaints;
Summary judgment is denied on the negligent supervision and training claim against
Paterson in Count XI of both Complaints; and
15. Summary judgment is denied on the NJCRA claim against Paterson in Count XII of
both Complaints.

An appropriate order follows.

ta
DATE: February-<@ , 2025

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10813018. Public record. Not legal advice.