# Rose v. Parsons

> Superior Court of Maine · August 18, 2017

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10811265

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Maine
- **Decided:** August 18, 2017
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Wayne R. Douglas
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
YORK, ss. Civil Action
Docket No. RE-11-0056

HELEN RIVAS ROSE and
NATHANIEL P. MERRILL,

Plaintiffs,

V.

WILLIAM PARSONS, JR., et als., ORDER ON SECOND
POST-JUDGMENT MOTION
Defendants,

and

LLEWELLYN P.H. ALDEN, et als.,

Parties-in-Interest.

Following issuance of the June 26, 2017 order on post-judgment motions granting
1
in part and denying in part relief requested by certain Defendants to amend final

judgment in this matter, the same Defendants timely filed a second motion to alter or

amend. The second motion is denied, and the court takes this opportunity to clarify its

ruling on the adverse possession issue in light of the Law Court's recent decision in

Dupuis v. Ellingwood, 2017 ME 132, __ A.3d __.

This second motion requests that the court reconsider and reverse its conclusion

in the June 26th order that Defendants failed to meet their burden of proof with respect

to the claim of abandonment of Road A by adverse possession. The court cited then­

prevailing Law Court precedent, Gravison v. Fisher, 2016 ME 35, <j[ 52, 134 A.3d 857, in

support of its previous application of the higher, clear and convincing evidence

standard. The day after the June 26th order issued, the Law Court decided Dupuis, 2017

1
See Order on Post-Judgment Motions, at l, n. 1.

1
J\.1E 132, which clarified that the burden of proof applicable to a claim of abandonment

by adverse possession is the preponderance standard, not clear and convincing

evidence. Id. <JI 9, n.4 ("Our notation in Gravison, 2016 J\.1E 35, <JI 52, 134 A.3d 857, that

extinguishment by abandonment and by adverse possession are both subject to a clear

and convincing standard of proof is a misstatement of our prior decisions.").

Even under the preponderance standard, Defendants have failed to establish

adverse possession. In particular, and for the same reasons discussed in the June 26th

order, the evidence does not establish it is more likely than not that their possession was

"actual", "visible", and/ or "exclusive." See Order on Post-Judgment Motions, at 6-7.

Despite the similarities between the instant case and D'Angelo v. McNutt, 2005 J\.1E 31, <JI

13, 868 A.2d 239, there are also significant differences, including the facts that (i) none of

the actions or improvements taken by the Liversidges over the years acted as a barrier

to foot passage over Road A; and (ii) the 1916 deeds expressly allowed for relocation of

the easement on the face of the earth over a servient estate.

The court hereby clarifies that it has applied the preponderance of evidence

standard in evaluating the claim of abandonment by adverse possession consistent with

Dupuis, and the application of that standard yields the conclusion that Defendants have

not established said claim.
2
Accordingly, with that clarification, the motion to alter/ amend is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Date: August 18, 2017

2
Plaintiff's request for further consideration of other issues not raised by the instant motion is
denied.

2
RE-11-56
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF HELEN RIV AS ROSE:
ALAN SHEPARD
ALAN SHEPARD & READ
93 MAIN STREET
KENNEBUNK ME 04043

PLAINTITT NATHANIEL P MERRILL PRO SE
CRESCENT SURF DRVE #1
KENNEBUNK ME 040431

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS:
MICHAEL BOSSE
MEREDITH EILERS
BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON
POBOX9729
PORTLAND ME 04104

PETER PLUMB
KELLY MCDONALD
MURRAY PLUMB & MURRAY
PO BOX 9785
PORTLANDME 04104

ATTORNEYS FOR PARTY-IN-INTEREST:
JENS PETER W BERGEN
LAW OFFICE OF JENS-PETER W BERGEN
79 PORTLAND ROAD
KENNEBUNK ME 04043

REID HAYTON HULL
DRUMMOND WOODSUM
84 MARGINAL WAY SUITE 600
PORTLAND ME 04101
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
YORK, ss. Civil Action
Docket No. RE-2011-056

HELEN RNAS ROSE and
NATHANIEL P. MERRILL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WILLIAM PARSONS, JR., et als., ORDER ON POST­
JUDGMENT MOTIONS
Defendants,

and

LLEWELLYN P. H. ALDEN, et als.,

Parties-in-Interest.

Following entry of final judgment, certain parties 1 timely filed post-judgment

motions. Plaintiff's motion requests that the court reconsider its conclusion concerning

the scope and purpose of the easements in Road A and Road H. Defendants' motion

seeks reconsideration of the court's ruling that the Farm Lot easement in Road A was

not abandoned through adverse possession, and also requests additional findings of

fact related to that issue. Their motion further seeks correction of a misstated fact. In

response to Plaintiff's motion, Defendants also asked the court to "explicitly address the

1 Plaintiff Helen Rivas Rose; Defendants William Parsons, Jr., William C. Parsons, Charles B.
Parsons, Louise P. Larry, Louise Parsons Pietsch (Louise Parsons Smith in complaint), David L.
Weld, Jr., Christopher P. Weld, Ashley Taylor, Rudolph Hutz, Elizabeth Hutz, Thomas K.
Liversidge, Jr., as Trustee of Beach Property Realty Trust, Kathryn A. Burns (Katherine A. Burns
in complaint), Michael A. Greeley, Jackayla, LLC, Anne Ferguson (Ann Ferguson in complaint),
Matthew Miller, Stacey Miller, Ben Miller, Ali Giacomin, Llewelyn Parsons Smith, Sarah S.
Gerritz, Abigail A.S. Davis, G. Putnam Smith, Jr., Sarah P. Currie (Bonnie Curry in the
complaint); and Party-in-Interest Horace P. Liversidge, II.

1
limits of the relief requested by Plaintiff in this action." (Def.s' Opp. to Pl.' s Mot. to

Recons. at 1.)

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff requests that the court reconsider its ruling on the scope of the Farm

Lot's easements with regard to use of the beaches, and urges a conclusion that the

easements include implied rights of general, recreational use of Crescent Surf Beach

"within Road H" and Parsons Beach "within the confines of the areas between Lot C

and CC on the 1915 Plan." (Pl.'s Mot. for Recons. at 10.)

The Law Court cases Plaintiff cites-Sleeper v. Loring, Flaherty v. Muther, and

Badger v. Hill-do not hold or imply that a right-of-way easement to a body of water per

se grants a dominant estate rights of use to the beach, land, or water. See Sleeper v.

Loring, 2013 ME 112, c_l[c_l[ 18-20, 83 A.3d 769; Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 32, c_l[c_l[ 56-57, 17

A.3d 640; Badger, 404 A.2d 222, 226 (Me. 1979). Rather, all three cases make clear the

grantor's intent determines an easement's scope and purpose, and where deed

language is ambiguous or incomplete, then resort to extrinsic evidence is appropriate to

divine the intent. Id. The language of the 1916 deeds, the incorporated 1915 Plan,

and pertinent extrinsic record evidence were the basis of the court's determinations of

the scope of rights within the easements, the purposes of the easements, and the

boundaries and location of the two roads. See Rose v. Parsons, No. RE-11-056, 2017 Me.

Super. LEXIS 5, *45-48 (Jan. 12, 2017). For the reasons noted therein, the record

evidence as a whole does not support Plaintiff's desired conclusions.

The cases Plaintiff cites from other jurisdictions are distinguishable or otherwise

unpersuasive as a basis for establishing implied use rights in the face of existing Maine

2
2
precedent.

Finally, Plaintiff states she is "seeking the ability to simply walk down the

beach," and thus also requests that the court "conclude that the beach access in this case

includes recreational rights ... to walk the beaches in their entirety." (Pl.' s Mot. for

Recons. at 5, 10.) Defendants' reply memorandum contends that Plaintiffs are

estopped from seeking any rights outside the boundaries of Road A and Road H

because other beachfront lot owners were not joined in the action, 3 and because earlier

pleadings, rulings, and representations in the case 4 reflect that Plaintiffs were not

seeking use rights beyond the confines of the easement boundaries. (Def.s' Opp. to

Pl.'s Mot. to Recons.) Defendants seek clarification on this issue.

2 In Toms v. Settipane, a Connecticut Superior Court case, one chain of title granted an express
right to use the beach and a second title chain granted "a right of way over a footpath to the
beach on Long Island Sound." 317 A.2d 467, 471-72 (Conn. 1973). The court held that the
right of way in the latter deed included use of the entire beach, based on extrinsic evidence of
use at the time the easement was created. Compare id. with Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 32, 11
56-57, 17 A.3d 640. Moreover, even if Connecticut law implies such a right when an easement
is ambiguous or silent without any supporting extrinsic evidence, Maine law does not; there
must be sufficient evidence, extrinsic or otherwise, to establish that the grantor so intended. Id.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court case of Murphy v. Olsen did not involve implied beach use
rights but rather rights that were expressly set out in the deeds. 826 N.E.2d 249 (Mass. 2005).
And, although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Anderson v. DeVries held that back­
lot owners' right-of-way to the beach implied recreational use rights in the beach, this
conclusion was based both on extrinsic evidence of historical use particular to the case as well
as upon a finding of "prior vested rights" because "[t]he chief inducement for the purchase of
[the back lots] was the right to use the beach for swimming, bathing, and sun bathing." 93
N.E.2d 251,253 (Mass. 1950).
3 In response to Defendants' March 2011 motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties,
Plaintiffs responded that they "are only asserting rights to get to the beach, and to utilize certain
portions of the beach which are extensions of Roads 'A' and 'H'." (Pl.s' Opp. to Motion to
Dismiss at 5.). The court (Fritzsche, J.) denied the motion stating, "[i]t is not necessary to join
the remaining beachfront owners as the dispute is primarily about the use of 'Road H' and Road
A."' (Order signed June 8, 2011) .
4 Plaintiffs' second amended complaint claimed rights to use the roads and pathways depicted
in the 1915 Plan, along with "access and use of the beach within these pathways," and sought a
declaration of rights to use said roads, including access and use of the beach within the right of
ways . ..." (2nd Am. Compl. Summary of the Claim, 11 19, 30, Demand for Judgment)
(emphasis added)) .

3
The judgment concludes that the rights-of-way in Road A and Road H extend to

the low water mark of the Atlantic Ocean. This provides a right of access to the

intertidal zone of the beach in question. It is not the intent of the judgment that

exercise of the use rights articulated therein be confined within the physical boundaries

of the easements themselves. Rather, once the intertidal zone of Parsons Beach or

Crescent Surf Beach is reached via the right-of-way, the easement holder has the right to

use the intertidal zone up and down each respective beach for any purpose so long as it

is consistent with a fee owner's acquiescence, see Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 32, 9I 56, 17

A.3d 640, and also has any and all public use rights recognized under Maine law. See

McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 9I 28, 28 A.3d 620; Bell v. Town of Wells, 57 A.2d 168,

173 (Me. 1989); Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536-37, 45 A 497, 498 (1900). These

limited use rights in the intertidal zone of the beaches are not inconsistent with legal

rights of beachfront lot owners, whether or not a party to this action. Flaherty, 2011 ME

32, 'JI 56, 17 A.3d 640.

Defendants' Partial Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

1. Adverse Possession

Defendants contend that the court did not adequately address their adverse

possession claim with respect to Road A They request the court make additional

findings of fact on the basis of the existing record and conclude the Farm Lot's easement

in Road A has been terminated by adverse possession.

The court did consider their adverse possession claim as an alternative ground

for proving abandonment, and concluded that Defendants had not proven each and

every required element of their claim. Rose, 2017 Me. Super. LEXIS 5, at *40-44.

While there may have been sufficient evidence at trial to satisfy some of the adverse

possession elements, Defendants did not meet their burden of proving all elements

4
required to establish their claim.

A claimant asserting fee ownership by adverse possession must prove actual,

open, visible, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession of the subject

property under a claim of right to that property for a period of over 20 years. Harvey v.

Furrow, 2014 ME 149, <[ 11, 107 A.3d 604, see also Rose, 2017 Me. Super. LEXIS 5, at *44.

These same nine elements comprise the substantive standard applicable to an adverse

possession claim brought by a servient estate owner to extinguish a private easement

over the servient estate. D'Angelo v. McNutt, 2005 ME 31, <[ 13, 868 A.2d 239. In

pressing their adverse possession claim, Defendants rely upon D'Angelo not only

because it provides the applicable standard for establishing adverse possession but also

because the "acts of dominion" found to be sufficient to extinguish a private easement

right in that case are very similar to the actions taken by the Liversidges in this case.

Despite its similarities, D'Angelo is not squarely on point and therefore does not compel

the same result in this case.

D'Angelo did not involve a sole claim of extinguishment of a private easement by

adverse possession. The plaintiffs, the D'Angelos, owned property abutting both sides

a 30-foot wide strip of property known as "Maine Avenue." Id. <_j[<_j[ 1, 3. The

defendants, the McNutts, were fee owners of Maine Avenue. Id. <[ 4. The plaintiffs

asserted fee ownership in Maine Avenue by adverse possession and prevailed on that

claim. Id. The Law Court rejected defendants' alternate contention that even if

plaintiffs established ownership of Maine Avenue by adverse possession, defendants

retained a private easement therein. Id. <[ 12. Without further analysis and seemingly

without applying a heightened burden of proof to the abandonment by adverse

possession claim, the Court found the same "acts of dominion" that were sufficient to

establish a fee interest by adverse possession under the preponderance standard were

5
also sufficient to extinguish a private easement. Id. 9[ 13.

In the instant case, however, the Liversidges are the rightful owners and

possessors of the servient estate. In light of this distinction, 5 and the heightened clear

and convincing burden of proof associated with abandonment claims, see Gravison v.

Fisher, 2016 ME 35, 9I 52, 134 A.3d 857; Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175, 1179

(Me. 1992), Defendants have not met their burden of proving the Liversidges'

possession and use was actuat visible, and/ or exclusive.

Possession is "actual" when the property is in the "immediate occupancy and

physical control" of the party claiming adverse possession. Striefel, 1999 ME 111, 9I 9,

733 A.2d 984. The purpose of this requirement is to give the owner against whom

adverse possession is being claimed "notice of the extent of the trespass." Id. (emphasis

in original). Whether possession is "actual" depends upon "the nature and location of

the property, the potential uses of the property, and the kind and degree of use and

enjoyment to be expected of the average owner of such property." Id.

5 Neither party cited a Maine Law Court decision addressing this precise issue. Courts in
other jurisdictions employ a sharp focus in evaluating the elements of adverse possession in
cases involving the se1·vient estate owner's attempt to extinguish a private easement; and they
require that the acts of dominion be sufficiently inconsistent and irreconcilable with the exercise
of the easement rights. See, e.g., Matoush v. Lovingood, 177 P.3d 1262, 1270 (Colo. 2008) (only
"i.ncom:pati.ble or irreconcilable use" w.i.th easement holder's authorized rights sufficient to
extinguish easement by adverse possession); Smith v. Muellner, 283 Conn. 510, 518, 932 A.2d 382,
390 (2007) (dominion over servient estate insufficient; acts of a servient owner must be
"distinctly adverse'' to easement rights); Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 507 (Wyo. 1994) ("use
of the servient estate made during the period of adverse possession [must be] sufficiently
hostile and inconsistent with the use permitted by the easement"); Titcomb v. Anthony, 126 N.H.
434, 437~38, 492 A.2d 1373, 1375-76 (1985) (use of land by servient tenant must be "incompatible
or irreconcilable with" easement rights); New England Home for Deaf Mutes v. Leader Filling .
Stations Corp., 276 Mass. 153, 158-59, 177 N.E. 97, 99 (1931) (occupation of land by servient
tenant must be "irreconcilable with the rights of the dominant tenant" to extinguish easement).
This view is consistent with Maine's elevated burden of proof required in claims of
abandonment of an easement, one basis for which can be adverse possession. See Gravison,
2016 ME 35, <J[ 52, 134 A.3d 857 (claim must be proven "by clear and convincing evidence,
establishing each fact to a high degree of probability.").

6
Possession is "visible" when the possession and use of the property is "capable

of being seen by persons who may view the premises." Id. <J[ 11. The purpose of this

requirement is to provide the party whose rights are being challenged "with adequate

notice that a trespass is occurring, and that the owner's property rights are in jeopardy."

Id.

Possession is "exclusive" when the adverse possessor is "nof sharing the

disputed property with the true owner or public at large." Id. <JI 17. To establish

exclusivity, the adverse possessor must show '"an exclusive domination over the land

and an appropriation of it for his own use and benefit, and not for another."' Id. <JI 17

n.10 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 565 (6th ed. 1990)).

The record is clear that the Liversidges have possessed and used their property

continuously since the early 1980s. Over the years they have made numerous changes

and improvements to the land, some of which directly or indirectly affect the pathway

across their property where Road A is depicted in the 1915 Plan. 6 With respect to the

question of whether their possession and use is sufficient to satisfy the foregoing

elements, however, the test in these circumstances is not merely whether they used the

property as average owners would or even whether they have made changes to the

property that would impact the pathway of Road A as delineated in the 1915 Plan.

6 For example, the Liversidges replaced the old white gate at the intersection of Road A and
Road B on the 1915 Plan with a new gate, and then later with a chain. Rose, 2017 Me. Super.
LEXIS 5, at *26. The court also made the following findings: the original gate was intended
to prevent vehicle traffic, not the foot traffic o.f family members; the new gate and chain likewise
would not have kept one from walking down that way; the Liversidges did "considerable
landscaping and other work on their property on the land tinderJying Road A;" "[t]hey planted
trees on the eastern boundary of the segment of Road A between Lots 12 and CC on the 1951
Plan;" they built a new driveway; they /,planted a rose garden on or near a section of Road A
between Lots CC and 21 on the Plan;" they "placed granite blocks on ·their property;" "[t]hey
p.lanted an arbor in [the samel location;" "(t]hey built a shed near, but not on, Road A;" and
they "built an addition to their house, the corner of which . .. just barely" encroad1ed upon a
portion of Road A. Id. at 26-27.

7
Rather, it is whether their use and possession as lawful owners of the property was, in

fact, inconsistent and irreconcilable with use of the easement. For several reasons,

Defendants did not carry their burden.

First, despite the changes and improvements over the years, after considering all

the evidence the court found "[n]one of the improvements would act as a physical

barrier preventing foot passage over where Road A is depicted; although to follow that

course today puts one squarely on the Liversidge property." Id.

Second, the 1916 deeds establishing the dominant and servient estates granted

the servient estate owners the right to relocate easements across their properties. The

original grantors did not intend for the actual locations of the rights-of-way on the face

of the earth as depicted in the 1915 Plan to be fixed or immutable. This affords

considerable flexibility to the servient estate owners to make changes in their properties

without jeopardizing the rights-of-way guaranteed by the easements. These deed

provisions, in the court's view, require an even clearer showing that the Liversidges'

possession and use of their property was inconsistent and irreconcilable with continued

use of an easement over Road A or a reasonable alternative pathway over the servient

estate. From the court's viewing of the property and from the trial evidence, it is clear

that Plaintiffs could traverse Road A and other alternative pathways, across the

Liversidges' property by foot to reach the beach.

2. Correction of Date

The judgment found: "In 1984, [the Plaintiffs] sent written notice to Kin and

Sandra Liversidge as well as owners of servient lots on the 1915 Plan, to give notice of

their intent to 'contest the extinguishment of all easements and rights of way."' Rose,

2017 Me. Super. LEXIS 5, at *28 (emphasis added). It also recites: "Beginning shortly

after Kin and Sandra Liversidge took up permanent residence at Parsons Beach around

8
1980, Plaintiffs gave express, written notice on more than one occasion of their intent

not to abandon Road A." Id. at *43 (emphasis added). Defendants are correct that the

evidence at trial established that, although the notice bore a date of 1984, it was not

mailed until 1990. (Joint Ex. 27 at 2, 30 at 1). Defendants' motion will be granted to

correct the date, and the court will issue an amended judgment to so reflect.

Order

In accordance with the foregoing, the court hereby orders:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

2. Defendants' Partial Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is GRANTED IN
PART and the Memorandum of Decision and Final Judgment dated January
12, 2017, is amended as follows: (a) the year "1984" on page 20, line 6 of the
judgment is amended to "1990," and (b) the sentence on page 31, line 11-13 is
amended as follows: "Beginning shortly After Kin and Sandra Liversidge
took up permanent residence at Parsons Beach around 1980, Plaintiffs gave
express, written notice on more than one occasion of their intent not to
abandon Road A." An amended final judgment shall issue reflecting the
foregoing amendments.

3. In all other respects, Defendants' motion is DENIED.

The clerk may incorporate this Order on Post-Judgment Motions by reference on
the docket by reference under M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

SO ORDERED.

Date: June 26, 2017

9
RE-11-056

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF:
ALAN SHEPARD
ALANE SHEPARD & READ
93 MAIN STREET
KENNEBUNK ME 04043

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS:
KELLY MCDONALD
MURRAY PLUMB & MURRAY
75 PEARL ST
PO BOX 9785
PORTLAND ME 04104-5085
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
YORK, SS. Civil Action
Docket No. RE-2011-056

HELEN RIVAS ROSE and
NATHANIEL P. I\1ERRILL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WILLIAM PARSONS, JR., et als., AMENDED*
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Defendants, AND FINAL JUDGMENT
(TITLE TO REAL ESTATE INVOLVED)
and

LLEWELLYN P. H. ALDEN, et als.,

Parties-in-Interest.

I. Background

A. Introduction

This case involves a dispute over private rights of access to and use of two

beaches-the western end of Parsons Beach and Crescent Surf Beach-both in

Kennebunk, Maine. The parties are descendants of a man named Charles Parsons,

who owned land along the Atlantic Ocean that included these beaches. After his death

in 1904, an elaborate plan to subdivide the property among his heirs was established in

accordance with his will. His descendants have owned and enjoyed use of the

property since that time.

Two of his descendants, Helen Rivas Rose and her brother, Nathaniel P. Merrill,

jointly own a parcel of land in the subdivision. The parcel is known as the Farm Lot

and does not have ocean frontage. They claim the Farm Lot benefits from deeded

easements over the properties of other family members in the subdivision. They

further claim the easements provide an ongoing right to use certain private roads to

1
access and use the beaches. The dispute was brought to a head when Nathaniel P.

Merrill attempted to sell part of the Farm Lot and represented to prospective buyers

that the land for sale included a right of access to the beaches. Other family members

and property owners oppose the claims.

B. Procedural History

This action was commenced in March 2011 when Plaintiffs filed a three-count

complaint. Count I sought a declaratory judgment to confirm that, as owners of the

Farm Lot, they have full rights to utilize the roadways depicted in the subdivision plan,

including for access to and use of the beaches. Count II sought similar relief under a

theory of adverse possession or prescription. Count III alleged slander of title.

The original complaint named a smaller subset of defendants. 1 However, in

response to a motion to dismiss, the court ordered joinder of any additional parties

owning properties that this decision could affect. Plaintiffs then filed two amended

complaints adding additional parties. 2 In March 2012, another amended complaint

added a new party-in-interest.3 Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory

judgment that Plaintiffs, as owners of the farm lot, have no rights to two of the roads

depicted in the plan or any right to use the beaches. Party-in-Interest Mary Elizabeth

1 The original complaint named the following Defendants: William Parsons, Jr.; Rudolph and
Elizabeth Hutz; Thomas K. Liversidge; Katherine (Kathryn) A. Burns and Michael A. Greely;
Matthew J. Burns and Debbie P. Burns; Ann Ferguson; Matthew Miller; Bonnie (Sarah P.) Curry;
Llewellyn Parsons Smith; and Louise Parsons Pietsch.
2 The complaint as amended named the following additional Defendants: William C.
Parsons, Charles B. Parsons, Louise P. Parry, and Louise Parsons Smith; David L. Weld,
Christopher P. Weld, and Ashley Taylor; Thomas K. Liversidge as Trustee of Beach Realty
Property Trust; Stacey Miller, Ben Miller, and Ali Giacomin; and Sarah Gerritz, Abigail Davis,
and G. Putnam Smith, Jr. It also added as Parties-in-Interest: Llewellyn P.H. Alden; United
States of America; Elizabeth McMaster and Philip R.B. McMaster; Charles Bach McMaster and
Joseph McMaster; Abigail M. Alling; Julia Read Burns; and Mary Elizabeth Fluke.
3
The third amended complaint added Horace P. Liversidge II.

2
Fluke filed a cross-claim seeking a declaration that she and owners of other property

depicted in the plan have rights to utilize the roadways, and in particular a road known

as "Road H" to access and use the beach.

After mediation proved unsuccessful, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary

judgment on Count I of their complaint. Defendants along with Party-in-Interest

Horace P. Liversidge II filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all counts. In

September 2012 the court denied Plaintiffs' motion and granted the cross-motion for

summary judgment, concluding that Roads A and H were terminated by merger except

for the easement across Lot 12 and "[n]o later deeds revived the easements for the

plaintiffs.,,4 Rose v. Parsons, No. RE-2011-056, 2012 Me. Super. LEXIS 139, at *11 (Sept.

27, 2012). Plaintiffs appealed.

In August 2013 the Law Court vacated summary judgment in part and remanded

the case to the trial court. Rose v. Parsons, 2013 ME 77, <JI<JI 1, 6, 76 A.3d 343. The Law

Court held that even if the doctrine of merger had operated to extinguish the easements,

a subsequent conveyance through a codicil to the will of one of Plaintiffs' predecessors

in title revived the easements in the roads appurtenant to the Farm Lot. Id. <JI 6. On

remand, the trial court was instructed to determine whether the easements were

thereafter abandoned or continue to exist. Id. <J[ 11. Summary judgment for

Defendants was upheld with respect to the adverse possession and slander of title

claims. Id. <J[<J[ 12-13.

In the wake of the Law Court's remand, the parties filed another round of

4 The court also found Plaintiffs "failed to establish that there was a false statement made with
malice or with reckless disregard of its falsity [and] their claim for slander of title in Count III of
the third amended complaint fails" and they "failed to establish that any rights ... were re­
created through adverse possession." Rose v. Parsons, No. RE-2011-056, 2012 Me. Super. LEXIS
139, at *12-13 (Sept. 27, 2012).

3
motions and cross-motions for sum.m.ary judgment. In May 2014, the trial court

granted Plaintiffs' renewed motion for sum.m.ary judgment, denied Defendants' cross­

m.otion, and dismissed as moot Party-in-Interest Fluke's motion. Defendants' motion

to alter or am.end the judgment was denied. Another appeal followed. The Law

Court vacated the second sum.m.ary judgment and remanded the matter for trial. Rose

v. Parsons, 2015 ME 73, 118 A.3d 220.

The court conducted a view of the property with counsel on September 27, 2016.

A bench trial was held on September 27, 28, and 29, 2016. Final argument was held on

October 27, 2016.

II. Facts

A. The 1915 Division Plan

Around the turn of the twentieth century, Charles Parsons owned a significant

am.aunt of land along the Atlantic Ocean in Kennebunk, Maine. He and his family

built and used seasonal horn.es and other buildings on the land. The property, which

is the subject of the present dispute, includes two beaches separated by a rock

outcropping-Parsons Beach to the east of the rocks and Crescent Surf Beach to the

west-as well as substantial acreage inland.

Charles Parsons died in October 1904. Pursuant to his will, the property was

initially placed in trust with instructions to the trustees, Edwin Parsons and Jefferson

Hogan, that it was to be divided among his heirs after the death of his wife, Sarah J.

Parsons. (Joint Ex. 21.) The trustees, with the assistance of Roland W. Libby an

Engineer based in Saco, Maine, created a detailed plan to divide the lots in accordance

with the will of Charles Parsons. The final plan is entitled, "Plan of Division of a part

of the Estate of Cha's. Parsons, Kennebunk, Maine," dated August 10, 1915 ("1915 Plan"

or "Plan"). (Joint Ex. 47.) The Plan was recorded in the York County Registry of

4
Deeds along with its implementing deeds in May 1916. (Joint Exs. 2-8, 47.)

The 1915 Plan divides the property into approximately 46 lots, 27 of which have

direct ocean frontage on one of the two beaches. (Joint Ex. 47.) The Plan states the

square footage, ascribes the length in feet and directional courses of boundaries, depicts

the footprint of any structure(s) then extant on a lot, and provides other details relevant

to the division of the property for each lot. (Joint Ex. 47.) The Plan depicts eight

"roads," labeled "Road A" through "Road H," passing over and through the lots.

(Joint Ex. 47.) According to the Plan's scale-1 inch equals 200 feet-the roads were

generally drawn to be between 12 Y:z to 25 feet wide. Below is an enlarged subsection

of the Plan5 highlighting the two roads in dispute in this case, Road A and Road H. It

also shows part of the Farm Lot, the dominant estate, and the relevant servient estates.

5 This enlargement, which is reprinted from Rose v. Parsons, 2013 ME 77, <j[ 2, 76 A.3d 343, is
provided for the reader to illustrate the roads and lots in issue only as a convenience. This
diagram itself is not in evidence, and the court does not rely on it for any other purpose. Joint
Exhibit 47 is the full-scale Plan.

5
Despite the meticulous detail of the 1915 Plan and its implementing deeds, there

remain several ambiguities that go to the heart of the dispute in this case, specifically,

the purpose and scope of the easements in Road A and Road H and the intended

location of Road A.

B. The Dane Letter

The record contains a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1915 addressed to Walter

L. Dane, Esq. ("Dane Letter" or "Letter") regarding "Charles Parsons' Estate." (Joint

Ex. 25.) The Letter addresses issues that needed to be considered in order to finalize

the plan for dividing the Parsons' property. (Id.) The author of the Letter does not

identify himself but represents that he was asked by the trustees under the will of

Charles Parsons "to take up with you [Walter L. Dane, Esq.]6 the matter of making a

division of land owned by the estate in Kennebunk." (Id.) The author also quotes

George C. Parsons, a son of Charles Parsons and one of the subsequently named co­

executors of the will, with respect to some of the issues that needed to be addressed in

dividing the property. (Id. at 10-12.) The Letter further authorizes Mr. Dane to

"prepare descriptions of the several parcels of land to be conveyed to the different

members of the family, ... make whatever investigations of the titles is necessary, and

have Mr. Libby make such surveys and maps as are necessary." (Id. at 2.)

Enclosed with the Letter was a map or draft of a division plan for the property

that Mr. Libby previously prepared showing "the proposed division in a rough way."

(Id. at 3.) The enclosure is not in the record, but it is apparent from the Letter's

6 The letter does not indicate Walter L. Dane Esq.'s position or relationship to the family.
The
court infers he was a local attorney assisting with the transaction. It is also noted that Mr.
Dane was subsequently named as a co-trustee/ co-grantee (along with George Clarence Parsons
and Henry Humphrey Parsons) of a 15-year trust established to oversee the property before all
heirs assumed full ownership rights. (Joint Ex. 1.)

6
descriptions and references that the draft depicted the same configuration of many lots

shown in the final 1915 Plan. (Id.) The Letter requests a new map be drawn up

depicting the land in Kennebunk as well as the proposed division of the land into lots

with "sufficient particularity to enable us to prepare proper deeds." (Id. at 3.)

Further, it states, "The map should also show all existing roads and other rights of

way," (Id.), and "[s]pecial attention should be paid to the question of public and private

roads and other rights of way, as there seems to be a great deal of confusion in regard to

this matter." (Id. at 9.)

The roads in issue in this case-Road H and Road A-are specifically referenced

in the Letter, though not by name. For example, in referring to access to Crescent Surf

Beach, the Letter quotes George C. Parsons as follows:

In 1887 father built the house on lot A and turned the road about where
the present circle on lot A is (on your map) westerly to the extreme
easterly point of lot B, thence along lot B to the road leading to the beach
between lot Band lot one. As far as I know from the circle on lot A to the
7
beach was the way the road always ran.

(Id. at 11.) (emphasis added). The italicized language is a reference to what became

Road H on the Plan. The Letter also references the third segment of Road A shown in

the 1915 Plan, again quoting George C. Parsons: "The road to the beach between lot 12 and

lot F.N.P.from E.P. 8 formerly ran through F.N.P. from E.P. and has been moved twice."

(Id.) (emphasis added).

7 The Letter also quotes George C. Parsons referencing Road H as follows: "Last fall we
stopped the Kennebunk road at the northwest corner of F.N.P. from E.P. People now to get on
the western beach [Crescent Surf Beach] have to turn at the only triangle on the map and go
along U1e road shown on the map running between the farm lot, lot one and lots F, E, G, and B."
(Joint Ex. 25 at 11.) (emphasis added).
8 The reference to "lot F.N.P. from E.P.", {Joint Ex. 25 at 11.), is clearly a reference to Lot CC in
the 1915 Plan. Joint Ex. 47. Lot CC on the Plan contains the name "Edwin Pa.rsons." (Id.)
Lot CC was conveyed to Frances N. Parsons and her 1916 deed confirmed that conveyance.
(Joint Ex. 3 at 6.) Lot CC abuts Lot 12, and the third segment of Road A runs over both lots.
(Joint Ex. 25 at 11; Joint Ex. 47.)

7
Other references in the Letter to the roads and easements are germane to the

issues in this case. For example, the author makes clear that "George C. Parsons thinks

that it would be a mistake to give any party the right to maintain pipes or wires over

another party's land." (Id. at 6.) The author requests further investigation as to

whether it is feasible to run pipes and wires along the roads. (Id.)

The Letter poses "two questions of law" for Mr. Dane to answer. It first asks

whether a "private owner in Maine" is entitled to the fee of a public road passing over

his land? (Id. at 10.) It then asks, "Has the public a right of way to the beach?" (Id.)

With regard to the latter question, the author notes George C. Parsons' observation that

"Father always claimed that the town had only a right of way to the western beach from the

two posts as when he bought the place it was a pasture and a gate had to be opened at

the two posts." (Id.) (emphasis added). And, the Letter notes that the "family seem

to have an idea that the public has such a right of way, but that its position may be

changed in any way the family desires." (Id.)

C. The 1916 Deeds

In 1916 the trustees of the Charles Parsons estate executed eight deeds to carry

out the planned distribution of his property. The deeds, which were recorded along

with the Plan in the York County Registry of Deeds in May 1916, conveyed the property

in accordance with and by explicit reference to the 1915 Plan. The heirs/ grantees were

the children of Charles Parsons-Robert W. Parsons, George Clarence Parsons, Frances

N. Parsons, Mary Parsons Hogan, Llewellyn Swayne Parsons, and Henry H. Parsons­

and one grandson-Charles ("Carl") Parsons. (Joint Exs. 2-8.)

The eighth deed conveyed the same properties in trust to George Clarence

Parsons, Walter L. Dane, and Henry H. Parsons as trustees for the benefit of each of the

foregoing heirs/ grantees for a period of 15 years. (Joint Ex. 1.) The trustees jointly

8
held the property during this period, with enumerated rights and responsibilities. Each

beneficiary held a fractional interest in the whole for that time, and any further

conveyance of a property required consent of the trustees and a specified percentage of

the other beneficiaries. (Id.)

Like the Plan, the deeds effectuating the transfer of property were carefully,

professionally, and meticulously drafted. The deeds, together with the Plan, reflect a

fully considered scheme for distributing the property among the heirs of Charles

Parsons as well as a mechanism for assuring the property, and its use, was protected

and initially maintained within the family. Each heir received at least one lot with

direct frontage onto a beach. Every oceanfront lot was expressly bounded by the

Atlantic Ocean in the deeds. (Stipulations 'JI 19.) Thus, each oceanfront lot owner

was granted a fee interest in the beach, from the sea wall to the ocean, directly seaward

of the upland portion of his or her lot(s). (Joint Ex. 2 at 2; Joint Ex. 3 at 2; Joint Ex. 4 at

2; Joint Ex. 5 at 2; Joint Ex. 6 at 2; Joint Ex. 7 at 2; Joint Ex. 8 at 2.)

In addition to describing the lots conveyed, the deeds specified a number of

common provisions regarding easements, including sewer easements, utility easements,

rights of way, and roads. The following provisions are common to all eight of the 1916

deeds and have particular relevance to the issues in this case.
9
Each 1916 deed granted "as appurtenant to the ... land and every part thereof,

a right of way over all roads shown on said map and a right to maintain along all roads

shown on said map water pipes, electric light wires, and telephone wires." (Joint Ex. 2

9 Joint Exhibit 4 consists of Pages 303-308 of Book 641, as recorded in the registry of deeds.
Page 304 of this deed, however, is missing from the court's record of the exhibits. Because all
of the other deeds are consistent in content and description and because Exhibit 4 is consistent
with the other deeds as far as is shown, the court has no reason to believe the missing page
contains a different provision with respect to the roads.

9
at 3-4; Joint Ex. 3 at 6; Joint Ex. 5 at 4; Joint Ex. 6 at 3; Joint Ex. 7 at 2; Joint Ex. 8 at 5.)

Each deed provided that an owner of a servient lot shall own in fee the land to

the center of the road. (Joint Ex. 2 at 4; Joint Ex. 3 at 7; Joint Ex. 4 at 4; Joint Ex. 5 at 5;

Joint Ex. 6 at 4; Joint Ex. 7 at 3; Joint Ex. 8 at 6.)

Each deed permitted servient lot owners to redirect a road crossing their

property as long as "a reasonably convenient route [was] maintained for the use of the

other parties entitled to a right-of-way over such road." (Joint Ex. 2 at 4; Joint Ex. 3 at

7; Joint Ex. 4 at 4; Joint Ex. 5 at 5; Joint Ex. 6 at 4; Joint Ex. 7 at 3; Joint Ex. 8 at 5.)

Each deed conveyed the lots "subject to the restriction that such real estate and

every part thereof shall be used only for private residential purposes." (Joint Ex. 2 at

4-5; Joint Ex. 3 at 6; Joint Ex. 4 at 4; Joint Ex. 5 at 5; Joint Ex. 6 at 4; Joint Ex. 7 at 3; Joint

Ex. 8 at 5.)

None of the 1916 deeds expressly conveyed to any inland lots a right to use or

recreate on the beaches. (Joint Ex. 2 at 3-4; Joint Ex. 3 at 6; Joint Ex. 5 at 4; Joint Ex. 6 at

3; Joint Ex. 7 at 2; Joint Ex. 8 at 5.)

D. The Farm Lot

The Farm Lot is the second largest single parcel in the Plan (1,014,000 square

feet). (See Joint Ex. 47.) In 1916, it was originally conveyed to Frances N. Parsons and

George Clarence Parsons as tenants in common. (Joint Ex. 3 at 4; Joint Ex. 8 at 4.) All

of the common provisions discussed above are found in these two original deeds.

(Joint Exs. 3, 8.) The deeds that conveyed Frances N. Parsons and George Clarence

Parsons an interest in the Farm Lot did not expressly grant any right to use the beaches.

(Joint Ex. 3 at 6; Joint Ex. 8 at 5.)

Llewellyn Swayne Parsons, also one of the original heirs of Charles Parsons, later

came to own the Farm Lot outright. Upon her death in 1956, the Farm Lot was devised

10
under her will to her niece, Helen Parsons Merrill. (Stipulations <JI 18.) Helen Parsons

Merrill is the mother of Plaintiffs Helen Rivas Rose and Nathaniel P. Merrill.

(Stipulations <JI 16.)

Upon Helen Parsons Merrill's death, the Farm Lot was devised to Plaintiffs'

father, Frederic Arnold Merrill. Rose v. Parsons, 2013 ME 77, <JI 4, 76 A.3d 343. He

conveyed the Farm Lot and other lots he inherited from Helen Parsons Merrill to his

children, Plaintiffs, "together with all my right, title and interest, in common with

others, in and to the roads shown on the 1915 division plan; and subject to and with the

benefit of all other rights, privileges, easements, obligations, conditions, covenants,

restrictions and reservations set forth in deeds and devises in record title to said

properties insofar as such benefits and burdens may be in force and effect and insofar as

applicable to said properties." Id.

Until 1977, the Farm Lot was occupied only by caretakers, who lived there year­

round and were responsible for maintaining all buildings and properties. The

caretakers were not members of the Parsons family nor did they have any ownership

rights in the Farm Lot. There was no evidence presented that the then owners of the

Farm Lot, Llewellyn Swayne Parsons and Helen Parsons Merrill, ever used either Road

Hor Road A to access the beaches between 1931 and 1978.

E. RoadH

Road H extends from a fork in Road F and initially runs between Lot 1 and a

small, unnamed lot situated between it and Road G. Ooint Ex. 47.) Road H then runs

southwesterly, burdening Lot 1, Lot B-1, and Lot B. (Id.) Based on the Plan's scale,

Road His depicted as having a width of approximately 25 feet (2/ 16"). (Id.) There is

an opening in the "line of sea wall" on the Plan where Road H reaches the beach. (Id.)

From that intersection, two parallel, dotted lines extend south across the beach to the

11
ocean. (Id.) The parties stipulated that Road H extends beyond the sea wall, across

the beach, and terminates at the low water mark of the Atlantic Ocean. (Stipulations <IT

20.)

By virtue of the 1916 deeds, the lots burdened by Road H-Lot 1, Lot B, and Lot

B-1-were held in fee by Charles Parsons' grandson, Carl Parsons. (Joint Ex. 2 at 2-3.)

The fee in Lot 110 and Lot B-1 were conveyed outright. (Joint Ex. 2 at 2.) It was

purported that Lot B was previously conveyed to Carl Parsons, 11 and the 1916 deed

expressly confirmed his ownership of Lot B. 12 (Joint Ex. 2 at 3.) The deeds contained

all of the common deed provisions mentioned above. (Joint Ex. 2.)

10 The deed describes Lot 1 is as follows:

Beginning at the northeasterly corner of Lot 2, running thence along the
southerly boundary line of Road E north 84 degrees 55 minutes east 173 feet to
the intersection of the southerly boundary line of Road E with westerly boundary
line of Road F, thence along Road F along the westerly boundary of Road F and
the westerly boundary line of Road H the following courses and distances, south
15 degrees west 129.5 feet, south 11 degrees 15 minutes east 217 ft, south 69
degrees 25 minutes east 66 feet, south 11 degrees west 274.2 feet to a point (which
is south 71 degrees 20 minutes west 169.9 feet from the westerly corner of the
house now owned by Charles Parsons on Lot B in the Sea Wall), thence in the
same course to the Sea, thence westerly by the sea to a point in the easterly
boundary line of Lot 2; thence north 5 degrees 5 minutes west along the easterly
boundary line of Lot 2 to a point in the Sea Wall; thence in the same course 660
feet still along the easterly boundary line of Lot 2 to the point of beginning;
containing about 40,590 square feet to the Sea Wall.
(Joint Ex. 2 at 2.)
11
There was no deed offered or admitted at trial with regard to the prior conveyance of Lot B
to Carl Parsons. The parties did not challenge or question the capacity of the trustee/ grantors to
encumber Lot B with easements in the 1916 deeds.
12 The deed's language with regard to conveying Lot B:

[A]ll rights, titles, interest, easements and restrictions which the grantors, or any
of them, have or have power to convey or release in respect to Lot B, together
with the beach and other land between said Lot B and the Sea included by
extending to the Sea the southeasterly and westerly boundary lines of Lot B. It is
believed that title in fee simple to Lot B is already in Charles Parsons, and the
foregoing provision is for the purpose of confirming his title and of releasing to
him any all easements and restrictions which the parties of the first part [the
grantors] may have in respect of Lot B.
(Joint Ex. 2 at 3.)

12
By the time of her death in 1956, Llewellyn Swayne Parsons owned Lot 1, Lot B,

and the Farm Lot. (Joint Ex. 23 at 2.) Upon her death, Lot 1 was devised to Helen

Parsons Merrill as one of five tenants in common. (Stipulations <JI 18.) Under a codicil

to the will, Lot B was conveyed to Helen Parsons Merrill. 13 (Stipulations <JI 17.) As

noted above, the Farm Lot was also conveyed under the codicil to Helen Parsons

Merrill. (Joint Ex. 22 at 11.)

Helen Parsons Merrill retained her ownership interest in these lots until 1964.

(Joint Ex. 11; Joint Ex. 13.) In 1964, she conveyed her interest in Lot 1 to Robert

Parsons. (Joint Ex. 11.) In 1973, she conveyed her interest in Lot B to William

Parsons. (Joint Ex. 13.) The conveyances were both made subject to any burdens "in

force and effect" at the time. (Joint Ex. 11 at 3; Joint Ex. 13 at 4.) Neither the 1964 nor

1973 conveyance made any reference to the easement in Road H appurtenant to the

Farm Lot, while the 1973 conveyance of Lot B to William Parsons did expressly reserve

an easement across Road G for the benefit of the Farm Lot. (Joint Ex. 13 at 4.)

F. RoadA

Road A is depicted on the 1915 Plan running from the north down the east side

of the Farm Lot to an intersection with Road B and Road C. 14 (Joint Ex. 47.) From

that intersection, Road A continues south and east in three discrete segments. (Id.)

The first segment runs in a southerly direction between Lot F and Lot 21, until it reaches

13 In the 1915 Plan, two small lots, Lot B-1 and Lot B-2, were carved out of Lot B. Uoint Ex.
47.) Lot B-1 was situated on the north side of Lot B between Lot Band the junction of Road H
and Road G. (Id.) Lot B-2 was situated to the east of Lot B, between Lots B, Kand A. (Id.)
At one point in time prior to 1973, Helen Parsons Merrill owned Lot B-2 in fee and owned a 1 / 3
interest in Lot B-1, both of which she conveyed in 1973 to William Parsons, Sr. (Joint Ex 13.)
14 In the early years Road A appears to have been the primary means of access to the family's
main home on Lot A. It may have been considered a public road for a time, and ran directly to
the northeast corner of Lot A-where the Big House is located-over land that was converted in
the 1915 Plan to Lots W, H, and I. (See Joint Exs. 25, 44, 47.)

13
the northeastern boundary of Lot W. (Id.) The second segment then turns 90 degrees

easterly and runs between Lot 21 and Lot CC, until it reaches the western boundary of

Lot L. (Id.) The third segment then turns 90 degrees southerly and runs between Lot

CC and Lot 12. (Id.)

The two solid, parallel lines depicting the third segment of Road A just described

intersect the "line of sea wall" pictured on the Plan at the southeast corner of Lot CC

and the southwest corner of Lot 12. (Id.) As is the case with the Plan's depiction of

Road H, there is an opening in the "line of sea wall" where it meets Road A. (Id.)

Unlike Road H, however, from the intersection of Road A and the sea wall only one

dotted line continues to the water, extending from the southwestern corner of Lot 12

across the beach to the ocean. (Id.)

The first and second segments of Road A are approximately double the width of

the third segment of Road A. (Id.) Based on the Plan's scale, the first two segments

are approximately 25 feet wide (2/ 16") and the third segment is approximately 12 1 / 2

feet wide (1/ 16"). (Id .)

Road A burdens multiple lots in the 1915 Plan, including, as relevant to this

matter, Lot F, Lot CC, and Lot 12. Under the 1916 deeds, three heirs-Henry H.

Parsons, Llewellyn Swayne Parsons, and George Clarence Parsons-were each granted

a one-third interest in Lot F. (Joint Ex. 4; Joint Ex. 5; Joint Ex. 8.) Frances N. Parsons

was granted a fee interest in Lot 12. 15 (Joint Ex. 3.) Lot CC was allegedly16 conveyed

15 The deed describes Lot 12 as follows :

Beginning at the northwesterly corner of Lot AA, running thence south 13
degrees 45 minutes east 165.3 feet along the westerly boundary line of Lot AA to
the Sea Wall, thence in the same course to the Sea; thence westerly about 299 feet
by the Sea to a point in a line which is 249 feet westerly from and parallel with
the westerly boundary line of said Lot AA, thence north 13 degrees 45 minutes

14
to Frances N. Parsons prior to 1916. (Id.) Thus, the deed purports to be a

confirmatory grant with respect to Lot CC, 17 just as the deed to Carl Parsons had been

a confirmatory deed to him with respect to Lot B. (Id. at 6.) These deeds contained all

of the common provisions with respect to the roads and easements referenced above.

As noted below, on the 1915 Plan the name "Edwin Parsons" is written below the

reference to "Lot CC." Edwin Parsons was one of the executors and trustees of the

Charles Parsons estate. Goint Ex. 1 at 1.) He previously owned some of lots in this

subdivision but confirmed the transfer of them to other family members as part of the

division of lands in the 1915 Plan.

Llewellyn Swayne Parsons held fee title to Lot F, Lot 21, and Lot CC by 1943.

(Joint Ex. 23 at 3, 5.) In 1948 she conveyed Lot Fas well as part of Lot CC and Lot W to

Mary Parsons Liversidge. (Joint Ex. 9 at 1.) In 1950, she also conveyed the part of Lot

21 adjoining Road A and the remainder of Lot CC to Mary Parsons Liversidge. (Joint

Ex. 10 at 1.) Neither deed expressly reserved an easement across said lots for the

benefit of the Farm Lot, nor, however, did they expressly release those easements.

west by said line to the Sea Wall, thence in the same course 167.2 feet along the
easterly boundary line of Road A to the southwesterly corner of Lot L thence
north 75 degrees 20 minutes east 299 feet along the southerly boundary line of
Lot L to the point of beginning, containing about 49,644 feet to the Sea Wall.
(Joint Ex. 3)
16
There was no deed offered or admitted at trial to reflect any prior conveyance to Frances N.
Parsons. The parties did not challenge or question the capacity of the trustee/ grantors to
encumber Lot CC with easements in the 1916 deeds.
17 The deed's language with regard to conveying Lot CC:

[A]ll rights, titles, interest, easements and restrictions which the parties of the
first-part, or any of them, have or have power to convey or release ... in Lot CC,
as shown on said map, together with the beach and all other land between said
Lot CC and the Sea included by extending the easterly and southwesterly
boundary lines of Lot CC to the Sea. (It is believed that title in fee simple to ...
Lot CC is already in Frances N. Parsons, and the foregoing provisions is for the
purpose of continuing her title and of releasing to her any and all easements and
restrictions which the parties of the first-part may have in respect of .. . Lot CC.)
(Joint Ex. 3.)

15
(Joint Exs. 9-10.) However, both deeds make express references to Road A in the lot

descriptions, and the 1950 deed conveying the eastern portion of Lot CC and part of Lot

21 states that a "conveyance to the boundary line of a road shall convey the fee to the

middle of the road subject to any easements now existing." (Joint Ex. 10 at 2.)

G. Use of the Property from 1915 to 1977

From 1915 through the mid-1960s, the heirs and descendants of Charles Parsons

used the property primarily during the summers. They stayed in one of four houses:

The "Big House," located on the point and shown on Lot A of the Plan; "Seven Gables,"

located and shown on Lot E; the "Play House," located and shown on Lot F; and "Pine

Knot," located on Lot 12 but not shown on the Plan. 18 (Stipulation <j[ 10; see also Joint

Exs. 35, 47.) All four houses had access to the ocean. (Stipulations <j[ 11.) Typically

the family that owned or stayed in each of the four houses would use the beach area in

front of that house. (Stipulation at Tr. Trans., Day 2 at 60.)

In the early years there was another building on the property known as the "Pool

House," an L-shaped structure located on Lot CC. Its footprint is depicted on the 1915

Plan. (Joint. Ex. 47.) The structure housed an in-ground, salt-water pool (fed by a

windmill-powered pump) and a bowling alley. The pool was in the vertical

(north/ south) part of the "L" -shaped figure shown on Lot CC on the Plan. According

to the Plan scale, the top of the "L" was approximately 100 feet (8/16") from the second

segment of Road A; and the horizontal or bottom (east/west) part of the "L" shape

appears to have been approximately 40 feet (3/16") from the third segment of Road A

as depicted on the Plan. (Id.) Thomas K. ("Kin") Liversidge testified that the

horizontal part of the Pool House may have been expanded at some point, bringing it

18 Although not depicted in the Plan, testimony at trial indicated that "Pine Knot" was the
house on Lot 12 east of the Pool House as pictured on page 1 of Joint Exhibit 35.

16
even closer to Road A where it approaches the sea wall.

The Pool House was torn down in the 1930s. At some point after it was torn

down, a white fence or gate was erected across Road A, in the vicinity of its intersection

with Road B. The hole where the pool had been remained open and unfilled for many

years. Road A was not used for vehicular access to the area where the Pool House

previously stood after that point. Over time, Road A from the gate south and east

became overgrown with vegetation. '

Helen Rivas Rose was born in 1942. As a child, she visited the Parsons Beach

property with her family every summer for two to three weeks during the month of

June and sometimes again during September. As a child, she and her immediate

family would stay at Seven Gables, located on Lot E. Her family was part of a group

that owned Seven Gables on Lot E. They would use the beach in front of on Lots C

and D, which were directly south of Lot E.

She testified that during her childhood visits to Parsons Beach she often spent

time with the caretaker's twin daughters, who lived on the Farm Lot. They would

traverse the land and sometimes idle away the hours at a white gate across Road A

southeast of the triangle at the intersection of Roads A, B, and C. She also testified that

they would walk along Road A behind and to the south of the white gate and would

spend time at the two pillars at the southwest and southeast corners of Lot W.

Helen Rivas Rose did not visit the Parsons Beach area from 1964 to 1971. It was

only after her father conveyed the property to her and her brother in 1978 that she

moved to Maine permanently.

Plaintiff Nathaniel P. Merrill's use of the property is unclear. He resides in

Colombia, South America and did not appear at trial.

17
H. Use of the Property and Road A Since 1977

Upon moving to Maine in 1978, Helen Rivas Rose took up permanent

residence in the house on the Farm Lot. She testified that she went to Parsons Beach

via a route she believed to be Road A across Lot CC up to four or five times during that

first summer. At the time, her cousin, Kin Liversidge, was also living at the property.

According to her testimony, Kin Liversidge asked her to take a different route to the

beach to afford him privacy while he was recovering from a long-term illness. She

obliged and used a different path-further to the east across Lot 21 and Lot 12-to

access Parsons Beach. (See Joint Ex. 42 (enlarged map with push-pins).)

Kin Liversidge and his wife, Sandra, currently own most of the land underlying

the southern three segments of Road A. (Joint Ex. 50.) His mother, Mary C. Parsons

Liversidge, deeded him the land in 1980. (Joint Ex. 16.) The deed granted him in

relevant part the "[w]esterly portion of Lot 21, [e]asterly portion of Lot CC, portion of

Road A (not open), all used in common, and adjoining beach of the Atlantic Ocean, 1915

Parsons division plan ...." (Joint Ex. 16 at 1.)

According to his testimony, Kin Liversidge began clearing vegetation to open a

road in this area as early as 1976. He testified that it took him three days to clear the

growth to re-create a road extending from behind the white gate at the intersection of

Roads A and B on the 1915 Plan to the western end of the segment of Road A located

between Lots F and 21, and to the point where Road A takes a 90 degree turn to the east

between Lots 21 and CC. When the new road was installed there was no trace of an

old gravel road, and the only indication of Road A's prior existence was elevated

ground between Lots CC and 21 and Lots CC and 12. He replaced the old white gate

with a new gate, but eventually replaced it with a chain. The gates and chain were

intended to keep out vehicles, not family members on foot. Kin Liversidge testified he

18
and his family, including two of his siblings, Horace Liversidge and Mary Elizabeth

Fluke, and their families, are the only ones who have used the road that he opened.

Over the years, Kin and Sandra Liversidge have done considerable landscaping

and other work to their property on the land underlying parts of Road A. They

planted trees on the eastern boundary of the segment of Road A between Lots 12 and

CC on the 1915 Plan. They planted a rose garden on or near a section of Road A, and

planted a vegetable garden near or on the southwestern portion of Lot 21. They placed

granite blocks on their property, one of which was placed in the location just below the

letters "OA" in the word "Road" labeling the segment of Road A between Lots CC and

21 on the Plan. (Joint Ex. 47.) They planted an arbor in a location that appears on the

Plan just above the same word. They built a shed near, but not on, Road A. Kin and

Sandra Liversidge also built an addition to their house, the corner of which extended up

to and perhaps just barely over the southern boundary of the second segment of Road

A. (Joint Ex. 51.) They did not see evidence of a path or evidence of use of that area

as a pathway. None of the improvements would act as physical barrier preventing

foot passage over where Road A is depicted; although, to follow that course today puts

one squarely on the Liversidge property.

Plaintiff Rose was aware of these improvements as they were being made,

including the addition. In November 2009 she sent an email Kin Liversidge, her

cousin, to ensure that the addition would not impede or block Road A. The next day

he responded, "[T]he addition will not effect Road A." (Joint Ex. 31.) She also visited

Kin Liversidge' s property as the foundation for the addition was being laid to see where

it was located.

Plaintiff Nathaniel Merrill emailed Kin Liversidge in May 2010 regarding Road

A: "I have used Road A very little over the years to get to the beach. However must

19
now think about my six children and six grandchildren! Helen and I will be surveying

this Road sometime during the summer." (Joint Ex. 32.) Kin Liversidge responded a

few days later expressing his concerns regarding Plaintiffs' desire "to pursue the use of

a road that has not existed for many, many years." (Joint Ex. 32.)

This was not the first time Plaintiffs, as owners of the Farm Lot, had asserted a

right of way over Road A. In 1990, they sent written notice to Kin and Sandra

Liversidge as well as owners of other servient lots on the 1915 Plan, to give notice of

their intent to "contest the extinguishment of all easements and rights of way." (Joint

Ex. 27.) Plaintiffs did not receive a response from any of the recipients of the notice.

Plaintiff Rose also wrote to Kin Liversidge in 1989 to inform him that she might have

people staying at her house that summer who would use Road A to access Parsons'

Beach. (Joint Ex. 28.) He responded that it was his belief that Road A was his and his

siblings' exclusive property, but offered to allow Plaintiff Rose to walk down his

driveway to the beach. (Def.'s Ex. 3.) That offer was later rescinded upon learning

that his sister and neighbor, Ms. Fluke, was planning to have renters at her house for

the summer. (Joint Ex. 29.)

III. Conclusions

Prior to trial the parties agreed that the legal issues in dispute were as follows:

(A) Whether the easement rights in Road H appurtenant to the Farm Lot19 have been

extinguished by operation of the doctrine of merger? (B) Whether the easement rights

in Road A appurtenant to the Farm Lot have been extinguished by abandonment? (C)

If easement rights in Road H and Road A have not been extinguished, then (1) What is

the scope of the easements? (2) Where is Road A's intended and actual location, and in

19 Defendants are not claiming that the doctrine of merger terminated any easement in Road H
appurtenant to Party-in-Interest Fluke's property. (See Stipulation <j[ 26.)

20
particular, does Road A extend beyond the sea wall and if so to what extent? (3) What

is the scope of the easements in the roads and does this include a general right of

recreation on the beaches? By the conclusion of trial, another disputed issue had

arisen: Whether the easement rights in Road A as appurtenant to the Farm Lot have

also been extinguished by operation of the doctrine of merger? 20

For the reasons set out below, the court concludes: (A) The easements in Road H and

Road A appurtenant to the Farm Lot have not been extinguished by the doctrine of

merger; (B) The easement in Road A appurtenant to the Farm Lot has not been

extinguished by abandonment; and (C)(l) The scope of said easement rights in the

roads consists only of a right-of-way over the roads and a right to maintain certain

utilities along the roads; (C)(2) One purpose of the rights-of-way in the roads is to

provide access to the beaches; (C)(3) Both roads extend from the sea wall to the Atlantic

Ocean and thus to the intertidal zone of the beach; and (C)(4) By virtue of these rights­

of-way, the easements imply general use rights, including recreational rights, within the

intertidal zone of said Crescent Surf Beach and Parsons Beach, but only as acquiesced in

or permitted by the title owner of the intertidal land(s) as well as any and all public use

rights in the intertidal zone of said beaches recognized under Maine law, including the so­

called Colonial Ordinance ofrights of fishing, fowling and navigation.

20 In the first appeal of this matter to the Law Court, Plaintiffs challenged this court's grant of
summary judgment to Defendants based upon an initial conclusion that merger had
extinguished the easements in both roads appurtenant to the Farm Lot. See Rose v. Parsons,
2013 ME 77, 'l['l[ l, 6, 76 A.3d 343. The Law Court's reversal of that ruling was predicated, in
part, on facts that trial revealed to be erroneous. Neither the parties nor the Law Court were
aware at the time of this gap in the record . Thus, the question of merger as it pertains to Road
A appears to now be revived. The court addresses the issue of merger with regard to Road A
and the doctrine of law of the case below in Section III (A)(2) .

21
A. Easements in Road Hand Road A Not Extinguished by Merger

1. RoadH

The doctrine of merger operates to extinguish an easement when there is "unity

of title and possession of the dominant and servient estates in the same person by the

same right." Dority v. Dunning, 78 Me. 381, 387, 6 A. 6, 9 (Me. 1886). Defendants

contend that the easements appurtenant to the Farm Lot comprising part of Road H

were extinguished in 1956 by operation of law under the doctrine of merger when

Helen Parsons Merrill acquired the dominant estate, the Farm Lot, and the two servient

estates, Lot 1 and Lot B.

The Law Court made clear, however, that the rule it was enunciating in Dority v.

Dunning "is subject to qualifications." Id. Thus, for merger to operate, "unity of title"

requires ownership of the estates to be "coextensive, equal in validity, quality, and all

other circumstances of right." 21 Id. If one estate is "held in severalty and the other

only as to a fractional part thereof by the same person, there will be no extinguishment

of such easement." Id.; see Restatement (First) of Property§ 497 cmt. b (1944) ("'unity

of ownership of estates' as used in this Section applies to the unity in one person of

estates in a dominant and servient tenement .... [and] does not extend to estates held

in co-ownership, but only to estates held in severalty."); 28A C.J.S. Easements § 123

(1996) ("[A]n easement is not extinguished under the doctrine of merger by the

21 DorihJ v. Dunning still appears to be sound precedent. It followed Massachusetts case
authority dating back to Ritger v. Parker, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 145 (1851) ("[I]n order to extinguish
an easement, by the unity of title and possession, both of the dominant and servient tenements,
in the same person, he should have a permanent and enduring estate, an estate in fee in both.").
Ritger v. Parker is still prevailing law in Massachusetts, see Busalacchi v. McCabe, 71 Mass. App.
Ct. 493 (Mass . App .Ct. 2008); Mills v. Mason, 120 Mass. 244, 251 (1876), and has been cited with
approval on other grounds by the Maine Law Court. See Lemay v. Anderson, 397 A. 2d 984, 988
n .3 (Me. 1979); see generally Knud E. Hermansen & Donald R. Richards, Maine Roads and
Easements, 48 Me. L. Rev. 197, 268 (1996) ("ownership of dominant estate and a half interest in
the servient estate will not result in unity of title.").

22
acquisition by the owner of the dominant or servient estate of title to only a fractional

part of the other estate.").

Helen Parsons Merrill did not have the requisite unity of title in the lots in

question in order for the doctrine of merger to operate to extinguish the easements in

Road H. She owned one of the servient estates-Lot 1-as a tenant in common with

four others. Since her ownership in all estates was not "coextensive, equal in validity,

quality, and all other circumstances of right," she did not have unity of title to support

extinguishment of her easement in Road H by merger. Dority, 78 Me. at 387, 6 A. at 9.
Defendants urge, in the alternative, that the court should bring the merger issue

into sharper focus and determine that partial extinguishment of the easement in Road H

has occurred as to particular burdened lots. For example, since the boundary of both

servient estates extends to the middle of Road H and since Helen Parsons Merrill held

both the Farm Lot and one of the two servient lots-Lot B-in severalty, Defendants

argue that easement rights in the half of Road H that falls on Lot B should be

extinguished.

The court is not inclined to accept this argument. Partial extinguishment here

would only apply to one segment of Road H-the lower portion of Road H between Lot

1 and Lot B-and not the full length or width of the road. In these circumstances, such

a ruling would have little practical effect or value. The upper portion of Road H,

which runs along the eastern boundary of Lot 1 between Lot 1 and the small,

unidentified island of land on the Plan between Road H and Road G, would not be

affected because Helen Parsons Merrill held only a fractional interest in Lot 1. And

with respect to the portion of Road H running between Lot 1 and Lot B, only the eastern

half of the easement would be extinguished; the western half would be unaffected.

The Farm Lot's owner(s) would still have an intact easement and a right of way over the

23
Lot 1-side of the road. This outcome would be both confusing and difficult to enforce.

Moreover, the principal case Defendants cite in support of partial extinguishment is

distinguishable. See Chase v. Eastman, 563 A.2d 1099 (Me. 1989) (affirming there was an

easement over defendant's property allowing plaintiff, in common with others, to

access the waterfront, even though part of the easement was abandoned by plaintiff's

failure to object to defendant's construction of cottage).

There is another basis for concluding that the easements in Road H have not

been, or should not be, extinguished by merger in these circumstances. The doctrine of

merger is given more limited application with respect to easements that are part of a

recorded subdivision plan or common plan of development. In that instance, complete

unity of title to all dominant and servient estates in the plan is required to extinguish

the easements by merger. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 7.5

(2000) 22 states a "servitude is terminated when all the benefits and burdens come into a

single ownership." Comment c to section 7.5, titled "Application to property subject to

general plan of development," provides as follows:

Because merger takes place only when all the benefits and burdens of the
servitude come into a single ownership, subdivision covenants and
servitudes in other developments with reciprocal servitudes are rarely
terminated by merger. Since each lot, unit, or parcel enjoys the benefit of
the servitudes imposed on every other property in the development, see §
2.14(a), the occasion for merger can arise only when the entire
development is acquired by a single owner.

Restatement (Third) of Property, § 7.5 cmt. c (2000); see also id. § 2.14(a) (conveyance of

land pursuant to a general plan of development implies creation of servitudes

22 The Law Court cited with approval other language in section 7.5 of Restatement (Third) of
Property when holding that the easements in this case had been re-established. See Rose v.
Parsons, 2013 ME 77, CJ[ 10, 76 A.3d 343 ("Transfer of a previously benefited or burdened parcel
into separate ownership does not revive a servitude terminated under the rule of this section.
Revival requires re-creation under the rules stated in Chapter 2.")

24
benefitting and burdening all lots).

The 1915 Plan is a common development plan or subdivision and merits

different treatment with respect to applying the merger doctrine. "Existence of a

general plan is a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances."

Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.14 cmt. f (2000); see, e.g., Murch v. Nash,

2004 ME 139, 9I9I 5-8, 861 A.2d 645 (discussing the creation and details of a subdivision

plan and the conveyance of the lots to the wife and heirs of the decedent landowner).

Pursuant to and at the direction of the will of Charles Parsons, his property was

subdivided for distribution among heirs according to a detailed, intricate plan and

implementing deeds. The Plan was drawn with due consideration not only for the

property distribution itself, but also the configuration and purposes of roads, and

easements therein. Each deed granted "as appurtenant to the ... land and every part

thereof, a right of way over all roads shown on said map" and the right was granted "in

common with others in and to the roads shown on the 1915 Plan." (Joint Ex. 2 at 3-4;

Joint Ex. 3 at 6; Joint Ex. 5 at 4; Joint Ex. 6 at 3; Joint Ex. 7 at 2; Joint Ex. 8 at 5.) This is

consistent with the intent of the trustee/ grantors to assure each lot owner had not only

rights of way over the roads, but also the right to use the roads as utility corridors.

This latter concern was explicitly raised in connection with the creation of the roads so

as to avoid the need to run pipes or wires over any of the lots. Extinguishing these

rights-of-way on a piecemeal basis is contrary to the overall intent and design of the

common plan of development.

The Law Court has not addressed whether the rule articulated in comment c to

section 7.5 of the Restatement (Third) Property applies in Maine. However, the Court

has held private easement rights in roads are created by implication based on estoppel

when grantees acquire property by reference to a plan providing for such roads. See

25
Murch, 2004 JvlE 139, <JI<JI 12-17, 861 A.2d 645 (grantee who acquired property by

reference to a plan received a private right-of-way in proposed streets delineated in the

plan); Callahan v. Ganneston Park Dev. Corp., 245 A.2d 274, 278 (Me. 1968) (grantee who

purchased land by reference to plan had easement in the roads "by implication based

on estoppel"); Arnold v. Boulay, 147 Me. 116, 120, 83 A.2d 574, 576 (1951) (person who

received a deed with a description of land recited as a lot number according to a

recorded plan received all rights contained within the plan, including use of roads on

the plan.); Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me. 460 (1878) (rights-of-way in streets annexed to

subdivision lots cannot be afterwards interrupted or destroyed).2 3

In the unique context of this case, and in light of the principles stated in the

Restatement (Third) Property and consistent with the principles articulated in the Law

Court's decisions cited above, the court finds that something more than mere inaction

or silence is required for merger to extinguish easements passively through operation of

law and on a piecemeal basis with respect to properties that are, and have been,

transferred only among family members and are part of a subdivision/ common

development plan. All of the parties to this action are descendants of Charles Parsons,

whose appointed trustees acted to create a thoughtful, integrated plan of development

for his descendants and heirs in which the roads, and the easements therein, were

considered with much care and attention. The original 1916 deeds effectuating the

23 Two cases cited by Defendants for a contrary position, the Maine case of Warren v. Blake, 54
Me. 276 (1866) and the Massachusetts case of Cheever v. Graves, 592 N.E.2d 758 (Mass App. 1992)
appear distinguishable and/ or not controlling. The Law Court expressly noted in Warren v.
Blake that it was "not called upon to discuss or decide the question [of] how far individuals
holding deeds of lots on other streets, laid down on this plan of 12 acres, can claim a right to
have this distant street always kept open." Blake, 54 Me. at 281. Although Cheever v. Graves
held that merger could extinguish individual easements in a subdivision, not all of the deeds
contained the express easement grants. Cheever, 592 N.E.2d 758. All of the 1916 deeds contain
such grants. Moreover, Cheever v. Graves was a decision by a Massachusetts intermediate
appellate court.

26
1915 Plan granted as appurtenant to each lot a "right of way over all roads shown on

the map [the Plan]." (Joint Ex. 2 at 3; Joint Ex. 3 at 6; Joint Ex. 4 (Page 304 missing)

Joint Ex. 5 at 4; Joint Ex. 6 at 3; Joint Ex. 7 at 2; Joint Ex: 8 at 5.) Plaintiffs acquired the

Farm Lot in 1978 together with all right, title and interest "in common with others, in

and to the roads shown on the 1915 division plan." Rose, 2013 ME 77, 9I 4, 76 A.3d 343.

The court concludes that the easements in Road H appurtenant to the Farm Lot

have not been extinguished by operation of law through the doctrine of merger.

2. RoadA

The issue of merger with respect to Road A was resurrected on the last day of

trial when it became clear from the evidence that the factual predicate for the Law

Court's holding in Rose v. Parsons I no longer proved accurate. 24 During her lifetime,

Llewellyn Swayne Parsons acquired a number of lots that were initially granted to her

siblings or nephew pursuant to the 1915 Plan. By 1948 she acquired the Farm Lot, a

dominant estate with respect to the easements in Road A, and Lots F, 21 and CC, the

servient estates burdened by two of Road A's three segments at issue. (See Joint Exs. 9,

10; Def. Exs. 2(a)-3(d).) Defendants contend that the doctrine of merger extinguished

the easements in Road A that benefitted the Farm Lot because there was unity of title

and possession in Llewellyn Swayne Parsons at that time..­

The Law Court's 2013 decision in Rose v. Parsons I held that, as with Road H, the

easements in Road A were recreated when Llewellyn Swayne Parsons' properties were

devised or conveyed out under her will and codicils upon her death in 1956. Rose,

2013 ME 77, 9I 6, 76 A.3d 343. However, unlike the lots that constitute the servient

estates with respect to Road H, Llewellyn Swayne Parsons did not own the servient

24 See supra note 20.

27
estates with respect to Road A at the time of her death. In 1949 she conveyed Lot F

and in 1950 she conveyed parts of Lots 21 and CC, all to Mary Parsons Liversidge. The

deeds that conveyed the lots to Mary Parsons Liversidge did not reserve or grant a new

easement. (Joint Exs. 9, 10.) One cannot convey-or as in this case devise or convey

by codicil-that which one does not own. And an easement can only be created if the

grantor owns in fee the land under the road. See Warchalowski v. Brown, 417 A.2d 425,

428 (Me. 1980).

Plaintiffs object to the court entertaining this issue. They contend it is settled

law of the case and even if the Law Court was operating on an record that was

subsequently discovered to be inaccurate, this court cannot revisit the merger issue with

respect to Road A. The law of the case doctrine does not preclude, as is the case here,

reconsideration of an issue that was decided on "essentially different facts." Blance v.

Alley, 404 A.2d 587, 589 (Me. 1979) (holding "absent a showing of essentially different

facts, the decision by an appellate court on a given issue is to be followed in the trial

court once the case is remanded."); Raymond v. Raymond, 480 A.2d 718,720 (Me. 1984).

Even though Llewellyn Swayne Parsons had unity of title and possession in

these estates, the court concludes that that the easements in Road A appurtenant to the

Farm Lot were not extinguished by merger because, as concluded above, the 1915 Plan

constituted a common development plan and in order for merger to extinguish the

easements there would need to be unity of title in all lots of the subdivision. 25

25 This conclusion also may be consistent with what Llewellyn Swayne Parsons might have
intended, as inferred from the record evidence. It is true, as Defendants have noted, that she
did not expressly recreate or reserve the easements in Road A in the deeds of conveyance to
Mary Parsons Liversidge with respect to Lots F, 21, and CC. At the same time, however, the
property descriptions in these deeds made a number of references to Road A on the Plan in
delineating the boundaries of the properties conveyed. Nowhere in the deeds did it appear
she intended to extinguish the easements in Road A. In any event, the third segment of Road

28
The court concludes that merger did not extinguish the easements in Road A

appurtenant to the Farm Lot.

B. Abandonment of Road A Not Proven by Clear and Convincing Evidence

Nonuse alone cannot extinguish an easement. Rutland v. Mullen, 2002 ME 98, <JI

10, 798 A.2d 1104. "To prove abandonment a party must show 1) a history of nonuse

coupled with an act or omission evincing a clear intent to abandon, or 2) adverse

possession by the servient estate." Canadian N. Ry. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Me.

1992); Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, <JI 51, 770 A.2d 592. The party seeking to

demonstrate abandonment must prove the above "elements by clear and convincing

evidence, establishing each fact to a high degree of probability." Gravison v. Fisher,

2016 ME 35, <JI 52, 134 A.3d 857. An intent to abandon requires evidence of

"unequivocal acts inconsistent with the further assertion of rights associated with the

existence of the easement." Chase v. Eastman, 563 A.2d 1099, 1102-03 (Me. 1989)).

Such unequivocal acts must be "decisive and conclusive." Canadian N. Ry., 609 A.2d at

1179.

The three segments of Road A at issue in this case were unused for a long period

of time. Llewellyn Swayne Parsons and Helen Parsons Merrill, previous owners of the

Farm Lot, were never seen using these portions of Road A. There was no evidence

that the original devisees of the Farm Lot used these parts of Road A. In the 1930s,

after the Pool House was razed, a fence or a gate was erected across Road A near its

intersection with Road B. 26

A would have been unaffected-or at least the portion of Road A that was on Lot 12, the lot
abutting Lot CC to the east.
26 Read together, the Plan and the Dane Letter suggest that Road A previously continued
southwest over what became Lots W, Hand I and thus was the primary means of access to the
Big House. It appears that the trustees and drafters of the Plan may have intended to close off

29
As noted above, Llewellyn Swayne Parsons conveyed Lot F, Lot 21, and Lot CC,

the Road A servient estates, to Mary Parsons Liversidge in 1949 and 1950. Road A was

referenced as part of the property descriptions, even though there was not an express

reservation of the easements. (Joint Exs. 9, 10.) Several later deeds also referenced

the fact that Road A "was not open." None of these deeds involved the Farm Lot.

In later years, after Kin and Sandra Liversidge acquired their property on Lot

CC, they cleared some of the land, built a driveway, and put in some gardens in the

vicinity of where part of Road A appears on the Plan. As time went on, parts of Road

A became overgrown with vegetation. Kin Liversidge testified that the vegetation he

cleared to build his driveway was thick and consistent with years of growth. The

driveway is in close proximity to, but not coextensive with, the first segment of Road A.

Kin and Sandra Liversidge have created gardens and arbors on or near portions of Road

A. They planted a hedge of bushes along the third segment of Road A. The built an

addition to their home which approaches, but does not infringe upon or obstruct the

third segment of Road A.

For an extended period of time, this road was not used. During some of this

time the servient estate owner undertook actions that appeared inconsistent with its

continued use. However, in order to establish abandonment there must be clear and

convincing evidence of "decisive and conclusive" intent on the part of the dominant estate

owners to abandon the easement. Chase, 563 A.2d at 1102. Defendants have not made

this showing. See Stickney, 2001 ME 69, <[ 52, 770 A.2d 592 (" Although the . . .

this portion of Road A, use the smaller lots established in the footprint of the former Road A as
buffer lots, and redirect "traffic" around onto Road B as the primary means of access to the Big
House, Seven Gables, and other houses on the lots fronting Crescent Surf Beach. When the
Pool House was torn down, there would have been no reason to keep this portion of Road A
open to vehicles . The fact that the road was no longer used for vehicles, however, does not
establish intent to abandon it altogether.

30
driveway is arguably a permanent structure, it is not a decisive act that permanently

obstructs the right-of-way, compelling an objection for the purposes of abandonment."

(emphasis in original)); Rutland, 2002 ME 98, cir 10, 798 A.2d. 1104 ("Neither the building

of a fence across an easement and using it for pasturage, nor a right-of-way overgrown

with trees, blocked by rocks, and inaccessible by car for many years is sufficiently

adverse to constitute abandonment." (internal citations omitted)).

The evidence regarding intent, if any, of the former owners of the Farm Lot,

Llewellyn Swayne Parsons and Helen Parsons Merrill, to abandon the easement in

Road A is indirect, circumstantial, and far from clear and decisive. The testimony of

the current owner of the Farm Lot, Helen Rivas Rose, established the contrary-that she

had no intention of abandoning this easement. After Kin and Sandra Liversidge took

up permanent residence at Parsons Beach around 1980, Plaintiffs gave express, written

notice on more than one occasion of their intent not to abandon Road A.

Further, for the same reasons the evidence does not clearly establish adverse

possession. To prove adverse possession, Defendants must demonstrate that their use

of the property was actual, open, visible, notorious, hostile, under claim of right,

continuous and exclusive for a period of over 20 years. Harvey v. Furrow, 2014 ME 149,

cir 11, 107 A.3d 604. Defendants have not so proven.

C. Scope, Purpose, and Location of Easements in the Roads

1. Scope of Easements

The scope of rights granted in an easement is to be determined from the

language of the deed. Sleeper v. Loring, 2013 ME 112, cir 18, 83 A.3d 769; Matteson v.

Batchelder, 2011 ME 134, cir 16, 32 A.3d 1059. In construing a deed, the court must "give

words their general and ordinary meaning to determine if they create any ambiguity."

Sleeper, 2013 ME 112, cir 12, 83 A.3d at 773. The language of the 1916 deeds was clear

31
and unambiguous as to the scope of easement rights.

Each of the 1916 deeds granted "as appurtenant to the ... land and every part

thereof, a right of way over all roads shown on said map and a right to maintain along all roads

shown on said map water pipes, electric light wires, and telephone wires." (Joint Ex. 2 at 3;

Joint Ex. 3 at 6; Joint Ex. 4 (Page 304 missing) Joint Ex. 5 at 4; Joint Ex. 6 at 3; Joint Ex. 7

at 2; Joint Ex. 8 at 5.) (emphasis added). A "right-of-way" is a "legal right to pass

through property owned by another." Sleeper, 2013 ME 112, <JI 13 n.5, 83 A.3d 769

(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1326 (7th ed. 1999)). Thus, the "right of way

over all roads" means the right to pass and re-pass over the roads as they cross

another's property, nothing more. Similarly, the "right to maintain along all roads"

pipes for water and wires for electricity and telephone is plain and unambiguous.

Based upon the unambiguous language of the deeds, the court concludes that the

scope of the easements is limited to the right to pass over the roads shown on the map;

and the right to maintain water pipes, electric lines, and telephone wires along the

roads depicted on the map. The court rejects the argument Plaintiffs and Party-in­

Interest Fluke put forward that any additional easement rights, specifically the right of

use for general recreational purposes, exist within the boundaries of the roads

themselves. Any rights or activities beyond those expressly specified would exceed

and conflict with the plain, unambiguous language of the deeds.

2. Purpose of Easements

Even though the scope of rights within an easement is clearly set forth in the

deeds, the question of the easements' purpose is not fully answered. See Flaherty v.

Muther, 2011 ME 32, <JI 55, 17 A.3d 640; Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222, 225 (Me. 1979). One

of the purposes of the easements in the roads can be determined from the express

language of the deeds-that is, to delineate specific corridors for laying certain utilities

32
to avoid crossing over individual lots. However, the purpose of the easement's second

component-the "right of way over all roads" -is not clear from the deeds alone. A

right of way over all roads to where? And, for what purpose(s)? When the

"purposes of an express easement are not specifically stated," the court may turn to

extrinsic evidence to "ascertain the objectively manifested intention of the parties [to the

original conveyance]," including facts and circumstances in existence prior to

conveyance. Flaherty, 2011 ME 32, 'II 55, 17 A.3d 640; Fine Line v. Blake, 677 A.2d 1061,

1064 (Me. 1996); Badger, 404 A. 2d at 225; Englishmans Bay Co. v. Jackson, 340 A.2d 198,

200 (Me. 1975).

The Dane Letter is persuasive extrinsic evidence from which the court infers that

one of the intended purposes of the rights of way in the roads was to access the beaches.

It is clear from the Letter, and in particular from the statements of George C. Parsons

quoted therein, that Roads A and H had historically been used to access the beach.

Road H is referred to as "the road leading to the beach between lot B and lot one."

(Joint Ex. 23 at 11.) Further, it stated "People now to get on the western beach ... go

along the road shown on the map running between ... lot one and ... [lot] B." (Joint

Ex. 23 at 11.) The Letter also makes explicit reference to the road "between lot 12 and

lot F.N.P. from E.P.," the third segment of Road A running between Lot CC and Lot 12

on the 1915 Plan, as "the road to the beach." (Joint Ex. 23 at 11.) There is nothing in

the deeds or the Plan evincing an intent to alter this historic usage of the roads, at least

insofar as private access for family lot owners was concerned. Moreover, the Plan

itself, which depicts openings in the sea wall at the intersection with Road H and Road

A, suggests the roads were not intended to terminate abruptly at the sea wall (see

below).

The court therefore finds that one purpose of the right-of-way easements in Road

33
H and Road A was for access to the beaches.

With respect to Road A, the court has considered, but ultimately finds

unpersuasive, Defendants' contention that Road A was not intended to go to the beach

but rather only to the Pool House. Their argument cites a 1908 letter from Henry

Parsons to Edwin Parsons discussing the property and referring to "the road from the

swimming pool to Kennebunk." (Joint Ex. 24 at 2.) Defendants also point to the fact

that the Pool House may have been later extended to be closer to the third segment of

Road A and that once the Pool House was torn down a gate was erected across a section

of Road A and Road A was little used thereafter. 27

The reference to the "road from the swimming pool to Kennebunk" was most

likely a reference to Road A. Even if Road A went to the swimming pool, it does not

preclude the fact that the road also was used to access the beach. The Dane Letter has

a clearer, more direct identification of both the particular segment of Road A being

referenced as well as one of its established purposes. Moreover, Road A appears to

have been the major access road to the entire property at that time. The Pool House

was also proximately located to other parts of Road A, to which Henry Parsons could

just as likely have been referring.

Further the fact that Road A fell into disuse after the Pool House was torn down

likewise does not persuade the court that the intent of the drafters of the deeds and the

Plan was to limit the purpose of Road A's third segment to accessing the Pool House,

especially given its historic use as referenced in the Dane Letter and the manner in

which it is depicted in the Plan.

27 Defendants' argument that the physical existence of sea wall indicated that Road A was
intended to terminate at the wall is addressed below in Section III(C)(3)(b).

34
3. Location of Road H and Road A

Determining the intended location of an easement is a question of law to be

based upon the language of the deed and any recorded plan referenced therein if clear

and unambiguous on their face; and if not, then the court looks to ascertain the intent of

the parties. See French v. Estate of Gutzan, 2015 ME 152, <J[ 7, 128 A.3d 657; Anchors v.

Manter, 1998 ME 152, <J[ 16, 714 A.2d 134. When the precise location of a right of way is

ambiguous on the face of the deeds then location becomes a question of fact. Anchors,

1998 ME 152, <J[ 16, 714 A.2d 134. Moreover, "where a boundary is on the face of the

earth is a question of fact." Hennessy v. Fairley, 2002 Jv1E 76, <J[ 21, 796 A.2d 41. The

party asserting easement rights has the burden of proving its precise location when

there is a dispute as to its location. See French, 2015 Jv1E 152, <J[ 19, 128 A.3d 657.

a. RoadH

The parties have stipulated to the intended location of Road H. They stipulated

that Road H runs between Lot 1 and Lot B as shown, and continues beyond the "line of

sea wall" as shown on the Plan and across the beach to the Atlantic Ocean, terminating

at the low water mark. (Stipulations CJ[ 20.) In other words, the stipulation effectively

provides that Plaintiffs and Party-in-Interest Fluke have access to the intertidal zone of

Crescent Surf Beach via Road H.

Likewise, there seems to be no disagreement as to Road H's location on the face

of the earth. During the September 27th view, parties, counsel, and the court traversed

the relevant part of Road H, which runs between Lot 1 and Lot B as depicted in the

Plan. The road began at a sign erected a number of years ago, ran along a pathway

that was somewhat overgrown but passable and that was distinctly raised in elevation.

The pathway terminated at the sea wall where a set of wooden stairs had been recently

erected. The court so finds that this is the location of Road H on the face of the earth.

35
b. RoadA

The location of Road A 1 in particular its southernmost point of termination and

the location on the face of the earth of its third segment between Lot CC and Lot 12 as

shown on the Plan, remains in dispute.

As to the former issue1 Defendants contend that Road A terminates at, and goes

no further than, the "line of sea wall" as depicted on the Plan. Plaintiffs take the

general position that if Road A was intended to provide access to the beach then it must

pass beyond the sea wall. The parties also contest-or did at one _point-the

dimensions of Road A south of the line of the sea wall.

The court finds that Road A was intended to extend beyond the sea wall to the

water, thus providing access to the intertidal zone of Parsons Beach.

The 1916 deeds alone are not determinative, one way or the other, of this
'
question. As discussed above, the deeds expressly provide a right-of-way easement in

the roads, but beyond that do not make reference to the beaches. The court concluded

above, in light of relevant extrinsic evidence, that one intended purpose of the rights-of­

way was to provide access to the beaches. The deeds do not support the conclusion

that that Road A was intended to terminate at the sea wall. Contrary to Defendants'

reading of the deed conveying Lot 12, the servient estate underlying the southeastern

most portion of Road A, the description of its western boundary does not support the

conclusion that Road A terminates at the sea wall. It is true that the relevant deed

describes the western boundary of Lot 12 by reference to Road A only from the sea wall

north and does not refer to Road A in the description of the boundary line extending
1

28
from the ocean to the sea wall. However, the deed's description of the eastern

28
See supra note 15.

36
boundary of Lot 12 also makes the same distinction in describing the portion of the

boundary north of the sea wall, which expressly references the adjoining Lot AA, and

the portion from the sea wall south to the ocean, which does not include such a

reference. The boundary south of the sea wall is similarly depicted on the Plan as a

dotted line extending from the sea wall to the ocean.

On the other hand, the deeds may support an inference that Road A was

intended to extend to the ocean. Lot 12's deed description vis-a-vis Road A is nearly

identical to the description of Lot l's western boundary that borders Road H. 29 The

deed descriptions of the other two lots adjacent to both of these roads-Lot CC to the

west of the third segment of Road A and Lot B to the east of Road H-are also identical.

In other words, the manner in which the relevant deeds describe the properties adjacent

to Road A and to Road His strikingly similar. 30 Thus, based on the language of the

deeds, there is little difference between the two roads in terms of where their seaward

terminus is located. 31

The 1915 Plan indicates an intention that Road A extend beyond the sea wall to

the beach. The Plan depicts both Road H and Road A at the "line of sea wall" with an

opening in the line, as if to indicate that the roads continue on and do not terminate

there. This stands in contrast with the Plan's depiction of road termination points in

other locations. For example, where Road A meets Lot W there is a solid black line

indicating that Road A terminates its southerly course and turns east. Where Road A

meets Lot L there is a solid black line, indicating that Road A terminates its easterly

29
See supra note 10.
30 The deeds differ in the limited respect that the description of the eastern boundary of Lot 1
is from north to south and the description of the western boundary of lot 12 is from south to
north.
31
Compare Joint Ex. 2 at 2 with Joint Ex. 3 at 2.

37
course and turns south. There is a solid black line across the Road G where it meets

and terminates at Lot K. (See Joint Ex. 47.)

However, despite those details, the Plan is not unambiguous with regard to the

southern terminus of Road A. The omission of a second, parallel dotted line extending

across the beach to the water from the intersection of Road A and the "line of sea wall"

at the southeast corner of Lot CC does not provide a clear, visual impression of a road

crossing the beach (as is the case with Road H) and thus raises at least a question as to

whether Road A was intended to extend past the sea wall. The court considers

relevant extrinsic evidence to answer this question.

In support of their position that Road A terminates at the sea wall, Defendants

rely primarily on extrinsic evidence concerning the physical feature of the sea wall at

the time as well as evidence suggesting that the third segment of Road A was only used

and intended to be used for access to the Pool House. 32 While photographs in

evidence show an "unbroken" sea wall along the oceanfront lots in the area, the wall

was not so high or formidable so as to prevent one from easily stepping down from the

upland onto the sand. (See Joint Ex. 35.) The court has considered, and for the

reasons noted previously, rejected the proposition that the third segment of Road A

existed only to access the Pool House.

The Dane Letter offers more persuasive evidence of an intent to extend Road A

beyond the sea wall. It provides a clear indication that the family at the time

32 Defendants cite the following evidence in support of their position that Road A was only
intended to access the Pool House, not the beach: (i) the proximity of the former Pool House to
the third segment of Road A, as evidenced by the Plan's depiction of the Pool House footprint
on Lot CC, the view taken on September 27tli which demonstrated the approximate location of
the in-ground pool, and testimony of Kin Liversidge regarding the addition to the Pool House
that brought its easter.n side closer to Road A; and (ii) the 1908 letter from Henry Parsons
discussed above. For the reasons discussed, the court does not find this evidence as persuasive
as other record evidence with regard to the intended purpose of Road A.

38
considered Road A as a means of access to Parsons Beach, as the court has previously

concluded. The provision in the deeds for "a right of way over all roads," the Plan's

depiction of the opening in the "line of sea wall" at the intersection with Road A, and

Road H, and the absence of any contrary provisions in either the deeds or the Plan, read

in the light of the historic uses of the roads as made clear in the Dane Letter, lead the

court to find the intent of the trustee/ grantors was to continue the historic use of these

rights of way to the beaches requiring the conclusion that the right of way in Road A

extends beyond the sea wall to the low water mark.

As noted above, the Plan's omission of a second, parallel, dotted line running

from the southeastern corner of Lot CC not only created an ambiguity as to Road A's

southern terminus but also as to its dimension once it extended past the sea wall.

Plaintiffs initially took the position in this litigation that this feature of the Plan

indicated an intent that Road A, as it extended past the sea wall, widened out to the

south and west, encompassing the entire beach area seaward of Lots CC, D and C.

Plaintiffs seemed to abandon this position at trial. If the position was not fully

abandoned, Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof on this point.

The Plan does not depict dotted lines extending from each boundary of the three

lots to the west of Road A-Lots CC, Lot D, and Lot C. This stands in marked contrast

with the fact that in every other instance the Plan depicts the boundaries of oceanfront

lots as extending via dotted lines from the sea wall to the water. While this is a curious

omission in an otherwise meticulously drawn plan, it does not evidence an intention to

widen the dimension of Road A as it extends from the sea wall to the water.

First, the Plan itself does not label this area as "Road A." All other segments of

Road A are expressly labeled as such. It would seem particularly important to include

that label here because it would have been an unusual and counterintuitive notion to

39
consider a wide stretch of beach to be the extension of a 12 1h foot road.

Second, the deeds conveying Lots C, D, and CC clearly and unequivocally

conveyed title to the beach seaward of these lots, down to the ocean. None of the

relevant deeds mention any reservation of a right of way or other encumbrance specific

to this situation. Moreover, the 1916 deeds provide that the servient estates extend to

the mid-point of any road. This construct would be difficult to apply in this instance if

the beach in front of these three lots was considered a "road."

Third, other record evidence does not support the notion that the beach on

Lots C, D, and CC was an extension of Road A. Plaintiffs point to evidence that this

particular stretch of the Parsons Beach was the part of the beach historically used by the

families. They contend this demonstrates the trustee/ grantors' intent to designate an

area of the beach for general use as part of the right-of-way in Road A. However, the

parties stipulated at trial that all of the families used t):le beach in front of their own

houses. (Stipulation at Tr. Trans. Day 2 at 60.) Moreover, as concluded above, the

roads served limited purposes as rights of way for passing over land and as utility

corridors. Neither of those purposes provides support to find this stretch of beach as

an extension of Road A.

The court concludes that Plaintiffs have not shown it more likely than not that

Road A encompassed the entire beach area in front of Lots C, D, and CC.

Even if Plaintiffs had met their burden of showing that Road A was intended to

encompass this entire beach area, such a ruling by the court would have little practical

effect or value. The 1916 deeds expressly granted servient estate owners the right to

alter the precise location of a road across his or her property so long as a "reasonably

convenient route is maintained for the use of the other parties entitled to a right-of-way

over such road." (Joint Ex. 3 at 7.) Even if Road A widened out to encompass the

40
entire beach, Plaintiffs' sole rights therein, as owners of the Farm Lot, would be to cross

over the beach for access to the intertidal zone. Pursuant to the controlling deeds, the

servient estate owners, presently the Liversidges, are entitled to alter the path of the

right-of-way. Thus, the Liversidges could, consistent with their deeds, relocate,

redirect, or limit the right-of-way easement in Road A to a particular route or location. 33

Therefore, the court concludes that the Road A easement appurtenant to the

Farm Lot assures a right to pass from the sea wall to the water, and hence to access the

intertidal zone, and that this is a 12 Vi foot wide extension of the third segment of the

road. And, use of this easement is subject to the right of the servient oceanfront lot

owners to dictate another, specific path that constitutes a "reasonably convenient route"

to the intertidal zone of the beach.

Finally, with regard to the location of the upland portion of the third segment of

Road A between Lot CC and Lot 12 on the face of the earth, the court finds and

concludes that it runs along the raised ground where the Liversidges have planted

shrubbery along their eastward boundary with Lot 12. The 2002 revised site plan of

Kin and Sandra Liversidge' s property provides an accurate depiction of the road as it

lays on the face of the earth relevant to his driveway and property boundaries. (Joint

Ex. 50.) This part of the road is approximately 12 1lz feet wide according to the scale of

the Plan. Of course, as noted, the precise location of the easement right-of-way in the

road can be altered consistent with the deeds so long as a "reasonably convenient

route" is maintained.

4. Extent of Use Rights in the Beaches

By virtue of the easements in the roads appurtenant to the Farm Lot, Plaintiffs

33
The servient estate may not alter the route in such a way that makes it less convenient than
the 12 Vz foot right of way that was depicted in the 1915 plan.

41
claim an unfettered right to use the beaches, including a right of general recreational

use. In asserting this claim, Plaintiffs rely primarily on language found in certain

deeds and Law Court cases discussed below. For the following reasons, the court

rejects their claim.

The 1916 deeds themselves do not convey any general rights of use in the

beaches as part of the easement rights or otherwise. As noted, the 1916 deeds

expressly limit the scope of easement rights to rights-of-way over the roads and for

certain utilities. The rights-of-way in Road H and Road A to the water thus assure the

right to pass over the land to reach the water and hence the intertidal land. Beyond

that, the 1916 deeds are silent with respect to any further use rights, recreational or

otherwise.

Significantly, the oceanfront lots conveyed by the 1916 deeds expressly extended

to the Atlantic Ocean. The lots, therefore, included all land from the sea wall to the

water, encompassing any dry sand portion of the beach (from the upland portion of the

lot to the mean high water line) and the intertidal zone (from the mean high water line

to the mean low water line). The clear intent and result was that each beachfront lot

owner holds title in fee to the beach seaward of the upland portion of the lot conveyed

and down to the water.

Plaintiffs point to more recent deeds in the chain of title of the current servient

owners as a basis for their claim of rights to use the beaches. In 1973, several deeds

conveying some of the properties in question began using the phrase, "adjoining beach

of Atlantic Ocean, all used in common." (Joint Ex. 12 at 2; Joint Ex. 13 at 2; Joint Ex. 14

at 2; Joint Ex. 15 at 2; Joint Ex. 16 at 1; Joint Ex. 17 at 1; Joint Ex. 18 at 2; Joint Ex. 19 at 1;

Joint Ex. 20 at 3.) For multiple reasons these deeds are not relevant to this issue.

First, the above-quoted language did not appear in any Parsons Beach deeds

42
until 1973 when Helen Parsons Merrill, Plaintiffs' mother and predecessor in title to the

Farm Lot, conveyed her fee interests in Lots B and B-2 and her one-third interest in Lot

B-1 to William Parsons. (Ex. 13 at 2.) The deed grants: "all our respective rights,

titles and interests in and to the following properties ... Entire int [sic] (title in HPM) of

combined area of Lots B, B-2, and adjoining beach of Atlantic Ocean., all used in comm.on,

1915 division plan." (Ex. 13 at 1-2.) (underscore in original; italics added).

Second, when read in context this language appears to have a different meaning

from that suggested by Plaintiffs. Lot B-2 is a very small carve-out from Lot B. It

does not have ocean frontage, and likely was never used as a stand-alone lot due to its

small size. The same may be said of Lot B-1, also is a very small carve-out from the

larger Lot B that lacks ocean frontage. It is far more likely that the phrase, "all used in

common, 1915 division plan," was intended to mean that both lots were conveyed to be

"used in common" with one another as well as with the "adjoining beach of Atlantic

Ocean," which previously would have been only part of Lot B and not part of Lot B-2 or

LotB-1.

All but one 34 of the later deeds using this same phrase involved transactions that

(i) were conveying two or more lots, at least one of which did not have ocean frontage,

and (ii) were transferring and/ or consolidating the lots among the children of Mary C.

Parsons Liversidge. (Joint Exs. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20.) Again, in this specific context it

34
The 1973 deed from Llewellyn Parsons Hogan Hall to Matthew and Deborah Head Burns
conveying "Lot 2 and adjoining beach of Atlantic Ocean, used in common, 1915 P-lan[,]" (Ex. 14
at 2.), is the only one of the seven deeds using this phrase that did not convey multiple Jots,
including a lot that did not have ocean frontage. However, even in this instance, given the
absence of any express authority in the prior deeds, it would make more sense to construe this
phrase to mean that Lot 2 and its adjoining beach were all one parcel, as is made clear from the
1916 deeds. Moreover, this deed, dated July 14, 1973, appears to have been prepared by the
same attorney who drafted the May 4, 1973 deed conveying Lots B, B-1 and B-2, in which this
phrase was used, likely for the reasons noted above.

43
would make sense that the intent of the grantor(s) was to provide that all lots conveyed

be "used in common" and that the beach adjoining any ocean front lot be "used in

common" for all of the lots, as the 1915 Plan had intended for the ocean front lot.

Third, none of the deeds using this phrase involve the dominant estate in this

case, the Farm Lot. Even if the court were to construe the phrase to have broader

intent and purpose with respect to conveying general rights to use the beach, these

conveyances do not benefit Plaintiffs as owners of the Farm Lot. Therefore, when

considered in context this language does not establish general recreational rights in the

beach through the easements in the roads, or otherwise. The later deeds using this

phrase have gone beyond the plain language of the 1916 deeds and, therefore, do not

reflect the intent of the grantors of the original deeds.

Plaintiffs rely on several Law Court decisions to support their claim of a right to

use the beaches. See Badger, 404 A.2d 222; Flaherty, 2011 J\1E 32, 17 A.3d 640; Sleeper,

2013 ME 112, 83 A.3d 769. These cases do not hold that a right of way via an easement

to the water overrides the private property rights of ownership in the beach.

Badger v. Hill and Sleeper v. Loring both addressed the question of whether a

deeded right-of-way to an inland body of water included a right for the owners of the

dominant lot to construct a dock at the end of the easement. Badger, 404 A.2d 222;

Sleeper, 2013 ME 112, 83 A.3d 769. The Court held that the easements in both cases

provided access to the water and that the right to construct a dock at the easements'

water-ward terminus fell within the scope of the easements' purpose. However, those

cases are distinguishable in an important respect. The area over which the plaintiffs

sought to construct a dock-the river in Badger and the lake in Sleeper--was not owned

by the defendants in either case. Thus, the imputation of the right to construct a dock

based on the easements' implied purpose and the exercise of that right by the easement

44
holders would not infringe upon any rights of others nor overburden the servient

estates. See Sleeper, 2013 ME 112, c_[ 21, 83 A.3d 769. That is not the case here. The

servient estates include the beach. An unfettered right to use Crescent Surf Beach or

Parsons Beach would directly impact the rights of the fee owners of the land.

Likewise, the Law Court in Flaherty v. Muther did not hold that an easement

right-of-way to access a beach established a general right to recreate inconsistent with

private ownership rights. Flaherty, 2011 ME 32, c_[c_[ 57-58, 17 A.3d 640. Flaherty

involved a "20 foot drainage and walkway easement" over an oceanfront lot in a

subdivision. Id. <JI 5. The easement extended to the high water mark, thus providing

the holder of the easement with access to the intertidal zone. Id. c_[<JI 57-58. Because

the easement, though unambiguous on its face, was "silent as to [its] purpose," the Law

Court affirmed the trial court's reliance upon extrinsic evidence of recent use to

conclude that the "the purpose of the easement was to allow access to Secret Beach for

general recreational purposes." Id. <JI 56. Even then, because the grantor of the

servient estate and easement did not own the intertidal land, the Court expressly

recognized that the general recreational rights created could only be "properly used ...

if the title owner of the intertidal land, who is neither a party to this litigation nor

identified by the record, permits or acquiesces to those uses." Id. c_[ 58.

In Flaherty, there was sufficient evidence in the record to establish that at the time

the subdivision and easement were created there was regular use of the beach for

general recreational purposes. Id. c_[ 57. Here, that is not the case. At the time of the

original conveyances, each heir inherited at least one ocean front lot. Over the years

the families tended to gather on and use the beach in front of their own houses and lots.

While there was also evidence that the portion of Parsons Beach in front of Lot C and

Lot D was commonly and regularly used, it is also true that the families using that part

45
of the beach owned houses and lots landward of that part of the beach.

Moreover, as noted the 1916 deeds made unequivocal grants in fee to the beaches

down to the Atlantic Ocean. Although those grants were subject to easements created,

there is little evidence that around the time the Plan was devised and deeds were

executed to suggest that families regularly used the beaches outside of their own

property. All of the lot owners were family members.

The court finds and concludes that it is more likely than not, given the record

evidence as a whole read in light of the language of the 1916 deeds and the incorporated

1915 Plan, that the intent of the trustee/ granters was for each heir to have separate,

private ownership of the beach area immediately seaward of their upland lot(s), and

that the roads could provide a means of access for family members to go to and use

each other's beach area; however, each owner would nonetheless have the ultimate

right to exclude anyone, including other family members or others, from using his or

her privately owned part of the beach.

This conclusion is buttressed by the silence of the deeds and Plan with respect to

the public's use of the beaches. The Dane Letter posed direct questions to be

addressed regarding the public right of access to the beaches. The Letter suggested, at

least, that the family believed it might have some latitude in determining whether to

change or restrict the public's historic access. The final 1916 deeds are silent in this

regard, and do not recognize any rights in the public, either to use the roads or the

beaches. While the public's use rights are distinct from the family's private use rights,

it is reasonable to infer from this silence and from the structure of the ultimate plan of

distribution, that the trustee/ granters intended, and the deeds reflected an intent, to

limit access to and use of the beaches from what it had been prior to that time, and to

give greater weight to the rights of private property ownership in and to the beaches.

46
That is not to say that the rights-of-way to the beaches via Road Hand Road A

are without purpose or meaning. Consistent with Flaherty and with this judgment,

there are implied rights of use within the intertidal lands of these beaches, and those

rights include general recreational rights if acquiesced in or permitted by the fee

owner(s) of the land. Over and above these rights, there are the limited, common law

rights in Maine to use the intertidal zones of the beaches, including rights of fishing,

fowling, and navigation. See McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 1 28, 28 A.3d 620;

Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989); Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536-37,

45 A. 497, 498 (1900). The court concludes that the 1915 Plan as implemented by the

1916 deeds reflected an intent on the part of the trustee/ grantors to strike a balance

between access to and use of the beaches and the private property interests granted to

the heirs and descendants of Charles Parsons.

Therefore, the court concludes as follows with respect to Plaintiffs' and Party-in-Interest

Mary Elizabeth Fluke's rights of use of the beaches. As owners of the dominant estates

benefited by easements appurtenant to those estates, they have (i) the right to pass over

the roads on the 1915 Plan, including the right to pass over Road H to reach the

intertidal lands of Crescent Surf Beach and the right to pass over Road A to reach the

intertidal lands of Parsons Beach; (ii) rights of use including general recreational rights

within the intertidal

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10811265. Public record. Not legal advice.