# State of Maine v. Glidden

> Superior Court of Maine · April 2, 2015

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10810813

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Maine
- **Decided:** April 2, 2015
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Robert E. Mullen
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
KENNEBEC, SS. CRIMINAL ACTION
Docket No. AUGSC-CR-14-1144

)
STATE OF MAINE, )
)
) ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPRESS
V. )
)
TIFF ANY D. GLIDDEN, )
)

Defendant Tiffany D. Glidden (hereinafter "defendant") moves to suppress any

and all statements, physical evidence, test results, and/or eyewitness identifications on

two grounds: 1) the evidence was obtained after she asserted her Sixth Amendment right

to counsel; and 2) the Miranda warnings she received did not adequately inform her of

her right to counsel. 1 For purposes of the present motion, the parties have stipulated that

the defendant was in custody at all pertinent times.

I. Whether Defendant Invoked Her Right to Counsel:

On November 5, 2014, defendant arrived at the Waterville Police Department.

Officer William Bonney of the Waterville Police Department met the defendant in the

parking lot and escorted her to an interrogation room to await the arrival of Detective

Bryant Jacques of the Maine State Police. Officer Bonney had known the defendant for a

number of years through his work in the Waterville community. Prior to Detective

Jacques' arrival, Officer Bonney spoke briefly with the defendant. During this

conversation, the defendant asked Officer Bonney a question on which she bases her

argument that she invoked her right to counsel. In particular, the defendant maintains she

1
At the hearing, counsel for Ms. Glidden clarified that, for the purposes of the present
motion, she was not pursuing her argument that her statements were involuntary.
invoked her right to counsel by asking, "I want my lawyer, what do I do?" The State

contends the defendant was not invoking her right to counsel, but was instead asking, "If

I want a lawyer, what do I do?''

At the hearing, the State introduced a DVD that contained both an audio and an

audio-visual recording of the conversation. The following is a transcription of the

pertinent conversation between the defendant and Officer Bonney:

Ms. Glidden: Ifl want a lawyer, what do I do?

Officer Bonney: Tell him.

Ms. Glidden: Tell him?

Officer Bonney: Umhuh.

Ms. Glidden: I think I have one, but for a different case.

Officer Bonney: Umhuh.

Ms. Glidden: She's my criminal lawyer. I didn't go to trial last week.

Officer Bonney: Did you fail to appear?

Ms. Glidden: Yeah, for unpaid fines.

Approximately one week after the defendant's arrest and interrogation, Officer

Bonney wrote a report of the events and provided it to the District Attorney's office. In

the report, Officer Bonney stated that the defendant had asked him, "What do I do if I

want a lawyer?" The report notes that Officer Bonney informed Detective Jacques of this

question well after Detective Jacques read the defendant her Miranda rights.

Upon reviewing the audio and audio-visual recording of the interaction, at the

suppression hearing Officer Bonney conceded that his recollection of defendant's

question was not accurate. Instead of asking, "What do I do if I want a lawyer," Officer

2
Bonney maintained that defendant asked, "If I want a lawyer, what do I do?" At the

hearing, the defendant testified that she recalled asking Officer Bonney, "I want my

lawyer, what do I do?"

In Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court established that a suspect subject

to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to have an attorney

present during questioning pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. State v. Nielsen, 2008 ME

77, ~ 15, 946 A.2d 382 (discussing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966)f

If a suspect invokes her right to counsel at any time during an interview with police, she

"is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the

suspect [her]self reinitiates conversation." Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.

452, 458 (1994)). A valid waiver of the right to counsel "cannot be established by

showing only that [the suspect] responded to further police-initiated custodial

interrogation even if [s]he has been advised of [her] rights." Edwards v. Arizona, 451

U.S. 477, 484 (1981).

"In order to invoke one's Fifth Amendment right to counsel, one must do so

unambiguously." Id. at ~ 16 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 459); see also Maryland v.

Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103-04 (2010). "[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that

is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would

have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our

precedents do not require the cessation of questioning." Id. (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at

459). Whether a defendant has invoked her right to counsel is an objective inquiry. Jd.

2
The Law Court has never adopted an equivalent to the Miranda rule or held that a violation of the
Miranda safeguards requires application of an exclusionary rule as a matter of state constitutional law.
State v. Durepo, 472 A.2d 919 (M3. 1984).

3
Once in custody, a defendant does not necessarily invoke her right to counsel

every time she uses the word "lawyer" or "attorney." !d. at ~ 17. For example, a

defendant's statement that he had "talked too much the way it is anyway, without a

lawyer" did not amount to even an ambiguous request for an attorney. !d. (discussing

State v. McCluskie, 611 A.2d 975, 977 (Me. 1992). Similarly, a defendant's statement in

response to Miranda warnings that "his right to an attorney meant that 'I should wait

until I see a lawyer,' was found to be an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel,

and his clarification that he would speak with the police officer at that time served as an

unambiguous, valid waiver of the right." !d. (discussing State v. Alley, 2004 ME 10, ~

28, 841 A.2d 803).

Here, the undersigned has reviewed both the audio and audio-visual recordings of

the defendant's conversation with Officer Bonney multiple times. Although the

conversation is less clear in the audio file, the audio-visual recording makes clear that the

defendant asked, "If I want a lawyer, what do I do?" This question does not constitute an

unambiguous assertion of the right to counsel and does not support Ms. Glidden's motion

to suppress. See State v. Lockhart, 830 A.2d 433,444 (Me. 2003)(defendant's question

as to whether officer thought defendant needed a lawyer was just that, a question, and the

officer properly answered it. Neither the question, nor the exchange between the officer

and defendant that followed, served to invoke defendant's right to an attorney.)

In summary, the undersigned finds the defendant did not invoke her right to

counsel prior to being questioned by either Officer Bonney or Detective Jacques.

4
II. Whether Detective Jacques' Miranda Warnings Adequately Advised Defendant
of Her Right to Counsel:

Following the aforementioned conversation, Detective Jacques arrived and began

questioning the defendant. At the time of the questioning, defendant was twenty years

old, sober, and had a tenth grade education. With defendant's permission, Officer

Bonney stayed in the interrogation room for Detective Jacques' questioning. Following

some preliminary questions, Detective Jacques purported to provide the defendant with

the Miranda warnings. The audio and audio-visual recordings of the interrogation reveal

the following pertinent interaction between the Detective and defendant:

Detective Jacques: I want to ask you some questions. Before I do so I want
to explain your rights. If you have any questions ask me.
You have the absolute right to remain silent. Do you
understand that?

Defendant: Yes.

Detective Jacques: Which means you don't have to say anything if you don't
want to, all right? Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law. Do you understand that?

Defendant: Yes.

Detective Jacques: You have the absolute right to the advice of a lawyer
before any questioning and to the presence of a lawyer
here with you during questioning. Do you understand
that?

Ms. Glidden: Yes.

Detective Jacques: I mean I can't produce you a lawyer, I mean we're not at
that step in the process like we're in a courtroom that's
not where we're at here, you came down to the police
station and we're trying to get you know answer some
questions about what happened and I'm willing to listen.
Do you understand what that means?

Ms. Glidden: Yes.

5
Detective Jacques: And if you want to call a lawyer you can at some point,
ok?

Ms. Glidden: Ok.

Detective Jacques: If you can't afford a lawyer one will be furnished to you
free before any questioning if you desire. Do you
understand that?

Ms. Glidden: Yes.

Detective Jacques: If you decide to answer questions now with or without a
lawyer present, Tiffany, you have the right to stop
answering any time or to stop answering at anytime until
you can talk to a lawyer, do you understand that?

Ms. Glidden: Yes.

Detective Jacques: So if you agree to speak with me, us and at some point
we're going through this and at some point you just don't
want to talk anymore for whatever reason just say that,
that's fme, Ok?

Ms. Glidden: Ok.

Detective Jacques: Tiffany, now having all those rights which I explained to
you in mind, do you wish to answer questions at this time
with me?

Ms. Glidden: Some. Depends on the questions, but yeah, for the most
part.

Detective Jacques: Ok that's kind of what we went over right,

Ms. Glidden: Yeah

Detective Jacques: Ok, so can I check off yes on here or no?

Ms. Glidden: (sighs) Yeah, I will answer some.

6
While Detective Jacques provided Ms. Glidden the Miranda warnings, he filled

out a Miranda warning form. 3 Ms. Glidden, Detective Jacques, and Officer Bonney

signed the form, on which "yes" is checked off in response to the question:

You have the absolute right to the advice of a Lawyer before any
questioning, and to the presence of a Lawyer here with you during
questioning. Do you understand that?

The form also contains the handwritten response, "Yeah (will answer some) in response

to the question, "[n]ow having all those rights which I just explained to you in mind, do

you wish to answer questions at this time?'' The response, "Yeah (will answer some)" is

handwritten on the form.

At the hearing, Ms. Glidden testified that based on the warning Detective Jacques

provided, she did not think she could call her attorney at that time. She explained that

she did not ask to speak to an attorney because she was not in court and did not think it

was time. During cross-examination, Ms. Glidden conceded that she has been arrested

before and has had multiple attorneys represent her in the past. She also conceded that

following the conversation with Officer Bonney, discussed supra in section I, she did not

invoke her right to an attorney over the course of the six hours she was interviewed and

did not tell Detective Jacques she wanted an attorney as Officer Bonney instructed her.

The undersigned finds defendant's testimony that she didn't think she could call her

attorney at the time of the interrogation and that she did not ask to speak to an attorney

because she was not in court and did not think it was time to do so not credible.

In her motion, defendant contends the Miranda warnings she received were not

adequate to inform her of her right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

3
The State introduced the Miranda form in question to the court at the hearing.

7
(1966). In particular, she argues the warning she received was insufficient because it

conditioned her right to counsel upon a future event in violation of California v. Prysock,

453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981). The State responds that the warnings were sufficient and

points to the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989)

for support.

To give force to the United States Constitution's protection against compelled

self-incrimination, the U.S. Supreme Court established in Miranda "certain procedural

safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation." Duckworth at

201; Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59 (2010); see also California v. Prysock, supra.

Taken together, these three opinions "provide guidelines for evaluating the sufficiency of

warnings given to a suspect. Most notable among them is the principle that the warnings

cannot convey a limitation on the rights Miranda requires to be conveyed to the suspect."

State v. Wright, 2015 WL 475847 (Del2015).

The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence of

establishing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. State v.

Lockhart, 830 A.2d 433 (Me. 2003). The State also bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that any interrogation was predicated on proper

compliance with Miranda. State v. Knights, 482 A.2d 436, 440 (Me. 1984).

Miranda prescribed the following four now-familiar warnings:

[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning [1] that he has the
right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in
a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
[4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires.

8
Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. "After

such warnings are provided, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these

rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. As

indicated, this inquiry has two distinct dimensions:

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense
that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been
made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

In sum, the Miranda waiver must be both voluntary and knowing.

A waiver will be found "[o]nly if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of

comprehension .... " !d. "The totality approach permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry

into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation," which may include the

defendant's "age, experience, education, background, and intelligence .... " Fare v.

Michael C, 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). "The prosecution does not need to show that a

defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was express; an implicit waiver of the right to

remain silent is sufficient to admit a defendant's statement into evidence." Berghuis v.

Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (citation omitted).

The right to the presence of an attorney addresses the concern that "[t]he

circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear

the will of one merely made aware of his privilege [to remain silent] by his

interrogators." Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. at 60 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469).

Accordingly, it is "an absolute prerequisite to interrogation, that an individual held for

9
questioning must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to

have the lawyer with him during interrogation." !d. (quotation omitted).

The four warnings Miranda requires are invariable, but the U.S. Supreme Court

has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. !d. at

60. In determining whether police officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, the

U. S. Supreme Court has held that reviewing courts are not required to examine the

words employed "as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The

inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as

required by Miranda." !d. at 60 (quotations omitted).

In California v. Prysock, an officer informed the suspect of his right to a lawyer's

presence during questioning and his right to counsel appointed at no cost. 453 U.S. at

356-57. In particular, the officer stated, "[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer before

you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being questioned, and all

during the questioning. Do you understand this?" !d. at 356. A California court of

appeals found the advice inadequate under Miranda because it lacked an express

statement that the appointment of an attorney would occur prior to the impending

interrogation. !d. at 358-59. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, observing that "nothing

in the warnings given [the defendant] suggested any limitation on the right to the

presence of appointed counsel different from the clearly conveyed rights to a lawyer in

general, including the right to a lawyer before you are questioned, ... while you are being

questioned, and all during the questioning." !d. at 360-61.

Prysock contrasted the permissible situation in the case before it with an

impermissible warning "in which the offer of an appointed attorney was associated with a

10
future time in court .... " Id. at 361 (quotation omitted). As examples of impermissible

warnings that linked "the reference to appointed counsel. .. to a future point in time after

police interrogation," Prysock pointed to United States v. Garcia, 431 F .2d 134 (9th Cir.

1970) and People v. Balinski, 260 Cal.App.2d 705 (1968). Id. at 360. The Court

explained that in Garcia, the Ninth Circuit "found inadequate advice to the defendant that

she could 'have an attorney appointed to represent you when you first appear before the

U.S. Commissioner or the Court."' Id. (quoting Garcia, 431 F.2d at 134). Garcia also

based its holding on the fact that although the defendant was provided several different

versions of the Miranda warning, not one warning fully complied with Miranda and

when "[t]aken together the warnings were inconsistent." 431 F.2d at 134. Garcia

concluded that the warnings failed to adequately inform the defendant of her rights,

explaining that "the offer of counsel must be clarion and firm, not one of mere

impression." Id. Similarly, Prysock explained that in Balinski, "[t]wo separate sets of

warnings were ruled inadequate" for linking the right to counsel a future event when the

first advised the defendant that "if he was charged .. .he would be appointed counsel" and

the second advised the defendant while he was in Illinois and about to be moved to

California that "the court would appoint [an attorney] in Riverside County, [California]."

453 U.S. at 360 (quoting Balinski, 260 Cal.App.2d at 718, 723) (emphasis added by

Prysock).

In Duckworth v. Eagan, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Miranda warning that

could be interpreted as linking the right to counsel to a future event. 492 U.S. at 198. In

particular, Duckworth involved the following, pertinent warning:

You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any
questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this

11
right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to
hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer but one will be
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to
answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop
answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop
answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer.

Id. A divided Seventh Circuit found the advice "that counsel would be appointed 'if and

when you go to court' ... was constitutionally defective because it denies an accused

indigent a clear and unequivocal warning of the right to appointed counsel before any

interrogation and link[s] an indigent's right to counsel before interrogation with a future

event." Id. at 200. The Seventh Circuit believed this language "suggested that only those

accused who can afford an attorney have the right to have one present before answering

any questions and implie[d] that if the accused does not got to court, i.e. the government

does not file charges, the accused is not entitled to counsel at all." Id. at 203 (internal

quotations omitted).

The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit stating that the circuit

"misapprehended the effect of the inclusion of "if and when you go to court" language.

Id. at 203-04. It explained that the instruction accurately described the procedure for the

appointment of counsel in Indiana and that it simply anticipated a question the suspect

might be expected to ask after receiving Miranda warnings, i.e., "when [will he] obtain

counsel." !d. at 204. The Court also noted that "Miranda does not require that attorneys

be producible on call, but only that the suspect be informed, as here, that he has the right

to an attorney before and during questioning, and that an attorney would be appointed for

him if he could not afford one." Id. Accordingly, reading the "if and when" language

together with the other information conveyed-including the warnings that the suspect

could talk to counsel before police asked him questions and could stop answering

12
questions at any time until he talked to a lawyer-the Court held that the warnings, "in

their totality, satisfied Miranda." !d. at 205.

Numerous courts following Duckworth have approved similar conditional

language when otherwise coupled with competent Miranda warnings. See e.g. Henson v.

United States, 563 A.2d 1096, 1097-98 (D.C.l989) (holding that Miranda was not

violated where officer provided standard warning that "[y]ou have the right to talk to a

lawyer for advice before we question you, and to have him with you during questioning,"

and also stated that "the police department does not provide attorneys for defendants, but

[the suspect] would have an opportunity to call himself an attorney" because Duckworth

was on point and the officer did not create the impression that the suspect must locate an

attorney himself); State v. Schwartz, 467 N.W.2d 240, 244, 247 (Iowa 1991) (Miranda

satisfied when suspect informed "[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice

before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during the questioning. You

have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire

one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you

wish, if and when you go to court" as it accurately reflected the procedure for the

appointment of counsel in Iowa); Commonwealth v. Colby, 663 N.E.2d 808, 811 (Mass.

1996) (departure from standard Miranda warnings that stated "if [suspect] could not

afford an attorney, the Commonwealth would attempt to provide one for him" was

harmless error); State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1989) (holding that detective's

advisement that suspect had the right to have an attorney appointed for him by court "at a

later date" was not defective under Miranda because even though "the warning did

inform defendant about the immediate unavailability of court-appointed counsel for him,

13
we do not believe it carried any implication that he was required to submit to an interview

with law enforcement officers without the presence of appointed counsel if he could not

afford one"); State v. Medrano, 751 N.W.2d 102, 109-10 (Minn. 2008) (Miranda warning

found sufficient where officer informed suspect he has "the right to talk to a lawyer now

and have a lawyer present now or at any time during questioning," but also responded to

question about having a lawyer present "now" by explaining the "chances are you won't

be able to talk to a lawyer until tomorrow").

Here, the Miranda warnings Detective Jacques provided to Ms. Glidden are

similar to those found sufficient by the U.S. Supreme Court in Duckworth. In particular,

the defendants in both cases were each initially provided a clear warning that they have

the right to the advice of an attorney before any questioning, and during questioning.

Compare Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 ("You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice

before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning") with

Detective Jacque's warning ("You have the absolute right to the advice of a lawyer

before any questioning and to the presence of a lawyer here with you during

questioning"). Similarly, both Duckworth and Detective Jacques made accurate, but

potentially confusing statements about the unavailability of a lawyer at the present time.

Compare Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 ("We have no way of giving you a lawyer but one

will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court") with Detective

Jacques' warning ("I mean I can't produce you a lawyer, I mean we're not at that step in

the process like we're in a courtroom that's not where we're at here, you came down to

the police station and we're trying to get you know answer some questions about what

happened and I'm willing to listen").

14
While the warnings in the present case are similar to those in Duckworth, they are

not identical. In particular, Duckworth did not involve an equivalent to Detective

Jacques' statement that "if you want to call a lawyer you can at some point." This

statement links the right to counsel to a future event. Had Detective Jacques not qualified

this statement, the undersigned might be more inclined to grant defendant's motion to

suppress. However, following the statement, Detective Jacques provided the following

qualifications: 1) he explained that if defendant could not afford an attorney one would be

provided to her "before any questioning if [she] desire[d]" and 2) that defendant has "the

right to stop answering any time or to stop answering at anytime until [she] can talk to a

lawyer .... " (emphasis added). These qualifications reiterated that defendant did not have

to respond to any ofthe Detective's questions before consulting with counsel who would

be appointed before any questioning.

Furthermore, additional circumstances indicate the defendant knowingly and

voluntarily waived her right to counsel. In particular, the recordings show that Detective

Jacques explained the Miranda warnings to defendant in a clear, deliberate voice and that

defendant was paying attention while the warnings were read to her. The defendant also

stated that she was sober during questioning and understood her rights. This

understanding was evidenced by her qualified response that she would answer some of

the questions posed by the Detective. Defendant acknowledged that she has been arrested

before and has had attorneys appointed to represent her in the past. This fact indicates a

familiarity with her rights under Miranda indicating she was not confused or misled by

Detective Jacques' statement that she could "call a lawyer at some point." Finally,

defendant signed the Miranda waiver form. Although a signed Miranda waiver form is

15
not conclusive on the issue, the presence of one is usually "strong proof' that a suspect

waived their rights. Hart v. Attorney Gen. of the State of Fla., 323 F.3d 884, 893 (11th

Cir. 2003); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-609(2004)("Giving the warnings and

getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility").

Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the court finds the Miranda

warnings provided by Detective Jacques were sufficient and that Ms. Glidden voluntarily

waived these rights.

Accordingly, the Court denies defendant's motion to suppress.

Date: 4/2/2015

BY ~ r: f}1tt_
Robert E. Mullen, Justice
Maine Superior Court

16
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
vs KENNEBEC, ss.
TIFFANY D GLIDDEN Docket No AUGSC-CR-2014-01144
11 WINTER ST APT 3
WATERVILLE ME 04901 DOCKET RECORD

DOB: 09/30/1994
Attorney: DARRICK BANDA State's Attorney: MAEGHAN MALONEY
LAW OFFICES OF RONALD W BOURGET
185 STATE ST
AUGUSTA ME 04330-6407
APPOINTED 11/20/2014

Filing Document: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT Major Case Type: FELONY (CLASS A,B,C)
Filing Date: 11/14/2014

Charge(s)

1 AGGRAVATED ATTEMPTED MURDER 1110412014 CHINA
Seq 8306 17-A 152-A(1) (A) Class A
FOWLIE I MSP
2 CRIMINAL ATTEMPT 1110412014 CHINA
Seq 8374 17-A 152(1)(A) Class A
FOWLIE I MSP
3 CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY 1110412014 CHINA
Seq 8369 17-A 151(1) (A) Class A Charged with INDICTMENT on Supplem
FOWLIE I MSP
4 ELEVATED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 1110412014 CHINA
Seq 10077 17 -A 208-B (1) (A) Class A Charged with INDICTMENT on Supplem
FOWLIE I MSP
5 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 1110412014 CHINA
Seq 629 17 -A 208 (1) (A) Class B Charged with INDICTMENT on Supplem
FOWLIE I MSP
6 CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY 1110412014 CHINA
Seq 8370 17 -A 151 (1) (B) Class B Charged with INDICTMENT on Supplem
FOWLIE I MSP

Docket Events:

11/14/2014 FILING DOCUMENT - CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FILED ON 11/14/2014

11/14/2014 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - INITIAL APPEARANCE SCHEDULED FOR 11/14/2014 at 01:00 p.m.

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
11/19/2014 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - INITIAL APPEARANCE HELD ON 11/14/2014
CHARLES DOW , JUDGE
Defendant Present in Court
11/19/2014 Charge(s): 1,2
CR 200 Page 1 of 3 Printed on: 04/03/2015
TIFFANY D GLIDDEN
AUGSC-CR-2014-01144
DOCKET RECORD
PLEA - NO ANSWER ENTERED BY DEFENDANT ON 11/14/2014

11/19/2014 BAIL BOND- $50,000.00 CASH BAIL BOND SET BY COURT ON 11/14/2014
CHARLES DOW , JUDGE
NOT TO POSSESS ANY DANGEROUS WEAPONS INLCUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO FIREARMS SUBMIT TO
SEARCH AT ANY TIME. HAVE NO DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACT WITH KATHRYN HOPKINS AND CARRISA
BUTKEWICZ. NOT TO ENTER ANY RESIDENCE, PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT, PLACE OF EDUCATION. COMPLY
WITH CURFEW OF 6PM-6AM. MAY BE REVIEWED BY ANY JUDGE OR JUSTICE.
11/19/2014 BAIL BOND - CASH BAIL BOND COND RELEASE ISSUED ON 11/14/2014

11/19/2014 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - STATUS CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 01/13/2015 at 10:00 a.m.

11/19/2014 MOTION- MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 11/17/2014

11/21/2014 MOTION - MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL GRANTED ON 11/20/2014
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
11/21/2014 Party(s): TIFFANY D GLIDDEN
ATTORNEY - APPOINTED ORDERED ON 11/20/2014

Attorney: DARRICK BANDA
11/21/2014 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - STATUS CONFERENCE NOTICE SENT ON 11/21/2014

12/22/2014 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
SUPPLEMENTAL FILING - INDICTMENT FILED ON 12/19/2014

12/22/2014 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - STATUS CONFERENCE NOT HELD ON 12/22/2014

12/22/2014 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULED FOR 01/13/2015 at 10:00 a.m.

12/22/2014 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT NOTICE SENT ON 12/22/2014

01/14/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT HELD ON 01/13/2015
JOSEPH M JABAR , JUSTICE
Defendant Present in Court

READING WAIVED. DEFENDANT INFORMED OF CHARGES. COPY OF INDICTMENT/INFORMATION GIVEN TO
DEFENDANT. 45 DAYS TO FILE MOTIONS
01/14/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
PLEA - NOT GUILTY ENTERED BY DEFENDANT ON 01/13/2015

01/14/2015 HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 03/10/2015 at 08:30 a.m.

01/14/2015 BAIL BOND - CASH BAIL BOND CONTINUED AS POSTED ON 01/13/2015

DEFER ARG.
01/14/2015 HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE NOTICE SENT ON 01/14/2015
CR 200 Page 2 of 3 Printed on: 04/03/2015
TIFFANY D GLIDDEN
AUGSC-CR-2014-01144
DOCKET RECORD

02/28/2015 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 02/27/2015

03/11/2015 HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE HELD ON 03/10/2015

03/11/2015 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 03/26/2015 at 01:00 p.m. in Room No. 1

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
03/11/2015 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE SENT ON 03/10/2015

03/30/2015 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS HELD ON 03/26/2015
ROBERT E MULLEN , JUSTICE
Attorney: DARRICK BANDA
DA: PAUL CAVANAUGH
Defendant Present in Court
03/30/2015 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 03/26/2015
ROBERT E MULLEN , JUSTICE
03/30/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
TRIAL - DOCKET CALL SCHEDULED FOR 04/08/2015 at 09:00 a.m. in Room No. 1

04/03/2015 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED ON 04/02/2015
ROBERT E MULLEN , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
04/03/2015 ORDER - COURT ORDER FILED ON 04/02/2015
ROBERT E MULLEN , JUSTICE
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A TRUE COPY
ATTEST:
Clerk

CR 200 Page 3 of 3 Printed on: 04/03/2015

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10810813. Public record. Not legal advice.