# Henderson v. Estate of Douglas J. Wiggins

> Superior Court of Maine · May 14, 2015

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10810785

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Maine
- **Decided:** May 14, 2015
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** M. Michaela Murphy
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

STATE OF l\t1AINE SUPERIOR COURT
KENNEBEC, SS. LOCATION: AUGUSTA
Docket No. CV-2013-166

JOSHUA HENDERSON, and STACEY )
HENDERSON, as Personal Representatives )
ofthe Estate ofDENNIS R. KAY, ) ORDER ON THE MOTION TO
) DISMISS AND MOTION FOR
Plaintiffs, ) SU~IARY JUDGMENT FIT.,ED BY
) DEFENDANT TRESSA SPRINGMANN,
v. ) AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
) OF THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS J.
ESTATE OF DOUGLAS J. WIGGINS et ) WIGGINS
al, )
)
Defendants. )

Plaintiffs Joshua and Stacey Henderson, as personalrepresentatives of the Estate

of Dennis R. Kay, are seeking to recover against Mr. Wiggins and "Mr. Wiggins d/b/a

Option Rentals" on the theory that Mr. Wiggins negligently caused Mr. Kay's wrongful

death. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Wiggins ordered Mr. Kay to carry _out a

vehicle transfer in conditions he knew were unsafe for driving. (See Amended

Complaint, ~~ 22-32 (hereinafter, "Complaint").)

Defendant Tress Springmann, as personal representative of the Estate ofDouglas

J. Wiggins, moves to dismiss the Complaint arguing that the claims against Mr. Wiggins

are barred by the Workers' Compensation Act. 1 In support of her motion to dismiss, Ms.

Springmann relies on affidavits and exhibits attached thereto. Because Ms.

Springmann' s motion to dismiss relies on documents outside of the pleadings, the court

will treat Ms. Springmann's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. Libner v.

1 The Complaint asserts a wrongful death cause of action against Ms. Springmann
1

(Count I) as well as a claim for punitive damages stemming from the wrongful death
claim (Count III).

1
Maine County Comm 'rs Ass 'n, 2004 NIE 39, ~ 7, 845 A.2d 570 ("if a party files a motion

to dismiss and documents outside the pleadings are presented to, and not excluded by, the

trial court, [it is] treat[ ed] as one for a summary judgment").

Concurrent with this motion, Ms. Springmann also moves for summary judgment

against Counts I and ill of the Complaint contending, in pertinent part, that the Plaintiffs

cannot meet their prima facie burden to establish duty and causation for their wrongful

death claim. 2

For the reasons discussed below, the court grants summary judgment in favor of

Ms. Springmann.

I. Background

A. Allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint

In Plaintiffs' Complaint, they assert that Mr. Wiggins d/b/a Option Rentals

provided services to Budget Truck Rental, LLC ("Budget Truck"), 3 including, but not

limited to, renting Budget Truck vehicles to customers and coordinating the movement of

Budget Truck vehicles among various other business locations throughout New England.

2 As noted in the court's Companion Order in this case granting Budget Truck's

motion for summary judgment against the Plaintiffs, Ms. Springmann and Budget
Truck raised concerns about the impact of their respective motions for summary
judgment against the Plaintiffs' Complaint on one another. In particular, they raised
concerns that admissions andjor statements of fact by the other party in connection
with their respective motion for summary judgment would be binding on the other.
As explained in the Companion Order, pursuant to the November 2011 Advisory
Nate to M.R. Civ. P. 56, the court finds that the admissions or statements of fact by
Ms. Springmann and Budget Truck in their respective motions for summary
judgment are not binding on the other party.
3 At the hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs and counsel for Budget Truck agreed that

Budget Truck was the proper defendant and Plaintiffs thereby dismissed their
claims against the other so-called Budget defendants: Centre Point Fundin& LLC
fjkja Budget Truck Fund\ng, LLC, Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC, and Avis Budge,t
Group, Inc. Accordingly, for the sake of convenience, the court will treat any
references to the Budget defendants as pertaining to Budget Truck.

2
(Pls.' Complaint~ 12.) Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Wiggins d/b/a Option Rentals

"substantially disregarded the safety of his employees and the public in general," "knew

that certain drivers operating under his employ were not licensed to operate motor

vehicles," "would often instruct drivers ... to operate [Budget Truck] vehicles with an

insufficient number of seats to safely seat each driver inside the vehicle," and "knew that

those drivers without proper seating would sit in the cargo area of the vans in lawn chairs

or on blankets while traveling .... " (Id. at~~ 14-17.) More specifically, Plaintiffs assert

that on December 30, 2011 and again on December 31, 2011-the day of Mr. Kay's

allegedly wrongful death-Mr. Wiggins ordered Mr. Kay to use a Budget Truck vehicle to

carry out a vehicle transfer. (See id. at~~ 22-23.) Mr. Wiggins allegedly ordered Mr. Kay

to make this transfer despite knowing there were dangerous weather conditions. (Jd. at~

23.) While carrying out the transfer, Mr. Kay lost control of his vehicle due to dangerous

road conditions and crashed. (Jd. at~~ 28, 31-32.) Mr. Kay was killed in the crash. (Jd. at

~ 32.)

Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts that Mr. Wiggins d/b/a Option Rentals "hired and

paid Dennis Kay on a regular basis to perform for Option Rentals" and that "Dennis Kay

was an employee ofDouglas Wiggins d/b/a Option Rentals." (Jd. at~~ 18-19.) The ·

Amended Complaint does not allege that Mr. Kay was an independent contractor for

Douglas Wiggins d/b/a Option Rentals.

B. Pertinent Facts From the Summary Judgment Record

a. The December 29, 2011 Trip

Mr. Wiggins ordered Mr. Kay to perform a Budget Truck transfer on December

28,2011 at 11:00 p.m. (Pls.' A.S.M.F. ~57.) Mr. Kay and other drivers r:eturned from

3
that transfer during the early morning hours of December 30, 2011. (!d. at ,-r 58.) Mr. Kay

was supposed to perform another Budget Truck transfer for Option Rentals on the evening

of December 30, 2011. (!d. at ,-r 59.) However, on the afternoon of December 30, 2011,

Mr. Kay made his reservations known to Mr. Wiggins about performing a transfer in

inclement weather. (!d. at ,-r 60.) In particular, Mr. Kay spoke to Mr. Wiggins about the

weather and the potential for a storm. (!d. at ,-r 61.) Mr. Wiggins responded that if the

transfer did not occur on the evening ofDecember 30, 2011, it would need to occur on the

morning of December 31, 2011. (!d. at ,-r 62.)

b. The December 31, 2011 Accident

On the morning ofDecember 31, 2011, Mr. Kay picked up his grandsons, Carlton

Norwood and Thomas Bourque, in a Budget Truck van to perform the transfer. (Pls.

A.S.M.F. ,-r 64.) Mr. Bourque testified that when he talked to Mr. Kay on December 30,

2011, Mr. Kay commented that the 31st might be a better day for the transfer because it

was only supposed to rain. (Exhibit A to Ms. Springmann's S.M.F., Deposition of

Thomas Bourque ("Bourque Dep.") 46.) However, as far as Mr. Bourque knew, the

December 31, 2011 transfer could have been carried out on January 1 or 2. (!d. at 44.)

Mr. Bourque explained that when Mr. Kay picked him up on the morning of the

31st, Mr. Kay was happy that the weather was, at the moment, decent for traveling. (!d.)

After picking up Mr. Bourque, Mr. Kay drove the group to Ainslie's Market in Gardiner,

Maine. (!d. at 50-51.) Ainslie's Market is approximately a mile and a halfto two miles

from Mr. Bourque's house. (!d. at 19.)

At Ainslie's Market, Mr. Bourque exited the van and testified that there was a

temperat~re difference between the time he was picked up by ~- Kay and the time they

4
arrived at Ainslie's. (Id. at 51.) He also testified that after the crash, he may have told

Stacey Henderson, Mr. Kay's daughter, that the temperature dropped 20 degrees in the ten

minutes he was in the market. (Jd.) He also stated that the roads were fine one minute and

then the next minute, "the roads were just-- everything happened so fast." (Id. at 52.)

Joshua Henderson, Mr. Kay's son, testified that around 7:00am on the morning of

the 31st, he told his father that bad weather was coming in. (Exhibit D to Ms.

Springmann's S.M.F., Deposition of Joshua Henderson ("J. Henderson Dep.") 40.) This

statement was in reference to the fact that Joshua had heard that there was a chance of

snow later in the day. (Id.) Mr. Kay, however, told Joshua that the roads were wet, but it

was very warm. (Id. at 40-41.) While Joshua was talking to Mr. Kay on the phone, he

looked over at a bank clock and saw that it read 40 degrees. (Id. at 41.)

At 8:00a.m. on the 31st, Joshua testified that he was told to go outside at his

workplace and place salt because the temperature "just dropped dramatically[.]" (Id.)

Joshua described the weather change as "like a SciFi movie. It was like a flash froze

[sic] .... " (Id.) When he went out to salt, Josh testified that the ground was "glazed over,

really iced, yes, and it was very, very cold .... " (Id. at 42.) The co-worker who asked

Joshua to go outside and salt "was standing outside smoking a cigarette" and stated "isn't

it f _ weird?" to which Joshua responded "real weird it seems. It was just warm out a

few seconds ago." (Id.)

To his knowledge, Joshua Henderson testified that neither Mr. Wiggins nor Mr.

Kay knew the weather was going to be bad on December 31, 2011. (Id. at 53-54; see also

Exhibit E. to Ms. Springmann's S.M.F., Deposition of Stacey Henderson ("S. Henderson

,Dep.") 106-1 08) (testifying that, as far as she knew, ne~ther Mr. Wiggins nor Mr. Kay

5
knew that the roads were going to get icy later in the morning of December 31, 2011).)

Joshua opined that it was just a freak accident. (J. Henderson Dep. 55.) Consistent with

this opinion, Mr. Kay's children and other relatives stated that Mr. Kay would not have

taken his grandsons, Messrs. Bourque and Norwood, out on the road that day if he thought

the road conditions would be unsafe. (See id at 54; Bourque Dep. 46-47; S. Henderson

Dep. 108; Exhibit F to Ms. Springmann's S.M.F., Deposition of Donna Henderson ("D.

Henderson Dep.") 40-41.)

The former store manager for Option Rentals, Kimberly McGruder testified that

she arrived at Option Rentals, from her home in Chelsea, Maine, at 8:00am on the

morning ofDecember 31,2011. (Exhibit C to Pls.' A.S.M.F., Deposition ofKimberly

McGruder ("McGruder Dep.") 7-8.) She testified that on her drive in to work the roads

were slick and her car was sliding off the road, although she managed to keep it on the

road. (Jd. at 8.) Similarly, Robert A Maskell, who knew both Mr. Wiggins and Mr. Kay,

testified that December 31, 2011 "was a slippery day. It was a bad day for --you know--

weatherwise, you didn't know where it was going to be slippery and where it wasn't going

to be. And up in their area where they were moving vehicles, it was very slippery."

(Exhibit G to Pls.' A.S.M.F., Deposition of Robert Maskell ("Maskell Dep."), 14-15.)

Official weather records from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration ("NOAA") indicate that the high temperature in the City of Gardiner,

Maine on December 31, 2011 was below freezing at 27 degrees Fahrenheit. (Exhibit J to

Pls.' A. S.M.F ., NOAA Records.) That same day, NOAA records indicate the high

temperate in the City of Augusta was 33 degrees Fahrenheit, with a low of 24 degrees and

0.16 inches of precipitation that day. (Jd.)

6
After leaving Ainslie's Market, Mr. Kay lost control of the van and crashed. (See

Ms. Springmann's S.M.F. ~ 1; Bourque Dep. 20.) Mr. Bourque testified that the accident

occurred approximately 1Y2-2 miles from Ainslie's. (Bourque Dep. 20.) Mr. Kay was

ejected from the van and died as a result of the accident. (Ms. Springmann's S.M.F. ~ 3.)

c. Post Accident Investigation

Gardiner Police Officer, Daniel S. Murray, testified that both he and Trooper

Christopher Rogers agreed "that it didn't look like excessive speed was involved" in the

accident and that "given the nature of the road change, it is not unreasonable to assume

they were traveling the speed limit when they encountered the sudden shift in road

conditions." (Exhibit B to Ms. Springmann's S.M.F., Deposition of Officer Murray

("Murray Dep.") 25-26.) He also testified, however, that it "would not be an unreasonable

position" to opine that the vehicle was driving too fast for the conditions that day. (!d. at

26.) Officer Murray qualified this statement by explaining that "the road conditions

changed very quickly. It wasn't a gradual onset. It was like a flash because I was

surprised approaching the scene where you have that unh-oh feeling." (Id.) Officer

Murray explained that on his way to the scene of the accident, "there was a difference

between the road conditions near Ainslie's Market and the road conditions closer to the

scene of the accident." (!d. at 15.) In particular, he testified that the road conditions

"went from just wet to frozen" and opined that while he was not aware of a change in the

temperature that morning, "[t]here must have been some change because it was wet in the

Ainslie's area and in the accident scene, it was obviously a temperature grading of some

kind that caused the road conditions to change dramatically." (Id. at 15-16.)

7
Trooper Rogers, an accident reconstructionist, stated that his theory about how the

accident occurred was a combination of"[i]cy roads and a vehicle traveling too fast for

those conditions." (Exhibit C to Ms. Springmann's S.M.F., Deposition of Trooper Rogers

("Rogers Dep.") 3, 16-17.) He explained, however, that he wasn't able to determine how

fast the van was going at the time of the accident, but estimated it would not have been

going much faster than the posited speed limit of 55 mph. (Id. at 17.) In his opinion, a

speed of 55 miles per hour was too fast for the icy roads, but he acknowledged that "it is

difficult with icy roads because a half mile back, they may not be icy so it may be fine

there .... " (Id.)

When asked whether there was a flash freeze or sudden change in the weather that

caused the conditions at the scene of the accident, Trooper Rogers testified that he

"vaguely remember[ed] it being icy in other areas around that area that day" and didn't

"think it was just that area, no." (Id. at 18.) In responding to the question, he explained

that he was trying "to put myself back in that cruiser that day driving and I remember

being at a couple different spots and guys talking on the radio back and forth about it

being icy." (Id. at 18.) He also testified that the weather on the morning of the accident

was "cloudy, rainy, misty. Just kind of a dreary day" and that, "for the road to freeze over

the way they [sic] did" must have meant the temperature was in the low 30s. (Id. at 13.)

d. Mr. Wiggins' Post Accident Statements

Ms. McGruder testified that in the first week of January 2012, Mr. Wiggins stated

that "if it were up to him, he would not have sent [Mr. Kay] out on the morning of

December 31 because the weather conditions were too dangerous." .(McGruder Dep. 62,

76-77.) Similarly, Mr. Ma8Jv England Pub. Warehouse,

Inc., 2000 l\1E 76, ~ 7, 749 A.2d 762). The court then turns "to the expectations and

assumptions that have existed historically in matters relating to the reduction or

elimination of risks caused by winter weather." Id at~ 16.

Stemming from this analysis, Alexander looked at Maine's common law,

Legislative law, and the common law of other states in arriving at its determination that

the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care. See id. at~~ 17-32. In particular,

Alexander declined to shift liability to private parties who contract to plow a

municipality's roads noting:

that [defendant's] contractual obligation was to the Town; the Town was
immune from liability through legislative action; the contractual
responsibility was for the plowing of public roa,ds; the precipitating cause
of the road conditions was weather, not [defendant's] actions; and the

28
assignment of a duty in tort in these circumstances could result in open-
ended responsibility for those plowing Maine's roads. Our conclusion is
based not only on legal precedent, but also on common law principles:
creating a new duty is disfavored because ofthe pervasiveness of the
annual risk caused by ice and snow on Maine roads.

!d. at~ 31 (citations omitted).

In support of this holding, Alexander explained that Budzko was "not helpful in

the question of duty before us" because that case was "informed by the nature of

landowner liability for hazardous conditions" much more than "it was related to the

buildup of snow and ice." !d. at~ 24. Alexander explained that Budzko did not involve

an "openended duty," but instead concerned "the ordinary responsibility of a landowner,

regarding a small and manageable part of its property, to make reasonable efforts to

reduce risks to those using the property." Id.

As indicated, Budzko involved an injury suffered by the plaintiff when she slipped

and fell on an icy stairway landing of a commercial building owned by the defendants.

2001 ME 37, ~ 2, 767 A.2d 310. The defendants were responsible for treating snow and

ice during the winter when approximately 500 to 1000 people would enter and exit the

building on a daily basis. !d. at~~ 2-3. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the

plaintiff and the trial court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter oflaw.

!d. at~ 8. On appeal, Budzko affirmed explaining that there was sufficient evidence to

support the jury's finding that the defendants breached their duty to reasonably respond

to foreseeable dangers and keep their premises reasonably safe when significant numbers

of invitees may be anticipated to enter or leave the premises during a winter storm. !d. at

~~ 15-16.

29
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that Maine does not impose open-ended

duties to protect individuals from hazards stemming from inclement weather. Applied to

the present situation, the court finds that an employer does not have a duty to predict

localized weather events that create unsafe driving conditions. Stated differently, Maine

law does not impose a duty on an employer to not only pay attention to weather reports,

but also to predict the conditions on a particular stretch of road before sending a worker

out to travel in a motor vehicle.

However, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and drawing

all reasonable inferences in their favor, there is arguably a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether Mr. Wiggins breached his duty to provide a reasonably safe work

environment. This is because there is evidence that Mr. Wiggins had specific knowledge

ofthe dangerous road conditions on the morning ofDecember 31, 2011, but did not take

any steps to warn or prevent Mr. Kay from driving in said conditions. In particular, Mr.

Maskell testified that Mr. Wiggins "came from- his house is north of there and he said it

was pretty slippery coming in an that it was patchy and he wouldn't have sent them

out. ... " (Maskell Dep., 21.) Although not made clear from the testimony, a reasonable

juror could arguably infer from this statement that Mr. Wiggins' commute took place

before Mr. Kay's accident and was in the same localized area where Mr. Kay was

driving. Building off these inferences, a reasonable juror could credit Mr. Wiggins'

testimony that the roads were slippery and patchy. Furthermore, in light of other

evidence indicating that Mr. Wiggins did tell Mr. Kay to carry out the transfer on

December 31, 2011, 10 a reasonable juror could find Mr. Wiggins was lying about not

1o (McGruder Dep., 50-51.)

30
ordering the transfer-perhaps to assuage his guilt or for fear of liability-but telling the

truth about his knowledge of the dangerous road conditions that morning. Putting this

together, a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Wiggins knew or should have known

that the condition of the local roads upon which Mr. Kay was set to travel were unsafe for

driving. Based on this string of factual determinations, a reasonable juror could arguably

find that Mr. Wiggins breached his duty of care to Mr. Kay by failing to warn or prevent

him from attempting to carry out the vehicle transfer on the morning of December 31,

2011 when he knew the particular local conditions were hazardous. While this evidence

could·be considered too speculative-especially considering that Mr. Wiggins' alleged

statements were made after the accident and could be construed as self-serving-the

court need not grapple too heavily with this issue as it is clear that the Plaintiffs cannot

demonstrate a prima facie case of causation.

B. No Reasonable Juror Could Find that Mr. Wiggins Conduct was a
Proximate Cause of Mr. Kay's Injuries

Budget Truck argues that the Plaintiffs cannot establish that it proximately cause

Mr. Kay's death because the accident was the result of 1) a sudden drop in temperature

that caused the road surface to freeze combined with 2) Mr. Kay driving too fast for the

icy conditions. Budget Truck further argues that there is no evidence that it-or Mr.

Wiggins-knew the conditions were unsafe that day or even that Mr. Kay was going to

drive that day. In support, Budget Truck argues that an hour before the accident, Mr. Kay

thought the weather was fine, Mr. Kay was not the type of person who would put his

grandchildren, Messrs. Norwood and Bourque, in harm's way by taking them on a

transport if he thought the weather was going to be bad, there was no urgency to the

31
transfer, and Mr. Kay could have performed the transfer on a later date if he needed to for

any reason.

Plaintiffs respond that Mr. Wiggins' conduct as an agent for Budget Truck was a

substantial factor in bringing about Mr. Kay's death. In particular, they argue that :N1r.

Wiggins had knowledge of the dangerous weather conditions, but still gave Mr. Kay

specific orders to complete the transfer by December 31, 2011. Indeed, they argue that

after Mr. Kay's death, Mr. Wiggins realized his culpability in the event and began to

falsely tell others that he had not told Mr. Kay to complete the transfer. Plaintiffs further

claim that the weather conditions were not localized and that Mr. Kay was not traveling

at an excessive speed. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that while the weather was one cause of

Mr. Kay's death, a reasonable juror could find that Mr. Wiggins' alleged order that Mr.

Kay perform the transfer was a substantial factor in bringing about his death.

In order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must make out a prima facie

case that Budget Truck-through its own actions or vicariously through Mr. Wiggins-

proximately caused Mr. Kay's death. See Crowe v. Shaw, 2000 NIE 136, ~ 9, 755 A.2d

509. The principle of proximate cause contains two elements, substantiality and

foreseeability. Tolliver v. Dep 't ofTransp., 2008 :ME 83, ~ 42, 948 A.2d 1223. In

particular, "evidence is sufficient to support a finding of cause if the evidence and

inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence indicate that the negligence

played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage and

that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably foreseeable

consequence of the negligence." !d. (quoting Merriam v. Wanger, 2000 NIE 159, ~ 8,

757 A.2d 77). "[T]here :rp.ay be more than one proximate cause of a particular inj.ury."

32
Fournier v. Rochambeau Club, 611 A.2d 578, 579 (Me. 1992). However, "[t]he mere

possibility of such causation is not enough, and when the matter remains one of pure

speculation or conjecture, or even if the probabilities are evenly balanced, a defendant is

entitled to a judgment." 1Vferriam v. Wanger, 2000 l\1E 159, ~ 8, 757 A.2d 77 (citations

omitted).

The question of whether a defendant's acts or omissions were the proximate cause

of a plaintiffs injuries is generally a question of fact reserved for the jury's

determination. Tolliver, 2008l\1E 83, ~ 42, 948 A.2d 1223. However, a jury cannot find

proximate caused based only on speculation or where a claim is wholly unsupported by

the evidence. Estate of Smith v. Cumberland Cnty., 2013l\1E 13, ~ 18, 60 A.3d 759.

In assessing whether the Plaintiffs have presented a prima facie case of causation,

Budget Truck directs the court to Estate of Smith v. Cumberland County, 2013l\1E 13, 60

A.3d 759, Crowe v. Shmv, 2000 NIE 136, 755 A.2d 509, Cyr v. Adamar Assoc. Ltd. Ptrs.,

2000 l\1E 110, 755 A.2d 509, and Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 341 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. App.

1986).

In Estate of Smith v. Cumberland County, the Law Court affirmed summary

judgment for the defendants where there was no evidence that the defendant's action

caused a fatal motorcycle accident. 2013 NIE 13, ~ 1, 60 A.3d 759. In that case, a police

officer observed the decedent travelling at forty-seven miles per hour in a thirty-mile per

hour zone on a motorcycle. I d. at~ 3. Based on that observation, the officer turned

around to follow the motorcycle and activated his emergency lights to initiate a stop. I d.

The motorcycle accelerated to "a very high speed" and the officer reported that he

exceeded ninety.-miles per hour without catching the fleeing motorcycle. I d. at~ 4. At

33
times during the dispute, the motorcycle crossed the centerline and travelled in the

oncoming traffic lane. I d. The officer contends that he lost sight of the motorcycle at an

intersection and when he turned the corner, he saw the motorcycle was off the pavement

on its side and the decedent was lying on the ground approximately twenty-seven feet

from the motorcycle. Id. at~ 5. The officer asserted that his cruiser did not make contact

with the motorcycle, but he admittedly radioed dispatch using an erroneous code

indicating his cruiser was involved in a collision. !d. at~ 5. The parties agreed that there

was no physical evidence that the cruiser made contact with the motorcycle. Id.

Based on this evidence, Estate of Smith found summary judgment was warranted

because there was not sufficient evidence to allow a fact-finder to make a factual

determination in favor of the estate without speculating. Id. at~ 19. This was because

the estate presented no evidence that the officer's vehicle was near the decedent's when

the crash occurred and there existed evidence indicating to the contrary. Id. at~ 20.

This case is similar to the present dispute in that there is no direct physical

connection between the respective defendants' actions and the plaintiffs' injuries.

However, Estate of Smith is distinguishable because the officer in that case did not order

the driver out onto the road, as allegedly happened in this case. (McGruder Dep., 50-51.)

Accordingly, Estate ofSmith provides some insight, but is not dispositive of the causation

question.

Similarly, in Crowe v. Shaw, the Law Court affirmed the trial court's grant of

summary against the plaintiff because it was clear that the defendant did not proximately

cause the plaintiffs injuries. 2000 NIE 136, ~ 2, 755 A.2d 509. In Crowe, the plaintiff

was drjving on Fuller Road in her car with her sister as a passey1ger while the defendant

34
was driving in the opposite direction on the same road with his son as a passenger. !d. at

~ 3. The "weather was poor and the road was icy." !d. As the plaintiffs car crested a

hill, she lost control of her vehicle and it started to slide down the hill. !d. The defendant

saw plaintiffs out of control car and pulled to the right, coming to a stop-or almost to a

stop-next to a snow bank. !d. . Still sliding sideways into the defendant's lane of traffic,

plaintiffs car hit the defendant's. !d. The impact injured the plaintiff and killed her

sister. !d. Approximately one hour after the accident, a blood sample was taken from the

defendant that showed a blood-alcohol level of .06. !d.

Based on these facts, Crowe determined that the defendant's operation of his

vehicle did not in any way contribute to the plaintiffs damages. !d. at ~ 11. This was

because the defendant had stopped, or nearly stopped, his vehicle well to the right of his

side of the road when the plaintiff, having lost control of her vehicle, collided with him.

Because the plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant's operation of his vehicle

while intoxicated caused her injuries, the court granted summary judgment. !d.

Crowe is of limited utility in resolving the causation question in this case because

the defendant in Crowe-while potentially breaching a duty to the public in general by

driving after consuming alcohol-did not take any active role in bringing about the

plaintiffs injuries unlike Mr. Wiggins alleged affirmative action of ordering Mr. Kay to

carry out the transfer on December 31, 2011. (McGruder Dep., 50.)

Next, in Cyr v. Adamar Assoc. Ltd. Ptrs., the Law Court affirmed a grant of

summary judgment because there was no proximate cause between the plaintiffs injuries

and the defendant's actions. 2000 J\1E 110, ~~ 1, 8, 755 A.2d 509. The decedent

1 registered as a guest at a hotel owned and operated by the defendant while attending a

35
work seminar. Id. at~ 2. While in the hotel lounge, the decedent noticed a man was

staring at her. Id. Around 11:00 p.m. the decedent placed a twenty-dollar bill on the

lounge table and told her colleagues to pay for the beer she had just ordered while she

want to the restroom. I d. The decedent never returned to the lounge and her body was

found the next day in a field adjacent to the hotel parking lot. I d. at~ 3. The decedent's

injuries were consistent with a struggle and the man who was staring at the decedent later

pled guilty to murdering her. Id. at~ 3. The hotel did not own the field where the

decedent's body was found. I d.

In Cyr, the court found there was no evidence that the defendant proximately

caused the decedent's death. Id. at~ 7. Although it would not be unreasonable to assume

the decedent was abducted from the defendant's premises, "the evidence does not reveal

whether [the decedent] voluntarily left the [defendant's] property with [the killer] or

whether he abducted her. I d. This lack of evidence and the discovery of the decedent's

body on property not owned by the hotel demonstrated "that the relation between the

[defendant's] security measures and [the decedent's] death is too uncertain and tenuous to

hold [the defendant] liable." Id. While not directly on point, Cyr shares a commonality

with the present case insofar as both plaintiffs premise their causation argument on the

defendants alleged failure to take proper cautionary steps to protect them.

Finally, in Wanless v. Winner's Corp., a Georgia court of appeals affirmed a grant

of summary judgment that the defendant's alleged negligence did not proximately cause

the plaintiffs injuries. 341 S.E.2d at 252. In Wanless, the decedent-a seven-week old

infant-was a passenger in a car driven by her father. Id. at 250. The car was a two-

seater and was also occupied by the decedeqt' s mother and sister. I d. The decedent's

36
mother occupied the passenger seat, her sister was on the floor of the car behind the two

seats, and the decedent was in her mother's lap. Id. None of the passengers wore a seat

belt or a restraining device. Id.

The decedent's father was driving his wife to work at the defendant's restaurant

because the roads around their house were covered with ice and snow. !d. at 250. The

decedent's parents owned two large vehicles, but opted to drive the smaller, two-seated

car. Id. Although the decedent's father was driving very slowly, the car skidded on a

patch of ice, crossed the centerline of the road, and collided with another car. Id. The

decedent's complaint alleged that on the day of the accident, her mother told her

supervisor that she was unable to go to work because a snowstorm had made highway

conditions dangerous. !d. The complaint further alleged that the supervisor told the

decedent's mother that she "must report for work and that her failure to come to work

would result in the termination of her employment." Id.

Wanless determined that the defendant's alleged negligence did not proximately

cause the decedent's death because "the conduct of defendant could have done nothing

more than give rise to the occasion which made plaintiffs injuries possible." Id. at 252.

Instead, "[o]ther circumstances preponderated in causing [decedent's] injuries" and

"defendant's conduct was, at best, a remote cause" thereof. Id. Factually, Wanless is

very similar to, and arguably more egregious than the present dispute. This is because

the supervisor in Wanless explicitly ignored the plaintiffs plea that she did not want to

drive to work due to bad weather shortly before the crash. Id. at 250. In the present case,

Mr. Kay raised concerns about bad weather on December 30, 2011, to which Mr.

Wiggins acceded. (McGruder De_g., 50-51.) There is no evidence, however, that Mr.

37
Kay voiced any concern about performing the transfer the following morning due to

inclement weather. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that Mr. Kay, as well as his

passengers, Messrs. Bourque and Norton, believed the road conditions were fine on the

morning of December 31, 2011. (S. Henderson Dep., 61-62; Bourque Dep., 13, 18; J.

Henderson Dep., 41.)

While Wanless is a Georgia opinion that is not binding on Maine Courts, it can

nevertheless be relied on for its persuasive value. Haag v. Dick, 2002l\1E 92, ~ 16 n.2

(citation to analogous out-of-state cases as persuasive authority is appropriate). Here, the

court finds the reasoning in Wanless persuasive. This is due in part to the court's

determination that Wanless is in line with Maine's limitations on liability stemming from

"the annual risks created by the relatively harsh winters in Maine[.]" See Davis, 2011

l\1E 88, ~ 21, 26 A.3d 787; see also Alexander, 2007l\1E 108, ~ 31, 930 A.2d 1016.

Accordingly, similar to Wanless, the court finds that no reasonable juror could find Mr.

Wiggins was the proximate cause of Mr. Kay's injuries because Mr. Wiggins' conduct

simply gave rise to the occasion which made Mr. Kay's injuries possible. Mr. Wiggins

actions did not play a substantial part in bringing about Mr. Kay's injuries, instead, those

injuries were brought about due to the annual risks posed by Maine's relatively harsh

winters.

III. Plaintiffs' Cause of Action for Punitive Damages Fails

"Punitive damages must be based on underlying tortious conduct by the

defendant." Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979). Here, the

court has rule that plaintiffs' have failed to make out a prima facie case of wrongful

death. Because this is th~ only cause of action underlying plaiptiffs' request for punitive

38
damages, there is no underlying tortious conduct from which plaintiffs can seek, to

recover punitive damages. Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment against

Plaintiffs' cause of action for punitive damages as to defendant Budget Truck.

IV. Conclusion

Even assuming that Budget Truck is vicariously liable for the actions of Mr.

Wiggins, Plaintiffs have failed to make out a prima facie showing that any conduct by

Budget Truck was a proximate cause of Mr. Kay's injuries. At most, Budget Truck's

alleged negligence gave rise to the occasion that made Mr. Kay's injuries possible. This

finding is reinforced by Maine's recognition oflimitations on liability stemming from the

annual risks created by winter weather conditions.

Because this lack of proximate cause warrants summary judgment against

Plaintiffs' wrongful death cause of action against Budget Truck, the court need not-and

does not-address Budget Truck's argument regarding agency and vicarious liability.

Finally, because the award of summary judgment against Plaintiffs' wrongful

death cause of action disposes of the underlying tortious conduct from which Plaintiffs

seek to recover punitive damages, the court grants summary judgment against Plaintiffs'

cause of action for punitive damages as to Budget Truck.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this

Order by reference in the docket.

Dated: May/I-f, 2015

Maine Superior Court

39
JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) - PLAINTIFF SUPERIOR COURT
21 WISCASSET ROAD KENNEBEC, ss.
PITTSTON ME 04345 Docket No AUGSC-CV-2013-00166
Attorney for: JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR)
SUMNER LIPMAN - RETAINED
LIPMAN & KATZ PA DOCKET RECORD
227 WATER STREET
PO BOX 1051
AUGUSTA ME 04332-1051

Attorney for: JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR)
PETER B BICKERMAN - RETAINED
LIPMAN & KATZ PA
227 WATER STREET
PO BOX 1051
AUGUSTA ME 04332-1051

Attorney for: JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR)
DAVID LIPMAN - WITHDRAWN
LIPMAN & KATZ PA
227 WATER STREET
PO BOX 1051
AUGUSTA ME 04332-1051

STACEY HENDERSON - PLAINTIFF
61 WORCESTER STREET
AUGUSTA ME 04330
Attorney for: STACEY HENDERSON
SUMNER LIPMAN - RETAINED
LIPMAN & KATZ PA
227 WATER STREET
PO BOX 1051
AUGUSTA ME 04332-1051

Attorney for: STACEY HENDERSON
PETER B BICKERMAN - RETAINED
LIPMAN & KATZ PA
227 WATER STREET
PO BOX 1051
AUGUSTA ME 04332-1051

Attorney for: STACEY HENDERSON
DAVID LIPMAN - WITHDRAWN
LIPMAN & KATZ PA
227 WATER STREET
PO BOX 1051
AUGUSTA ME 04332-1051

vs
TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR) - DEFENDANT

Page 1 of 14 Printed on: 05/19/2015
AUGSC-CV-2013-00166
DOCKET RECORD
Attorney for: TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
ELIZABETH GERMANI - RETAINED
GERMANI MARTEMUCCI RIGGLE & HILL
43 DEERING STREET
PORTLAND ME 04101

BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC
MICHAEL E SAUCIER - RETAINED
THOMPSON & BOWIE
THREE CANAL PLAZA
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

Attorney for: BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC
HILLARY J BOUCHARD - RETAINED 08/01/2013
THOMPSON & BOWIE
THREE CANAL PLAZA
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC
MICHAEL E SAUCIER - RETAINED
THOMPSON & BOWIE
THREE CANAL PLAZA
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

Attorney for: CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC
HILLARY J BOUCHARD - RETAINED 08/01/2013
THOMPSON & BOWIE
THREE CANAL PLAZA
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC
MICHAEL E SAUCIER - RETAINED
THOMPSON & BOWIE
THREE CANAL PLAZA
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

Attorney for: AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC
HILLARY J BOUCHARD - RETAINED 08/01/2013
THOMPSON & BOWIE
THREE CANAL PLAZA
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

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DOCKET RECORD
AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC
MICHAEL E SAUCIER - RETAINED
THOMPSON & BOWIE
THREE CANAL PLAZA
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

Attorney for: AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC
HILLARY J BOUCHARD - RETAINED 08/01/2013
THOMPSON & BOWIE
THREE CANAL PLAZA
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

Filing Document: COMPLAINT Minor Case Type: AUTO NEGLIGENCE
Filing Date: 07/08/2013

Docket Events:
07/08/2013 FILING DOCUMENT - COMPLAINT FILED ON 07/08/2013

07/08/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR)
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 07/08/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: SUMNER LIPMAN

07/08/2013 Party(s): STACEY HENDERSON
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 07/08/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: SUMNER LIPMAN

07/18/2013 Party(s): CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS SERVED ON 07/09/2013

07/18/2013 Party(s): CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS FILED ON 07/18/2013

07/18/2013 Party(s): AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS SERVED ON 07/09/2013

07/18/2013 Party(s): AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS FILED ON 07/18/2013

07/18/2013 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS SERVED ON 07/18/2013

07/18/2013 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS FILED ON 07/18/2013

08/01/2013 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER FILED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI

08/01/2013 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
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DOCKET RECORD

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI

08/01/2013 Party(s): AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS SERVED ON 07/15/2013
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE BY PAUL MATHEWS AGENT FOR AVIS BUDGET GROUP

08/01/2013 Party(s) : AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS FILED ON 08/01/2013

08/01/2013 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC,CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC
RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER & AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FILED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER

08/01/2013 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER

Party(s): CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER

Party(s): AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER

08/01/2013 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: HILLARY J BOUCHARD

Party(s): CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: HILLARY J BOUCHARD

Party(s): AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: HILLARY J BOUCHARD

08/01/2013 Party(s): AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER

08/01/2013 Party(s): AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: HILLARY J BOUCHARD

08/01/2013 Party(s): AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS SERVED ON 07/15/2013

08/01/2013 Party(s) : AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS FILED ON 08/01/2013

08/01/2013 Party(s): AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC
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DOCKET RECORD

RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER & AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FILED ON 08/01/2013
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER

08/01/2013 ORDER - SCHEDULING ORDER ENTERED ON 08/01/2013
M MICHAELA MURPHY I JUSTICE
ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL

08/01/2013 DISCOVERY FILING - DISCOVERY DEADLINE ENTERED ON 04/01/2014

08/01/2013 ASSIGNMENT - SINGLE JUDGE/JUSTICE ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE ON 08/01/2013
M MICHAELA MURPHY I JUSTICE

08/22/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
OTHER FILING - ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED ON 08/19/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: DAVID LIPMAN

08/22/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR)
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/19/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: DAVID LIPMAN

Party(s): STACEY HENDERSON
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/19/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: DAVID LIPMAN

08/22/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CNSL FILED ON 08/19/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: BENJAMIN J TUCKER

08/27/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CNSL GRANTED ON 08/26/2013
M MICHAELA MURPHY JUSTICE
I

COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL BENJAMIN TUCKER
TO WITHDRAW

10/03/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 09/30/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: PETER B BICKERMAN
PARTIES AGREE TO ADR EXTENSION

10/09/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
OTHER FILING - ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED ON 10/07/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: PETER B BICKERMAN

10/09/2013 Party(s) : JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR)
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 10/07/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: PETER B BICKERMAN

Party(s) : STACEY HENDERSON
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 10/07/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: PETER B BICKERMAN

10/09/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR),STACEY HENDERSON
Page 5 of 14 Printed on: 05/19/2015
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DOCKET RECORD

OTHER FILING - NOTICE WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL FILED ON 10/09/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: DAVID LIPMAN

10/09/2013 Party(s) : JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR)
ATTORNEY - WITHDRAWN ORDERED ON 10/09/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: DAVID LIPMAN

10/09/2013 Party(s): STACEY HENDERSON
ATTORNEY - WITHDRAWN ORDERED ON 10/09/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: DAVID LIPMAN

10/30/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION ALTER/AMEND ORDER/JUDG FILED ON 10/29/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: PETER B BICKERMAN
PLTFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING ORDER

11/03/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION ALTER/AMEND ORDER/JUDG GRANTED ON 10/30/2013
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL EXPERT
WITNESSES: PLTF 4/1, DEFTS 5/1. DISCOVERY 8/1. ADR 3/29. JURY FEES: PLTF 6/27, DEFTS
7/7.

11/03/2013 DISCOVERY FILING - DISCOVERY DEADLINE ENTERED ON 08/01/2014

12/1-9/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR LEAVE FILED ON 12/19/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

12/31/2013 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 12/31/2013
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
DEFENSE COUNSEL HAS INDICATED AN INTENTION TO FILE OBJECTION TO PLTF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

01/07/2014 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 01/03/2014
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH_ GERMANI
DEFT SPRINGMANN'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLTFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/08/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 01/08/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
PLTFS' REPLY TO DEFT SPRINGMAN'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLTFS' MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/10/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR LEAVE GRANTED ON 01/10/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
AMENDED COMPLAINT ADDING COUNT III IS ALLOWED.

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DOCKET RECORD

01/12/2014 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC
OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 01/10/2014
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER
OBJECTION TO PLTF'S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT.

01/23/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR),STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR LEAVE VACATED ON 01/20/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
ORDER IS VACATED. COURT WAS NOT PRESENTED WITH OPPOSITION. SET FOR HEARING.

01/28/2014 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER TO AMENDED PLEADING FILED ON 01/16/2014
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT OF DEFT TRESSA SPRINGMANN

01/28/2014 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 01/23/2014
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI
RE: PLTF'S AMENDED COMPLAINTS DATED 12/18 AND 1/15; ANSWERED ON 1/15, WILL NOT FILE
ANOTHER ANSWER.

01/29/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 01/29/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
(RE: REPLY TO DEFT'S OBJECTION TO PLTF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT)

01/29/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 01/29/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
PLTFS' REPLY TO DEFT BUDGET TRUCK'S OBJECTION TO PLTFS' MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

01/30/2014 HEARING - OTHER MOTION SCHEDULED FOR 02/27/2014 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 2
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
MOTION TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/30/2014 HEARING - OTHER MOTION NOTICE SENT ON 01/30/2014
MOTION TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

02/27/2014 HEARING - OTHER MOTION HELD ON 02/27/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
MOTION TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT ALSO APPEARING:
MICHAEL SAUCIER, ESQ. TAPE 1826, INDEX 1667-2462

02/27/2014 CASE STATUS - DECISION UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 02/27/2014
.M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
PLTF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

03/10/2014 ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 03/09/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
RE: PLTF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED 12/19/13. MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT IS GRANTED OVER OBJECTION OF BOTH DEFENDANTS.
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03/10/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
SUPPLEMENTAL FILING - AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED ON 01/17/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON

03/19/2014 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC,CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS
BUDGET GROUP INC
RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER TO AMENDED PLEADING FILED ON 03/18/2014
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER
ANSWER, DEFENSES, AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO PLTFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT

04/01/2014 ORDER - REPORT OF ADR CONF/ORDER FILED ON 04/01/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY I JUSTICE

04/03/2014 Party(s) : TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
DISCOVERY FILING- RULE 26(G) LETTER FILED ON 04/03/2014

04/04/2014 ORDER - REPORT OF ADR CONF/ORDER UNRESOLVED ON 03/28/2014

04/11/2014 HEARING- 26(G) CONFERENCE REQUESTED ON 04/03/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI

04/11/2014 HEARING- 26(G) CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 04/16/2014 at 12:30 p.m. in Room No. 2
M MICHAELA MURPHY I JUSTICE
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL

04/11/2014 HEARING- 26(G) CONFERENCE NOTICE SENT ON 04/11/2014

04/11/2014 ORDER - REPORT OF ADR CONF/ORDER ENTERED ON 04/09/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY JUSTICE
I

ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL

04/15/2014 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
OTHER FILING - ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED ON 04/14/2014
Defendant's Attorney: AMANDA LYNCH

04/16/2014 HEARING- 26(G) CONFERENCE HELD ON 04/16/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY JUSTICE
I

Defendant's Attorney: AMANDA LYNCH
ALSO PARTICIPATING: MICHAEL SAUCIER, ESQ.

04/16/2014 ORDER- 26(G) ORDER ENTERED ON 04/16/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY JUSTICE
I

ALL OUTSTANDING INFORMATION REQUESTED AS IDENTIFIED IN DEFT SPRINGMANN'S RULE 26(G) FILING
SHALL BE PROVIDED BY 5/9/14, INCLUDING ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

05/02/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 02/24/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY JUSTICE
I

COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL PLTF'S REPLY TO
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT IS ACCEPTED AS TIMELY
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DOCKET RECORD

06/25/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
JURY FILING - DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL FILED ON 06/25/2014

07/29/2014 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC
MOTION - MOTION EXTEND DISCOVERY FILED ON 07/29/2014
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER
CONSENTED-TO MOTION FOR LIMITED EXTENSION OF DISCOVERY

07/30/2014 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC
MOTION - MOTION EXTEND DISCOVERY GRANTED ON 07/30/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL DISCOVERY
EXTENDED SOLELY FOR THE PUTPOSE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF BUDGET TRUCK, TO 9/30/14, AND
DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS DUE BY 10/30/14.

08/13/2014 Party(s) : TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
OTHER FILING - WITNESS & EXHIBIT LIST FILED ON 08/11/2014
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI
DEFT SPRINGMANN

08/13/2014 OTHER FILING - STATEMENT OF TIME FOR TRIAL FILED ON 08/11/2014
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI
5 TO 6 DAYS

08/19/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
OTHER FILING - WITNESS & EXHIBIT LIST FILED ON 08/15/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
PLTFS'

08/19/2014 OTHER FILING - STATEMENT OF TIME FOR TRIAL FILED ON 08/15/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
5 DAYS

08/21/2014 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC
OTHER FILING - WITNESS & EXHIBIT LIST FILED ON 08/21/2014
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER
DEFTS BUDGET/AVIS

08/21/2014 OTHER FILING - STATEMENT OF TIME FOR TRIAL FILED ON 08/21/2014
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER
5 DAYS

10/17/2014 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
MOTION - MOTION TO DISMISS FILED ON 10/14/2014
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI
AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

10/29/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 10/29/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
UNOPPOSED, TO FILE OPPOSITION TO DEFT SPRINGMANN'S MOTION TO DISMISS/SJ

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AUGSC-CV-2013-00166
DOCKET RECORD

11/03/2014 Party{s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 10/31/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL PLTFS'
OPPOSITION TO DEFT SPRINGMANN'S MOTION TO DISMISS/SJ DUE BY 11/14.

11/04/2014 Party{s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL ~LC,CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS
BUDGET GROUP INC
MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED ON 10/30/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER
W/ MEMORANDUM OR LAW, STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

11/12/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 11/12/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
2ND UNOPPOSED MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME TO FILE OPPOSITION TO DEFT SP~INGMANN'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND FOR SJ

11/14/2014 Party{s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 11/13/2014
DANIEL I BILLINGS , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL PLTF'S
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO D/M AND SJ DUE 11/21. DEFT'S REPLY DUE 12/5.

11/21/2014 Party{s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 11/18/2014
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI
DEFT SPRINGMANN'S LIMITED OBJECTION TO BUDGET'S MOTION SJ; OPPOSING SOMF

11/21/2014 Party{s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 11/18/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
UNOPPOSED, TO FILE OPPOSITION TO DEFT BUDGET'S MOTION SJ

11/24/2014 Party{s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR),STACEY HENDERSON
OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 11/21/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
PLTF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFT SPRINGMANN'S MOTION TO DISMISS/SJ, OPPOSING SOMF AND ADDITIONAL
SOMF

12/01/2014 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC,CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS
BUDGET GROUP INC
OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 12/01/2014
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW TO DEFT SPRINGMANN'S LIMITED OBJECTION TO BUDGET TRUCK DEFTS'
MOTION SJ

12/03/2014 Party{s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 11/24/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL PLTF'S
OPPOSITION TO DEFT BUDGET'S MOTION SJ DUE BY 12/10/14.

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DOCKET RECORD

12/11/2014 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 12/04/2014
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI
REPLY TO SUPPORT MOTION TO DISMISS/SJ, REPLY STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS,
AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN SCHWARTZ

12/11/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 12/10/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
2ND UNOPPOSED, TO FILE OPPOSITION TO DEFT BUDGET'S MOTION SJ

12/18/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 12/16/2014
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL PLTF'S
OPPOSITION TO DEFT BUDGET TRUCK'S MOTION SJ DUE BY 12/24/14.

12/30/2014 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 12/24/2014
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
PLTFS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW TO DEFT BUDGET TRUCK'S MOTION SJ, OPPOSING SOMF AND ADDITIONAL
SOMF.

01/08/2015 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 01/05/2015
Defendant's Attorney: ELIZABETH GERMANI
DEFT SPRINGMANN'S LIMITED REPLY SOMF RE: BUDGET'S MOTION SJ

01/09/2015 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS SCHEDULED FOR 02/03/2015 at 09:30 a.m. in Room No. 2
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE

01/09/2015 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS NOTICE SENT ON 01/09/2015

01/09/2015 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT SCHEDULED FOR 02/03/2015 at 09:30 a.m. in Room No. 2
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE

01/09/2015 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOTICE SENT ON 01/09/2015

01/14/2015 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC,CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS
BUDGET GROUP INC
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 01/12/2015
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER
UNOPPOSED, TO FILE MOTION SJ REPLY

01/14/2015 Party(s~: JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR LEAVE FILED ON 01/13/2015
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
TO EXCEED PAGE LIMIT. UNOPPOSED.

01/22/2015 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC,CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS
BUDGET GROUP INC
OTHER FILING - ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED ON 01/16/2015
Defendant's Attorney: BRENDAN R O'ROURKE
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01/22/2015 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC,CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS
BUDGET GROUP INC
OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 01/16/2015
Defendant's Attorney: MICHAEL E SAUCIER
BUDGET DEFTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION SJ, OBJECTIONS/RESPONSES TO PLTFS' OPPOSITION TO
ITS SOMF AND REPLY TO PLTFS' ADDITIONAL FACTS.

01/22/2015 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC,CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS
BUDGET GROUP INC
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 01/20/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL REPLY TO PLTF'S
OPPOSITION TO BUDGET DEFTS MOTION SJ DUE 1/20, AND PAGE LIMIT EXTENDED TO 10 PAGES

01/22/2015 Party(s): JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) ,STACEY HENDERSON
MOTION - MOTION FOR LEAVE GRANTED ON 01/20/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE

01/30/2015 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONTINUED ON 01/30/2015
TO 2/4

01/30/2015 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS CONTINUED ON 01/30/2015
TO 2/4

01/30/2015 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS SCHEDULED FOR 02/04/2015 at 02:45 p.m.
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE

01/30/2015 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS NOTICE SENT ON 01/30/2015

01/30/2015 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT SCHEDULED FOR 02/04/2015 at 02:45 p.m.
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE

01/30/2015 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOTICE SENT ON 01/30/2015

02/04/2015 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT HELD ON 02/04/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
Defendant's Attorney: TRACY HILL
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
ALSO PRESENT: PETER BICKERMAN, ESQ. AND MICHAEL SAUCIER, ESQ. TAPE 2021,
INDEX 2375-3806 UNDER ADVISEMENT

02/04/2015 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS HELD ON 02/04/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
Defendant's Attorney: TRACY HILL
Plaintiff's Attorney: CALEB GANNON
ALSO PRESENT: PETER BICKERMAN, ESQ. AND MICHAEL SAUCIER, ESQ. TAPE 2021,
INDEX 2375-3806 UNDER ADVISEMENT

02/04/2015 CASE STATUS - DECISION UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 02/04/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION SJ

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05/15/2015 Party(s): TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR)
MOTION - MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED ON 05/14/2015
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL ORDER INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE COURT GRANTS
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLTFS' WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSE OF ACTION. COURT GRANTS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST PLTFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS TO MS. SPRINGMANN.

05/15/2015 FINDING - JUDGMENT DETERMINATION ENTERED ON 05/14/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL

ORDER - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED ON 05/14/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL
Judgment entered for TRESSA SPRINGMANN (PR) and against JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) , STACEY
HENDERSON.

05/15/2015 Party(s): BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC,CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS
BUDGET GROUP INC
MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED ON 05/14/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL GRANTED AS TO
DEFT BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL, LLC

05/15/2015 Party(s): CENTRE POINT FUNDING LLC,AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL LLC,AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC
FINDING - PARTIAL DISMISSED W/ PREJUDICE ENTERED ON 05/14/2015
SEE FOOTNOTE 1, ORDER ON BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC'S MOTION SJ

05/15/2015 FINDING - JUDGMENT DETERMINATION ENTERED ON 05/14/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY I JUSTICE
ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL THE COURT GRANTS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST PLTFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS TO DEFT BUDGET TRUCK. THE
COURT GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLTFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS TO
BUDGET TRUCK.

05/15/2015 ORDER - SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED ON 05/14/2015
M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE
ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL THE COURT GRANTS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST PLTFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS TO DEFT BUDGET TRUCK. THE
COURT GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLTFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS TO
BUDGET TRUCK.
Judgment entered for BUDGET TRUCK RENTAL LLC and against JOSHUA HENDERSON (PR) , STACEY
HENDERSON.

05/15/2015 FINDING - FINAL JUDGMENT CASE CLOSED ON 05/15/2015

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DOCKET RECORD

A TRUE COPY
ATTEST:
Clerk

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10810785. Public record. Not legal advice.