# Daniel G. Lilley Law Office v. Flynn

> Superior Court of Maine · May 5, 2014

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10810565

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Maine
- **Decided:** May 5, 2014
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Roland A. Cole
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10810565

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- Finding "[t]he common thread 8 ! - between these exceptions is that mental distress is a particularly likely result of a breach."

## Opinion text

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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION
Docket No. CV-11-403, 1
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DANIEL G. LILLEY LAW OFFICE, P.As"\~~0 ,'='"'' \..~"fo.
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and DANIEL G. LILLEY, (',. ~ <".,.0
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JOHN P. FLYNN,

Defendant

The Plaintiffs Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. and Daniel G. Lilley ("Lilley"), have

moved for summary judgment against the Defendant, John Flynn ("Flynn") on his counterclaims.

Flynn's Answer asserted seven counterclaims: Count I is for breach of contract; Count II is for

fraud in the inducement; Count III is for tortious interference with a prospective economic

advantage; Count IV is for breach and invasion of right to privacy; Count V is for intentional

infliction of emotional distress; Count VI is for quantum meruit; and Count VII is for unjust

enrichment.

Defendant John Flynn, in turn, has cross-moved for a summary judgment finding that the

Original Cases section of the parties' Memorandum of Understanding is an enforceable contract

between Flynn and Lilley concerning the cases Flynn brought from Troubh Heisler to Lilley's

firm. Flynn wants the court to fmd the original cases section of the MOU to be severable and

enforceable.

Broadly speaking, this case arises from an employment relationship that went entirely

awry. It involves a dispute between Attorneys Lilley and Flynn regarding Flynn's ownership of
transferred cases and Flynn's compensation while he was employed by Lilley at Daniel G. Lilley

Law Office, P.A., as well as Flynn's compensation and case ownership after leaving Lilley's law

firm, and Lilley's treatment of Flynn and his clients.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

Flynn worked at Lilley's firm from February 2009 to June 2011. Prior to joining Lilley's

law firm in February 2009, Flynn was an attorney at Troubh Heisler, P.A. He applied to Lilley's

firm after seeing a blind ad for an attorney paying a six-figure salary plus bonuses. Flynn brought

cases with him from his former firm ("Flynn cases"). Before beginning at Lilley's firm, Flynn

drafted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that discussed the employment terms between

Lilley and Flynn. The MOU provided that Flynn was to be paid a salary of $115,000.00 per year.

The MOU also provided that Flynn was to be paid bonuses "based upon results generated", the

amount of which were up to Lilley's discretion, and that some portion of the fees payable to

Flynn from the Flynn cases would be payable to Lilley to compensate him for the resources that

he provided. The MOU was executed by Lilley and Flynn on January 17,2009.

During his employment with Lilley, after Lilley relayed news of the firm's financial

distress, Flynn offered to reduce his salary from $115,000.00 to $100,000. The parties disagree

regarding whether this salary reduction was supposed to be temporary. and compensated for, or

whether the salary reduction was permanent.

While Flynn was still employed by Lilley, a disagreement developed over their differing

interpretations of the MOU and the actual implementation of the MOU. More specifically, the

parties disagreed regarding the original cases section of the MOU, which dealt with cases Flynn

brought with him from Troubh Heisler. In one Flynn case, Paige, Lilley issued Flynn a payment

for $50,000.00 to settle their dispute. The parties have differing interpretations regarding the

2
purpose and effect of that payment. The parties also strongly contest how Flynn should be

compensated for his win in Estate of Braley v. Easterm Maine Medical Center, a medical mal-

practice matter that secured a judgment of over 2 million dollars. After a series of contentious

emails, including a profanity-laden email from Lilley, Flynn announced that he was resigning

from Lilley's firm on May 12, 2011. Flymi and Lilley disagree regarding Lilley's behavior and

intentions with respect to the case in light of Lilley's decision to obtain a new fee agreement for

the case. When Flynn resigned from Lilley's practice, Lilley purportedly decided that a new fee

agreement was necessary, because the original fee agreement was not witnessed. The agreement

was also changed by Lilley to state that compensation was for the Daniel G. Lilley Law Offices,

P.A., rather than simply for counsel.

Flynn states that shortly before he left the firm he was hospitalized due to stress induced

conditions. Lilley allegedly told a number of people that Flynn was hospitalized as a result of a

heart attack.

When Flynn left Lilley's firm on July 1, 2011, some of Flynn's clients followed him.

Lilley responded by sending out attorney's fee lien letters.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW:

"Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals no issues of material fact in

dispute. A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case." Lepage v. Bath

Iron Works Corp., 2006 ME 130, ~ 9, 909 A.2d 629 (citations omitted).

The Law Court has held that "[s]ummary judgment is properly granted if the facts are not

in dispute or, if the defendant has moved for summary judgment, the evidence favoring the

plaintiff is insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff as a matter of law." Curtis v. Porter,

2001 ME 158, ~ 7, 784 A.2d 18; see also Houde v. Millett, 2001 ME 183, ~ 11,787 A.2d757. If

3
"a defendant moves for summary judgment, the plaintiff 'must establish a prima facie case for

each element of her cause of action' that is properly challenged in the defendant's motion."

Curtis, 2001 ME 158, ~ 8, 784 A.2d 18 (quoting Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME

87, ~ 9, 711 A.2d 842); see also Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 1999 ME 196, ~ 9, 742

A.2d 933.

III. DISCUSSION:

a. Breach of contract and cross-motion

In order to demonstrate breach of contract, the party bringing the claim must demonstrate

that there has been a "(1) breach of a material contract term; (2) causation; and (3) damages."

Maine Energy Recovery Co. v. United Steel Structures, Inc., 1999 ME 31, ~ 7, 724 A.2d 1248.

Flynn has alleged that the MOU was a contract that was breached by Lilley in three different

ways: Lilley breached the contract due to his failure to compensate Flynn for his salary

reduction; Lilley breached the contract by retaining Flynn's fees on the Flynn cases; and Lilley

breached the contract by failing to pay Flynn bonuses on cases that originated at the Lilley Law

Office.

The court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary

judgment regarding both Flynn's breach of contract claim, and Flynn's cross-claim for summary

judgment that the Original Cases section of the MOU is severable and enforceable.

1. Salary reduction

Waiver is defmed as "a voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known right and may

be inferred from the acts of the waiving party." Blue Star Corp. v. CKF Properties, LLC, 2009

ME 101, ~ 26, 980 A.2d 1270 (quoting Interstatelndus. Unif. Rental Serv., Inc. v. Couri Pontiac,

Inc., 355 A.2d 913,919 (Me. 1976)); see also Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Pelletier, 2009

4
ME 11, ~ 16, 964 A.2d 630 (quotation omitted) ("Waiver is the voluntary and knowing

relinquishment of a right and may be shown by a course of conduct signifying a purpose not to

stand on a right, and leading, by a reasonable inference, to the conclusion that the right in

question will not be insisted upon.") To prevent a party from enforcing a supposedly waived

right, the party who is relying on the waiver, must show that they believed that the party planned

to voluntarily give up the party's right. Blue Star Corp., 2009 ME 101, 126, 980 A.2d 1270. In

addition, while the Plaintiff contends that a wavier does not have to be permanent, the Law Court

has held that "[f]or waiver to apply, there must be a voluntary or intentional decision to

permanently relinquish a known right." Chalet Susse Int'l, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 597 A.2d

1350, 1352 (Me. 1991).

The parties dispute whether or not Flynn waived his right to his salary of$115,000.00

when he volunteered to take a salary cut to $100,000.00 for the economic benefit of the firm.

Flynn argues that the salary reduction was a temporary arrangement, brought on by Lilley's

claims of fmancial distress, whereunder Flynn was entitled to be compensated for his salary

reduction and reinstated to his original salary. Lilley argues that Flynn waived his right to the

salary under the MOU. The Law Court has determined that waiver is an iss~e of fact. Interstate

Indus. Unif. Rental Serv., Inc. v. Couri Pontiac, Inc., 355 A.2d 913, 919 (Me. 1976). In this

instance, the parties are presenting cont:mdicting factual aecounts regarding the salary reduction.

The parties have presented enough information to show that there is a genuine issue of

material fact regarding whether or not Flynn waived his right to his salary of $115,000.00, and

whether he is entitled to back-payments for the months during which he was paid $15,000.00

less.

5
2. Flynn cases

A contract is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in different ways. Am. Prot.

Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6, ~ 11, 814 A.2d 989. With regard to ambiguous contracts,

the meaning of the contract becomes a question of fact and it is up to the factfinder to interpret

the contract. Id

The Original Cases section of the MOU contains ambiguities regarding fees _from the

Flynn cases, and thereby the court can consider extrinsic evidence. See Pettee v. Young, 2001

ME 15 6, ~ 8, 783 A.2d 63 7. "As a general rule parol evidence of additional terms is admissible

to suppl~ment a partially integrated written agreement if the additional terms are consistent with

the writing." Rogers v. Jackson, 2002 ME 140, ~ 10, 804 A.2d 379. "If a contract leaves open a

key term, the law invokes the standard of reasonableness, and courts will supply the needed

term." Ault v. Pakulski, 520 A.2d 703, 706 (Me. 1987) (Glassman, J., dissenting).

The parties have differing interpretations of the MOU's provisions regarding the Flynn cases,

and whether the Original Cases section of the MOU is enforceable. The Original Cases section

left the fee arrangement between Lilley and Flynn regarding the Flynn cases unresolved.

Provision III of the MOU regarding "Original Cases" contains the following language regarding

fees generated from cases brought over by John Flynn to Lilley's firm: "As compensation for the

assistance, resources, and staff support from Daniel G. Lilley Law Office in the continuing

representation by Mr. Flynn in such cases described above, the parties agree that a percentage of

the attorney's fees payable to Mr. Flynn, shall be payable to the Daniel G. Lilley Law Office."

(Pl.'s Ex. 1.) The MOU fails to state what percentage of the fees will be payable to Lilley and

what percentage of fees will be payable to Flynn. The parties also have starkly different

interpretations regarding the meaning of the $50,000.00 payment that_Lilley made to Flynn

6
following the Paige case, and whether that payment had some sort of effect upon their

arrangement going forward with respect to Flynn cases.

At this juncture, genuine issues of material fact remain that preclude fmding that the Original

Cases section of the MOU was a severable enforceable contract. Because the MOU fails to

clearly provide how fees will be apportioned for the Flynn cases, this court denies Flynn's cross-

motion for summary judgment. It is important that this court hear additional evidence, and that

the jury have the opportunity to decide upon the meaning of the ambiguities in the Original

Cases section through fact fmding. This denial of Flynn's cross-motion is not a fmding that the

Original Cases section is not contractually binding. "[L]ack of a key term is not necessarily fatal

to the enforcement of a contract, as long as the missing term does not indicate a lack of

contractual intent." Pelletier v. Pelletier, 2012 ME 15, ~ 15, 36 A.3d 903.

Flynn has demonstrated that he may be able to demonstrate a breach of contract regarding the

Flynn cases. The MOU m,ay be specific enough for the factfinder to be able to decide upon its

meaning and determine the parties' liabilities. See Fitzgerald v. Hutchins, 2009 ME 115, ~ 17,

983 A.2d 3 82. The jury may be capable of supplying the missing material terms in the Original

Cases section of the MOU, and it may fmd that Lilley did or did not breach the contract, and that

he owes Flynn compensation for his cases, including the BraZe/ case.

Regarding the breach of contract claim with regard to the Flynn cases, this dispute should go

to the factfmder to determine the parties' intent regarding this provision, if the missing

percentage terms can be supplied, whether the parties ever amended this provision, and, whether

Lilley breached the contract.

1
The court notes that Flynn's claims regarding the Braley fee are not res judicata, as the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Wheeler J.) in Troubh Heisler v. Lilley, did not make a finding on the merits
regarding Flynn's cross-claim against Lilley. 2013 WL 7934424 (Me. Super. July 30, 2013). The Troubh
Heisler case is currently up on appeal.

7
3. Lilley cases bonuses

The compensation section ofthe MOU provides:

In addition to the base salary, Mr. Flynn shall also be entitled to payment of bonuses
based upon results generated. Such bonu~s shall be payable at the conclusion of the case
after funds are distributed and the amount of said bonuses shall be at the sole discretion
of Daniel G. Lilley Law Offic~. (Def.'s Ex. C).

The use of the words "shall also be entitled" would suggest an obligation for Lilley to pay

bonuses to Flynn under circumstances described as "results generated." While the amount of the

bonuses was left up to Lilley, this does not necessarily mean that Lilley can award a bonus of

zero when Flynn was entitled to a bonus.

There is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether the bonuses were entjrely up to his

Lilley's discretion, or whether Lilley_ was under a good faith obligation to award bonuses under

certain conditions. Lilley advertised the position as one where compensation would take the form

of a base salary as well as bonuses. Lilley's December 4, 2008 email with Flynn also suggested

bonuses would be paid on a discretionary basis. Additional information is necessary to determine

what "upon results generated" means in the context of the MOU, and to determine whether

bonuses should have been awarded to Flynn on the Lilley cases.

It is clear that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the amount of l?onuses

that Flynn was due from cases he worked on for Lilley.

Lastly, while the breach of contract count survives for trial, the court notes that Flynn

cannot recover emotional distress damages for his breach of contract claim. The Law Court has

noted that emotional distress damages are not usually available for a breach of contract, except in

some limited circumstances other courts and ·the Restatement (Second) of Contracts have allowed

such damages (for example, cases with contracts involving death or innkeepers and their guests).

See McAfee v. Wright, 651 A.2d 371, 372-73 (Me. 1994) (Finding "[t]he common thread

8
! -
between these exceptions is that mental distress is a particularly likely result of a breach.")

Accordingly, Flynn cannot advance his claim for emotional distress damages resulting from

breach of contract.

b. Fraud in the inducement

From reading Flynn's memoranda, it's unclear whether he is truly advancing a claim for

fraudulent inducement or another variation of fraud. In either case, a party can be found

'liable for fraud or deceit if he (1) makes a false representation (2) of a material fact (3) with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is true or false (4) for the
purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon it, and ( 5) the
plaintiff justifiably relies upon the representation as true and acts upon it to [her] damage ....
Reliance is unjustified only if the plaintiffknows the representation is false or its falsity is
obvious to [her].'

Francis v. Stinson, 2000 ME 173, ~ 38, 760 A.2d 209 (quoting Letellier v. Small, 400 A.2d 371,
376 (Me.1979))(alterations in the original). Fraud must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. See Petit v. Key bank, 688 A.2d 427, 431 (Me. 1996).
Regardless of the type of fraud claim Flynn plans to assert at trial, Flynn has failed to

present a prima facie case of fraud in his Statement of Material Facts. Primarily, Flynn has not

demonstrated that Lilley knowingly made false representations to Flynn. While Flynn has

demonstrated that he did not receive bonuses on the Lilley cases, and that the compensation that

he is owed on the Flynn cases is heavily disputed, he has not proven that when the MOU was

drafted and signed Lilley knowingly intended to falsely represent material facts to him.

Accordingly, Lilley is granted summary judgment on Flynn's fraudulent inducement claim.

c. Tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage

To demonstrate tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage (TIPEA) a

party must show "(1) that a valid contract or prospective economic advantage existed; (2) that

the defendant interfered with that contract or advantage through fraud or intimidation; and (3)

that such interference proximately caused damages." Rutlandv. Mullen, 2002 ME 98, ~ 13, 798

9
A.2d 1104. The Law Court has held that when a party is asserting what it believes to be a legal

right, or when a party is asserting a property right, and that legal or property right turns out to be

invalid, those assertions do not constitute fraud or intimidation. Id at 15-16.

Flynn has failed to make a prima facie case of TIP EA. While Flynn has alleged that

Lilley sent lien letters to his clients and made a client enter into a new contingent fee agreement,

Lilley has argued that he believed that his lien letters were valid and that contingent fee

agreements must be witnessed. In addition, Flynn has failed to make a prima facie claim that

Lilley's letters, Lilley's disclosures regarding Flynn's health, or the new fee agreement caused

damages. Accordingly, Lilley is granted summary judgment ori Flynn's claim for TIPEA.

d. Breach and invasion of right to privacy

Flynn brought his claim for breach and invasion of right to privacy pursuant to the

Constitution of the State of Maine, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As an initial matter, the Law Court has held:

In order to state a claim for relief in an action brought under§ 1983, [plaintiffs] must
establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution ... and that the
alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. Private action, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful, may not be reached through section 1983. !d. The same
is true of claims brought directly under the Constitution; most rights secured by the
Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments.

Holland v. Sebunya, 2000 ME 160, ~ 11, 759 A.2d 205 (quotations and citations omitted)

(alterations in the original).

As Flynn is asserting a breach of privacy claim pursuant to the Maine and U.S.

Constitutions and§ 1983 against Lilley, a private actor, his claim fails. Even ifthis court were to

consider Flynn's claim to be a common law right to privacy claim, he has failed to meet the

requirement that Lilley's disclosures "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Loe v.

10
Town a/Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 1991). Lilley is entitled to summary judgment on

this claim.

e. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Lilley alleges that Flynn's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (liED), along

with his claims that request emotional distress damages, are barred by the Worker's

Compensation Act, which provides:

An employer who has secured the payment of compensation in conformity with sections
401 to 407 is exempt from civil actions, either at common law or under sections 901 to
908; Title 14, sections 8101 to 8118; and Title 18-A, section 2-804, involving personal
injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of employment, dr for
death resulting from those injuries.

39-A M.R.S.A. § 104. "The exclusivity and immunity provisions of the Workers' Compensation

Act bar employees from pursuing civil litigation against their employers for injuries incurred in

the course of employment." Li v. C.N Brown Co., 645 A.2d 606, 607 (Me. 1994). Flynn disputes

that his injuries were obtained "in the course of employment." It is unnecessary, however, for

the court to even come to the conclusion that Flynn's liED claim is barred, however, as Flynn

has failed to make a prima facie case for liED.

In order to demonstrate liED, a party must show:

(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or was
certain or substantially certain that such distress would result from his conduct,
Restatement (Second) of Torts s 46, Comment I; (2) the conduct was so "extreme and
outrageous" as to exceed "all possible bounds of decency" and must be regarded as
"atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community," Restatement (Second) of
Torts s 46, Comment D; (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiffs emotional
distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was "severe" so that "no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it." Restatement (Second) of Torts s 46,
Comment};

Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, ·154 (Me. 1979). While it is clear from the

parties' statements that the work environment between Lilley and Flynn became acrimonious,

that there were and are disputes regarding fees and compensation, that 'Lilley possessed a temper

11
and used strong language, Flynn has not produced evidence that Lilley's behavior rose to the

level of"extreme and outrageous" required to prevail on an liED claim. Thereby, summary

judgment is granted to Lilley on Flynn's liED claim.

f. Quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims

Quantum meruit "also sometimes labeled 'contract implied in fact,' involves recovery for

services or materials provided under an implied contract." Paflhausen v. Balano, 1998 ME 47, ~

6, 708 A.2d 269, 271. The parties' actions lead to the inference of a contract. Id The Law Court

in Paflhausen distinguished quantum meruit from unjust enrichment, Id The Law Court defmed

unjust enrichment as "recovery for the value of the benefit retained when there is no contractual

relationship, but when, on the grounds of fairness and justice, the law compels performance of a

legal and moral duty to pay, and the 'damages analysis is hased on principles of equity, not

contract."' Id (quoting Aladdin Elec. Assoc. v. Old Orchard Beach, 645 A.2d 1142, 1145

(Me.1994)). The Law Court explained that in quantum meruit damages are determined by the

value of the services the plaintiff provided, while in unjust enrichment damages are gauged "by

the value of what was inequitably retained." Id at 7. In order to prevail on a claim for quantum

meruit, a party must demonstrate "'that (1) services were rendered to the defendant by the

plaintiff; (2) with the knowledge and consent of the defendant; and (3) under circumstances that

make it reasonable for the plaintiff to expect payment." Id at 8 (quoting Bowden v. Grindle, 651 ,

A.2d 347, 351 (Me.1994)). The performing party must expect to be compensated and the

receiving party must intend to compensate the performing party. Id

To succeed on a claim for unjust enrichment, a party must show that "that it conferred a

benefit on the other party ... that the other party had appreciation or knowledge of the benefit ...

and ... that the acceptance or retention of the benefit was under such circumstances as to make it

12
inequitable for it to retain the benefit without payment of its value." Forrest Associates v.

Passamaquoddy Tribe, 2000 ME 195, ~ 14, 760 A.2d 1041 (quotation marks omitted)

(alterations in the original).

Viewed in the light most sympathetic to Flynn, Flynn has asserted a prima facie case that

he could expect to be compensated for his work on the Flynn and Lilley cases. Flynn has also

made a prima facie case that his work on the Flynn cases benefitted Lilley fmancially, and that

Lilley was obligated to compensate Flynn for his work on the Flynn cases. Genuine issues of

material fact remain regarding whether Lilley intended to compensate Flynn for his work on the

Flynn cases over and above Flynn's salary, and as regards unjust enrichment, whether Lilley

unjustly retained fees and was obligated to compensate Flynn over and above his salary. The

court notes that while Lilley has argued that Flynn cannot succeed on an unjust enrichment claim

if there was a valid contract in place between the two parties, see In re Wage Payment Litig.,

2000 ME 162, 1 19, 759 A.2d 217, Flynn's claim for unjust enrichment can proceed as a claim in

the alternative. The court finds that Flynn's claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment

should proceed to trial.

Accordingly, the court ORDERS that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED as to counts II, III, IV, and V of Defendant's counterclaim, and the Motion is

DENIED as to counts I (with the exception of the issue of emotional distress damages, on which

summary judgment is granted to the Plaintiffs), VI, and VII. Defendant's cross-motion for

summary judgment is DENIED.

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The clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to

Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a). ~

Dated:
on. land A. Cole
JustiJ, Superior Court

14
THE DANIEL G LILLEY LAW OFFICE PA ET AL VS JOHN P FLYNN
UTN:AOCSsr -2011-0088954 CASE #:PORSC-CV-2011-00403

01 0000002967 FRANCO MARK
~~~~~~--------------------------~---------------
THREE CANAL PLAZA PO BOX 4630 PORTLAND ME 04112-4630
F JOHN P FLYNN DEF RTND 09/26/2011
THE DANIEL G LILLEY LAW OFFICE PA ET AL VS JOHN P FLYNN
UTN:AOCSsr -2011-0088954 CASE #:PORSC-CV-2011-00403

'

03 0000007848 MCKEE WALTER
133 STATE STREET AUGUSTA ME 04330
F THE DANIEL G LILLEY LAW OFFICE PA PL RTND 10/24/2011
F DANIEL G LILLEY PL RTND 10/24/2011

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10810565. Public record. Not legal advice.