# Hider v. City of Portland Planning Board

> Superior Court of Maine · March 14, 2012

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10810099

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Maine
- **Decided:** March 14, 2012
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Roland A. Cole
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION
STATE OF MAINE DOCKET NO: AP-11-044
cumberland,ss,Clerk's Office

MARK HIDER, MAR 1 5 2012
Plaintiff,
RECEIVED
V. ORDER
CITY OF PORTLAND
PLANNING BOARD

Defendants.

Before the court is Plaintiff Mark Hider's SOB appeal .of the City of Portland Planning

Board's decision. The City of Portland Planning Board opposes the appeal and asks the

court to dismiss the Plaintiff's action.

BACKGROUND
Enterprise Rent-a-Car (Enterprise) filed an application with the City of Portland

Planning Board (the Board) to expand the paved area, include a maintenance building,

and add a new fueling facility at their ~ 128 Westbrook Street location. Enterprise

hosted a neighborhood meeting concerning the application and the Board held a

workshop about the expansion for abutting landowners and interested parties. Finally,

the Board held a public meeting on August 23, 2011, where they approved the

application.

Plaintiff Jviark Hider (Hider) is an abutting landowner 1 who opposes the

expansions proposed by Enterprise. While Hider did not attend Enterprise's

neighborhood meeting or the Board's workshop he did email the Board written

1The complaint noted that Hider resides at 70 Cobb Street, Portland, Maine, which abuts the
property involved in the Enterprise app.Lica.tion. (Compl. 9I 1.) He does n t m,vn that property.
(Def.'s Br. 4.) During the hearing Hider demonstrat.ed that he owns other abutting property at
76 Cobb Street. As a result, the Board conceded that Hider has standing to pursue this appeal.

1
comments prior to the Board's public meeting. Additionally, Hider attended the public

meeting and spoke for over seven minutes.

The Board is permitted to "adopt its own rules for the conduct of its business."

Portland, Me., Code§ 14-25(b). Pursuant to this permission, the Board has adopted a

"three minute rule."

Members of the public may offer evidence or statements relevant to the
project under consideration. Each speaker shall be limited to three (3)
minutes. The Chair may, at is discretion, extend this period for an
additional three (3) minutes. The Board may grant an initial or any
further extensions upon a majority vote of those present and voting.
Rules of the Portland Planning Board Art. VI(B) §l(E).

Hider, through his attorney Mark Dion, filed a complaint for review of

govermnental action and declaratory judgment on September 28, 2011, and listed the

City of Portland Planning Board as the defendant. 2 Attorney Dion's motion to

withdraw was granted on January 27, 2012. Hider represented himself during the

March 7, 2012, hearing.

DISCUSSION

1. Due Process Violation as an Inde12endent Action

The Superior Court is granted the authority to review the Board's decision by

Sec. 14-29 of the Portland Code. 3 These appeals must be conducted in accordance with

2 The Board argues that it is not the appropriate party for this appeal since Portland's municipal

code does not give it authority to defend its decision on appeal. See Portland, Me., Code§ 14-30;
Inhabitants of the Town of Boothbay Harbor v. Russell, 410 A.2d 554, 560 (Me. 1980) (" Absent a
positive legislative grant of authority ... the board is not a proper party."). Here, the Board is
being asked to defend its procedure against a claim that the Plaintiff's right to due process was
violated by the Board's rules. The Board has sufficient interest in the outcome of this dispute,
since it concerns the constitutionality of its own procedures, to remain as a party to the case. See
Nisbet v. Faunce, 432 A.2d 779, 781 (Me. 1981) (allowing the Board of Overseers to remain as a
party because it was "sufficiently lnterested in the outcome of the dispute").
· The Code addresses appeals as follows:
An appeal from any final decision of the plann ing board as to any rn.atter over
which it has final authority may be taken by any party or by any authorized
officer or agent of the city to the superior court in accordance with Rule SOB of

2
Rule SOB of the :tviaine Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule SOB limits the Superior Court's

appellate review "of any action or failure or refusal to act by a governmental agency,

including any ... board" as allowed by statute or "as otherwise available by law." :tvI.R.

Civ. P. SOB(a). The Board asserts that this claim is an independent action, not a SOB

appeal, and the Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements set out in Rule SOB(i)

regarding independent actions. The court agrees.

The Plaintiff has not asked the court to review the Board's actions; instead he

asked the court to declare the Board's procedures unconstitutional. Such a request does

not fall ·within the scope of M.R. Civ. P. SOB. Rule SOB(i) controls independent actions

and requires the Plaintiff to file a motion "requesting the court to specify the fuh1re

course of proceedings." M.R. Civ. P. SOB(i). The Plaintiff failed to file this motion;

therefore this claim is not properly before the court.

Additionally, the Board's imposition of the three-minute rule does not violate

Hider's due process rights. 4 With regards to agency hearings and property rights, a

party's right to procedural due process is protected if he is "given notice of and an

opportunity to be heard at proceedings in which his property rights are at stake."

Niutton Hill Estates, Inc. v. Oakland, 468 A.2d 989, 992 (Me. 1983)_. In order to ensure that

the public was given an adequate opportunity to be heard the Board needed to "strike a

fair and reasonable balance between its interest in efficiency and the public's right to

speak." Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, 1999 ME 112, CJ[ 20, 736 A.2d 241 (noting that the

the Maine Rul s of Civil Procedlrre. No appeal shall lie concerning any ma lt er as
to which the p wer of the board is lhTtited to the making 0£ a reconunendation.
Section 14-29
1
The Board asserts that the th.ree-m.im1 te rule was not eveJ1 applied to Hider during the public
me ting because he spoke for over seven minutes. The rul includes allowing the Chairperson
Lo allow for additional time. Even though he spoke £or more than three minutes the rule was
applied t him. His comments ended with the Chairperson 0£ the Board telling him his time
was up. (MeeLing Tr. 25:11-12.) As a result, he was poterttially restricted by the rule .

3
right to address the T_o wn Council is not unlimited). Here, it is undisputed that Hider

was given notice. He was also given several opportunities to be heard both orally and

in writing.

In Crispin v. Town of Scarborough the Law Court determined that a similar three­

minute rule provided the public with an adequate opportunity to be heard. Id. at 91: 21.

The Town Council allowed members of the public "three minutes to make initial

comments, and [individuals were] allowed a second chance to speak after everyone

present had been given an opportunity to speak once." Id. at 91: 19. The Law Court

found that "[i]n light of the number of people who wished to address the Town

Council, both for and against the project, the Council's decision to limit initial

comments to three minutes represented a reasonable balancing of the interest of the

public." Id. at <]I 21. Similarly, the court finds that the Board's three-minute rule

provides the public an opportunity to be heard and therefore Hider's due process rights

were not violated.

2. Merits of the Enterprise Ap12licati n

During the March 7, 2012, hearing Hider presented several arguments that were

not included in the complaint. These arguments addressed the merits of the Enterprise

application and the overall review process used by the Board. Additionally, Hider

requested a trial of the facts. While these arguments are appropriate for an SOB appeal

the court cannot consider them at this time.

Rule SOB incorporates the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure and provides

additional guidelines for the Superior Court's review of government actions. M.R. Civ.

P. SOB(a). Pursuant to :tvI.R. Civ. P. SOB(d) a party may move for a limited trial of the

facts. "The purpose of such a trial is not to retry the facts but rather to permit the court

to obtain facts that are not present in the record." Silsby v. Belch, 2008 ME 104, 91: 6, 952
)

4
A.2d 218 (citing Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7, <IT 9, 743 A.2d 237). The

motion for a trial of the facts must be filed "within 30 days after the complaint is filed."

:tvI.R. Civ. P. 80B(d). In addition to the motion the party must also file "a detailed

statement, in the nature of an offer of proof, of the evidence that the party intends to

introduce at trial." Id. If the party does not file the motion within 30 days then the

party has waived any right to a trial on the facts. Id. When such a trial is waived the

Superior Court's review is limited to the record. M.R. Civ. P. 80B(f). Here, Hider did

not file a motion for a trial of the facts and the 30-day window has passed. As a result,

the court's review of the case is restricted to the record. 5

Hider disagrees with how his former counsel handled this appeal and the

arguments :tvir. Dion set forth in the complaint. Despite this disagreement, Hider is

unable to present arguments during the hearing that are based on causes of action not

set forth in the complaint. "[T]he purpose of the complaint is to provide defendants

with fair notice of the claim against them." Bowen v. Eastman, 645 .A.2d 5, 7 (Me. 1994).

If the defendant does not have notice then it cannot properly defend the claim as

required in M.R. Civ. P. 12. Rule SOB states, "[t]he complaint shall include a concise

statement of the grounds upon which the plaintiff contends the plaintiff is entitled to

relief, and shall demand the relief sought." M.R. Civ. P. SOB(a). 6 Since the merits of the

Board's review of the Enterprise application are not plead in the complaint, nor are they

5 The record in this case is insufficient for appellate review. Rule 80B(e)(2) sets forth the
contents and procedure requirements for the record. Here, counsel for the Board noted that the
parties did not meet in advance to determine the contents of the record. Adclitionally1 the
record did not incl ude "the application or other doct1ments that inil":i.ated the agency
proceedings" as required by the rule. M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e)(2). The ourl is entitled to "djsrniss
the action for want of prosecution" for failing to con1ply with the record requirements. M.R.
Civ. P. 80B(h).
6 At this point in the litigation, a party may only amend the complaint "by leave of court or by

written consent of the adverse party." M.R. Civ. P. lS(a). However, even with an amended
complaint, Hider is not entitled to a trial of the facts because the 30-day deadline has passed.

5
discussed in the brief in support of the complaint, the court is unable to address the

merits of the application in this appeal.

The entry is:

The SOB Appeal of the City of Portland Planning Board

is DIS:tvIISSED.

6

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10810099. Public record. Not legal advice.
