# State of Maine v. Emerson > Superior Court of Maine · June 23, 2010 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10809582 ## Case - **Court:** Superior Court of Maine - **Decided:** June 23, 2010 - **Precedential status:** Unpublished - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Judges:** Nancy Mills - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10809582 ## Opinion text STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss CRINIINAL ACTION DOCKET , ,. NO. CR~9-~78 '1 /-, /1/ ~ - '<' ~ !) - lp d / i 0 I 0 • - ' r c/ STATE OF MAINE v. ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS ROBERT EMERSON, Defendant The defendant seeks to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop of the vehicle operated by the defendant on 12/3/09. The defendant argues that the officer lacked any specific and articulable facts to justify the stop. For the following reasons, the motion is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT Augusta Police Department Officer Matthew Estes graduated from the Maine Criminal Justice Academy in December 2008. He was working the 2:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. shift on 12/3/09. He was in uniform and operating a marked cruiser. At approximately 10:30 p.m. he received information from dispatch. He heard that a white Jaguar traveling southbound on 1-95 from Sidney was being operated erratically, was swerving, and almost struck another vehicle. The information that the Jaguar almost struck another vehicle was not included in Officer Estes's report and he did not include that in his testimony at the administrative hearing at the DMV. He did receive the information from dispatch. Augusta Police Department Officer Nicolas Hample graduated from the Maine Criminal Justice Academy in December 2007. He also heard the dispatch information regarding the Jaguar. He heard that a white Jaguar traveling southbound on 1-95 almost struck a motor vehicle and was all over the road. The information that the Jaguar was all over the road was not included in Officer Hample's report. His report provided that a "possibly impaired driver almost struck another vehicle while traveling southbound on Interstate 95." The information was called in to dispatch by Jessica Verreault, who was operating a vehicle behind the white Jaguar. Officer Estes responded and parked in a U-turn area on 1-95. He observed the white Jaguar, not a commonly seen car, traveling southbound. Officer Estes pulled out behind the Jaguar and the vehicle following the Jaguar. He observed the brake lights of the second vehicle flashing. He interpreted that as meaning the operator of that car wanted the officer to know that she had called in the information about the Jaguar. The second car slowed and Officer Estes pulled in behind the Jaguar. He followed the Jaguar for four miles and observed the Jaguar traveling at fluctuating speeds from 50 to 65 m.p.h. Officer Estes observed no other erratic operation during the four-mile drive. The Jaguar exited 1-95 at the Winthrop exit. Based on the information provided by Ms. Verreault and his observations regarding the speed of the Jaguar, Officer Estes activated his blue lights and siren to stop the Jaguar. The operator of the Jaguar, the defendant, reacted immediately and pulled into a parking lot appropriately. CONCLUSIONS In order to justify a brief investigatory stop, "a police officer must have an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct or a civil violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur, and the officer's suspicion must be 'objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. "' State v. Brown, 1997 ME 90, C[ 5, 694 A.2d 453, 455 (quoting State v. Cusack, 649 A.2d 16, 18 (Me. 1994)). "An investigatory stop is valid when it is 'supported by specific and articulable facts which, taken as a whole and together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the police intrusion.'" See State v. Taylor, 1997 ME 81, <.IT 9, 694 A.2d 907, 909 (quoting State v. Hill, 2 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992)). "The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause that a crime was being committed, but more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch." State v. Sampson, 669 A.2d 1326, 1328 (Me. 1996) (quoting State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978, 979 (Me. 1987)). "The facts supporting an investigatory search need not be based on the officer's personal observations, but can be provided by an informant if the information carries sufficient 'indicia of reliability.'" State v. Cushing, 602 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Me. 1992); see also State v. Burgess, 2001 ME 117,