# Addison v. Daigle

> Superior Court of Maine · July 30, 2010

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10809566

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Maine
- **Decided:** July 30, 2010
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** William R. Anderson
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
PENOBSCOT, SS. CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO CV-07-391
. p r;;,J - -, -.

MARY ADDISON,

Plaintiff,
v. DECISION and JUDGMENT
EUGENE DAIGLE,

Defendant.

Hearing was concluded and briefs filed by October 5, 2009. The plaintiff was

present and represented by counsel, Joseph Ferris, Esq., while the defendant was

present and represented by counsel, James Munch, Esq. The Court will address all

issues raised in the analysis that follows.

A. COUNT I

1. Existence of a Written Contract

This lawsuit arises from defendant's construction of a home for plaintiff in 2006.

Her prior residence had been destroyed by fire in March of 2006 and she explored

options to replace it. She found a set of plans for a new home that seemed suitable and

located a builder, Andy Samaras, owner of Hammer-All Home Improvement who

agreed to build the home according to the plans. He provided her with a proposal, Pl.'s

Ex. #3, that quoted a price of $173,430, and it contained certain terms and conditions

that had to be completed before specified payments were due. The homeowner was

required to provide site work, foundation, septic system, water-line to existing well,

cellar floor, and painting. The second floor was to be unfinished except for heat,

plumbing, and drywall. Included in the proposal was a list of allowances, as well as a

list of building materials and related costs. Unfortunately, Mr. Samaras chose to build
another house instead of plaintiff's and Ms. Addison was faced with the prospect of

finding another builder, one who could complete the project by winter.

Ms. Addison worked at the University of Maine with the defendant, and spoke

with him frequently about the difficulties she had encountered in getting her house

built. She knew he worked as a computer systems administrator, but also was aware

that he bought and fixed properties and had construction knowledge. Mr. Daigle and

the plaintiff were friendly and he was concerned about her plight. Ms. Addison became

even more distressed after another potential builder backed out of the project and

eventually she and Mr. Daigle discussed whether he could provide assistance.

Although he was not a contractor, he was familiar with building procedures and

practices and knew an engineer, Mr. Manion, who could provide assistance. Defendant

indicated that he would consult with Mr. Manion and then decide whether he would

take on the project to assist the plaintiff. He eventually agreed to help.

Central to the Court's decision in this case is whether the terms of a construction

contract, Pl.'s Ex. #1, are binding on the parties. After agreeing to help, Mr. Daigle went

on-line to find a construction contract form and then proceeded to include the Samaras

contract terms in the new contract. Both agreements contained an agreement to build

the home according to the plans for $173,400 and included a similar schedule of

payments, and provided for an exclusion of foundation and site work from the contract.

The Samaras contract contained a list of allowances for certain expensive materials and

segments of construction such as drywall, plumbing, electrical, chimney, and the

homeowner was free to select materials within these allowances. The Daigle contract

had no list of allowances but specified that materials were to be specified by the

contractor and invoiced to the owner. Additionally, the Samaras contract provided that

the flooring would be the responsibility of the owner while flooring was included in the

2
Daigle contract. Both parties agree that the Daigle contract was based on the Samaras

contract.

As construction progressed, Ms. Addison needed to borrow funds from a bank to

complete the project. The bank required that she have a contract in order to obtain the

funds. She indicated this need to Mr. Daigle, which prompted him to draft the contract

described above. He obviously gave no independent thought to the cost of the project,

did not price materials, and performed no labor cost estimates, but just adopted Mr.

Samaris' conclusions in this regard. As the summer progressed without a loan

authorization, the plaintiff told the defendant that the bank needed a list of costs and

the parties jointly prepared construction cost worksheets. Def.'s Ex. #1,2,3, and 4 were

prepared for this purpose and Def. Ex. #2 was submitted to the bank. The costs on the

worksheet included costs such as foundation and site work that were not included in

the parties' contract, and the parties obviously manipulated the entries in various

categories in order for the entire project to come in at the target price of $189,500.

Plaintiff asserts that the parties' obligations with regard to the construction of her

home are defined in the written contract dated June 20, 2010. Plaintiff also argues that

the parole evidence rule excludes consideration of extrinsic evidence offered to change

the terms of the written contract. In reply, the defendant argues that extrinsic evidence

is admissible to prove that the parties did not intend to be bound by the written

contract, which was only prepared because the bank that originated the construction

loan required that the parties have a contract. The Court agrees that parol evidence is

not admissible to vary, add to, or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract.

Clark v. DiPietro, 525 A.2d 623, 625 (Me. 1987). If the agreement is partially integrated,

extrinsic evidence will be admissible if the additional terms are consistent with the

written terms. Rogers v. Jackson, 2002 ME 140, <IT10, 804 A.2d 379, 381. Although the issue

3
does not appear to be decided in Maine, the Court is also willing to rule that extrinsic

evidence is admissible on the issue of whether the parties intended to be bound by the

terms of a written contract. See, Am. Jur. 2nd Evidence § 1120; Corbin on Contracts §

85.19; Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435, 440 (Me. 1998). After reviewing the evidence

admitted at hearing, the Court concludes that the parties intended to be bound by the

June 20,2010 agreement.

At the time of the agreement, the parties had been discussing the difficulties

plaintiff had encountered in having her home built. The defendant agreed to be

responsible for the construction of the home in order to help a friend. Since he wasn't a

contractor, he went to the internet to download a form contract and then incorporated

the Samaris terms into the form contract. Once he was assured of Manion's assistance,

he expressed confidence that he could build a better home than Samaris and felt

Samaris' price may have been high. Defendant knew plaintiff needed a contract in order

to obtain a loan from the bank and assisted in this regard, but there is no indication that

this was the sole reason for the contract to be drafted. There was absolutely no clear,

unequivocal agreement between the parties that the written contract was for financing

purposes only and not to be enforced. In the absence of an overt agreement that the

written contract would not be enforceable, it is difficult to believe that the defendant, an

educated, competent person, would have cavalierly signed a document entitled

"Construction Contract," thinking it was not enforceable. This is especially true since

there is no evidence of the existence of an alternative agreement between the parties. If

the agreement were simply cost of materials plus labor, one would expect that there

would at least be an agreement about the labor rate for any of the individuals who

worked on the house and an agreement governing when payment was due.

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Subsequently, when the parties were completing Def.'s Ex. #1,2,3, and 4, they

mutually discussed why it was necessary to create those documents, and were both

aware that it was for financing purposes only. Together, they manipulated the entries in

the documents to satisfy the bank, not to reflect the reality of their agreement. Thus, the

Court does not construe those documents as constituting any changes or additions to

the contractual agreement.

Since the defendant stopped working on the home, he has acted in a manner

consistent with having a belief that the June 20,2006 contract defined the relationship

between the parties in the construction project. He wrote to plaintiff's counsel on

March 5,2007, Pl.'s Ex. #9. In this correspondence, he summarized various aspects of

the written contract and then stated, "so I am ready to finish the house under my

contract with Mary." In the same correspondence, he also stated, "we used Mary's

contract with Hammer-All as the basis for the project and added in finishing the

exterior trim, siding it in pre-stained cedar shingles, and installing a hardwood floor.

Mary said she needed these items in the contract to make it work for the bank. The price

stayed the same at $173,400 with some $20,000 in additional labor and material added

to the base." By making these comments, the defendant implicitly acknowledged that

the parties' obligations were contained in the written contract. Additionally, as plaintiff

has pointed out, Defendant has admitted in the course of discovery that the June 20,

2006 agreement constitutes the contract in plaintiff's complaint, Pl.'s Ex. #356 at p.l;

Pl.'s Ex. #357 at 1.

The defendant argues that he could not have intended for the contract to be

enforceable because he made no independent assessment of price, because the contract

provided that plaintiff had control over the selection of materials, yet the contract was

for a fixed price; and because plaintiff tracked spending, making it difficult for

5
defendant to monitor contract expenditures. Although these observations are accurate,

the Court believes that the defendant reached the agreement without exploring

potential consequences. He probably was not thinking about the actual mechanics of

complying with the agreement, or what would happen if a dispute arose, but was only

trying to provide assistance to the plaintiff. Although it was improvident of him to sign

the agreement, he did so intending to be bound by its terms.

There is one curious aspect of the contract that deserves further discussion.

Although the Daigle contract was dearly based on the Samaras contract, Mr. Daigle

included flooring in the agreement but did not increase the contract price to reflect the

increased cost to purchase and install the flooring. He testified that he included it in the

contract because plaintiff told him the bank required that the floor be installed and

finished now, rather than later. Although his comments about the flooring in PI's. Ex. 9

are somewhat ambiguous because it is not clear what "add it to the base" means, The

Court does not conclude that he intended to install the flooring as an expensive gift to

Ms. Addison. With regard to the flooring alone, the Court considers extrinsic evidence

concerning whether the parties intended to be bound by the written contract in this

regard, and finds that the parties intended that plaintiff pay for the flooring, over and

above the full contract price.

2. Breach and Damages

Although the parties disagree on the extent of the breach, they agree the project

is not complete. Implicit in the contract is the requirement that the construction be

finished according to its terms and since it is not finished, the defendant has breached.

The Court will use the plaintiff's format in discussing the elements of the breach and

damages, addressing each issue in the order listed in plaintiff's memorandum.

Although the plaintiff alleges that the defendant breached the contract by failing to

6
complete the project by December 20,2006, the Court does not find a breach in this

regard. The relevant phrase in the contract, "[w]ork is expected to start July 20th and

complete on December 20th , 2006 A.D." falls short of requiring that the project be

completed by that date. The Court finds that the word "expected", although awkwardly

used, applies to "start" and "complete", and implies that contingencies could

reasonably delay completion. Even if this phrase were construed to require completion

by December 20,2010, the defendant has appropriately described several delays

attributable to the plaintiff, such as her insistence on certain changes and the delay in

her mason's completion of the chimney, that would excuse the delay and result in no

award of damages. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 269

(1981); Rockland Poultry Co. v. Anderson, 148 Me. 211, 216, 91 A.2d 478 (1952). The Court

presumes, in the absence of a firm completion date, that performance was to be

complete within a reasonable period of time. See Cellar Dwellers, Inc. v. Dominic

D'Alessio, Jr., 2010 ME 32, <JI 16, 993 A2d 1, 10-11.

The other damage claims will now be addressed in order. Some of the costs

determined by the Court are lower than the estimates of Mr. Schiele, primarily because

his estimates were based on an hourly rate of $45, excessive for the area. Qualified

carpenter's assistants are paid between $20 and $25 per hour and Mr. Manion, an

engineer and carpenter, only earned $40 per hour while working on the project. In

determining damages, the Court will discount the Schiele estimates that include

materials and labor by 10%, and the estimates that include labor only by 20% because

the work could be performed by a combination of qualified carpenters and assistants. In

the ensuing analysis, the discounted amount, reflecting actual damages that the Court is

awarding, will not appear in parenthesis, while the full amount designated by Schiele

will appear in parentheses.

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l.Kitchen Cabinets - The Court finds that providing and installing kitchen

cabinets was required by the contract and not accomplished. The cost of cabinets to

complete the kitchen is $6,000, while the reasonable cost of installation is $2,536 ($3,170).

The plaintiff has already purchased the floor cabinets for $3,465, subsumed within the

$6,000 estimate.

2. Daylight Basement - The daylight basement opening was not in the plans, and

therefore, the Court finds there is no contractual requirement that defendant bare the

cost of completion.

3. Bathroom Completion - In order to complete the bathroom according to the

plans, including toilets, shower, vanity, soaking tub, roman shower completion, faucets,

hookups, and connections, a reasonable expense of $15,210 ($16,900) will be incurred.

4. Reframing Common Bath Area - The Court does not award damages in this

category because the parties agreed to the alterations to the plans concerning the

common bath area. The $696 spent to hook up one toilet and sink is recoverable.

5. Electrical- Having a licensed electrician make necessary corrections was a

necessary expense. Plaintiff is awarded her reasonable expense in this regard, $2,905.

6 Interior Finish - The estimated cost to provide doors, finish, and install them is

$5,490 ($6,100). The Court does not find that sheetrock was improperly installed, but

finds that the cost of finishing wood floors is included in the contract, since the use of

pre-finished flooring was not specified. The reasonable cost for installation and

finishing is $4,560 ($5,700). The reasonable cost to trim windows and doors is $3,830

($4,800). The Court is not including the cost of floor finishing because of the Court's

ruling that this expenses was not included in the contract price.

7. Heating - The contract included a euro-type boiler heating system. The

allowance in the Samaris contract for the system is $11,500 and, coincidently, the

8
plaintiff has spent that amount on the installation of a system. The damages related to

this element of the breach are $11,500.

8. Siding - The purchase and installation of the siding was required by the

contract. It will cost $6,080 ($7,600) to install the siding that is already at the site.

9., 10., & 11. Baseboard - It will cost $2,000 ($2,500) to vent the dryer and finish

the interior baseboard, the garage, and wheelchair ramp.

12. & 13. Rear Porch and Deck - The Court is not awarding damages for failing to

finish the enclosed porch properly or for failing to finish or improperly installing the

rear deck. The plans include neither an enclosed rear porch, nor a rear deck. The Court

does not find that the defendant improperly installed the rear porch or deck and finds

that his work on the porch/ deck was made more difficult by the foundation

contractor's failure to install cheek walls in the area. The defendant was not responsible

for foundation work.

14. & 15. Front Porch and Entryway - The contract included a front porch, which

is incomplete. The reasonable cost of completion is $4,752 ($5,280).

16. Second Floor Completion - The reasonable cost of completing the second

floor pursuant to the plans is $4,230 ($4,700).

17. Dormers, Bay Windows - The Court is not awarding costs associated with

these claims. The parties orally modified their contract to replace two single dormers in

the front with two skylights and to replace a single dormer in the back with a double.

Because the defendant installed the skylights and dormer pursuant to the modification,

there are no damages. Likewise, the parties agreed mutually to dispense with the bay

windows. This was done in recognition of the many "extras" provided by the

defendant, including the superior clapboards, many interior accommodations for

9
wheelchair accessibility and other reasons, as well as the framing changes to decrease

the number of posts, and to strengthen the building to accommodate snow loads.

The total of these amounts represents the damages total. Although plaintiff

incurred out of pocket expense to pay for goods and services that should have been

supplied by defendant, $16,628.40 to Davis Builders, $2,950 to Gray Electric, $11,500 to

David Brown for heating, and $3,465 to Home Depot for kitchen cabinets; these sums

are not being added to the damages amount because the amounts are subsumed in the

Schiele estimates. Mr. Schiele performed his inspection in January of 2007, before

Davis, Gray, and Brown worked at the home to address some of the shortcomings

found by Schiele. Additionally, the kitchen completion estimate contemplated that no

cabinets had been purchased, so it included the value of the Sebco cabinets that plaintiff

purchased.

B. COUNTS II AND III

To the extent that the defendant was negligent in his execution of the contract or

breached the implied warranty, any damages in relation thereto have already been

awarded. In reality, any negligence or warranty breach was minor.

C. COUNTIV

The Court finds that the defendant misrepresented nothing. In discussing the

dormers and bay windows, the defendant agreed to alter or delete them to save money

overall on the project and in recognition of the he defendant's willingness to provide

more than the contract specified in other areas.

D. COUNTY

The Court does not award consequential damages. It does not construe the

contract as specifying a December 20, 2010 completion date. It was reasonable, because

10
of the changes in he contract agreed upon by the parties and the delays not caused by

the defendant, to be working toward completion well beyond that date. Additionally,

There is no evidence of the value of the experience of living in the new home versus

remaining in the quilt shop, nor for living in an unfinished house. Awarding

consequential damages would be based on speculation.

E. COUNT VI

Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), via a

violation of the Home Construction Contract Act (HCCA). If the plaintiff prevails on the

HCCA claim, she is entitled to a receipt of a civil penalty, 10 M.R.S.A. § 1490(2) and the

violation constitutes prima facie evidence of violation of UTPA, 10 M.R.S.A. § 1490(1),

that could lead to award of attorney fees. 5 M.R.S.A. § 213(2).

All would agree that the contract signed in this case does not conform to the

requirements of 10 M.R.S.A. § 1487. The Court finds that, although there is a violation,

the defendant was not aware of the requirements of the law in this regard nor could he

be expected to know of the contract requirements because he was not a contractor who

was in the occupation of building for others. Instead, he was a person helping a friend

and who was expecting a reasonable amount of compensation. He was not seeking an

advantage by drafting an inadequate contract and was not misrepresenting anything.

He, in fact, was not engaging in any specific unfair trade practice that can be identified.

contract price.

According to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1490(2), no home contractor may be held liable for a

civil violation under the HCCA "if the contractor shows by a preponderance of the

evidence that the violation was an unintentional and a bona fide error, notwithstanding

the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid any such error." Because

this violation was unintentional and a bona fide error, the Court applies this exception

11
in this case and does not order the defendant to pay a civil penalty. The Court

recognizes that the exception is only to be applied when the contractor has "procedures

reasonably adopted to avoid any such error," and the defendant had no such

procedures; but discerns an intent that such procedures not be required of a non­

professional contractor who would have no reason to adopt such procedures.

Finally, the plaintiff requests that the Court order the defendant to pay her

attorney fees since a violation of the HCCA is prima facie evidence of an unfair trade

practice. Because the Court finds that the defendant in fact committed no unfair trade

practice, the prima facie effect of the HCCA violation is overcome and the Court does

not order payment of attorney fees.

F. COUNTERCLAIMS

Because the Court has found for the plaintiff on the breach of contract count of

plaintiff's complaint, it finds for Ms. Addison on the breach of contract counterclaim.

The unjust enrichment and quantum meruit counterclaims are rejected because the

Court has already found that a contract governed the obligations of the parties in the

construction of this home. All goods and services provided that represent the amount

due in the counterclaim were provided under the terms of the contract, and were not

provided under circumstances required by unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.

The entry is:

The Court Orders that Judgment be entered for the plaintiff on Count I of her

complaint and awards damages in the amount of $65,229, pre judgment interest at the

rate of 5.99%, and costs; and that Judgment be entered for the defendant on Counts II

through VI.

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The Court Orders that Judgment be entered for the counterclaim defendant on all

counterclaims.

The clerk is directed to incorporate this Judgment into the docket by reference.

Dated: July 30,2010 W~~. v~
WILLIAM ANDERSON
JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT

13
.-­
MARY ADDISON - PLAINTIFF DISTRICT COURT

••
Attorney for: MARY ADDISON
BANGOR
Docket No BANDC-CV-2007-00391

JOSEPH FERRIS - RETAINED 07/13/2007
LAW OFFICE OF JOSEPH L FERRIS PA DOCKET RECORD
120 N MAIN ST
BREWER ME 04412

vs
EUGENE DAIGLE - DEFENDANT

•
• L L2
Attorney for: EUGENE DAIGLE
JAMES C MUNCH III - RETAINED
VAFIADES BROUNTAS & KOMINSKY
23 WATER STREET
PO BOX 919
BANGOR ME 04402-0919

Filing Document: COMPLAINT Minor Case Type: CONTRACT
Filing Date: 07/13/2007

Docket Events:
07/16/2007 FILING DOCUMENT - COMPLAINT FILED ON 07/13/2007
5-9-08 COPY OF COMPLAINT SENT TO THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CONSUMER AND
ANTITRUST DIVISION, STATE HOUSE STATION 6, AUGUSTA, MAINE (UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE)

07/16/2007 Party(s): MARY ADDISON
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 07/13/2007
Plaintiff's Attorney: JOSEPH FERRIS

07/16/2007 Party(s): MARY ADDISON
MOTION - APPROVAL ATTACH/TRUSTEE PROC FILED WITH AFFIDAVIT ON 07/13/2007
Plaintiff's Attorney: JOSEPH FERRIS
ALONG WITH MEMORANDUM OF LAW

07/30/2007 Party(s): EUGENE DAIGLE
SUMMONS/SERVICE - ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE SERVED ON 07/23/2007
SIGNED BY ATTY JAMES MUNCH III.

07/30/2007 Party(s): EUGENE DAIGLE
SUMMONS/SERVICE - ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE FILED ON 07/25/2007
Plaintiff's Attorney: JOSEPH FERRIS

08/15/2007 Party(s): EUGENE DAIGLE
RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER & AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FILED ON 08/10/2007
Defendant's Attorney: JAMES C MUNCH III

08/15/2007 Party(s): EUGENE DAIGLE
RESPONSIVE PLEADING - COUNTERCLAIM FILED ON 08/10/2007
Defendant's Attorney: JAMES C MUNCH III

08/15/2007 Party(s): EUGENE DAIGLE
Page 1 of 5 Printed on: 05/09/2008

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10809566. Public record. Not legal advice.