# Franklin v. Talbert House Crisis

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · February 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10806167

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** February 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

QUEEN CHARLOTTE FRANKLIN, Case No. 1:25-cv-88

Plaintiff, Hopkins, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.

TALBERT HOUSE CRISIS, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On February 11, 2025, Plaintiff Queen Charlotte Franklin moved for leave to file
the above-captioned complaint in this Court in forma pauperis, or without payment of fees.
(Doc. 1). Attached to Plaintiff’s motion/application is a copy of the proposed complaint.
(Doc. 1-1).
I. General Screening Authority
By separate Order issued this date, Plaintiff has been conditionally granted leave
to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. As a result, the complaint is
now before the Court for a sua sponte review to determine whether the complaint, or any
portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31
(1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous
when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d
1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is
immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does
not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
Congress has also authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints which fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Although a plaintiff’s pro se complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” the complaint must “give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(internal citation and quotation omitted)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and
Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.

II. Analysis of Complaint
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that between Plaintiff’s first pro se
appearance in this Court on December 30, 2022 and the end of 2024, this Court
dismissed (or recommended the dismissal of) at least four complaints filed by Plaintiff as
frivolous under applicable screening standards. See e.g., Franklin v. U.C. Drake Hospital,
No. 1:24-cv-611-JPH-KLL (case dismissed, appeal pending); Franklin v. Hamilton County
Sheriffe, No. 1:24-cv-610-DRC-SKB (R&R recommending dismissal pending before
presiding district judge); Franklin v. Dieffenbach, No. 1:24-cv-524-JPH-SKB (case
dismissed by this Court, in forma pauperis denied, but ruling on in forma pauperis status

pending in Sixth Circuit); Franklin-Samuels v. Soc. Sec. Admin., et al., No. 1:22-cv-775-
MWM-KLL (case dismissed, motion to reopen denied, no appeal filed).
Recently, Plaintiff has picked of the pace of her filings. Between January 31, 2025
and February 11, 2025, Plaintiff initiated twenty new cases. In each case, she seeks to
file in forma pauperis, or without payment of fees. See, e.g., Case Nos. 1:25-cv-41-DRC-
SKB, 1:25-cv-42-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-44-MRB-SKB, 1:25-cv-48-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-49-
MRB-KLL, 1:25-cv-51-JPH-SKB, 1:25-cv-52-DRC-SKB, 1:25-cv-58-SJD-SKB, 1:25-cv-
59-JPH-SKB, 1:25-cv-60-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-65-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-77-MRB-SKB, 1:25-
cv-78-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-79-MWM-KLL, 1:25-cv-80-JPH-KLL, 1:25-cv-82-MWM-KLL,
1:25-cv-83-SJD-KLL, 1:25-cv-86-SJD-SKB, 1:25-cv-87-JPH-KLL, 1:25-cv-88-JPH-SKB.
The undersigned is working diligently to review and screen all cases that have been
randomly assigned to her. Each case is unique and must be addressed on its unique
facts. But in every case reviewed to date, the undersigned has determined that Plaintiff’s
complaints either fail to assert facts sufficient to support the exercise of federal subject

matter jurisdiction and/or fail to state any cognizable claim. Therefore, the number of
cases filed by Plaintiff that have been deemed to be subject to sua sponte dismissal as
frivolous continues to grow.
In the above-captioned case, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
indicates that she receives $1,783 in retirement income on a monthly basis, and owes a
single creditor only $300 with no other debts. (Doc. 1, PageID 2-3).1 Given that report and
evidence that she paid a $605 filing fee in another case on January 31, 2025, 2 it is unclear
whether Plaintiff actually qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis. But absent further
information, the undersigned has conditionally granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed

without payment of a filing fee. Under the referenced screening standards, however, the
undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s lawsuit be dismissed for failure to state any
plausible claim.
This Court routinely warns pro se litigants who file multiple cases that are deemed
to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 screening standards that continuing the same
course of conduct may result in the imposition of pre-filing sanctions and/or a declaration

1Plaintiff’s application in this case states that she has “no” cash on hand or money in any savings, checking,
or other accounts. However, in multiple prior applications filed within days of the above-captioned case,
Plaintiff has stated that she has $500 in cash or savings on hand.
2On January 31, Plaintiff paid an appellate filing fee of $605 in order to pursue her appeal of this Court’s
dismissal of Case No. 1:24-cv-611-JPH-KLL.(Id., Doc. 15).
that their filings are “vexatious.” Despite the prior dismissal of multiple frivolous lawsuits
and Plaintiff’s recent initiation of twenty new lawsuits, the undersigned acknowledges that
Plaintiff was only recently warned that she could be deemed to be “vexatious.” Part of the
reason for the delay in issuing that warning is because Plaintiff’s use of different first and
last names made it more difficult for this Court to track her cases.3 In addition, although

Plaintiff tenders her complaints on a form that is commonly used by pro se litigants, she
routinely leaves blank a section of the form that specifically asks her to list her previous
cases, including “the case number and caption” of each lawsuit in which she previously
appeared. (See Doc. 1-1, PageID 7). The referenced query is designed to assist the Court
in more readily identifying duplicitous lawsuits and/or vexatious litigants. By leaving the
question blank, Plaintiff falsely implies that she has filed none. (See id.)
Turning to the complaint filed in this case, Plaintiff names the following Defendants
(1) Talbert House Crisis; (2) Chillicothe Correctional Inst. - Ross; (3) N.A.A.C.P.; (5) Mrs.
Thomas Walsh; and (5) B.M.V. She has checked every possible box on the form to assert

subject matter jurisdiction, indicating both that she is filing a civil rights lawsuit that arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
that she is invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 5).
As with other handwritten complaints she has filed, the instant complaint is difficult
to decipher and sometimes illegible. But to the best of the undersigned’s ability, the Court
understands Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” to recite as follows:
On a Sunday, I had to break out of the Crisis Center to go on Fountain
Square to Praise the Lord, cause they said I couldn’t go. No one stop me
from worshiping the Almighty Lord Jesus I don’t know where people think
they come from, they don’t have to answer to the heavenly Father or Jesus

3Plaintiff has filed cases under multiple first and last names. For example, she routinely uses variations of
“Charlotte” or “Queen” as a first name and either “Franklin” or “Franklin-Samuels” as a surname.
Christ. I do and am going to this is our Father’s planet for us to live on, and
we don’t elect him. And his going to have his way regardless what man
thinks he will mangel [sic] the face of earth and care less. He’s the only one
I look up to and fear, to the point I want to obey him and him only. Man and
woman have tried all kinds of Black Magic on me but they [illegible] better
with him or Jesus Christ.

(Doc. 1-1, PageID 6). In the “Relief” section, which asks plaintiffs to “state (write) briefly
exactly what you want the court to do for you,” Plaintiff writes: “Praise the Heavenly Father
and his son Jesus Christ. If you want to live and be Bless. Help one another, pray for
each other,, use the LOVE, we all were given. Asking 700 Billions.” (Id., PageID 7).
From the face of the complaint, it is clear that this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction
because Plaintiff identifies both herself and all but one Defendant as residents or citizens
of Ohio. Therefore, to the extent that any jurisdiction exists, it would have to arise under
the civil rights statute or 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “To state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, a plaintiff ‘must allege that he was deprived of a right secured by the Federal
Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of state law.’”
Smith v. Detroit Entertainment L.L.C., 338 F.Supp.2d 775, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (quoting
Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992)).
Three of the Defendants do not appear to be or and are not alleged to be persons
acting under color of state law. At least in theory, the Defendants identified as the
“Chillicothe Correctional Inst. – Ross,” and the “B.M.V.” might be subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. But even if the identity of those potential state actors would give rise to a
claim of federal subject matter jurisdiction by this Court, Plaintiff still fails to include
sufficient facts in her complaint to state any plausible federal or constitutional claim
against any Defendant. In fact, Plaintiff does not so much as mention any of the
Defendants other than the “Crisis Center” in her first sentence. In short, Plaintiff’s
complaint lacks sufficient detail to state any claim against any Defendant. At best, her
allegations amount to nothing “more than … unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
As such, Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed.
Given the number of lawsuits that Plaintiff has filed as to which sua sponte

dismissal has been recommended under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 screening standards, and in
light of Plaintiff’s dramatically increased litigation activity in 2025, the undersigned further
warns Plaintiff that if she persists in filing further lawsuits that are dismissed sua sponte
on initial screening, she is likely to be deemed to be a vexatious litigant subject her to pre-
filing restrictions. Every frivolous lawsuit that is filed taxes scarce judicial resources and
necessarily detracts from this Court’s administration of justice in presiding over legitimate
non-frivolous cases.
Because Plaintiff initiated twenty new cases within so short a time period, the
undersigned entered an order in No. 1:25-cv-52-DRC-SKB that prohibits the Clerk of

Court from accepting new case filings from Plaintiff for the sixty-day period beginning
February 12 and continuing through April 13, 2025. That order is intended to permit the
assigned magistrate judges adequate time to screen the twenty recently filed cases, and
for the presiding district judges to rule on those Reports and Recommendations. If, after
the expiration of the requisite time period, Plaintiff’s frivolous cases number six or more,
the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be deemed to be vexatious, and that pre-filing
restrictions be imposed.
When a litigant fails to comprehend the basis for the prior dismissals and continues
to file additional lawsuits subject to dismissal on the same grounds, a federal court may
deem that litigant to be vexatious and impose an appropriate sanction. See Tropf v.
Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 938-940 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming imposition of
monetary sanctions and injunction that prohibited plaintiffs from filing any civil lawsuit in
federal court that included similar claims without written permission); Feathers v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir.1998) (“There is nothing unusual about imposing

prefiling restrictions in matters with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation.”); Filipas
v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir.1987); Stewart v. Fleet Financial, 229 F.3d 1154, 2000
WL 1176881 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (Table) (upholding sanctions against pro se litigant
who had repeatedly attempted to collaterally attack foreclosure and eviction, and was
using the judicial system to harass and punish anyone who had anything to do with those
actions). See also, generally Matter of Chaban, Case No. 2:17-cv-11139, 2017 WL
2544346 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2017) (directing plaintiff to “show cause” under Bankruptcy
Rule 8020 why the court should not sanction him for filing a fifth frivolous appeal of a
bankruptcy court order).

III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons stated, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. All claims contained in the above-captioned complaint should be either
DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B), or alternatively – for claims against Defendants A.A.A.,
N.A.A.C.P., and Mrs. Thomas Walsh - be DISMISSED without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
2. Based on the number of cases for which this Court has recommended sua
sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Plaintiff should be formally
warned that she is highly likely to be deemed to be vexatious and made subject
to prefiling limitations if she persists in filing additional cases that lack any
reasonable basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction and/or that are factually
and legally frivolous under screening standards;
3. The Court should certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing

reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation
would not be taken in good faith and therefore should deny Plaintiff leave to
appeal in forma pauperis.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

QUEEN CHARLOTTE FRANKLIN, Case No. 1:25-cv-88

Plaintiff, Hopkins, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.

TALBERT HOUSE CRISIS, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of
the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of
the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of
the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10806167. Public record. Not legal advice.