# Swearengin v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · February 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10805304

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TIANNA SWEARENGIN, )
an individual, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 24 C 5279
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole
)
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF )
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, and )
SHEILA BARLOW, in her individual )
and official capacity, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Plaintiff has brought a number of claims against the defendants: retaliation for exercising her
freedom of speech (Count I), retaliation for exercising her freedom of association with her son
(Count II), denial of due process when she was fired without a pre-termination or a post-termination
hearing (Count III), violation of the Illinois Whistle Blower Act (Count IV), common law retaliatory
discharge (Count V), conspiracy to deprive her of her First Amendment rights (Count VI), and
common law intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII). The defendants have moved
to dismiss all these claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6) with prejudice. To survive a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Put simply, a complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Reviewing those factual allegations
at the pleadings stage, the court must accept them as true and view them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Emerson v. Dart, 109 F.4th

936, 941 (7th Cir. 2024); Approved Mortg. Corp. v. Truist Bank, 106 F.4th 582, 588 (7th Cir. 2024).
Indeed, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556.
The defendants’ arguments in their motion ultimately fail to sufficiently adhere to these
standards. Obviously, a complaint is always just a compendium of allegations. It is a plaintiff’s
version of a “story” which may not, in the long run, turn out to be entirely accurate – at least in the

eyes of an ultimate fact finder. But, a defendant’s initial – or for that matter ultimate – version of
events may not necessarily be accurate either. At this early point, however, a defendant – and the
court must accept as true the plaintiff’s version of events alleged in the complaint – so long, of
course, as the adumbration is consistent with pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and principles articulated in appropriate case law. “The reason why judges accept a
[C]omplaint's factual allegations when ruling on motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is that a
motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Its factual sufficiency will be tested
later—by a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, and if necessary by trial.” Szabo v.

Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). A defendant cannot – as the
defendants’ briefs in this case tend to do – ignore certain allegations or construe others in a light
more flattering to them. A defendant cannot be dismissive of a complaint’s well pled allegations so
2
long as they satisfy the applicable Rules governing the standards by which a pleading must be judged
in the face of a Motion to Dismiss a complaint.
II.
The Plaintiff’s Story
The plaintiff began working at Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. Paideia Academy (“Powell
Elementary School”), an elementary school, in 2016. She said she was a “staff member,” but her
position was classified as “Miscellaneous Employee.” [Dkt. #1, Par. 7]. Perhaps these phrases might
be legalese or human resources “speak” for “teacher,” which is what plaintiff refers to herself as later

in her complaint. In any event, after a few years, in the Fall of 2023, her son enrolled there. Not
long after that, he became the target of bullies at the school. [Dkt. #1, Par. 11]. Plaintiff reported the
bullying to her superior, Sheila Barlow, the school’s Principal, but nothing allegedly was done. [Dkt.
#1, Par. 12]. Instead, one of plaintiff’s colleagues threatened her. [Dkt. #1, Par. 13].
Things came to a head in February of 2024 when three Powell Elementary School attendees
attacked plaintiff’s son in a school restroom and stole his shoes. [Dkt. #1, Par. 16]. As seems to be
the norm nowadays, the three assailants proudly posted their attack on Tik Tok. [Dkt. #1, Par. 17].

When the plaintiff reported this incident to Principal Barlow, Barlow told her that she was not
wanted at the school, to “keep [her] mouth shut” about bullying, and threatened plaintiff that her son
would be beaten the following year if she didn’t stop complaining. [Dkt. #1, Par. 20]. As Barlow did
nothing about the situation, about a month later, plaintiff’s son was choked in gym class by the same
assailants and, once again, they posted their violent handiwork on Tik Tok. [Dkt. #1, Par. 21]. Still,
nothing was done about it. Later, one of the three assailants complained to the principal that the
plaintiff was trying to intimidate him by following him with her eyes. [Dkt. #1, Par. 26].

3
By this time, plaintiff had had enough of her complaints and fears for her son’s well-being
going unaddressed and reposted the assailants’ videos for commentary on social media and posted
that Principal Barlow had done nothing about the incidents. This is what finally got the attention of
Principal Barlow. She drafted a statement for CPS that said:

On social media platforms, Tianna Swearengin is posting the student’s names (D and
A) and calling them names. There are individuals in the comments stating that they
wanted to harm the students. Tianna Swearengin also posted that I as the principal
and the dean did nothing about the incident. I immediately contacted CPS Safety and
Security to make them aware.
[Dkt. #1, Par. 28]. Principal Barlow had the bullies make statements that plaintiff was making faces
at them. [Dkt. #1, Par. 29]. Just a couple of days later, Jennifer Reger, Executive Director of
Administrative Hearing, sent the plaintiff a termination letter. Plaintiff was fired for “discourteous
treatment of students and staff members and engaged in other inappropriate behavior . . . .” [Dkt. #1,
Par. 30]. Plaintiff was “barred from working in any capacity for CPS, but she was also barred from
volunteering in any capacity at a CPS-affiliated event.” [Dkt. #1, Par. 31].
Plaintiff’s sister wrote to CPS to explain the situation, relating the attacks on her nephew and
noting the assaults were ignored by Principal Barlow. [Dkt. #1, Par. 32]. Plaintiff wrote to CPS
relating the attacks on her son and explaining that she had been fired for posting the video after the
principal refused to take any action. [Dkt. #1, Par. 34]. She asked that the “do not hire” designation
be removed, but CPS, through Reger, refused. [Dkt. #1, ¶ 35].
III.
Federal Claims
A.
First Amendment Retaliation Claims (Counts I and II)
Like all public employees, employees do not relinquish their First Amendment rights by
4
accepting government employment. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 527 (2022);
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). On the other hand, government employers, like all
employers, must be able to curtail speech that interferes with the operations of the government entity
in order to promote “the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”

Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In cases like these,
courts apply a two-step balancing test which began with Pickering and was later modified by
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). At the first step, a court must ask if the employee spoke (1)
as a private citizen and (2) on a matter of public concern. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 527–28; Connick,
461 U.S. at 147; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Brockett v. Effingham Cnty., Illinois, 116 F.4th 680,
683–84 (7th Cir. 2024). If the answer to either of these questions is “no,” then the employee has no
First Amendment cause of action. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. Otherwise, the court proceeds to a

second step, asking whether the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees “outweighs” the interests of the [employee],
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Brockett,
116 F.4th at 684.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims must be
dismissed because (1) the plaintiff did not speak as a private citizen but as a public employee
pursuant to her official duties; (2) the plaintiff did not speak on a matter of public concern; and (3)
the Board of Educations’s interest in efficiency outweighs the plaintiff’s interests.

The defendants contend that the plaintiff was “acting in her role as a CPS employee when
she reported multiple instances of employee and student misconduct to the administration at Powell
elementary School. . . . Plaintiff alleges that as a ‘teacher,’ she felt compelled to report the incidents.”
5
Id. at ¶ 12. [Dkt. #15, at 5]. As was stressed earlier, however, the court must accept a complaint’s
allegations as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Emerson, 109
F.4th at 941; Approved Mortg. Corp., 106 F.4th at 588. Yes, the complaint says at one point that the
plaintiff is a teacher [Dkt. #1, Par. 12], but, more importantly, the complaint repeatedly makes clear

that plaintiff is the mother of the student who, according to the complaint, was being bullied. [Dkt.
#1, Pars. 10, 11, 12, 16-21, 43]. Being a teacher does not trump being a mother, nor does the former
eliminate the fact of the latter. Here, as always, “reality must dominate judgment.” Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774 (1984). There is more than enough in the
complaint to allege that plaintiff was speaking as a private citizen, and the allegations in the
complaint make it certainly more than just plausible that that was the greater motivation for her
speaking out. Tellingly, the defendant seems to unwittingly concede this when it argues that plaintiff

was not speaking on a matter of public concern because she was motivated out of “concerns about
her own child.” [Dkt. #15, at 7]. “The fact that an employee has a personal stake in the subject matter
of the speech does not necessarily remove it from the scope of public concern.” Spiegla v. Hull, 371
F.3d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 2004). The complaint alleges more than enough to get over defendants’
private citizen/public employee objection.
This provides a segue to the most surprising assertion in the defendants’ brief namely that
the plaintiff did not speak on a matter of public concern. [Dkt. #15, at 6-7]. It is difficult to imagine
a matter of public concern more dire and of greater import than that alleged in the challenged

complaint. “[W]here the employer brings a motion to dismiss the employee's free speech claim on
the basis of the pleadings rather than on the facts in the record, the speech may be presumed to
involve a matter of ‘public concern’ if it touches upon ‘any matter for which there is potentially a
6
public interest.” Pugel v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 378 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 2004). Only
jaundiced partisanship could suggest that, at this point in our history, bullying in our public schools
is not a “matter for which there is potentially a public interest.” I am confident that the Board of
Education of the City of Chicago – or a Board of Education anywhere in this country – would take

the stance that it does not regard bullying in its schools as a matter of public interest. Yet, curiously
that seems to be the stance taken in the defendants’ brief. The public pays for those schools and pays
the salaries of administrators like Principal Barlow, and pays the salaries of the members of the
Board. The public certainly has a strong interest in the safety of the students in those schools and
a strong interest in whether administrators and Board members are adequately responding to attacks
of students on school grounds made known to them. Not surprisingly, other courts have indicated
this is a matter of public importance. See, e.g., Peoples v. Oswego Cmty. Sch. Dist., No.

19-CV-00568, 2020 WL 1330652, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2020); Meredith v. Cnty. of Jefferson,
No. 3:18-CV-105, 2019 WL 1437821, at *23 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2019); Thibault v. Spino, 431 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D. Conn. 2019). Indeed, the City of Chicago has conceded that this is a matter of
public concern. Thus, the City’s own website has stressed: “There are about 160,000 children that
miss school every day out of fear of being bullied. Nationwide surveys of 6th through 10th graders
conducted by the national institute of Child Health and Human Development revealed that 17% of
children in the 6th through 10th grade are bullied sometimes or weekly, while 19% bully others
sometimes or weekly.” Https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/cdph/supp_info/behavioral-health/

bullying_prevention1.html. The State of Illinois has echoed the same concerns. See, e.g., 105 ILCS
5/27-23.7(a). It is of no legal significance that the student who was repeatedly attacked at the school
was plaintiff’s son. “A personal aspect contained within the motive of the speaker does not
7
necessarily remove the speech from the scope of public concern.” Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895,
908 (7th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff’s retaliation claims will not be dismissed on the basis of the
defendants’ contention that the case does not involve a matter of public concern.
We then turn to the question of whether the government’s “interests as employer outweigh

even an employee's private speech on a matter of public concern.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 531;
Brockett, 116 F.4th at 684; Hicks v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 109 F.4th 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2024). Here,
the defendants argue that “the Board’s interests in maintaining efficacy within its schools certainly
outweighs Plaintiff’s interests,” and “that it is self-evident that CPS, an entity entrusted with both
the education and welfare of students, must be able to protect those students from imminent threats
of harm.” [Dkt. #15, at 7-8]. But, according to the complaint, neither CPS nor Principal Barlow were
doing those things. A student was attacked – at least twice – and the school administrator told the

employee who reported what had occurred – at least twice – to shut up about it or things might get
worse for the student. If true, these allegations are of significant public concern.
Moreover, the defendants’ argument is rather vague, and that’s unhelpful in the context of
an inquiry that the Supreme Court has said “sometimes has proved difficult.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
418. The balancing part of this inquiry is a highly fact-intensive one. Hicks, 109 F.4th at 901;
McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 675 (7th Cir. 2004). It involves an examination of several
interrelated factors, Hicks, 109 F.4th at 901, which the defendants have failed to sift through in their
briefing. One cannot simply pronounce something “self-evident” and have a complaint dismissed.

“Pickering balancing is not an exercise in judicial speculation.” Harnishfeger v. United States, 943
F.3d 1105, 1116 (7th Cir. 2019)(quoting Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 909). Indeed, speculation is
anathema to informed decision making.
8
Overall, the question of whether an employer’s interests outweigh an employee’s First
Amendment rights is generally ill-suited to resolution “through the lens of [a] liberal, undemanding
pleading standard.” Brockett, 116 F.4th 684. If the defendants were to move for summary judgment
on the Pickering balancing defense, they would have to lay out the elements of the defense, cite the

facts which they believe satisfy those elements, and demonstrate why the record is so one-sided as
to rule out the prospect of a finding in favor of the plaintiff. Harnishfeger, 943 F.3d at 1116.
Obviously, the defendants have fallen far short of that here, and, in any event, this is a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, where a plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The defendants’ motion to dismiss
Counts I and II of the complaint is denied.
B.
Qualified Immunity
The defendants also argue that Principal Barlow is entitled to qualified immunity because her
conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. See, e.g., Purtell v. Mason, 527
F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 2008). But, as noted earlier, as with a fair portion of the Motion to Dismiss,
its argument puts out of view the fact that the complaint’s well pled allegations must be taken as true,

and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Emerson, 109 F.4th at 941;
Approved Mortg. Corp., 106 F.4th at 588. Here, the defendants’ argument is based on their
interpretation of the complaint and what they feel is true; this portion of the defendants’ motion to
dismiss cannot be granted.
The flaw in the defendants’ argument is made clear when its interpretation of the complaint
is set against its actual allegations. According to the defendants’ reading of the complaint:
Here, Principal Barlow did not report Plaintiff’s actions to CPS superiors to silence
or retaliate against Plaintiff for advocating for her son. Rather, it is clear from
9
Plaintiff’s Complaint that it was Principal Barlow’s intention and priority to protect
the students who were entrusted in her care. See Compl. ¶ 28.
[Dkt. #15, at 3-4]. But, that is not clear in the least. What is clear is that the complaint alleges that
plaintiff’s son was attacked by two or three Powell Elementary attendees on at least two occasions
– in a bathroom and during gym class. [Dkt. #1, Pars. 16, 21]. The bullies recorded their attacks and
posted them on Tik Tok. [Dkt. #1, Pars. 16, 21]. When plaintiff complained, Principal Barlow
initially instructed her staff to do nothing [Dkt. #1, Par. 19]. She later told plaintiff that she was not
wanted in her job, and that she should shut up about the incidents or her son was likely to be attacked

in high school as well. [Dkt. #1, Par. 20]. Repeatedly dismissed, rebuffed, and threatened, the
plaintiff took the matter to the public forum. Principal Barlow then set plaintiff’s termination in
motion, and it happened in very quick succession. So, no, nothing in the complaint suggests that
Principal Barlow was motivated by a desire to “protect the students who were entrusted to her care,”
although Principal Barlow may think otherwise. In fact, according to the facts set forth in the
complaint, she did not even follow the Chicago Public Schools Policy for Addressing Bullying that
the defendants attach to their Motion to Dismiss. [Dkt. #15-1, Page 7-9 of 12]. Instead – again,

according to the allegations in the complaint – she did exactly what CPS Policy warned her not to
do: “Dismiss bullying as typical student behavior or assume it is not serious.” [Dkt. #15-1, Page 9
of 12]. It is difficult to imagine a complaint that more completely informs the defendant of the claims
against it. Whether those allegations are true or not remains to be seen. But the contention that what
is alleged is insufficient is rejected.
C.
Due Process Claim (Count III)
Defendants contend that the denial of due process claim in Count III must be dismissed
10
because plaintiff was an at-will employee with no property interest in her job and was, therefore, not
entitled to any due process. In order to proceed on a due process claim, a plaintiff has to allege the
existence of a constitutionally-protected property interest in continued employment. O'Gorman v.
City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2015); Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 700 (7th

Cir.2007). Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but rather are created and defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.
O’Gorman, 555 F.3d at 590; Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, Am. Federation of Teachers v.
Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir.2011). Such property interests
usually arise from rights created by state statutes, state or municipal regulations or ordinances, and
contracts with public entities. O’Gorman, 555 F.3d at 590; Ulichny v. Merton Community School
Dist., 249 F.3d 686, 700 (7th Cir.2001).

Here, the plaintiff alleges that:
[a]s a public employee, [she] was entitled to both a pre-termination hearing prior to
her termination, as well as a post-termination hearing after her termination. This
pre-termination hearing is an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially,
a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges
against the employee are true and support the proposed action. . . . A public entity
prior to the termination must provide oral or written notice of the charges against the
employee, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present
her side of the story.
[Dkt. #1, Pars. 69-70]. But, where does such entitlement come from? Indeed, it would seem that,
under Illinois law, only tenured teachers have a constitutionally protected property interest in
continued employment, a necessary predicate to a due-process claim. Mascow v. Bd. of Educ. of
Franklin Park Sch. Dist. No. 84, 950 F.3d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 2020); Harbaugh v. Bd. of Educ. of City
of Chicago, 716 F.3d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 2013). Perhaps plaintiff has some other source of a property
11
interest in mind – she speculates in her response brief that it might be an employment regulation, an
employee handbook, or other policy statement [Dkt. #21, at 6] – but she fails to allege what it is.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s due process claim (Count III) is dismissed, but contrary to the
defendants’ wishes, it is dismissed without prejudice. See O'Brien v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d

616, 628 (7th Cir. 2020)(“Ordinarily, after an original complaint is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6),
a court should allow at least one opportunity to amend the complaint before dismissing the entire
action.”); Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510,
519 (7th Cir. 2015).
D.
Civil Conspiracy Claim (Count VI)
A civil conspiracy is “a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an
unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500,
510 (7th Cir. 2015); Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1988). The elements of a
conspiracy claim are: (1) the individuals reached an agreement to deprive plaintiff of her
constitutional rights, and (2) overt acts in furtherance actually deprived him of those rights.

Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2018); Beaman, 776 F.3d at 510. The plaintiff falls
short of stating a claim under this Count. Contrary to her response brief, her allegations have no
common ground with those found sufficient in Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 749 (7th
Cir. 2012), where “several members of the same police unit allegedly acted in the same inexplicable
way against a plaintiff on many different occasions, . . . .” Plaintiff may have alleged a pattern of
harassment as in Geinosky but, according to the complaint, the only one doing the harassing was
Principal Barlow. The principal then crafted the tale to suit her needs in a letter to CPS, which then

12
acted upon the principal’s letter. Capping that off with a conclusory allegation that “Defendants,
along with Jennifer Reger, Executive Director of Administrative Hearings, made an agreement to
deprive [plaintiff] of her constitutional rights” [Dkt. #1, Par. 86] is not enough. Indeed, as the
complaint reads, Reger did not have what the plaintiff considers to be the real story, only Barlow’s

version. Accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, as we must, Principal Barlow was driving the
retaliation school bus, and Reger and CPS were merely the last stop. The defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss is granted as to Count VI, and the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim is dismissed, again,
without prejudice. O'Brien, 955 F.3d at 628; Runnion, 786 F.3d at 519.
IV.
State and Common Law Claims
A.
Illinois Whistleblower Act (Count IV)
In their reply brief, the defendants withdraw the bulk of their arguments for dismissal of the
plaintiff’s Illinois Whistleblower Act claim1 because they misread the plaintiff’s claims being
brought under 740 ILCS 174/15. [Dkt. #22, at 8]. Instead, the complaint specifically alleges that
Count is brought under 740 ILCS 174/20.1. [Dkt. #1, Par. 76 (emphasis added)]. Under Sec. 20.1:
Any other act or omission not otherwise specifically set forth in this Act, whether
within or without the workplace, also constitutes retaliatory action by an employer
under this Act if the act or omission would be materially adverse to a reasonable
1 While it is unclear whether defendant is withdrawing its Tort Immunity Act arguments as well,
their Reply brief [Dkt. #22, at 8] ignores the plaintiff’s arguments and case citations for why tort
immunity does not apply here [Dkt. #21, at 9-11] and, so, those points are conceded. Webb v. Frawley,
906 F.3d 569, 581 (7th Cir. 2018)(“[P]laintiff has waived any counterarguments he may have had by not
responding to Frawley's argument on this topic in his reply brief.”); Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d
461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010)(“Failure to respond to an argument . . . results in waiver.”); United States v.
Farris, 532 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir.2008) (“[Defendant] failed to respond to the Government's argument
in a Reply Brief, and accordingly, we find that [Defendant] waived his sufficiency of the evidence
challenge[.]”).
13
employee and is because of the employee disclosing or attempting to disclose public
corruption or wrongdoing.
740 ILCS 174/20.1. The defendants argue in their reply brief that plaintiff fails to present facts
showing she was terminated because she reported that her son was being bullied. [Dkt. #22, at 8].
But, again, the defendants clearly demand too much from the complaint. Here, the allegations
adequately state that plaintiff was fired in retaliation for complaining about her son being bullied and
reposting the bullies’ own videos of those attacks on social media when Principal Barlow repeatedly
refused to take any action. In response to the social media reposting, Principal Barlow wrote to CPS

and plaintiff’s termination followed. [Dkt. #1, Par. 78]. Surely, these facts are adequate to state a
claim at the pleading stage.
B.
Retaliatory Discharge (Count V)
Defendants’ argument for dismissal of the retaliatory discharge claim (Count V) depends
entirely on the failure of plaintiff’s Illinois Whistleblower Act claim. [Dkt. #15, at 13]. But, as
already noted, the defendant has misread the Illinois Whistleblower Act and thus the challenged
claim must stand. Based on the defendants’ Reply brief, it would appear that the defendants’ only
remaining argument for dismissal of Count V is based on the public policy argument that was
essentially rejected in connection with Counts I and II.
An employee can state a valid retaliatory discharge claim under Illinois' common law if he
or she alleges they were discharged from their employment in retaliation for certain activities and

“that the discharge violated the clear mandate of public policy.” Villegas v. Princeton Farms, Inc.,
893 F.2d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 1990); Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Center, Inc. 374
Ill.App.3d 630, 313 Ill.Dec. 568, 872 N.E.2d 551, 552–53 (Ill.App.Ct. 2007). As already discussed,
14
it is impossible to accept the defendants’ argument regarding whether bullying in our schools is a
matter of public concern. It is, not only by the defendants’ own admissions and those of other Illinois
officials, but of common sense, which is not to be ignored. See Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43,
46 (1957)(“Common sense often makes good law.”). See also United States v. Ingham, 502 F.2d

1287, 1291 (5th Cir. 1974)(“The law... allows for common sense.”). Not surprisingly, as the
complaint alleges, Illinois has a clearly mandated public policy in favor of providing a safe and civil
school environment for students to learn and achieve without bullying. [Dkt. #1, Par. 80]; see 105
ILCS 5/27-23.7(a). The defendants, of course, have a different view of the events and gloss over the
attacks on plaintiff’s son and recast them as “[plaintiff’s] son in the bathroom with other students
from Powell” [Dkt. #15, at 2, 6] or “elementary students in . . . an intimate setting” [Dkt. #22, at 9].
But, here as always, “we must think things not words...” Holmes, Law and Science and Science and

Law, 12 Harv.L.Rev. 443, 460 (1899). They claim, without evidence – of course not, as this is a Rule
12(b)(6) proceeding – that the bullies were threatened on social media. Perhaps; perhaps not. It’s
perhaps worth noting that it was the bullies, craving attention, who originally posted their attacks on
social media, and the defendants seemed to have no concern about that, however humiliating it might
have been to plaintiff’s son and however distressing it might have been to the plaintiff. But those
are matters for summary judgment or trial. Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675. Overall, the defendants’ softening
of the plaintiff’s allegations and the seemingly dismissive view of a principal ignoring a student
being attacked and choked and having his shoes stolen tends to undermine their stance that they are

concerned with “protecting school environments from such endangerment . . . .” [Dkt. #22, at 9].
The defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count V’s retaliatory discharge claim is denied.

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C.
Emotional Distress (Count VII)
The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
must be dismissed because she does not sufficiently plead extreme and outrageous conduct. [Dkt.
#15, at 13-14]. In Illinois, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress involves three
elements: that the actor’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; that the actor intended to inflict
severe emotional distress or knew that there was at least a high probability that his conduct would
have caused such distress; and that the conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress. Sun v. Xu,

99 F.4th 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 2024). The tort does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Sun, 99 F.4th at 1013. In the employment context,
a claim can arise where an employer “clearly abuses the power it holds over an employee in a manner
far more severe than the typical disagreements or job-related stress caused by the average work
environment.” Trahanas v. Nw. Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 860 (7th Cir. 2023). The everyday job stresses
resulting from discipline, personality conflicts, job transfers or even terminations do not give rise
to emotional distress claims, otherwise nearly every employee would have a cause of action. Sun,

99 F.4th at 1013; Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2006). As has been
already been seen, the defendants clearly have a different perspective on what went on at Powell
Elementary School, and they also have a very different perspective on what is extreme or
“outrageous” conduct. But, once again, accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all
reasonable inferences in her favor, the complaint easily passes muster.
Principal Barlow held a position of authority over plaintiff. She was also in charge of the
school plaintiff’s son attended, and as is undeniable, and, as we are told repeatedly in defendants’

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submissions, she had a duty to keep students safe. But when plaintiff complained to the principal
about attacks on her son, Barlow not only ignored those attacks and left plaintiff’s son to whims of
the bullies, she told plaintiff to stop complaining or her son would likely continue to be beaten. In
the context of school bullying and a mother’s concerns for her child, that certainly qualifies as

outrageous and would clearly cause any mother emotional distress. With nowhere to turn, plaintiff
took the matter to the public forum and, soon thereafter, was terminated at the behest or at least at
the suggestion of Principal Barlow. That made the conduct alleged only more outrageous and the
distress more severe. The defendants’ motion to dismiss this Count must be denied.
D.
Punitive Damages
Finally, the defendants argue that because the Board of Education is a government agency
and local government entity, it is immune from punitive damages on the plaintiff’s state law claims.
See 105 ILCS 5/34-2; Biggs v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 82 F.4th 554, 557 n.1 (7th Cir. 2023); City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); 745 ILCS 10/2-102 (“Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, a local public entity is not liable to pay punitive or exemplary damages

in any action brought directly or indirectly against it by the injured party or a third party.”); Simonsen
v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, No. 01 C 3081, 2001 WL 1250103, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17,
2001)(“The Board argues that as a municipality, it cannot be held liable for punitive damages under
§§ 1981, 1983, 1985 or Title VII. We agree.’). The plaintiff makes no mention of punitive damages
or defendants’ argument in her response brief, so she has waived any challenge to it. Webb, 906 F.3d
at 581; Bonte, 624 F.3d at 466; Farris, 532 F.3d at 619. The plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages
against the Board is stricken.

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CONCLUSION
The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [Dkt. #14] is denied as to Counts I, II
(First Amendment Claims and qualified immunity), IV (Illinois Whistleblower Act), V (retaliatory
discharge), and VII (intentional infliction of emotional distress). While the Motion to Dismiss is
granted as to Counts III (Due Process) and VI (civil conspiracy), the dismissal is without prejudice.
The defendants’ Motion is also granted as to plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against the Board
of Education.

ENTERED: Ua
UMTED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DATE: 2/24/25

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10805304. Public record. Not legal advice.