# ROMAN v. M & T BANK

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · February 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10805120

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10805120

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that a common please judge’s entry of orders in foreclosure proceedings were protected by judicial immunity

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOANNE MARIE ROMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-308
)
M&T BANK et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently before the Court are two motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint and briefs
in support, filed by Defendants in this matter, and the responses in opposition to such motions,
filed by pro se Plaintiff Joanne Marie Roman (“Plaintiff”): (1) Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 and supporting brief (Docket Nos. 40,
42, 43), filed by Defendants M&T Bank, KML Law Group, P.C., and several individuals named
as employees of and/or attorneys for M&T Bank (collectively, the “Bank Defendants”), and
Plaintiff’s response (Docket No. 48); and (2) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and
supporting brief (Docket Nos. 51, 52), filed by Defendant the Honorable William R. Shaffer
(“Judge Shaffer”), and Plaintiff’s response (Docket No. 56). Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a
motion entitled, “Motion for Opinion and [Memorandum] Conclusion of Law Findings by the
Court Judgment on the Plaintiffs’ Specific Independent Claims as Stated in the Entire Complaint
Statutory Authority 42 U.S.C. 1983” (Docket No. 57, hereinafter “Motion for Findings by the
Court”) and supporting brief (Docket No. 58), to which the Bank Defendants have filed a response
(Docket No. 65).
For the reasons set forth herein, the motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by
the Bank Defendants and by Judge Shaffer will both be granted, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Findings
by the Court will be denied as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Since the parties are well-acquainted with the factual background of this case, at this

juncture the Court will present an abbreviated version of the facts alleged in the Amended
Complaint (Docket No. 33).1 This case arises out of a mortgage foreclosure action that was lodged
by M&T Bank against Plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Pennsylvania
(M&T Bank v. Joanne M. Roman, Civ. Action No. AD-2022-10337 (Ct. of Common Pleas of
Butler Cnty., Pa.)) (the “foreclosure case”). The original Complaint in this case, filed by Plaintiff,
pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that Plaintiff’s civil rights were violated in the
foreclosure case by Bank Defendants M&T Bank and KML Law Group, P.C., and J. Eric
Kishbaugh (identified in the Complaint as attorney for M&T Bank).2 (Docket No. 1). The Bank
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12, and Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. (Docket Nos. 11, 12, 18). Plaintiff also filed a
number of her own motions at or near that time, including a “Motion [to] Avoid Summary
Judg[]ment Lien in Per[son]al Liability, Violation of 11 USC 524 – Effect of Discharge Disguised
In Rem Action ‘Wrongful Mortgage For[e]closure’” (Docket No. 16, refiled with minor changes
and different attachments at Docket No. 20), a “Motion [to] Enter Default Ju[d]gment in
Accordance with Rule 55 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (Docket No. 17, refiled with minor

1 The Court notes at the outset that, like Plaintiff’s allegations in the original Complaint, the allegations in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are once again, at best, unclear.

2 Plaintiff contends that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims, which are brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because they involve a federal question. (Docket No. 33-1 at 1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
changes and different attachments at Docket No. 19), and a “Motion [by] Debtor-in-Possession
(DIP) [to] Re-Open Bankruptcy Case No. 21-20642-GLT Violation, 11 USC 524 – Effect of
Discharge” (Docket No. 21).
The Court granted the Bank Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint and denied all
of Plaintiff’s motions at moot, noting that the allegations in the Complaint were “at best, unclear.”

(Docket No. 32 at 2). In so ruling, the Court also discussed at length several troubling issues in
this case, including procedural confusion (such as whether, in filing the present action, Plaintiff
intended to remove a case from state court or whether she was attempting to commence a new
action), conflicting statements made by Plaintiff in her filings regarding her intentions in filing this
matter, and the overall lack of clarity in the Complaint. (Docket No. 32). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Complaint was dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and Plaintiff was afforded an
opportunity to amend her pleading. (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint in which
she now names as Defendants, in addition to the original Bank Defendants, several other attorneys

for and/or employees of M&T Bank, as well as Judge Shaffer, who presided over the foreclosure
case.3 (Docket No. 33).

3 The Court notes that, while the Defendants named in the Amended Complaint appear to be largely the same
as those named in the original Complaint, Plaintiff has created confusion in her new pleading as to who exactly she
intends to name as additional Defendants among the Bank Defendants. Plaintiff clearly names the following three
entities/individuals as Defendants on the Amended Complaint’s Civil Cover sheet: “M&T Bank, One Fountain Plaza,
Buffalo, NY 14203”; “KML Law Group, P.C., Philadlpha, Pittsbrg, PA; San Diego, CA et. al.”; and “William R.
Shaffer, Sr. Judge, 10th Judicial District Commonwealth, PA.” (Docket No. 33-1). In the body of the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff identifies three Defendants in this action: “DEFENDANT No. 1: M&T Bank, One Fountain
Plaza, Buffalo NY 14203,” “Defendant No. 2 KML Law Group, P.C. et. al., Philadelphia, Pa Headquarters – Law
Firm . . . OBLIGE, (official/individual) Michael McKeever, Esquire, Partner, Lead Attorney M&T Bank, and all
named defendants,” and “Defendant No. 3 Commonwealth, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas of Butler County,
PA Civil Division, 10th Judicial District . . . OBLIGE, Honorable William R. Shaffer, Senior Judge Both
(official/individual).” (Docket No. 33 at 49, 51, 53).
Finally, in the caption of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff lists M&T Bank, KML Law Group, and Judge
Shaffer as Defendants, and she also lists several attorneys for and/or employees of M&T Bank (specifically, as
“EMPLOYEE(S),” “Eric J. Kishbaugh, Attorney for M&T Bank” (“Kishbaugh”); “Geraldine Linn, Attorney for M&T
Bank” (“Linn”); “Danielle M. DiLeva, Attorney for M&T Bank” (“DiLeva”); and “Natalie Rowan, Legal Assistant”
The Bank Defendants have filed their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing
that Plaintiff has, once again, failed to state a claim against them under Rule 12(b)(6).4 Judge
Shaffer has also filed his motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) that: (1) to the extent Plaintiff alleges claims against him in his official
capacity, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United

States; and (2) to the extent Plaintiff alleges claims against him in his individual capacity, he is
entitled to judicial immunity. As noted, Plaintiff has also filed her Motion for Findings by the
Court. Responses to all motions have been filed by the opposing parties, and the parties’ motions
are ripe for decision by the Court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint on account of the
Court’s “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rule 12(b)(1) motions challenging jurisdiction are
either facial or factual. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006). “A

facial attack . . . is an argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient

(“DiLeva”)). (Docket No. 33 at 1). Notably, Michael McKeever, Esq. (the attorney representing the Bank Defendants
in this matter) is also listed in the caption of the Amended Complaint. Additionally, the motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint filed by Attorney McKeever represents that it is filed on behalf of Defendants M&T Bank, KML
Law Group, Kishbaugh, Linn, DeLeva, and Rowan (but not himself), yet that motion also states that “[n]o new parties
were named as defendants” in the Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 42 at 1, 3). It is therefore unclear whether
Plaintiff intends to include Kishbaugh, Linn, DiLeva, and Rowan (and perhaps McKeever) as separate named
Defendants in this matter, whether such individuals are simply identified as employees of and/or attorneys for M&T
Bank, or whether Plaintiff mistakenly believes that parties’ attorneys should be listed in the caption (they should not
be).
Therefore, for purposes of clarity at this juncture, and viewing the Amended Complaint in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court will consider M&T Bank and KML Law Group, P.C., as well as Kishbaugh, Linn,
DiLeva, and Rowan, collectively, to be the “Bank Defendants.”

4 The Court notes that the Bank Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint refers to Rules
12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(f), but their brief in support seeks dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Such brief also notes
the lack of diversity of citizenship among the parties, although Plaintiff states that the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction
here is federal question jurisdiction, not diversity jurisdiction. As the Bank Defendants’ brief is supported by
supporting discussion and citation to law, while the motion is not, the Court herein considers the motion to dismiss
the Amended Complaint in the context of Rule 12(b)(6).
to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court . . . .” Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele,
757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). A facial attack asserts that a claim “is insufficient to invoke the
subject matter jurisdiction of the court because, for example, it does not present a question of
federal law, or because there is no indication of a diversity of citizenship among the parties, or
because some other jurisdictional defect is present.” Id. at 358. A facial attack “can occur before

the moving party has filed an answer or otherwise contested the factual allegations of the
complaint.” Id. Conversely, a factual challenge “attacks the factual allegations underlying the
complaint’s assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or ‘otherwise
present[ing] competing facts.’” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting
Constitution Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 358).
Here, to the extent Judge Shaffer seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), he is making a facial challenge, arguing that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars such
claims.5 When analyzing a facial attack on subject-matter jurisdiction, “the court must only
consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto,

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176
(3d Cir. 2000). “Thus, a facial attack calls for a district court to apply the same standard of review
it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., construing the alleged
facts in favor of the nonmoving party.” Constitution Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 358 (citing In re
Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir.
2012)).

5 A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is the proper vehicle for asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity because such
immunity “is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.” Blanciak v. Allegheny
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations contained in the
complaint must be accepted as true and must be construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and the court must “‘determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,
the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.’” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d

Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)); see Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,” the complaint must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, while “this standard does not require
‘detailed factual allegations,’” Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

It should be further noted, therefore, that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme
Court has noted that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard “‘does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at
234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, the requirement that a court accept as true all
factual allegations does not extend to legal conclusions; thus, a court is “‘not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
To review a complaint under this standard, the Court proceeds in three steps. See Connelly
v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). First, the Court notes the elements of a

claim. See id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the Court eliminates conclusory allegations.
See id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). And finally, the Court assumes the remaining well-pleaded
facts are true and assesses “‘whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Id.
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Notably, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against state officials for actions
taken in their individual capacities. See Jones v. Wetzel, Civ. Action No. 17-5121, 2018 WL
1322045, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2018). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are asserted
against Judge Shaffer in his individual capacity, the Court has jurisdiction over claims for
individual liability, subject to overcoming Judge Shaffer’s motion brought pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). See id.
C. Pro Se Pleadings
Although courts must generally construe pro se pleadings liberally pursuant to Rule
8(a)(2), courts are not required to accept legal conclusions disguised as statements of fact,
unsupported conclusions, or unwarranted inferences. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007). “[A] pro se complaint must still
contain factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Wallace v. Fegan, 455 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim,” and “they cannot flout procedural rules – they must abide by the same rules that apply to
all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Bank Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, like her original Complaint, is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and alleges, in essence, that the Bank Defendants violated her civil rights in the course of
litigating the underlying foreclosure case. As the Court previously indicated in ruling on the Bank
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, “Section 1983 is the ‘vehicle for imposing
liability against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person of “rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”’ Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen
Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 525 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), and
42 U.S.C. § 1983).” (Docket No. 32 at 6). The Court further explained in its opinion that, to
establish a claim under Section 1983, the following two criteria must be met: “1) the conduct

complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) the
conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights secured under the Constitution or federal law.” (Docket
No. 32 at 6 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of
Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir.1998))).
In their prior motion to dismiss, the Bank Defendants argued that, even accepting all factual
allegations in the Complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
the Complaint simply did not aver that the conduct complained of was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. The Bank Defendants asserted at that time – and Plaintiff did not
allege in the Complaint or argue otherwise – that they are all either private entities or individuals,
and that none of them act under color of state law or state or local authority. The Bank Defendants
further contended that, therefore, without allegations of action under color of law or state or local
authority, Plaintiff did not allege sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim pursuant to
Section 1983, and dismissal of the Complaint was appropriate.
In granting the Bank Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, the Court specifically indicated

the reasons for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim, as follows:
Upon consideration of the Complaint in its entirety, the Court agrees
that Plaintiffs do not aver any facts indicating that Defendants were acting under
color of state law or state or local authority in engaging in the conduct alleged.
There are no allegations that Defendants have some relationship to a state or
local legal authority, nor that Defendants are employed by or affiliated with
(directly or indirectly) any state or municipal authority, nor that any Defendant
acted under the authority of any governmental entity. Absent any allegations
showing some connection to or colorable relationship between Defendants and
state, local or any governmental authority, even assuming the other factual
allegations are true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
the Court finds that the allegations in the Complaint do not plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief under Section 1983 because there are no facts from
which the Court could draw the reasonable inference that Defendants were
acting under color of state law. Accordingly, the Court agrees that the
Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.

(Docket No. 32 At 7). The Court dismissed the Complaint without prejudice, however, and
permitted Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint in order to cure these pleading deficiencies.
Now, in their second motion to dismiss, the Bank Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint suffers from the same defect as the initial Complaint, and that Plaintiff again
fails to state a plausible claim under Section 1983 because she has not alleged the deprivation of
civil rights by one acting under color of law or state authority. See Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City
of Phila., 142 F.3d at 590. The Bank Defendants argue – again – that they are all private
individuals or entities, that none is employed by or otherwise acts under color of state law or state
or local authority, and that Plaintiff has not pled otherwise. Therefore, the Bank Defendants
conclude that this critical precondition to the establishment of a Section 1983 claim remains absent
in the Amended Complaint. According to the Bank Defendants, to the extent Plaintiff purportedly
alleges a violation of Section 1983, her Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In opposing the Bank Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff argues that she does not have to aver

that Defendants acted wrongfully under color of state law, since the foreclosure complaint “was
filed under the color of state law in Pennsylvania (not New York) and the judgment was obtained
under the color Pennsylvania state law.” (Docket No. 48 at 18). Moreover, Plaintiff asserts
repeatedly that the Bank Defendants’ use of the state court system – specifically, to proceed against
her in a mortgage foreclosure action – constitutes action under color of state law or local authority
sufficient to state a Section 1983 claim. However, Plaintiff has cited no authority to support her
argument, nor does the Court agree with her bald assertion that an entity’s use of the state court
system to pursue a claim constitutes that entity acting under color of state law or other government
authority. The Court therefore agrees with the Bank Defendants that Plaintiff has, again in her

Amended Complaint, failed to allege a relationship by employment or affiliation between a state
or local government authority and the person or entity depriving her of civil rights. Because
Plaintiff has failed to cure the defect that was previously identified by the Court in affording her
leave to amend her claims, she has again failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the Bank Defendants’ motion and will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Having determined that Plaintiff has once more failed to state any plausible claims for relief
against the Bank Defendants in her Amended Complaint, the Court must decide whether to dismiss
such claims with prejudice. The Court may give leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, futility can justify refusing leave to amend. See Krantz v. Prudential
Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113,
115 (3d Cir. 2000)). The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed two lengthy complaints,6 various
related motions, as well as numerous additional documents for the Court’s consideration, totaling
in sum thousands of pages of filed materials at an early procedural juncture in this case.

Additionally, the Court has already granted Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint in this matter
once and, in doing so, the Court provided Plaintiff with clear instructions regarding the need to
plead state action on the part of Defendants in order to state claims under Section 1983. Plaintiff
did not amend her allegations in that regard, and she instead offers a theory as to why her
allegations – essentially unchanged in this regard from the original allegations – show state action
on the part of the Bank Defendants. The Court has explained, supra, that Plaintiff’s theory is not
valid to show the requisite state action under Section 1983.
Additionally, despite the Court having dismissed the Complaint and having ordered
Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint, Plaintiff indicates in her brief opposing the Bank

Defendants’ motion to dismiss that, “[t]he amended complaint is not the full complaint,” and that
she “must use the original and its own documents used in the state case to show what happened
under the color of state law to fully explain the wrongful actions that occurred . . . .” (Docket No.
48 at 4). Plaintiff further states that she “amended the complaint adding pages 1 to 67,” and that
“[t]he amended complaint should be referred to as Part 2 (in whole) read together is the (entire
complaint).” (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff appears to erroneously think that the Complaint together with

6 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s original Complaint is 17 pages long and her Amended Complaint is 65 pages
long, and although the documents were submitted in an extremely small typeface font and do not appear to be double-
spaced, the Court accepted both filings despite Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 5.1 of the Local Rules of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (regarding paper format requirements that include
the use of double-spaced text and a typeface not smaller than twelve (12) point word processing font). However,
going forward, Plaintiff shall be expected to abide by such format requirements in all future filings or risk having her
filings stricken for being noncompliant with the Local Rules.
the Amended Complaint now form the operative complaint in this matter. That is not so, as the
Amended Complaint alone is the operative complaint at this juncture.
In light of these considerations, and mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court, in
granting the Bank Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, will afford Plaintiff
one final chance to file an amended complaint in this matter. However, Plaintiff is hereby put on

notice that if she wishes to file a Second Amended Complaint to correct the substantial pleading
deficiencies identified by the Court, she shall do so in a single pleading that fully alleges every
claim she wishes to pursue and that stands by itself without reference to the original Complaint or
the Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim under Section 1983
against the Bank Defendants, her claims against the Bank Defendants will be dismissed, without
prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Judge Shaffer’s Motion to Dismiss
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also avers additional Section 1983 claims against a

new Defendant, Judge Shaffer of the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Pennsylvania, who
oversaw the state court foreclosure action upon which Plaintiff’s claims here are based. Plaintiff
brings her claims against Judge Shaffer in both his official and individual capacities, alleging that
he violated her civil rights while acting in his role as the judge in the foreclosure action. In moving
to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, Judge Shaffer argues, among other things, that Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against him are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and those claims should
be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Shaffer also
argues that Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against him are barred by the doctrine of absolute
judicial immunity, and such claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
1. Plaintiff’s Official Capacity Claims Against Judge Shaffer
Judge Shaffer argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims
against him because such claims are, in effect, brought against the Court of Common Pleas of

Butler County over which he presides, which is a state entity that is entitled to sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d
Cir. 2010); Chilcott v. Erie Cnty. Domestic Rels., 283 F. App’x 8, 10 (3d Cir. 2008); Marinkovic
v. Sinnot, No. 1:12cv139, 2014 WL 1255886, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2014). Judge Shaffer
contends that such official capacity claims should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff filed a lengthy, rambling response to Judge Shaffer’s motion, which the Court,
mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status, has carefully reviewed and considered. To the extent Judge
Shaffer seeks dismissal pursuant the Rule 12(b)(1), Plaintiff argues, among other things, that

“Judge Shaffer is pleading a defense outside of the amended complaint.” (Docket No. 56 at 2).
Plaintiff asserts that the Court does, in fact, have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter
because federal courts “have original jurisdiction in their exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy
cases.” (Id. at 18 (emphasis in original omitted)). Plaintiff also states that judges “have absolute
immunity unless they totally lack subject-matter or personal jurisdiction in the case.” (Id. at 19
(emphasis in original omitted)). Plaintiff, further, implies that Judge Shaffer did not follow the
law, so he lost subject matter jurisdiction over her case, and his orders are therefore void. (Id.).
While the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court, “[s]uits against
state officials in their official capacity . . . should [also] be treated as suits against the State.” Hafer
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); see U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Thus, a claim against an
officeholder of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in his official capacity is, in essence, a claim
against the Commonwealth itself and is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Conklin
v. Anthou, 495 F. App’x 257, 263 (3d Cir. 2012). Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has indicated that the state courts comprising Pennsylvania’s unified judicial system,

including the courts of common pleas, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Benn
v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005).
There are, however, three exceptions to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment:
“(1) congressional abrogation, (2) waiver by the state, and (3) suits against individual state officers
for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law.”
Pennsylvania Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002). The
Court notes that the first two exceptions clearly do not apply to this case since Pennsylvania has
not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court,7 and since Congress has
not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Conklin, 495 F.

App’x at 263 (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Wheeling &
Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998); 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 8521(b)). Therefore, only the third exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity
remains for the Court’s consideration.8
However, to the extent Plaintiff may seek declaratory and/or injunctive relief, the Amended
Complaint does not seek declaratory and injunctive relief from Judge Shaffer in his official

7 Pennsylvania has specifically withheld consent to suit in federal court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b)
(“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in
Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).

8 The Court is giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt in providing such analysis here since she is proceeding
pro se, but the Court notes that Plaintiff does not specifically address this argument in her brief.
capacity. (Docket No. 33 at 63-65). Additionally, the third exception to Eleventh Amendment
Immunity, as articulated in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), applies only where a plaintiff
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md.,
535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (“In determining whether the doctrine of Ex Parte Young avoids an
Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether

[the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized
as prospective.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Here, the Amended Complaint
is based solely upon Judge Shaffer’s past conduct during the foreclosure action, including his
actions in holding oral argument and issuing rulings and orders. Plaintiff does not allege any facts
from which the Court might infer that any similar conduct has since occurred or is anticipated,
which would indicate ongoing violations of federal law. See Surina v. South River Bd. of Educ.,
No. 20-2804, 2022 WL 264464, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 27, 2022) (holding that the Ex Parte Young
exception did not apply where, although the injunctive relief plaintiff sought was phrased in
prospective terms, facts were not alleged indicating that the purported violations of constitutional

rights were ongoing); Taylor v. City of Jersey City, No. 22-457, 2023 WL 6997250, at *4 (D.N.J.
Oct. 24, 2023) (holding that claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment where the plaintiff
failed to allege specific facts from which the court might infer that alleged civil rights violations
were ongoing). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff might possibly be seeking a declaration regarding
Judge Shaffer’s past conduct during the foreclosure action, “the Eleventh Amendment ‘does not
permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past.’” Brown
v. Riazzi, Civil No. 17-708, 2018 WL 2435185, at *4 n.7 (W.D. Pa. May 30, 2018) (quoting Puerto
Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
The Court therefore finds that, in considering the third exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity, the Ex Parte Young exception does not apply to Plaintiff’s official capacity claims
against Judge Shaffer. Since no exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity exists under the
facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Shaffer in his official
capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court thus finds that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s official capacity claims to the extent they might seek declaratory and/or
injunctive relief against Judge Shaffer. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims
are brought against Judge Shaffer in his official capacity, such claims will be dismissed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Although a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be “without prejudice,”
see Aldossari ex rel. Aldossari v. Ripp, 49 F.4th 236, 262 (3d Cir. 2022), which typically indicates
that a plaintiff may amend her complaint, such dismissal “without prejudice” simply indicates that
the claim was not decided on the merits. Here, however, the Court further finds that, to the extent
Plaintiff might wish to amend her official capacity claims against Judge Shaffer, such amendment
would be futile and will not be permitted.9 See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000)

(quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)) (listing
futility among the reasons justifying refusal of leave to amend).

9 “‘Futility’ means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Judge Shaffer are based entirely on
allegations that he acted improperly in overseeing the foreclosure action. As discussed, supra, however, the Eleventh
Amendment bars Plaintiff’s official capacity claims here since, according to the facts averred in her Amended
Complaint, she does not seek declaratory or injunctive relief based on an ongoing violation of federal law.
Furthermore, given the basic premise of Plaintiff’s case and the applicability of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the
Court finds that no set of facts – even if viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff – could validate her claims or
her requested relief here.
2. Plaintiff’s Individual Capacity Claims against Judge Shaffer
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Judge Shaffer in his individual capacity, like her
official capacity claims, relate to Judge Shaffer’s judicial actions in the foreclosure action,
including holding oral argument, ruling on motions, and issuing opinions and orders of court. To
the extent Plaintiff alleges individual capacity claims, however, Judge Shaffer argues that he has

absolute judicial immunity from suit. (Docket No. 52 at 9). Having survived the threshold
jurisdictional analysis for such a claim, Judge Shaffer’s argument in this regard should be
considered as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1989) (“In order for the
defendants to succeed on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on absolute immunity, the allegations of
appellant’s complaint must indicate the existence of absolute immunity as an affirmative defense;
the defense must clearly appear on the face of the complaint.” (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 605–06 (1984)); see, e.g., Mazzetti v.
New Jersey Div. of Child Protection & Permanency, Civ. No. 14-8134, 2017 WL 1159726, at *11

(D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2017) (considering the issue of absolute judicial immunity in the context of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion). Additionally, it should be noted that Plaintiff is only permitted to seek
monetary damages (rather than equitable relief) for her claims against Judge Shaffer in his
individual capacity, and that a state official sued in his individual capacity is a “person” amenable
to suit under Section 1983 and, as such, does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment protection. See
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991).
However, judges have absolute immunity from suit for actions they take in their judicial
capacity in cases over which they have jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991).
In fact, a “‘judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was
done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.’” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d
Cir. 2006) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978)). Accordingly, “only when an
action, while judicial in nature, was pursued in ‘complete absence of all jurisdiction’” will a judge
not be entitled to absolute immunity. Richardson v. Wilkinsburg Police Dep’t, Civ. Action No.
16-0129, 2016 WL 4141084, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016) (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12).

“This is an especially stringent standard, as it is generally held that, in light of the broad judicial
immunity afforded to judges, ‘where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient
jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’” Id. (quoting Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44
(3d Cir. 2000)).
Pennsylvania’s courts of common pleas have “unlimited original jurisdiction” over all
actions and proceedings, including “all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or
usage in the courts of common pleas.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 931(a); see also Pa. Const. Art. V, §5
(stating that there shall be “one court of common pleas for each judicial district . . . having
unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law.”).

Furthermore, District Courts within the Third Circuit have recognized that common pleas courts
have broad jurisdiction. See Coulter v. Doerr, Civ. Action No. 11-1201, 2012 WL 642469, at *4
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2012); Dantzler v. Cohen, Civ. Action No. 22-CV-2522, 2022 WL 3030828, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2022); Strader v. U.S. Bank, No. 2:19-cv-118-NR, 2020 WL 3447776, at *4
(W.D. Pa. June 24, 2020) (holding that “a judge for the Court of Common Pleas . . . was well
within his jurisdiction to rule upon a motion for summary judgment in a mortgage-foreclosure
matter and to conduct the oral argument proceedings in a manner that he deemed appropriate.”).
Furthermore, presiding over proceedings, conducting hearings, and issuing orders are all
considered to be “quintessential judicial functions.” Silver v. Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
Cnty., Civ. A. No. 18-494, 2018 WL 6523890, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2018), aff’d 802 F. App’x
55 (3d Cir. 2020). As explained, supra, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Shaffer violated her civil rights
when he held oral argument, ruled on motions, and issued opinions and orders in the foreclosure
action. Such acts clearly fall within the jurisdiction of court of common pleas judges, as defined
by Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., Strader, 2020 WL 3447776, at *4 (finding that, in a foreclosure

proceeding, allegations that a judge cut a plaintiff off at oral argument, did not recuse himself when
he should have, and ruled against the plaintiff in a summary judgment motion were all acts in the
judge’s judicial capacity and protected by immunity); McBride v. PHH Mortgage Corp., Civ.
Action No. 18-1401, 2019 WL 4605629, at *2, *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2019) (dismissing Section
1983 claims brought against judges based on judicial immunity, where the plaintiff claimed that a
common pleas judge failed to act impartially throughout foreclosure proceedings, a judge granted
summary judgment in favor of a lienholder without considering the plaintiff’s arguments, a judge
ordered a sheriff’s sale on the plaintiff’s property, and the lienholder and its law firm collaborated
with judges to foreclose on the property); Crimone v. McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, P.C., No.

2:14-cv-808, 2015 WL 3967825, at *2, *7 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Crimone v.
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 634 F. App’x 375 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that a common please judge’s
entry of orders in foreclosure proceedings were protected by judicial immunity).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Judge Shaffer was acting within his jurisdiction when he
engaged in the conduct alleged in the Amended Complaint, and he is therefore protected by
absolute judicial immunity against the claims brought against him in his individual capacity for
monetary relief. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are brought against Judge
Shaffer in his individual capacity, such claims will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
As discussed, supra, Plaintiff’s claims of constitutional violations are based entirely on her
allegations concerning Judge Shaffer’s judicial acts. In view of the basic factual premise of the
Amended Complaint and the applicability of the absolute judicial immunity doctrine here, the
Court finds that Plaintiff cannot allege any set of facts, even if viewed in the light most favorable
to her, that could provide her with a valid claim against Judge Shaffer in his individual capacity.

See, e.g., Reardon v. New Jersey, Civ. No. 13-5363, 2014 WL 2921030, at *6 (D.N.J. June 27,
2014) (holding that since the plaintiff’s allegations concerned granting a search warrant and other
judicial acts, they are entitled to immunity and allowing amendment of the allegations would be
futile); Shearin v. Delaware, No. Civ.A. 02-276, 2003 WL 1697540, at *7 (D. Del. Mar. 21, 2003)
(holding that allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint would be futile because judges and
judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages under Section 1983)).
Therefore, the Court finds that amendment would be futile as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims
against Judge Shaffer in his individual capacity, and those claims will be dismissed with prejudice.
C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Findings by the Court

In her Motion for Findings by the Court, Plaintiff appears to seek a ruling by the Court as
to the validity of the claims she alleges in her Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 57). Such motion
has no basis in law, and Plaintiff is advised that any future motion of a similar nature will be
stricken. Since the Court will be granting the motions to dismiss filed by the Bank Defendants
and by Judge Shaffer, and the Amended Complaint will be dismissed in its entirety, Plaintiffs’
Motion for Findings by the Court will be denied as moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed
by the Bank Defendants and by Judge Shaffer will be granted. Plaintiffs’ claims against the Bank
Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Judge Shaffer
will be dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Judge Shaffer will be dismissed with
prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Findings by the Court will be denied as moot.
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: February 24, 2025 s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge

cc/ecf: Joanne Marie Roman (via U.S. Mail)
All counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10805120. Public record. Not legal advice.