# R. Moton v. K. Boockvar ~ Appeal of: L. Hoopes & G. Stenstrom

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · February 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10804714

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 24, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Wolf. McCullough
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10804714

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that courts will dismiss an appeal as moot unless an actual case or controversy exists at all stages of the judicial or administrative process

## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ruth Moton, Leah Hoopes, and : CASES CONSOLIDATED
Gregory Stenstrom :
:
v. :
:
Kathy Boockvar, Delaware County, :
Delaware County Board of Elections, :
Delaware County, Bureau of Elections, :
James Byrne, Gerald Lawrence, :
Ashley Lunkenheimer, :
Laureen Hagan, James Allen, :
Maryann Jackson, James Savage, :
Thomas Gallagher, James Ziegelhoffer, :
Crystal Winterbottom, Chevon Flores, :
Jean Fleschute, Stacy Heisey-Terrell, :
Christina Iacono, Christina Perrone, :
Karen Reeves, Donna Rode, :
Norma Locke, Jean Davidson, :
S.J. Dennis, Louise Govinden, :
Marilyn Heider, Doug Degenhardt, :
Mary Jo Headley, Jennifer Booker, :
Kenneth Haughton, Regina Scheerer, :
Cathy Craddock, Maureen Moore, :
Pasquale Cipolloni, Gretchen Bell, :
Anne Coogan, Howard Lazarus, :
Christine Reuther, William Martin, :
and James Manly Parks :
:
Appeal of: Leah Hoopes and :
Gregory Stenstrom : No. 876 C.D. 2022

Ruth Moton, Leah Hoopes, and :
Gregory Stenstrom :
:
v. :
:
Kathy Boockvar, Delaware County, :
Delaware County Board of Elections, :
Delaware County, Bureau of Elections, :
James Byrne, Gerald Lawrence, :
Ashley Lunkenheimer, :
Laureen Hagan, James Allen, :
Maryann Jackson, James Savage, :
Thomas Gallagher, James Ziegelhoffer, :
Crystal Winterbottom, Chevon Flores, :
Jean Fleschute, Stacy Heisey-Terrell, :
Christina Iacono, Christina Perrone, :
Karen Reeves, Donna Rode, :
Norma Locke, Jean Davidson, :
S.J. Dennis, Louise Govinden, :
Marilyn Heider, Doug Degenhardt, :
Mary Jo Headley, Jennifer Booker, :
Kenneth Haughton, Regina Scheerer, :
Cathy Craddock, Maureen Moore, :
Pasquale Cipolloni, Gretchen Bell, :
Anne Coogan, Howard Lazarus, :
Christine Reuther, William Martin, :
and James Manly Parks : No. 877 C.D. 2022
:
Appeal of: Ruth Moton : Argued: December 9, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE WOLF FILED: February 24, 2025

In these consolidated appeals, we must consider whether a court of
common pleas properly dismissed a complaint challenging the administration of the
2020 General Election. In the complaint, Ruth Moton, Leah Hoopes, and Gregory

2
Stenstrom (Appellants) allege that dozens of public officials in Delaware County
engaged in a sweeping, carefully hidden conspiracy to fraudulently change the
outcome of the 2020 General Election. In a July 15, 2022 decision, the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court) sustained two sets of preliminary
objections filed by former Secretary of the Commonwealth Kathy Boockvar
(Secretary or Secretary Boockvar) and the above-captioned Delaware County public
officials and entities that were named as defendants below (Delaware Defendants,
and together with Secretary Boockvar, Appellees) and dismissed Appellants’
complaint. It did so principally on the basis that the 2020 General Election is long
over and settled, so this matter is moot. We will affirm that determination. Also
before the Court are Appellees’ Applications for Sanctions against Attorney Thomas
Carroll, counsel for Appellant Moton (Attorney Carroll) on the basis that this appeal
is frivolous, which we will deny.
Appellants filed their complaint in January 2022, after receiving the
results of a Right-to-Know Law1 (RTKL) request. At no time did Appellants attempt
to avail themselves of the Pennsylvania Election Code2 to contest the election or its
administration pursuant to law, though many other litigants managed to do so.
Appellants have persisted in this appeal through yet another General Election, in a
case that is obviously moot, having obviously ignored or avoided the lawful statutory
remedy, on claims that look largely frivolous.
Election integrity and transparency are serious matters. So too are
election finality and legitimacy. The Election Code balances those policy
considerations and tells parties how, where, and when they may challenge an
election—and how and when they may not. See Baxter v. Phila. Bd. of Elections,

1
Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
2
Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2600-3591.

3
325 A.3d 645, 646 (Pa. 2024) (per curiam) (Donohue, J., concurring) (explaining
that litigating election challenges as they arise “under the Election Code,” however
imperfect, “is the nature of our system”). When parties venture beyond the Election
Code’s procedures into civil litigation over elections, they will find our courts being
careful to entertain claims only “in the ordinary course.” New PA Project Educ.
Fund v. Schmidt (Pa., No. 112 MM 2024, filed Oct. 5, 2024), 2024 WL 4410884
(per curiam), slip op. at 3 n.2; see Repub. Nat’l Comm. v. Schmidt (Pa., No. 108 MM
2024, filed Oct. 5, 2024), 2024 WL 4406909 (per curiam) (Brobson, J., concurring),
slip op. at 4 (explaining need for even important election matters to proceed before
“an appropriate court with appropriate parties in the ordinary course”).
In affirming dismissal of the complaint, we end this ill-conceived
matter, we hope for good. That does not mean we do not value election integrity.
We do. This Court stands ready to examine any election when asked, but we do that
by rigorously applying the law, including the Election Code’s procedural restrictions
and prudential limits on judicial power. Those laws apply to everyone, not least
“against those who seek to delegitimize this Commonwealth’s elections, or its
judiciary.” Cnty. of Fulton v. Sec’y of Commonwealth, 292 A.3d 974, 1063-64 (Pa.)
(Dougherty, J., concurring), cert. denied sub nom. Fulton Cnty., Pa. v. Sec’y of the
Commonwealth, 144 S. Ct. 283 (2023).
I. BACKGROUND
Appellants are residents and electors of Delaware County who voted in
the 2020 General Election. Appellant Moton was also a candidate in the 2020
General Election. Appellants filed a complaint in the trial court on January 1, 2022
(Complaint) seeking relief with respect to the 2020 General Election in five counts.

4
The 104-page Complaint makes sweeping allegations that the Delaware Defendants3
intentionally created chaos around their administration of the 2020 General Election
in order to enable and then conceal their commission of election fraud. The
Complaint further alleges that the Delaware Defendants destroyed, deleted, and
concealed lawfully cast ballots, data, materials, and equipment used during the
Election, and then created fraudulent return sheets after the Election. The Complaint
comprises claims sounding in common law fraud (Count I), fraudulent
misrepresentation (Count II), negligent misrepresentation (Count III), common law
quo warranto (Count IV), and mandamus and/or equitable relief (Count V). The
complaint seeks relief (1) enjoining further destruction or alteration of data or
equipment, (2) requiring Appellees to produce all equipment and data used in the
Election and allowing Appellants to access that equipment and data, and (3) allowing
Appellants to conduct a forensic investigation of that equipment and data. The
Complaint also essentially seeks declaratory relief in the form of determinations that
Appellees violated Appellants’ constitutional rights, violated the RTKL, and
engaged in a conspiracy to violate the law and commit fraud.
Secretary Boockvar filed preliminary objections to the Complaint based
on improper service, lack of standing (under the common law, as well as for quo
warranto actions and actions under the Election Code in particular), mootness,
sovereign immunity, and several demurrers. The Delaware Defendants filed a
second set of preliminary objections based on improper service, mootness, and
failure to exhaust statutory remedies under the Election Code. Appellants filed
responses in opposition to each set of preliminary objections.

3
The Delaware Defendants are Delaware County (County), the Delaware County Board of
Elections, the Delaware County Bureau of Elections, and the individual employees and officials
of those entities as captioned above.

5
On July 15, 2022, the trial court entered an order sustaining both sets
of preliminary objections in their entirety and dismissing the Complaint with
prejudice. The trial court found that “[a]s the . . . Complaint challenges the
administration of an election that occurred in 2020, and the prevailing candidates in
that election have been inaugurated, the claims set forth in the Complaint are moot
and must be dismissed.” Reproduced Record (R.R.)4 at 341a. The trial court found
the exceptions to the mootness doctrine inapplicable. Id. It did not expressly discuss
any other preliminary objections beyond sustaining them.
On August 10, 2022, Moton filed a motion for reconsideration. On
August 14, 2022, Hoopes and Stenstrom filed a notice of appeal. On August 15,
2022, Moton filed her own notice of appeal from the trial court’s order.5 The trial
court denied the motion for reconsideration on September 16, 2022, on the basis that
it had been divested of jurisdiction by the notices of appeal. In that Opinion denying
reconsideration, the trial court gave the following reasoning regarding its earlier
decision dismissing the Complaint:

The Defendants[’] preliminary objections included
challenges on the grounds of service, failure to exhaust
statutory remedies under the Election [C]ode, immunity,
and most poignant, mootness. In support of their
contention, Defendants cited to Bognet v. Degraffenreid,

4
There were two reproduced records filed in these consolidated matters. This Opinion will
principally cite the reproduced record filed by Appellant Moton, unless otherwise noted. Although
that reproduced record does not use pagination followed by a small letter “a” as required by
Pa.R.A.P. 2173, we will use the correct pagination format.
5
In their brief in this Court, the Delaware Defendants argue that Moton’s notice of appeal was
untimely filed on October 26, 2022, and they essentially request that the Court quash her appeal.
But this Court’s docket indicates that the two consolidated notices of appeal now before us were
timely filed on August 14 and 15, 2022, respectively. Moton did file a second notice of appeal on
October 26, 2022, but the Court struck that filing as duplicative of her timely filed notice of appeal.
See Moton v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1189 C.D. 2022, Order filed Mar. 3, 2023).

6
141 S. Ct. 2508 (2021)[,6] which involved election fraud
in the 2020 [General E]lection. The [United States] Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the Plaintiff’s
[sic] lacked standing on all grounds. On petition for writ
of certiorari to the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court [of
the United States] vacated the judgment and remanded the
case with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. This
court found Bognet persuasive.

....

That Pennsylvania’s election was certified, and that
the President and Vice President assumed office a full year
before this lawsuit was filed is a clear indicator that claims
regarding election fraud from November of 2020 is [sic]
moot. There is thus no further relief related to the 2020
election that the Court could grant.

R.R. at 337a-38a.
II. ISSUES
On appeal, Appellants raise essentially two issues. They first argue that
the matter is not moot, or alternatively, that exceptions to the mootness doctrine
apply, so it was error for the trial court to dismiss the Complaint as moot. Second,
Hoopes and Stenstrom challenge the trial court’s conclusion on standing, arguing
that they have standing as certified poll watchers. In response, Appellees maintain
the trial court correctly sustained the preliminary objections on mootness and
standing. In addition, Appellees raise alternative bases on which we should affirm
the trial court. The Delaware Defendants maintain the trial court correctly found a
failure to exhaust statutory remedies. Secretary Boockvar invokes deficient service
of the Complaint on her, sovereign immunity, and her demurrers to the Complaint
as further reasons to affirm.

6
In Bognet, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Third Circuit’s decision, and
remanded for dismissal as moot in accordance with United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S.
36 (1950).

7
III. DISCUSSION
“We review a common pleas court’s decision sustaining preliminary
objections and dismissing a complaint for an abuse of discretion or error of law.”
Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City of Harrisburg, 218 A.3d 497, 505 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2019) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Firearm Owners Against Crime v.
Papenfuse, 261 A.3d 467 (Pa. 2021). Where a preliminary objection raises a
question of law, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary.” Id. (citing Off. of the Governor v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1228 (Pa.
2014)); see also Crespo v. Hughes, 292 A.3d 612, 617 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“Mootness,
like standing, is a question of law.”).
A trial court ruling on preliminary objections—and this Court when
reviewing that ruling—must “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material
fact” and all reasonable inferences from those facts, and the objections “should only
be sustained if the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible.” Id. at 505-
06 & n.12. Given the fantastical nature of the claims in this Complaint, it may seem
strange that the Court would “accept [them] as true.” Id. at 506 n.12. This
assumption of truth is a temporary but important legal fiction that helps us “avoid
conflating the question of whether the asserted facts state a plausible claim with the
question of whether such facts are accurate.” Ridenour v. Multi-Color Corp., 147 F.
Supp. 3d 452, 456 (E.D. Va. 2015). But it is just that—a fiction. We are not saying
that we agree with the claims, or believe them, or “that [Appellants’] allegations are
true or even that [Appellants would] ultimately be able to prove them.” Barker ex
rel. U.S. v. Columbus Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1346 (M.D.
Ga. 2013). In a colloquial sense, at the preliminary objection stage we do not yet

8
care whether the factual claims are true. We are answering a different question, to
which we now turn: Are the claims procedurally and legally sound?
A. Mootness
“Generally, a case will be dismissed as moot if there exists no actual
case or controversy.” Mistich v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 863 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2004). The controversy must be real, concrete, and sufficiently adverse to
sharpen the issues for resolution. Id. Mootness analysis also considers whether the
court can grant a meaningful remedy, since “courts will not enter judgments or
decrees to which no effect can be given.” Id.; Toland v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
311 A.3d 649, 658 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024).
There are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, two of which are
potentially relevant here. See Toland, 311 A.3d at 658. The first exception, for
conduct capable of repetition but likely to evade review, requires two factual
predicates to be met: “(1) the action the complaining party challenges must be so
short in duration that it would have ended by the time the parties could fully litigate
the issue, and (2) a reasonable expectation must exist that the offending party would
subject the complaining party to the same exact action again.” Id. The second
exception allows us to decide moot cases if they are “of great public importance.”
Id. But like mootness exceptions generally, that principle is to be applied only in
rare cases and “the general, prudential approach in Pennsylvania remains that courts
do not review moot questions.” Chester Water Auth. v. Pa. Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ.
Dev., 249 A.3d 1106, 1115 (Pa. 2021).
Hoopes and Stenstrom argue the Complaint is not moot because they
are not requesting to have the 2020 General Election overturned or decertified. They
view the trial court as having mistakenly relied on the finality of the 2020 General

9
Election as a basis for mootness. Instead, they claim they seek “no less than 10”
other remedies for election law violations, spoliation, and fraud, as well as costs,
expenses, and attorney fees incurred in having to bring this action and damages they
are entitled to pursuant to law. Hoopes & Stenstrom Br. at 21. Alternatively, they
argue that a mootness exception applies because this matter will evade review. They
assert that the misconduct they allege will occur again in future elections. They also
accuse Appellees of voluntarily and strategically mooting this case, though they do
not explain how Appellees would have done so.
Moton makes similar arguments, pointing out that the counts of the
Complaint allege, and seek remedies for, specific actions by the Delaware
Defendants during the 2020 General Election, but “do not rely on, nor ask for,
transformation of prior events,” such as the certification of the election results.
Moton’s Br. at 31. Moton also invokes a mootness exception in the alternative,
arguing that the matter is of great public importance. In support, she points to the
need for clear understanding of the Election Code’s requirements, and a recent
decision of this Court that decided a technically moot appeal on the basis that proper
construction of the Election Code is of great public importance. See Moton’s Br. at
33 (citing In re Pets. to Open Ballot Box Pursuant to 25 P.S. §3261(A), 295 A.3d
325, 333 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (hereinafter Appeal of Dawson)).7
In response, the Delaware Defendants start with the proposition that the
certification of an election moots any claim regarding the administration of that
election. In support, they cite Bognet, 141 S. Ct. 2508, as the trial court did. They

7
Because Moton’s argument on mootness bears summarizing, we reject the Secretary’s
assertion that Moton waived this issue by failing to brief it. See Secretary’s Br. at 16 n.6. In
making that assertion, the Secretary did not cite or discuss the portions of Moton’s brief
summarized here.

10
also rely on our unreported decision in Ioannidis v. Wolf (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 635
M.D. 2020, filed July 8, 2021), aff’d, 270 A.3d 1110 (Pa.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.
98 (2022), where we held that certification of the 2020 General Election and the
inauguration of the President on January 20, 2021, rendered “any claim moot.”
Secretary Boockvar makes similar arguments, claiming that the matter was moot
from the moment it was filed in 2022, because the Complaint “could not possibly
bring about the result [Appellants] were seeking,” i.e., because the 2020 General
Election was long over. Secretary’s Br. at 13. She argues that since the trial court
could not order anyone to undo the results of the 2020 General Election, no
meaningful relief could be granted, which is the hallmark of mootness.
Appellees dispute that any mootness exception applies. They
specifically argue this case is not capable of repetition yet evading review because
the Complaint concerns allegedly unlawful actions of individuals which are unlikely
to be repeated, rather than challenges to laws or policies that are perpetually in place,
which is the typical basis for this exception. Appellees also more generally argue
that we should not apply exceptions to the mootness doctrine where a plaintiff has
failed to exhaust statutory remedies under the Election Code. In support, they again
cite Ioannidis, where we stated that we would not “apply any of the . . . exceptions
to the mootness doctrine in this case because [the p]etitioner failed to avail himself
of the statutory remedies provided in the Election Code prior to filing the
[pleading].” Ioannidis, slip op. at 9.
We find our decision in Ioannidis persuasive, particularly because it
involved the intersection of mootness and election law, as this case does. There,
Andrew Ioannidis filed a petition for review in our original jurisdiction against the
Governor and Secretary of the Commonwealth, seeking “declaratory and injunctive

11
relief, and an audit and recount of the results of the [2020 General Election] relating
to the election of electors of President and Vice-President of the United States.” Id.,
slip op. at 1-2. We noted that the petitioner had not sought to challenge the
administration of the election through the procedures set out in the Election Code
(such as by filing an election contest petition). We also noted his argument that he
was not actually seeking to contest the outcome of the election, or even alleging
violations of the Election Code, but rather sought to vindicate his constitutional
rights and to determine “whether [the r]espondents’ conduct was arbitrary [or]
fraudulent.” Id., slip op. at 6. We rejected that argument, reasoning as follows:

Assuming that the allegations contained in the
Amended Petition are true, Petitioner may well have
asserted a viable claim with respect to the conduct of the
2020 General Election . . . . However, the subsequent
certification of the election results and the inauguration of
the new President and Vice-President on January 20, 2021,
have rendered any claim moot. See generally Bognet [141
S. Ct. 2508] . . . ; Conant[ v. Brown, 248 F. Supp. 3d 1014,
1019 (D. Or. 2017), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 611 (9th Cir.
2018)] (“I agree with [d]efendants that the challenges to
the 2016 certified election results and ascertainment of
electors are moot because that process is complete, the
electors have performed their duties, and the President has
been inaugurated.”).

Because this Court may not grant Petitioner the
injunctive or mandamus relief that he requests, the instant
matter is deemed to be moot. See Graziano Constr[.]
Co[.], Inc. v. Lee, 444 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Pa. Super.
1982) (“[W]e cannot enter judgments or decrees to which
effect cannot be given. The rule is that where . . . pending
an appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible for
the appellate court to grant any relief, the appeal will be
dismissed.”) (citations omitted); 18 Standard Pa. Practice
2d § 99.7 (2021) (“Mandamus is unavailable where it
would be futile or ineffectual by reason of the respondent’s
inability to comply therewith. Mandamus also will not

12
lie . . . where only a moot question, and no justiciable
issue, is presented.”) (footnotes omitted).

Id., slip op. at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
Here, the claims for relief in the Complaint are strikingly similar to
those requested of this Court in Ioannidis. We determined those claims were moot,
in part because the election was completed and certified, and its officeholders
inaugurated, preventing the Court from being able to afford meaningful relief.
Appellants make the same argument: that they seek information and investigation,
rather than to disturb the results of the election. We rejected that argument in
Ioannidis, and similarly here we conclude that this matter is technically moot.
Further supporting that result, our Supreme Court recently recognized that the
expiration of the term of an elected office (as distinct from a candidate’s
inauguration into that office) also renders the court unable to afford relief, and thus
moots the case. Martin v. Donegal Twp., 325 A.3d 502, 508-09 (Pa. 2024).
Further, we agree with Appellees that no exception to the mootness
doctrine applies in this case. In general, the exceptions are to be applied only in rare
cases. Chester Water Auth., 249 A.3d at 1115. Regarding the first exception
(capable of repetition yet evading review), we conclude that neither of the two
factual prerequisites is met. The conduct alleged in the Complaint is not of such
short duration that it could not be reviewed if it were to occur in the future. That is
principally because, as we discuss further below, the Election Code provides a
thorough and expeditious process for scrutinizing the conduct of elections.
Appellants may avail themselves of that process in the future, making the alleged
conduct—which they allege is pervasive and years-long, not of short duration—
unlikely to evade review. As to the second predicate, we conclude that there is not
a “reasonable expectation” that Appellees would engage in “the same exact action”

13
as alleged in the Complaint. Toland, 311 A.3d at 658. Treating the allegations in
the Complaint as true, as we must, it would be unreasonable to expect Appellees to
engage in the same conduct in future elections, because that conduct would expose
them to considerable litigation under the Election Code (if, as we discuss below, a
party timely avails themselves of that available remedy) and potentially to other
liability.
Regarding the great-public-importance exception, we acknowledge
that, occasionally, an election matter will meet that test. See, e.g., Appeal of Dawson,
295 A.3d at 333. But that decision applied the exception only because this Court
had, in short time, received at least three appeals in separate cases on the exact same
issue of the proper construction of the Election Code. Id. Even when statutes of
great public importance—such as the RTKL or the Election Code—are implicated,
“not every claim arising under the [statute] crosses the high threshold for exception.”
Chester Water Auth., 249 A.3d at 1115. We conclude that the exception does not
apply here.
Most importantly, we noted in Ioannidis that we were “not inclined to
apply any of the foregoing exceptions to the mootness doctrine in this case because
Petitioner failed to avail himself of the statutory remedies provided in the Election
Code prior to filing the instant Amended Petition for Review.” Ioannidis, slip op. at
9. We considered our mootness analysis to be strongly informed by the General
Assembly’s obvious choice to provide, in the Election Code, the sole path for testing
the administration of elections. We relied on the principle that “the proper remedies
for violations of the Election Code are to be found within the comprehensive
legislative framework of the Code itself.” Brunwasser v. Fields, 409 A.2d 352, 354
(Pa. 1979). We observed that the Election Code provides carefully for various ways

14
in which persons may challenge the administration of an election, including by filing
a contest petition, though such a challenge must be brought within 20 days of the
election. Ioannidis, slip op. at 11 (quoting Sections 1711 and 1756 of the Election
Code, 25 P.S. §§ 3291, 3456). We concluded that the petitioner “utterly failed to
avail himself of the foregoing appropriate statutory remedy thereby precluding the
grant of the requested declaratory relief.” Id. Because we consider the mootness
issue alongside questions of exhaustion of remedies under the Election Code, see
Ioannidis, we next turn to that issue.
B. Failure to Exhaust Statutory Remedies
The Delaware Defendants assert that, even if this matter were not moot,
we should affirm the trial court’s dismissal on the basis that it properly sustained
their separate preliminary objection as to failure to exhaust statutory remedies.
Citing Brunwasser, 409 A.2d at 354, they point to the same concept we relied on in
Ioannidis: that the Election Code is the exclusive remedial scheme for examining
the administration of an election. Appellants do not discuss this issue in their briefs8
and, unlike for mootness and standing which they do address, they do not list the
exhaustion issue in their statements of questions involved. Thus, by failing to
address this aspect of the trial court’s decision—an aspect that could be challenged
on appeal because the trial court sustained all preliminary objections in their
entirety—Appellants have waived this issue. Gun Owners of Am., Inc. v. City of
Phila., 311 A.3d 72, 85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (en banc) (issues not developed in brief
are waived); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Piper, 615 A.2d 979, 986 n.3 (Pa.

8
Appellants filed no reply briefs in this matter.

15
Cmwlth. 1992) (en banc) (issues not named in statement of questions involved are
waived, even if addressed in brief).9
For completeness, however, we will address the issue, and we conclude
that even if the matter were not properly dismissed as moot, it would have been
properly dismissed for failure to exhaust statutory remedies. Before bringing suit at
law or in equity, a party must exhaust any adequate statutory or administrative
remedy.10 Canonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Dep’t of Health, 422 A.2d 141, 144 (Pa. 1980);
Funk v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 71 A.3d 1097, 1101 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); Keystone
ReLeaf LLC v. Dep’t of Health, 186 A.3d 505, 513 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc).
If there is an adequate remedy available, courts must refrain from exercising equity
jurisdiction to adjudicate declaratory relief, or quasi-equitable relief like mandamus.
Keystone ReLeaf, 186 A.3d at 513-14. This requirement prevents premature judicial
intervention in a remedial process that has already been established by law, and
allows development of a factual record on the terms established for that legal
remedy. Funk, 71 A.3d at 1101; Keystone ReLeaf, 186 A.3d at 518. Courts may

9
At oral argument, Appellants Hoopes and Stenstrom, pro se, and Attorney Carroll, as counsel
for Appellant Moton, were directly asked about Brunwasser, 409 A.2d 352, which had been cited
in the Delaware Defendants’ brief. Neither the pro se parties nor Attorney Carroll were able to
articulate any arguments regarding that case. After oral argument, on December 11, 2024,
Appellants Hoopes and Stenstrom filed a Praecipe for Supplemental Brief in Support of Full
Review on the Merits (Praecipe). That filing discusses Brunwasser, among other things, and was
effectively a supplemental memorandum of law that violated Pa.R.A.P. 2501(a), which prohibits
post-argument communication with the Court “except upon application.” Since permission to file
said memorandum of law was not properly sought, the Praecipe is stricken. Even if the Court had
considered the arguments raised in the Praecipe, those arguments fail for the reasons that we
articulate in the remainder of Section III.B of this Opinion.
10
“The terms ‘exhaustion of statutory remedies’ and ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies’
are at times used interchangeably in our decisional law.” Off. of the Governor v. Donahue, 98 A.3d
1223, 1231 n.6 (Pa. 2014). The latter term more often refers to an administrative appeals process
created by agency rule or regulation, as opposed to one created by statute. Id.

16
sometimes consider cases brought by plaintiffs who have not yet exhausted, but only
when a defined exception to the exhaustion requirement applies, such as when “the
constitutionality of a statutory scheme or its validity is challenged,” or “legal or
equitable remedies are unavailable or inadequate.” Keystone ReLeaf, 186 A.3d at
514 (quoting Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 684 A.2d 1047,
1054 (Pa. 1996)).
We have applied exhaustion principles consistently in election-related
matters. As we have discussed, this Court in Ioannidis concluded that a would-be
plaintiff was required to pursue the remedies in the Election Code before pursuing
another cause of action, given the Code’s primacy as the remedial scheme for
election administration. Relatedly, in a recent appeal arising under the Code, we
emphasized that the Code provides the exclusive remedial scheme and also carefully
constrains that scheme with jurisdictional timelines to ensure prompt resolution of
any dispute about our elections. See In re Contest of Nov. 7, 2023 Election of
Towamencin Twp. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1482 C.D. 2023, filed Apr. 8, 2024), slip op.
at 10. “Allowing untimely challenges”—or, for that matter, challenges that
circumvent the Code entirely, like this case—“could render every election suspect,
leaving the public who voted, and the government body affected by the election
continually unsure as to its status.” Id. (quoting Koter v. Cosgrove, 844 A.2d 29, 34
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For that “critical reason[],” the General Assembly established
numerous obligations in the Election Code and numerous procedures for vindicating
them pursuant to the Code. Id. The Code prohibits, among other things: violation
of the oath of office by election officials; failing to perform a duty set forth in the
Code; fraudulent conduct by election officers; and the refusal of county boards to

17
permit the inspection of or to destroy “any general or duplicate return sheet, tally
paper, affidavit, nomination petition, certificate or paper, other petition, witness list,
account, contract, report or any other document or record in the custody of such
county board which, under the provisions of [the Code], is required to be open to
public inspection.” 25 P.S. §§ 3504, 3510, 3525, 3548. The remedies for violations
of those provisions, such as the violations the Complaint alleges, “are to be found
within the comprehensive legislative framework of the Code itself.” Brunwasser,
409 A.2d at 354. The Election Code provides a self-contained system for good-faith
challenges to elections. There are risks to going beyond that system. One is
confusion and chaos. See New PA Project Educ. Fund (Pa., No. 112 MM 2024),
slip op. at 3; Baxter, 325 A.3d at 645-46. Another is endless bad-faith litigation
calculated to weaken our elections and the institutions that administer them,
including our courts. See Cnty. of Fulton, 292 A.3d at 1013-14. To avoid those
evils, we believe requiring exhaustion is especially important in election-related
matters.
It is clear that Appellants did not file any action pursuant to the Election
Code, such as an election contest petition. To the extent they would argue they could
not possibly have done so timely, we note that our courts do permit nunc pro tunc
relief in cases arising under the Election Code, though we hold such requests in
election cases “to a stricter rule” than in other types of cases. In re Twenty-Sixth
Election Dist., Second Ward, Borough of Lehighton, 41 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. 1945).
Aside from a few passing and undeveloped references to “nunc pro tunc relief” in
the Complaint, Appellants have not actually sought to file any nunc pro tunc action
under the Election Code. See Complaint, ¶¶ 385-86. Thus, we conclude they have

18
failed to exhaust the exclusive statutory remedies found in the Code, which required
the trial court to dismiss the Complaint.
C. Applications for Sanctions
Finally, we address Appellees’ Applications for Sanctions, filed
December 7 and 19, 2023, respectively (Applications). The Applications seek
similar relief, asking for sanctions to be imposed against Attorney Carroll in the form
of striking Appellant Moton’s brief, dismissing her appeal, remanding for imposition
of fees and costs against Attorney Carroll, and/or referring Attorney Carroll to the
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Disciplinary Board) for
professional misconduct. The Applications give the same basis for that relief: that
this “appeal is frivolous [because] it has no basis in law or fact.” Secretary’s
Application at 3-4; accord Delaware Defendants’ Application at 8-9.
An appeal is frivolous when it has no basis in law or fact and is “readily
recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect of success.” Reinhart
v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 954 A.2d 761, 768 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2008) (assessing fees and costs under Pa.R.A.P. 2744). An appellate brief that “lacks
support for an argument and citation to pertinent authority is grounds to find an
appeal frivolous.” Venafro v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 796
A.2d 384, 388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Although, with the benefit of analysis, we reject
Appellants’ arguments as to mootness and its exceptions, which were contained in
their briefs, we are not persuaded that those arguments were wholly without merit.
Nor are we persuaded by Appellees’ apparent suggestion that Attorney Carroll’s
unconscionable conduct in other election-related litigation should, by association,

19
subject him to sanctions more readily here. See Applications at 9-10 (both citing
Cnty. of Fulton, 292 A.3d 974).11 Accordingly, we deny the Applications.
IV. CONCLUSION
This matter challenges the administration of the 2020 General Election,
which occurred more than four years ago. We conclude that it is moot and does not
warrant application of any exception to the mootness doctrine. Further, we conclude
that Appellants failed to exhaust statutory remedies that were available to them under
the Election Code. Accordingly, the trial court correctly sustained the preliminary
objections and dismissed the Complaint. We will affirm that determination.12, 13
However, we conclude that the arguments on appeal are not so utterly
lacking in support as to be frivolous, so we deny the Applications for Sanctions.

_____________________________________
MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

President Judge Cohn Jubelirer and Judges Covey, Fizzano Cannon, and Wallace
did not participate in this decision.

11
We also note that our Supreme Court has already referred Attorney Carroll to the
Disciplinary Board for examination of his conduct in that matter. Cnty. of Fulton, 292 A.3d at
1018.
12
Given these conclusions, we do not address the many other bases for the preliminary
objections below.
13
The “emphatic[] dissent” so recharacterizes the Majority Opinion that it responds to an
opinion we have not written. Dissenting Opinion at 22. Endeavoring, as always, to stay on the
respectful side of disagreement, the Majority chooses not to respond to the Dissent.

20
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ruth Moton, Leah Hoopes, and : CASES CONSOLIDATED
Gregory Stenstrom :
:
v. :
:
Kathy Boockvar, Delaware County, :
Delaware County Board of Elections, :
Delaware County, Bureau of Elections, :
James Byrne, Gerald Lawrence, :
Ashley Lunkenheimer, :
Laureen Hagan, James Allen, :
Maryann Jackson, James Savage, :
Thomas Gallagher, James Ziegelhoffer, :
Crystal Winterbottom, Chevon Flores, :
Jean Fleschute, Stacy Heisey-Terrell, :
Christina Iacono, Christina Perrone, :
Karen Reeves, Donna Rode, :
Norma Locke, Jean Davidson, :
S.J. Dennis, Louise Govinden, :
Marilyn Heider, Doug Degenhardt, :
Mary Jo Headley, Jennifer Booker, :
Kenneth Haughton, Regina Scheerer, :
Cathy Craddock, Maureen Moore, :
Pasquale Cipolloni, Gretchen Bell, :
Anne Coogan, Howard Lazarus, :
Christine Reuther, William Martin, :
and James Manly Parks :
:
Appeal of: Leah Hoopes and :
Gregory Stenstrom : No. 876 C.D. 2022
:
:
Ruth Moton, Leah Hoopes, and :
Gregory Stenstrom :
:
v. :
:
Kathy Boockvar, Delaware County, :
Delaware County Board of Elections, :
Delaware County, Bureau of Elections, :
James Byrne, Gerald Lawrence, :
Ashley Lunkenheimer, :
Laureen Hagan, James Allen, :
Maryann Jackson, James Savage, :
Thomas Gallagher, James Ziegelhoffer, :
Crystal Winterbottom, Chevon Flores, :
Jean Fleschute, Stacy Heisey-Terrell, :
Christina Iacono, Christina Perrone, :
Karen Reeves, Donna Rode, :
Norma Locke, Jean Davidson, :
S.J. Dennis, Louise Govinden, :
Marilyn Heider, Doug Degenhardt, :
Mary Jo Headley, Jennifer Booker, :
Kenneth Haughton, Regina Scheerer, :
Cathy Craddock, Maureen Moore, :
Pasquale Cipolloni, Gretchen Bell, :
Anne Coogan, Howard Lazarus, :
Christine Reuther, William Martin, :
and James Manly Parks : No. 877 C.D. 2022
:
Appeal of: Ruth Moton :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of February 2025, the July 15, 2022 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County is AFFIRMED.
The Applications for Sanctions filed December 7 and 19, 2023, by
former Secretary of the Commonwealth Kathy Boockvar and the other above-
captioned Appellees, respectively, are DENIED.

2
The Praecipe for Supplemental Brief in Support of Full Review on the
Merits, filed December 11, 2024, by Appellants Leah Hoopes and Gregory
Stenstrom, is hereby STRICKEN for failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2501(a).

_____________________________________
MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

3
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ruth Moton, Leah Hoopes, and : CASES CONSOLIDATED
Gregory Stenstrom :
:
v. :
:
Kathy Boockvar, Delaware County, :
Delaware County Board of Elections, :
Delaware County, Bureau of Elections, :
James Byrne, Gerald Lawrence, :
Ashley Lunkenheimer, Laureen Hagan, :
James Allen, Maryann Jackson, :
James Savage, Thomas Gallagher, :
James Ziegelhoffer, Crystal Winterbottom, :
Chevon Flores, Jean Fleschute, :
Stacy Heisey-Terrell, Christina Iacono, :
Christina Perrone, Karen Reeves, :
Donna Rode, Norma Locke, Jean Davidson, :
S.J. Dennis, Louise Govinden, :
Marilyn Heider, Doug Degenhardt, :
Mary Jo Headley, Jennifer Booker, :
Kenneth Haughton, Regina Scheerer, :
Cathy Craddock, Maureen Moore, :
Pasquale Cipolloni, Gretchen Bell, :
Anne Coogan, Howard Lazarus, :
Christine Reuther, William Martin, :
and James Manly Parks :
:
Appeal of: Leah Hoopes and :
Gregory Stenstrom : No. 876 C.D. 2022
:
:
Ruth Moton, Leah Hoopes, and :
Gregory Stenstrom :
:
v. :
:
Kathy Boockvar, Delaware County, :
Delaware County Board of Elections, :
Delaware County, Bureau of Elections, :
James Byrne, Gerald Lawrence, :
Ashley Lunkenheimer, :
Laureen Hagan, James Allen, :
Maryann Jackson, James Savage, :
Thomas Gallagher, James Ziegelhoffer, :
Crystal Winterbottom, Chevon Flores, :
Jean Fleschute, Stacy Heisey-Terrell, :
Christina Iacono, Christina Perrone, :
Karen Reeves, Donna Rode, :
Norma Locke, Jean Davidson, :
S.J. Dennis, Louise Govinden, :
Marilyn Heider, Doug Degenhardt, :
Mary Jo Headley, Jennifer Booker, :
Kenneth Haughton, Regina Scheerer, :
Cathy Craddock, Maureen Moore, :
Pasquale Cipolloni, Gretchen Bell, :
Anne Coogan, Howard Lazarus, :
Christine Reuther, William Martin, :
and James Manly Parks : No. 877 C.D. 2022
:
Appeal of: Ruth Moton : Argued: December 9, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: February 24, 2025

Respectfully, the majority affirms the dismissal of Appellants’1 entire
litigation by misconstruing their claims and misapplying the mootness standards and
exceptions. When considering mootness, we must evaluate each claim to determine
whether we can grant meaningful relief.2 Each claim in a single multi-claim suit must be

1
Ruth Moton (Moton), Leah Hoopes, and Gregory Stenstrom (Hoopes/Stenstrom) are
collectively referred to herein as Appellants.

2
See United States v. Vega, 960 F.3d 669, 673 (5th Cir. 2020). See also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667
F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A suit may become moot only as to a particular form of relief. Therefore,
we separately analyze mootness as to the claims supporting money damages and for equitable relief.”)
(citing Henschen v. City of Houston, 959 F.2d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding claim for immediate
injunctive relief moot but claim for damages live)); JSLG, Inc. v. City of Waco, 504 F. App’x 312, 315-
19 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (analyzing mootness separately as to claims for injunctive and
(Footnote continued on next page…)
PAM - 2
individually examined for mootness and disposed of accordingly. Yet here, that has not
occurred. Instead, the Majority, in a broad stroke and without any basis in the complaint
whatsoever, affirms the dismissal of the complaint, concluding that Appellants’ sole
objective in bringing the lawsuit is to overturn or decertify the November 2020 General
Election (Election). See Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022,
filed February 24, 2025), slip op. at 13 (rejecting outright Appellants’ argument that they
are not seeking “to disturb the results of the election”). See also Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa.
Cmwlth., Nos. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed February 24, 2025), slip op. at 1
(mischaracterizing Appellants’ claims as simply “challenging the administration of the
2020 General Election”). This is wrong for several reasons. As explained below, the
complaint actually alleges not only the occurrence of, but the likelihood of ongoing fraud,
misrepresentation, willful misconduct in the performance of Defendants’ official duties
and oaths of office, violations of the Pennsylvania Election Code,3 the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions,4 and improprieties in responses to requests made pursuant
to the Right-to-Know Law5 (RTKL). The Majority fails to separately analyze these
claims and requests for relief, which it must do for mootness. As I explain below, these

declaratory relief and for damages); 13B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3533.2 (3d ed. 2023) (“Individual issues may be mooted [through voluntary action by the
defendant that accords [ ] the relief demanded by the plaintiff] if all other matters are resolved, or even
though other matters remain to be resolved.”). Cf. also Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs,
Miss., 697 F.3d 279, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[A] plaintiff seeking both injunctive relief and money
damages can continue to pursue the case, even after the request for an equitable remedy is rendered
moot.”).

3
Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2600-3591.

4
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (failing to count a legal vote and/or allowing
a fraudulent vote to be counted are both violative of fundamental constitutional rights of citizens because
such actions and conduct disenfranchises registered voters in direct violation of the state and federal
constitution).

5
Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
PAM - 3
claims are “live,” and Appellants should not be prohibited from pursuing them on the
basis of mootness.
To be clear, I do not opine on whether Appellants have stated one or more
valid claims upon which relief may be granted as we are not here addressing any of the
merits of Appellants’ claims. That issue is not before us. It was not raised here or decided
below by the trial court. Therefore, I will assume for purposes of this dissent, as the
Majority has, that Appellants’ claims are otherwise viable.
The error by the Majority is glaring. Nowhere in the entirety of the
complaint do Appellants request that the Election be overturned, or decertified.
Appellants have neither requested decertification or invalidation of the Election. Rather,
they seek relief in the nature of declaratory and injunctive relief, mandamus, and
damages. In substance, the complaint avers that Defendants have neglected and willfully
refused to perform the duties imposed upon them by law and would continue to do so.
Thus, I cannot agree with the application of the doctrine of mootness in this instance, and
I would reach the merits which I believe raise very serious constitutional questions and
Election Code issues regarding whether Defendants committed unconstitutional,
unlawful, intentional, reckless, and grossly negligent acts in violation of state and federal
laws and in dereliction of their duties.
Further, because the action is not moot, it is unnecessary to consider the
exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated below, the
Majority has not only misapplied those exceptions, but it has also failed to engage in any
meaningful analysis of them in the context of the circumstances presented in this case.
Finally, for the reasons set forth below, I believe the Majority has erred in its conclusion
regarding Appellants’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies.

The Complaint Alleges Election Fraud/Misrepresentation and Post-Election Fraud
But Does Not Seek to Overturn or Invalidate the Election

PAM - 4
As averred by Appellants, they filed a complaint with 98 exhibits, originally
on October 18, 2021, which was not docketed until January 1, 2022, with testimony,
documents, video, and audio evidence of thousands of grievous election law violations,
criminal acts, massive election fraud, spoilation of election materials required to be
maintained by both state and federal statutes, and fraudulent certification of the votes in
Delaware County.6 (Hoopes/Stenstrom Br. ¶ 3, page 9.) The complaint consists of five
counts alleging: Common Law Fraud (Count I); Fraudulent Misrepresentation (Count II);
Negligent Misrepresentation (Count III); Common Law Quo Warranto (Count IV); and
Mandamus and Equitable Relief (Count V). Appellants’ legal claims are based upon
documents and evidence received in response to a RTKL request on May 21, 2021,
pursuant to which they received video and audio evidence of election law violations,
testimony, documents, and other evidence which they allege show patterns or practices
of behaviors in violation of the Election Code and state and federal statutes and
include, among other things, that

• the County certified the election with data from over half
the precincts missing,
• Return Sheets could not be reconciled because election
data was missing,
• Return Sheets and election tapes were hidden in the
basement of the Voting Machine Warehouse,
• new Return Sheets were created after the election,
• Delaware County employees were observed destroying
election data,
• ballots were delivered to the precinct by a sheriff,
• election data was destroyed to hide election law violations
and fraud,
• thousands of ballots were processed unobserved,
• 300 ballots were taken out of one individual’s car at the
drop off location,

6
I note that the action was timely filed within six months of Defendants’ alleged activity;
however, it was three years, spanning another election cycle, before it was decided by the Majority that
the claims were now moot.
PAM - 5
• missing V-Drivers were found in an empty van with Biden
stickers,
• some election data and materials were thrown in the trash,
• machines/proof tapes were destroyed and thrown in the
trash,
• information responsive to the RTKL requests was
excluded, altered, and destroyed,
• information responsive to the RTKL request was
intentionally mixed up to make it time consuming for
anyone reviewing the response to be able to organize the
data and read it,
• new election results were created with “Clean V Drives”
so the data would be consistent with the November 3, 2020
data,
• there were missing tally tapes, poll tapes, ballot count
tapes, write-in report tapes, open poll tapes, zero report
tapes,
• the Blue Crest Sorter was erased of all November 3, 2020
election data, and
• there was absolute chaos on the day of the election and
afterward.

(Complaint ¶¶ 204, 205, 207, 209, 212, 219, 221, 222, 225, 227, 228, 229, 237, 239, 249,
251, 256, 262, 268, 344.) Appellants aver, inter alia, that

[the] failure on the part of Defendants to ensure the
transmission of accurate information and data reflecting the
proper tally of legal votes cast at an election by Delaware
County’s legally registered citizen voters; to properly certify
the aforementioned citizens’ votes; to ensure elections in
Delaware County are conducted legally and that all facets of an
election, including the processing, tallying, return, and
certification of the votes, complies with the federal and state
constitutions, and all applicable federal and state laws and
regulations; to guard and preserve all evidence in relation to a
federal election as required by federal law; to refrain from
destroying or altering any such evidence; and to respond to and
produce complete, truthful, and accurate information,
materials, and data as requested in response to a lawful request
for said information by a member of the public; and to preserve
PAM - 6
all documents and information demonstrating that this was
done, constitutes a violation of state and federal law and
entitles [Appellants] to the relief sought herein.
(Complaint, ¶ 150) (emphasis added).
The allegations span a period of time before, during, and after the
Election through the present. For example, Appellants allege that after the election and
in response to RTKL requests, Defendants destroyed, deleted, secreted, altered, hid, and
obscured election data, materials, and equipment in violation of common law and
statutory law in order to prevent the discovery of the alleged fraud. (Complaint, ¶ 184.)
Appellants also aver that Defendants’ committed fraud in their responses to RTKL
requests in order to conceal the irregularities and violations of the Election Code.
(Complaint, ¶ 202.) Those allegations do not relate to and do not support any claim to
overturn the Election. Rather, they relate to the claim there was some inappropriate action
on the part of Defendants in responding forthrightly to RTKL requests. The
certification of the Election did not “resolve” or “moot out” any of these contentions
because they relate to something more than just the outcome of the Election. Yet, the
Majority states these claims “look largely frivolous” without any examination of them
whatsoever.7
The case alleges fraud and willful misconduct8 against Defendants in their
official capacities, with a factual issue outstanding as to whether the conduct alleged

7
See Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed February 24, 2025),
slip op. at 3 (“Appellants have persisted in this appeal through yet another General Election, in a case
that is obviously moot, having obviously ignored or avoided the lawful statutory remedy, on claims that
look largely frivolous.”).
8
The term “willful misconduct” is construed to mean willful misconduct aforethought and is
synonymous with an intentional tort. Specifically, it occurs when the actor desired to bring about the
result that followed or was aware that it was substantially certain to ensue. Orange Stones Co. v. City
of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (governmental immunity does not bar claims against an
employee if their actions constituted willful misconduct); Holt v. Northwest Pennsylvania Training
Partnership Consortium, Inc., 694 A.2d 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (local agency employees can be held
liable if they have engaged in crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct).

PAM - 7
occurred.9 Merely because the Election was certified before the fraud was detected does
not mean that there is no other relief available to Appellants. The Majority seems to
believe that since the Election was certified, there is no point to resolving whether the
alleged fraud or willful misconduct occurred. See Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth.,
Nos. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed February 24, 2025), slip op. at 3 (affirming trial court’s
dismissal of preliminary objections on the basis that “the 2020 General Election is long
over and settled”). I vehemently disagree with that sentiment as it is diametrically
opposite of what the complaint avers. The prayer for relief states:

[Appellants] seek mandamus relief to the extent that there is a
want of any other adequate, appropriate and specific remedy
available; there is a clear legal right to which they are entitled;
and there exists a corresponding duty on the part of the
Defendants.

Nunc pro tunc relief is also appropriate where a breakdown in
the administrative operations of the Election Board occurs.
Appeal of Orsatti, . . . 598 A.2d 1341 ([Pa. Cmwlth.]), appeal
denied, . . . 600 A.2d 956 ([Pa.] 1991).

[Appellants] also seek injunctive relief from the Court as
follows:

A. [Appellants] request the Court to issue a
protective order to enjoin Defendants, and anyone
acting on their behalf, from destroying, secreting,
or otherwise altering any and all voting machines,
servers, computers, computer codes, hard drives,
software, programs, internet records, mobile
phone records, ballot images, photocopies, or
9
In Pennsylvania, a cause of action for fraud and willful misconduct in an official capacity can
be pursued under certain conditions. According to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550, in any action against a local
agency or its employee for damages due to an injury caused by the employee’s act, if it is judicially
determined that the act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct, the
provisions of Sections 8545 (official liability generally), 8546 (defense of official immunity), 8548
(indemnity), and 8549 (limitation on damages) do not apply. See also Edmondson v. Zetusky, 674 A.2d
760 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550.
PAM - 8
scanned images of ballots, return tapes, and/or
tally sheets, paper ballots, return tapes, and/or tally
sheets used in and/or related to the November 3,
2020, [E]lection;

B. Order Defendants to produce any and all voting
machines, servers, computers, computer codes,
hard drives, software, and programs, internet
records, mobile phone records, ballot images,
photocopies, or scanned images of ballots, return
tapes, and/or tally sheets, paper ballots, return
tapes, and/or tally sheets used in and/or related to
the November 3, 2020, [E]lection;

C. Allow [Appellants] access to any and all voting
machines, servers, computers, computer codes,
hard drives, software, and programs, internet
records, mobile phone records, ballot images,
photocopies, or scanned images of ballots, return
tapes, and/or tally sheets, paper ballots, return
tapes, and/or tally sheets used in and/or related to
the November 3, 2020, [E]lection;

D. Allow [Appellants] to conduct an independent
and non-partisan forensic examination of any and
all voting machines, servers, computers, computer
codes, hard drives, software, and programs,
internet records, mobile phone records, ballot
images, photocopies or scanned images of ballots,
return tapes, and/or tally sheets, paper ballots,
return tapes, and/or tally sheets used in and/or
related to the November 3, 2020, [E]lection;

[Appellants] also request the Court to:

Determine that, by their conduct as alleged herein, Defendants
violated the Pennsylvania Right to Know Law [RTKL], in that
they did destroy, secrete, alter, or otherwise adulterate
information, documents, and materials responsive to Plaintiffs’
requests for information, consistent with the allegations in this
Complaint.

PAM - 9
Determine that, by their conduct as alleged herein, Defendants
committed fraud, consistent with allegations in the Complaint.

Determine that, by their conduct as alleged herein, Defendants
committed intentional and negligent misrepresentation,
consistent with the allegations in the First Amended Complaint.
Determine that, by their conduct as alleged herein, Defendants
engaged in a conspiracy to violate the law and commit fraud
consistent with allegations in this Complaint.

Grant such other and further relief as is equitable and just and
grant him costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred in having
to bring this action and damages [Appellants] are entitled to
pursuant to law.

(Complaint at 99-103.)
As is evident, the relief Appellants seek includes a jury trial and, inter alia,
mandamus (require Defendants to properly and lawfully administer fair and true
elections), and equitable injunctive and declaratory relief by way of a judgment finding
that fraud had indeed occurred during and also after the Election in an effort to conceal
it and to stop [D]efendants from doing the things they are shown to be doing in future
elections. See, e.g., Paragraph 353 of [c]omplaint pointing out defendant John Savage’s
intention to continue in his role as Chief Custodian and Voting Machine Warehouse
Supervisor (quoting Facebook post that he intends to “re-enter the ring” in mid-
December). See also Paragraph 255 of the complaint stating, “This pattern of conduct
further corroborates the system of fraud in continuing to have more ballots, continuous
practices of the Delaware County fraud that took place in the November 3, 2020, election
and continues to this day.” See also Paragraphs 24, 27, 30, 32, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47,
49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 80, 82, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 98,
100, and 104 of the complaint, identifying those Defendants who currently remain
employed by Delaware County, the Delaware County Board of Elections, the Delaware
County Bureau of Elections, Delaware County Council, and the Delaware County Return
PAM - 10
Board.10 On page 9 of her Brief, Moton states that “[i]t is [her] contention that such
behavior and practices cannot be tolerated or allowed to continue in Delaware
County’s elections.”
Appellants also seek a judgment for damages for violations of their civil
rights stemming from the use of uncertified voting systems, for allowing, or facilitating
vote flipping, additions, falsification, and/or deletions to the vote returns and vote tally
counts, and for allowing or facilitating party preference tracking and/or ballot
identification. (Complaint, ¶ 384.) The allegations of Defendants’ election law violations
and fraud are also not isolated to the immediate timeframe surrounding the Election. In
fact, Appellants attached evidence to the complaint to support their claims that the
planning, execution, and coverup took place over the course of 18 months starting in
November of 2020.
Thus, contrary to the Majority’s conclusion, the relief Appellants seek does
not exclusively include a review of the Election. See Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth.,
Nos. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed February 24, 2025), slip op. at 13 (suggesting that
because the Election was completed and certified, and its officeholders inaugurated the
Court is prevented from affording any meaningful relief). It also includes a request that
Defendants be held accountable under Pennsylvania law for Appellants’ common law,
legal, constitutional, and equitable claims based on a myriad of transgressions designed
to cover up disparities in the election results and the manner in which election materials
were handled. These are legitimate legal theories pleaded and causes of action raised that
have nothing to do with decertifying or overturning the Election. These claims were not
even addressed by the Majority, let alone in the context of mootness. They are not moot
because they do not rely on, nor ask for, transformation of prior events. Each claim and
request for relief should have been addressed separately and independently. Vega,

10
There is nothing in the record which suggests that these Defendants will not remain in their
respective roles in the upcoming elections.
PAM - 11
960 F.3d at 673. Had the Majority undertaken the required analysis, it would have
properly concluded that Appellants were not, in fact, seeking to overturn or decertify the
Election. As Appellants assert repeatedly in their briefs, “[t]he case is not about the
results of the [Election] and does not seek to overturn that [E]lection.” (Moton’s Br.
at 9) (emphasis added). According to Moton,

[Appellants] did seek and continued to seek justice by holding
the named and unnamed Defendants responsible for hiding the
truth from the American people concerning the [E]lection.
(Moton’s Br. 29) (emphasis added). See also Moton’s Brief at 10 (explaining that the
complaint was “to stop Defendants from doing the things they are shown to be doing
in future elections”); Hoopes/Stenstrom Brief at 20 (“Nowhere in the entire
complaint/petition did [] Appellants (then Plaintiffs) request that the November 2020
election be overturned, or even decertified, or present any controversy that could be
considered ‘moot.’”); Hoopes/Stenstrom Brief at 21 (“Appellants specifically requested
no less than [] 10 rulings and remedies to the election law violations, spoliation, and
blatant fraud — none of which included overturning the November 2020 election”).
The entirety of the Majority’s conclusion on mootness is based on its
inaccurate and perplexing finding that Appellants’ sole demand was to overturn the
Election results. The Majority’s conclusion that Appellants are seeking to have the
election decertified or overturned as the basis for mootness can only be viewed at best as
an oversight of the plain language of the pleadings. Appellants never requested
decertification of the Election as a specific form of relief in their complaint. They also
did not challenge the State of Pennsylvania’s certification of said Election. Yet, this is
the primary basis for the Majority’s finding of mootness. See Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa.
Cmwlth., Nos. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed February 24, 2025), slip op. at 13.

Mootness Doctrine

PAM - 12
A case becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” United States Parole
Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980). In general, courts will not decide
moot questions. See Sierra Club v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 702 A.2d
1131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), aff’d, Sierra Club v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,
731 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1999) (holding that courts will dismiss an appeal as moot unless an
actual case or controversy exists at all stages of the judicial or administrative process). In
this regard, our Supreme Court has stated that:

This Court generally will not decide moot questions. . . . [W]e
[have] summarized the mootness doctrine as follows: The cases
presenting mootness problems involve litigants who clearly had
standing to sue at the outset of the litigation. The problems arise
from events occurring after the lawsuit has gotten under way—
changes in the facts or in the law—which allegedly deprive
the litigant of the necessary stake in the outcome. The
mootness doctrine requires that an actual case or controversy
must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the
complaint is filed.
Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 599-600 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). A claim is moot if no order of the court can affect the rights of the
parties with regard to the requested relief. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316,
(1974) (noting that the “starting point” for an analysis of mootness is the “familiar
proposition that [] courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the
rights of litigants in the case before them”) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.
244, 246 (1971)).
Applying this general rule to the case at hand, the Majority has in effect
concluded that Appellants have lost their stake in the matter because the Election has
already been certified. Without addressing the specific claims for relief or the alleged
Election Code and constitutional violations to determine if any of these are “live”

PAM - 13
controversies, the Majority relies on Ioannidis v. Wolf (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 635 M.D. 2020,
filed July 8, 2021), as footing for its holding of mootness. Specifically, the Majority
reasons:
Here, the claims for relief in the Complaint are strikingly
similar to those requested of this Court in Ioannidis [v. Wolf
(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 635 M.D. 2020, filed July 8, 2021)]. We
determined those claims were moot, in part because the
election was completed and certified, and its officeholders
inaugurated, preventing the Court from being able to afford
meaningful relief. Appellants make the same argument: that
they seek information and investigation, rather than to disturb
the results of the election. We rejected that argument in
Ioannidis, and similarly here we conclude that this matter is
technically moot.
Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed February 24, 2025),
slip op. at 13 (emphasis added). But Ioannidis is readily distinguishable, as in that case,
the party did seek to overturn an election. Specifically, the petitioner in Ioannidis
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to direct the governor to withdraw the
certification of the 2020 Election. Even though the petitioner in Ioannidis argued that he
was not seeking to overturn or contest the outcome of the election, as the Court properly
found, he was doing just that based on the claims. Here, Appellants have clearly alleged
fraud, misrepresentation, and violations of the Election Code, constitutions, and the
RTKL, which were concealed and could be repeated in future elections. Their request
for declaratory and injunctive relief is obviously premised on exposing past fraudulent
practices and preventing any such violations in future elections to ensure the people of
this Commonwealth free and fair elections.11 Thus, contrary to the Majority’s view, I
cannot agree that the claims for relief in the instant complaint are “strikingly similar” to

11
In the three years these parties have had to wait to have their case argued before this Court,
another national election occurred. The subsequent 2024 General Election as such could not and is not
part of this case and no presumptions one way or the other can be made regarding it.
PAM - 14
those in Ioannidis. Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed
February 24, 2025), slip op. at 13.
Deciding this case on the merits is not a pointless gesture. Many of the
allegations are brought against individuals who remain in their respective positions or
involve alleged practices of Delaware County and, as averred, if unchecked, there is a
sufficient likelihood that they would again engage in the alleged conduct. Nowhere in
the complaint, pleadings, or briefs do Appellants ask that the Election be decertified or
invalidated.
Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine
Assuming arguendo the case is moot, which it is not, the Majority has
misapplied the exceptions to mootness. Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly recognized
two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) for matters of great public importance, and
(2) for matters capable of repetition, which are apt or likely to elude review. See Rendell
v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 983 A.2d 708, 719 (Pa. 2009).
Capable of Repetition
A case is “capable of repetition, yet evading review” when “(1) the
challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
[will] be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149
(1975). Even assuming arguendo the 2020 Election makes the case moot, the challenged
action (to the extent it occurred before the Election) in its duration was too short to be
fully litigated prior to the Election. Furthermore, “[e]lection cases often fall within this
exception, because the inherently brief duration of an election is almost invariably too
short to enable full litigation on the merits.” Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 490 (9th Cir.
2003).
Appellants’ concern over the recurrent nature of the questions involved is
clear. If the same parties remain in the same positions they were in during the Election,
PAM - 15
or if the alleged practices are perpetuated, then there is a strong likelihood of future
recurrence of the same or similar problem. This is certainly a real danger. In Werner v.
King, 164 A. 918 (Pa. 1933), the Supreme Court decided to review a moot question that
concerned duties that public officials had to perform every year. There, the Supreme
Court refused to dismiss as moot the plaintiff’s complaint concerning the Department of
Revenue’s yearly advertisement of a mercantile appraisers’ list because the question was
one that can be “raised any year hereafter, when the lists are about to be advertised, unless
it is settled by us.” Id. at 919.
In Bradway v. Cohen, 642 A.2d 615 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), Eric Bradway, the
Democratic candidate for state representative sought to enjoin Lita Cohen, the Republican
candidate’s alleged violations of the Election Code. Bradway had alleged that Cohen
displayed campaign posters in the district that lacked the requisite authorization and
financial information in violation of the Election Code. Meanwhile, the election was
held, and Bradway was defeated. The common pleas court sustained Cohen’s preliminary
objections and dismissed Bradway’s motion for injunctive relief. On appeal, Cohen
argued that the matter was rendered moot since Bradway was defeated in the election and
any detriment he may have suffered had also ended. Id. at 252. She also argued that the
issue of the alleged violation of the Election Code was not a matter of great public
importance. We disagreed that the matter was moot, explaining

Election cases in particular raise the question of mootness when
the election at issue has passed before the appeal can be heard.
In In re General Election, November 8, 1988, . . . 560 A.2d 260
([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1989), this Court considered the appeal by the
Republican State Committee and Republican Executive
Committee of Allegheny County because the issue of whether
the trial court could grant blanket authorization to the county’s
election officials to register untimely registration applications
of over 4[,]700 voters was deemed one of wide public
importance which was recurring in nature but evaded review
due to the timing aspects of the election. Similarly, because
PAM - 16
the instant appeal presents a question of public importance
which is capable of repetition yet evading review, we decline
to dismiss the appeal as moot and will address the merits of the
appeal.
Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
Recently, in In re General Election, 2024, 328 A.3d 606 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024),
we held that a campaign’s request to prohibit certain badges worn by a political party’s
poll watchers that had the words “PA DEMS VOTER PROTECTION” was violative of
the Election Code. The trial court denied the request. By the time the case got to this
Court, the election was over. We noted that, technically, the campaign’s appeal was moot
because Election Day was over, and we could no longer enter an order permitting or
prohibiting the poll watcher badges while they were still in use. Nonetheless, we held
that the dispute was capable of repetition and that it was reasonable to expect that a
political party will provide poll watchers with the same or similar badges in future
elections. We also noted that any challenge to the badges is likely to evade judicial review
because Election Day will always have ended by the time it reaches an appellate court.
Here, as in Werner, Bradway, and In re General Election, 2024, the issues
pertaining to the manner in which Defendants conducted the certification of the Election
and responded to requests for information relating thereto are capable of repetition and
may evade review unless they are decided now. As Hoopes/Stenstrom argue:

The Court did not address a single allegation brought against
the 48 [D]efendants. And leaves [D]efendants (all
government officials) capable of continuing to evade review,
and permits their grievous and in criminal behavior to be
repeated for every election since the [E]lection, without
accountability, repercussions or remedy by the citizenry.
(Hoopes/Stenstrom Br. at 13-14) (emphasis added). They further argue on pages 15 and
16 of their Brief:

17. The Court’s avoidance of review of allegations, and
avoidance of evidentiary hearing and discovery, would clearly
PAM - 17
enable the unrepentant [D]efendants to continue with their
unlawful conduct, without Civil remedy by the citizenry,
candidates, and intervenors (certified poll watchers), either
before an election (for not being “ripe”), or after an election (for
being moot), with no remaining litigative surface area or vector
for remedy under Pennsylvania Civil Law that governs conduct
of election officials that stands apart from the standing and
laches requirements of “election law,” leaving a [c]onstitutional
“no man’s land” in which public corruption may thrive.
(Hoopes/Stenstrom Br. at 15-16) (emphasis added). On page 8 of her Brief, Moton
explains that

[she] filed this action as a last resort in an effort to have
Defendants’ bad practices and procedures exposed and
corrected, and to ensure ongoing fair elections in Delaware
County. If Defendants are not held accountable, which the
District Attorney refuses to do, the behavior seen in the
attachments will continue and election integrity is lost.

(Moton’s Br. at 8) (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, to compound the egregious error by the Majority in dismissing
for mootness on the grounds that Appellants are supposedly only asking to “disturb the
results of the [E]lection,” which they are not, the Majority goes on to misapply the
applicable legal standard to the exception. Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 876
and 877 C.D. 2022, filed February 24, 2025), slip op. at 13. Specifically, the Majority
states that “there is not a reasonable expectation that Appellees will engage in the same
exact action as alleged in the complaint.” Id. However, contrary to the Majority’s
pronouncement, under this exception to mootness, in order for a question to be capable
of repetition, it is not necessary to predict that history will repeat itself at a very high level
of specificity. See Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449, 463 (2007).
Moreover, there has been no trial or discovery in this case because it has
been peremptorily precluded by the trial court’s finding of mootness. The Majority
PAM - 18
provides absolutely no discussion or justification for its conclusion that “there is not a
reasonable expectation that [Defendants] would engage” in the same conduct alleged in
the complaint. Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed
February 24, 2025), slip op. at 13. In fact, the exact opposite has been claimed – that
there is a reasonable expectation that the misconduct will again occur unless certain
safeguards are put in place to ameliorate the potential of that happening another time. In
reviewing an order sustaining preliminary objections, we must accept as true all well-
pleaded factual allegations and any inferences that reasonably may be drawn from them.
Wurth v. City of Philadelphia, 584 A.2d 403 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). The Majority here
failed to adhere to that standard by ignoring the averments of the complaint. Because the
complaint alleges that most, if not all, Defendants remain in their positions, and there has
been an ongoing practice of Election Code violations, there is a demonstrated probability
that they will again engage in the same conduct if the situation were to present itself again.
The Majority’s declaration to the contrary is wholly conclusory, and therefore I decline
to join it.
Great Public Importance
I also believe the great public importance exception applies. As argued by
Appellants, identifying voter fraud and eliminating violations of the Election Code and
the constitution before they occur again protects the rights of the people to free and fair
elections. With virtually no discussion, explanation, or justification, the Majority once
again in summary fashion simply concludes that “the exception does not apply here.”
Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed February 24, 2025),
slip op. at 14.
The question of election fraud is undoubtedly a public one of great future
importance to voters and election officials alike. Pardee v. Schuylkill County, 120 A.
139, 140 (Pa. 1923) (“[s]ince the question thus raised is a public one, of great future
importance, alike to the various counties and the taxpayers therein, we shall proceed to
PAM - 19
decide it, although it might be considered moot”). To the extent it could be decided that
the practices and procedures undertaken by Defendants after the Election to, in hindsight,
create documentation in an attempt to reconcile the election data with the election results,
a final decision on the matter would provide guidance to the public officials whose offices
and authority it affects. The public would also greatly benefit from a decision in this
matter, directly and through the clarity it would give local election officials regarding
what they may and may not do during the election certification process and after an
election. As it stands now, Defendants remain vindicated which sends a clear message
that the alleged conduct set forth in the complaint cannot be challenged and thus will be
tolerated.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Finally, I must also disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that Appellants
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. As aptly argued by Appellants, it would
have been impossible to engage in the administrative process in a 20-day window, as the
alleged unlawful conduct was not discovered until after the 20-day window for
challenging an election had closed. Appellants have made clear the specific alleged
violations did not come to their attention until they received documents and videos in
response to a 2021 RTKL request. The Majority’s conclusion effectively precludes any
lawsuit where the alleged violations of the Code or constitution are concealed, or illegal
conduct is discovered beyond the 20-day window. This is contrary to our precedent. See
In re Koch Election Contest Case, 41 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. 1945); In re General Election
for District Justice, 670 A.2d 629, 635 (Pa. 1996).
Conclusion
As noted, we here address only the trial court’s dismissal for mootness. The
Majority’s opinion is moreover based on its own factual and speculative conclusion, that
the Appellants are seeking, without basis, to “delegitimize this Commonwealth’s
elections.” Hoopes v. Boockvar (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 876 and 877 C.D. 2022, filed
PAM - 20
February 24, 2025), slip op. at 4. The Majority dismisses the allegations in the complaint
as “ill-conceived.” Id. This is tantamount to deciding as a matter of fact that the
allegations are without merit. That is not for our Court to do. These are issues of
credibility for the factfinder who, in this case, is the common pleas court.
The public has a right to know and to be assured that our government takes such
allegations of infringement of its citizens’ right to a free and fair election very seriously
and, if necessary, will undertake measures intended to prevent it. There is a “longstanding
constitutional mandate that every citizen of this Commonwealth is entitled to no less than
a fair and free election.” Kelly v. Commonwealth (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 620 M.D. 2020, filed
November 27, 2020) (single-judge opinion).12 Such willingness to acknowledge the
possibility that these violations occurred goes to the heart of public confidence in election
results. The same is true if the allegations turn out to be incorrect. The public has a right
to know either way. This can only occur by a trial where the allegations laid out in the
complaint are tested. “Wrong decisions issued at the wrong time are doubly threatening
to the integrity of Pennsylvania’s elections and the public’s confidence in them.” Baxter
v. Philadelphia Board of Elections (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 1305 and 1309 C.D. 2024, filed
October 30, 2024) (McCullough, J., dissenting), petitions for allowance of appeal
granted, in part, (Pa., Nos. 395-96 EAL 2024, January 17, 2025).
For the reasons aforesaid, we should vacate the trial court’s order dismissing for
mootness and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine
whether violations of our common law, the Election Code, RTKL, or constitution have
indeed occurred, and are likely to re-occur. We must be ever mindful of the “right of the

12
Pursuant to Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, unreported opinions
of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited for their persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code §
69.414(a).

PAM - 21
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend.
I.
If we deem this case moot and affirm its dismissal on that basis, we would, in
effect, be declaring that there is no legal redress when election fraud is discovered after
an election is certified. This will have a deleterious effect on the election process, inviting
election officials to act with abandon, possibly disposing of potentially implicating
evidence until the election is certified, to ensure they will not be held accountable. I
cannot be party to that outcome. For all of the above, I must emphatically dissent.13

________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

13
In response to footnote 13 of the Majority Opinion, we have included citations to the Majority
Opinion for ease of reference.
PAM - 22

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10804714. Public record. Not legal advice.