# Driver v. Naranjo

> District Court, S.D. California · February 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10804491

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** February 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10804491

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining when a prisoner’s claims for 25 injunctive relief relating to prison conditions are rendered moot by his transfer to another 26 facility

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 BILLY DRIVER, CDCR #D-35391, Case No.: 24cv166-CAB-DTF

12 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. No. 22]
14 DR. NARANJO, Psychiatrist,
15 Defendant.
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17 Pending before the Court is Defendant Dr. Naranjo’s motion to dismiss. [Doc. No.
18 22.] For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.
19 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
20 Plaintiff Billy Driver, currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison
21 (“SVSP”) in Soledad, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint
22 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. No. 1.]1 Plaintiff alleges that while he was
23 incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) on January 16, 2024,
24 Defendant, a staff psychiatrist, refused to discontinue an anti-psychotic medication
25 (Invega) that Plaintiff claims was causing heart palpitations, chest, and kidney pain. Id. at
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1 Plaintiff is a frequent litigator and has brought many similar lawsuits. [See Doc. No. 22 at 1-2.]
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1 1‒2. Plaintiff alleges this refusal to discontinue the medication violated his Eighth
2 Amendment rights and seeks compensatory, declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 3.
3 Plaintiff was incarcerated at RJD when he filed his Complaint on January 18, 2024,
4 but has since been transferred to SVSP, and is therefore no longer under Defendant’s
5 care. See Doc. Nos. 8, 11. Both at the time the medication was administered and
6 presently, a court order authorized the California Department of Corrections and
7 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and its personnel to involuntarily medicate Plaintiff. [See Doc.
8 No. 22-1, Exhibit A (“Plaintiff’s Active Keyhea Order”) and Exhibit B (“Plaintiff’s
9 Keyhea Order Active at Time Relevant to Litigation”.]2 Since April 7, 2020, through the
10 present, Plaintiff has had six different hearings concerning involuntary medication. Id. At
11 the conclusion of each, the court has authorized CDCR to involuntarily medicate
12 Plaintiff. Id. At each of these hearings, the court made three vital specific findings. First,
13 if left unmedicated, Plaintiff was a danger to others. Id. Second, without medication,
14 Plaintiff would revert to behavior that served as the basis for ordering the
15 involuntary medication. Id. Finally, Plaintiff lacks insight into his own need for
16 medication, and therefore cannot manage his own medication. Id. At the hearing for each
17 case reevaluating if Plaintiff needed to be medicated, Plaintiff was represented by
18 counsel. Id.
19 On November 4, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 22.] On
20 December 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 27.] On January 21, 2025,
21 Defendant filed a reply. [Doc. No. 32.]
22 LEGAL STANDARD
23 A motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
24 tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.
25 2001). A complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
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2 Defendant’s request for judicial notice [Doc. No. 22-1] is GRANTED pursuant to Federal Rule of
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1 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not necessary;
2 the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
3 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell
4 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
5 Dismissal is proper where the complaint does not contain enough factual
6 allegations, when taken as true, to establish “plausible,” as opposed to merely “possible”
7 or “speculative,” entitlement to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Although
8 detailed factual allegations are not required, Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned,
9 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
10 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
11 elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
12 ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic
13 Corp., 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
14 DISCUSSION
15 Defendant moves for dismissal on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff’s injunctive
16 claim against Defendant is moot; (2) Plaintiff is precluded from bringing his Section
17 1983 claim; and (3) Defendant is entitled to immunity.
18 1. Mootness
19 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Defendant Naranjo, a doctor at RJD. But
20 Plaintiff was transferred to a different prison, is no longer housed at RJD, and is no
21 longer under Defendant’s care. Therefore, his claim against Defendant is moot. See
22 Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (prisoner’s claims for
23 injunctive relief deemed moot because he was transferred to another facility); Walker v.
24 Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining when a prisoner’s claims for
25 injunctive relief relating to prison conditions are rendered moot by his transfer to another
26 facility).
27 / / / / /
28 / / / / /
1 2. Preclusion
2 a. Claim Preclusion
3 Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim based on his continued involuntary
4 placement on Invega. However, that claim has already been litigated and is therefore
5 precluded. “Claim preclusion is a broad doctrine that bars bringing claims that were
6 previously litigated as well as some claims that were never before adjudicated.” Clements
7 v. Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1995). Claim preclusion is
8 met when there is “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3)
9 privity between parties.” Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
10 Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting Stratosphere Litig. L.L.C. v. Grand
11 Casinos, Inc., 298 F.3d 1137, 1142 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002)).
12 Here, all elements of claim preclusion are met. The claim of whether Plaintiff’s
13 anti-psychotic medication should be continued was the exact issue decided by the
14 administrative state court in California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation v.
15 Billy Driver, D35391, Case No. 2023070258. [Doc. No. 22-1, Ex. B.] Further, the
16 administrative court’s decision was both final and on the merits. Finally, there is privity
17 between the parties, as the order is between Plaintiff and CDCR, and is to be enforced by
18 any CDCR doctor treating Plaintiff, including Defendant. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is barred
19 by claim preclusion.
20 b. Issue Preclusion
21 Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is based on the issue of whether Plaintiff can
22 be involuntarily medicated. This issue has already been litigated and is therefore
23 precluded. To determine if the issue preclusion doctrine applies, the Court of Appeals
24 applies a three-prong test, asking if: (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous
25 proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first
26 proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against
27 whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first
28 proceeding. Garity v. APWU Nat'l Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2016).
1 Here, the standard for issue preclusion is met. The validity of Plaintiff’s
2 involuntary medication has been upheld by the California Administrative Court, as
3 both currently and at the time this Complaint was filed, Plaintiff was subject to a Keyhea
4 order authorizing his involuntary medication. [Doc. No. 22-1, Exs. A, B.] The
5 administrative court’s decision was both final and on the merits. Finally, the decision of
6 the administrative court is binding on CDCR and its employees who effectuate the order,
7 thus establishing privity. Thus, Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief to be taken off anti-
8 psychotic medication is precluded because it directly contradicts the findings of the
9 California court on this exact issue.
10 c. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
11 A federal district court is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over a suit that is
12 a de facto appeal from a state court judgment. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, 525 F.3d 855,
13 859 (9th Cir. 2008); see Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
14 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). The Ninth Circuit has recognized
15 that the “clearest case for dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when a
16 federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court,
17 and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Reusser, 525 F.3d at
18 859.
19 Here, while Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment claim based on his
20 placement on Invega, he ultimately requests that this Court overturn the Keyhea
21 orders, which are currently in effect, imposed on him and directing the involuntary
22 administration of psychiatric medication. Plaintiff essentially asks this Court to overturn
23 the Keyhea order that he alleges was in error and seeks relief from that decision. But this
24 request is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859.
25 3. Immunity
26 a. Absolute Immunity
27 Prison officials charged with executing facially valid court orders are afforded
28 absolute immunity from 42 U.S.C. section 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those
1 orders. Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Patterson v.
2 Von Riesen, 999 F.2d. 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 895-
3 96 (9th Cir. 2003)(absolute immunity is “necessary to free prison officials from the fear
4 of litigation and insure that such officials can perform their function without the need to
5 secure permanent legal counsel.”) Absolute immunity applies to the execution of an
6 administrative law judge’s order requiring that he be involuntarily medicated. Bradford v.
7 Kvichko, 2017 WL 6730408, *3 (December 28, 2017, E.D. Cal.).
8 Here, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is based on his involuntary
9 placement on Invega. However, Plaintiff was placed on Invega pursuant to a Keyhea
10 order that was in effect from July 26, 2023 to July 25, 2024. [Doc. No. 22-1, Ex. A.]
11 Consequently, Plaintiff was administered Invega on the dates in question in accordance
12 with the involuntary medication orders. Therefore, Defendant is absolutely immune from
13 Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim.
14 b. Qualified Immunity
15 Qualified immunity shields an official from civil-damages liability unless his
16 conduct violated clearly established law of which a reasonable official would have
17 known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity applies
18 when either of two conditions exists. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). First,
19 qualified immunity applies if no constitutional right was violated on the facts alleged. Id.
20 If, after a review of the facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, no right was
21 violated, then the inquiry ends and the defendants prevail. Id. at 201. But even if a
22 constitutional right was violated, qualified immunity still applies when the constitutional
23 right was not “clearly established” under the particular circumstances. Id. at 200. A
24 clearly established right is one that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
25 would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards, 566
26 U.S. 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741). If a
27 reasonable official could have believed the defendant’s actions were lawful, the
28 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02, 208.
1 Here, even if Plaintiff could establish a constitutional violation, it was not clearly
2 || established that Defendant’s actions were unconstitutional. The dispositive question is
3 || whether the violative nature of a particular conduct was clearly established. Mullenix v.
4 || Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015). And no prison physician would believe that acting in
5 || accordance with a court order for involuntary medication based on the inmate’s mental
6 || conditions violated the inmate’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled
7 || to qualified immunity.
8 CONCLUSION
9 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED
10 || without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and
11 || CLOSE the case.
12 IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 Dated: February 21, 2025 €
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Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
15 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10804491. Public record. Not legal advice.