# LITTLE v. OUTLAW

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · February 20, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10804456

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 20, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARK ANTHONY LITTLE, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-4033
:
DANIELLE OUTLAW, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
SURRICK, J. FEBRUARY 20, 2025
Plaintiff Mark Anthony Little, an unrepresented litigant, commenced this action by filing
a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of his constitutional rights and
related claims arising from a period of involuntary confinement.1 Currently before the Court are
Little’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” ECF No. 9) and his Motion for Leave to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 7). Little asserts claims against former Philadelphia Police
Commissioner Danielle Outlaw, Philadelphia District Attorney Lawrence Krasner, Mental
Health Crisis Worker Eb Adyemi, and Friends Hospital employees Dr. Elizabeth Conlin and

1 After filing his Complaint, Little filed a three-page pleading that was docketed as an Amended
Complaint and a lengthy pleading that was docketed as “Exhibits.” (See ECF Nos. 8, 9.) Upon review,
the pleading docketed as “Exhibits” appears to be a Second Amended Complaint containing Exhibits.
The Court will screen it as such because an amended complaint, once submitted to the Court, supersedes
the prior pleading and serves as the governing pleading. See Shahid v. Borough of Darby, 666 F. App'x
221, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“Shahid’s amended complaint, however, superseded his initial
complaint.” (citing W. Run Student Hous. Assocs. LLC v. Huntingdon Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d
Cir. 2013)); see also Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
1611 (2020) (“In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original
pleading a nullity. Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.”)
(internal citations omitted); see also Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App’x 173, 175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019)
(holding that “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean accumulating allegations
from superseded pleadings”). The Clerk of Court will be directed to amend the docket to reflect the
foregoing.
Chaplin Ken. (SAC at 17-19.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Little leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. Little’s claims asserting violations of certain federal criminal
statutes, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendments
will be dismissed with prejudice. Little’s claims against Krasner and Chaplin Ken, and his claim

against Outlaw based on her alleged failure to investigate crimes reported by Little will also be
dismissed with prejudice. Little’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Outlaw, his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Adyemi, and his claims against Conlin will be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Little will be granted leave to file a third amended complaint.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
Little alleges that on July 15, 2022, he began emailing now former Commissioner Outlaw
to report that he had been sexually assaulted by the owner and occupants of the rooming house
where he lived.3 (SAC at 25-28.) On August 3, 2023, Defendant Adyemi allegedly called Little
regarding the emails. (Id. at 25.) Two days later, he allegedly arrived at Little’s residence with

two police officers. (Id.) At that time, Little allegedly described the sexual assaults that had
occurred. (Id.) In response, Adyemi asked whether Little would agree to speak to a psychiatrist
regarding a “201 commitment” and told Little he would be free to leave following the

2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Little’s Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 9). The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.
Where appropriate, grammar, spelling, and punctuation errors in Little’s pleadings will be corrected for
clarity. In drafting his SAC, Little completed the Court’s form civil rights complaint and supplemented
his allegations with handwritten pages. He also attached numerous exhibits to the supplemented form.
The Court considers the entire filing to constitute the SAC.

3 Little alleges that the owner of this rooming house and other individuals in the house have
repeatedly sexually assaulted him. (SAC at 27, 28.) In a prior lawsuit, Little pursued claims against the
then current inhabitants of the property based on allegations of repeated sexual assault. See Little v.
Outlaw, Civ. A. No. 22-1043 (federal claims dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim and state
law claims dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with no leave to amend granted).
consultation.4 (Id. at 25, 28-29.) Little agreed, but upon arriving at Friends Hospital, Adyemi
allegedly filed a report seeking Little’s involuntarily commitment under § 302 of the Mental
Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”).5 (Id. at 25, 29.) He also allegedly signed papers releasing
Friends Hospital from responsibility for abusing Little and instructed hospital personnel to

inform Little that weekends were not included in the 72-hour hold to which Little was
committed. (Id.) Adyemi also allegedly stole $79.00 and three bus passes from Little’s wallet.
(Id.) Little alleges that shortly after he was committed, he was attacked by unnamed Friends
Hospital staff members, who gave him injections that raised his blood pressure. (Id.)
Little alleges that while committed, he unsuccessfully sought to contact the Patients’
Rights Office at Friends Hospital. (Id. at 27.) When he was unable to do so, he spoke with
Chaplin Ken, who allegedly began to investigate Little’s commitment on his behalf. (Id.)
Chaplin Ken allegedly advised Little that no property log existed for his missing cash and bus
passes. (Id.) He also allegedly confirmed that Little had seemingly signed a document releasing
Friends Hospital personnel of legal responsibility for his commitment and acknowledging that

the 72-hour hold did not include weekends. (Id.)

4 Little’s use of “201” appears to reference § 201 of the MHPA, titled “Persons who may
authorize voluntary treatment.” It provides, relevantly: “Any person 14 years of age or older who
believes that he is in need of treatment and substantially understands the nature of voluntary treatment
may submit himself to examination and treatment under this act, provided that the decision to do so is
made voluntarily.” 50 Pa. Stat.and Cons. Stat. § 7201.

5 Section 302 of the MHPA, entitled “Involuntary emergency examination and treatment
authorized by a physician – Not to exceed one hundred twenty hours,” provides that:
Emergency examination may be undertaken at a treatment facility upon the certification of
a physician stating the need for such examination; or upon a warrant issued by the county
administrator authorizing such examination; or without a warrant upon application by a
physician or other authorized person who has personally observed conduct showing the
need for such examination.
50 Pa. Stat and Cons. Stat. § 7302(a).
Little alleges that a hearing was held related to his commitment, but the circumstances
surrounding the hearing are unclear. (Id. at 29.) He alleges only that prior to the hearing he was
told by an unidentified case worker that if he did not agree to a ten-day commitment, he would
be committed for 20 days, and that he would be required to “do five days on the ten.” (Id.) He

alleges that prior to being released from Friends Hospital, he was told he would be required to
take a monthly injection of Abilify. (Id.)
Following his release, Little allegedly contacted former Commissioner Outlaw’s office
by text requesting the name of Adyemi’s supervisor so that he could report Adyemi’s conduct,
but he received no response. (Id. at 30.) He alleges he also contacted several state and federal
offices and agencies in an attempt to prevent Adyemi from hurting other innocent people,
including the following: the Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; the
Pennsylvania Department of Behavioral Health; the U.S. Department of Justice; and the
Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General. (Id. at 30-31.) He attaches to the SAC
correspondence from these offices and agencies reflecting their responses. (See SAC at 103-17.)

Little alleges that he was ultimately unable to obtain the contact information for Adyemi’s
supervisor. (Id. at 31.)
Little claims that Adyemi arranged for his involuntary commitment because he
persistently asked former Commissioner Outlaw to help him stop the alleged criminal activities
of the owner and inhabitants of his rooming house. (Id. at 28.) He further claims that former
Commissioner Outlaw responded to his request for help to stop the owner and occupants of his
rooming house from sexually assaulting him by sending Adyemi and non-Defendant Officer
Gable to harm him. (Id.) He claims that he has experienced, inter alia, emotional trauma,
weight loss, and muscle deterioration.6 (Id. at 32.) Based on the foregoing, Little asserts claims
for violation of his First, Fifth,7 Eighth,8 Ninth,9 Thirteenth,10 and Fourteenth Amendment rights,

6 Of note, Little attributes the emotional distress and muscle deterioration to events that occurred
at his rooming house, not to his involuntary commitment. (See SAC at 33.) He also alleges he has been
subjected to trauma that has affected his right testicle. (Id. at 34.) Little alleges he has also experienced
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety, depression, feelings of guilt, anger, and helplessness, and an
inability to form social relationships because of the sexual abuse. (Id. at 35-36.)

7 The SAC references the Fifth Amendment as a basis for recovery. (SAC at 23.) The Fifth
Amendment provides, in part, that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however,
applies only to the federal government and federal officials. Shoemaker v. City of Lock Haven, 906 F.
Supp. 230, 237 (M.D. Pa. 1995). “It does not apply to the acts or conduct of the states, their agencies,
subdivisions, or employees.” Id. Because the defendants here are not federal actors, the Fifth
Amendment is not applicable in this case and Little’s Fifth Amendment claims will be dismissed with
prejudice. Patrick v. Rodriguez, No. 23-00672, 2023 WL 10410947, at *15 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1159242 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2024), reconsideration
denied, 2024 WL 4868305 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2024). To the extent Little asserts due process claims, the
Court will construe them as asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment.

8 The Eighth Amendment governs claims brought by convicted inmates challenging their
conditions of confinement. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). The Court cannot
discern a basis for an Eighth Amendment claim against the named Defendants based on the allegations in
the SAC, and Little’s Eighth Amendment claims will, therefore, be dismissed with prejudice.

9 Little makes a single reference to the Ninth Amendment. (SAC at 23.) The Ninth Amendment
provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const. amend. IX. This claim is not developed, and, in
any event, the Court cannot discern any basis for a Ninth Amendment violation here. Therefore, Little’s
Ninth Amendment claims will be dismissed with prejudice. See Bowens v. Matthews, 765 F. App’x 640,
644 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (summarily affirming where inmate “ha[d] not alleged the violation of
any specific fundamental right that might be protected by the Ninth Amendment”).

10 Little identifies the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for his claims. (SAC at 20.) The
Thirteenth Amendment provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. amend XIII, § 1. The purpose of the Amendment “’was
not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the
United States.’” McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505, 510-11 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Pollock v. Williams,
322 U.S. 4, 17-18 (1944) (reversing dismissal of pretrial detainee’s complaint where litigant alleged that
long hours of work in prison laundry were compelled by physical and legal coercion). The Supreme
Court has defined involuntary servitude as “a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work
for the defendant by the use of or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of
coercion through law or the legal process.” United States v. Kazminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). Thus,
some form of coercion is required. While the Court understands Little to allege that he was subject to an
involuntary commitment under the MHPA, because none of the named Defendants is alleged to have
various provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution,11 and various criminal statutes.12 (Id. at
19.) As relief, he requests money damages and Adyemi’s criminal prosecution.13 (Id. at 32-
33.)14

placed Little in a position where he had to perform involuntary labor, this claim will be dismissed with
prejudice.

11 Little asserts claims under various provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution. (SAC at 20-23.)
“Pennsylvania does not have a statutory equivalent to § 1983 and does not recognize a private right of
action for damages stemming from alleged violation of the state constitution.” Miles v. Zech, 788 F.
App’x 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam). As there is no private right of action for damages under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, these claims will be dismissed with prejudice. See Plouffe v. Cevallos, 777 F.
App’x 594, 601 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[N]or is there a private right of action for damages under the
Pennsylvania Constitution”); Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F.
App’x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (“No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania court has
recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution.”).

12 Little references several criminal statutes as providing a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, see
SAC at 19, but it is not clear that he is asserting claims based on these statutes. To the extent that he is,
the claims are not plausible, because criminal statutes generally do not give rise to a basis for civil
liability. See Brown v. City of Philadelphia Office of Human Res., 735 F. App’x 55, 56 (3d Cir. 2018)
(per curiam) (“Brown alleges that the defendants violated various criminal statutes, but most do not
provide a private cause of action.”); Brown v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Pa., No. 18-747 (E.D. Pa.)
(Apr. 9, 2018 Order at 6 (dismissing claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 as “meritless and frivolous”)), aff’d,
740 F. App’x 239, 240 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that, unless specifically provided for, federal criminal statutes rarely create private rights of action.
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 377 (1958) (stating that where a statute “contains only
penal sanctions for violation of it provisions; in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent
to the contrary, these sanctions should under familiar principles be considered exclusive, rather than
supplemented by civil sanctions of a distinct statute”); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (“We have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action
from a criminal prohibition alone.”). The fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person
harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action for the injured person. Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979).

13 This relief is not available in a §1983 action. See Smith v. Friel, No. 19-943, 2019 WL
3025239, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3003380 (M.D.
Pa. July 10, 2019) (collecting cases and stating “courts have long held that a civil rights plaintiff may not
seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order directing the criminal prosecution of some third
parties”).

14 Little attaches nearly 100 pages of exhibits to his SAC. These include pages purporting to be
screen shots of text messages sent by Little to former Commissioner Outlaw requesting identification of
Adyemi’s supervisor and investigation into and arrest of individuals who allegedly sexually assaulted him
(id. at 39-64); a completed Citizen’s Complaint No. 61282 against former Commissioner Outlaw
describing events that allegedly occurred between August 4 and 8, 2022, the Philadelphia Police
Department Internal Affairs Division’s response thereto, and a second copy of the same Citizen’s
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Little leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he
is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether

a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v.
Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). “At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court
will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences

Complaint with attached screen shots of Little’s text messages to former Commissioner Outlaw (id. at 65-
66 and 76-101); paperwork from Penn Medicine dated May 6, 2023 (id. at 67-68); a completed Citizen’s
Complaint against non-defendants describing an apparently unrelated assault that allegedly occurred on
April 1, 2023 (id. at 69-70); a Unit Safety Search Checklist from Friends Hospital dated August 16, 2022,
identifying Little as a patient (id. at 71); two copies of January 18, 2024 correspondence from the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowledging
receipt of Little’s complaint against District Attorney Krasner (id. at 103-04; 118-19)); April 24, 2024
correspondence from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel advising Little that the Office will dismiss his
complaints regarding District Attorney Krasner (id. at 120-21); a form dated April 25, 2024,
acknowledging receipt of and rejecting Little’s request for assistance from the Department of Behavioral
Health and Intellectual and Disability Services (id. at 105); May 21, 2024 correspondence from the U.S.
Department of Justice acknowledging receipt of Little’s complaint related to improperly shared medical
records and rejecting Little’s request for assistance (id. at 106); May 9, 2023 correspondence from the
Health Care Section of the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General acknowledging receipt of Little’s
complaint and rejecting his request for assistance (id. at 107); a completed Citizen Complaint Form
directed to the U.S. Department of Justice relating to Little’s alleged involuntary commitment, with
attached, annotated correspondence addressed to Little (id. at 108-11); a completed Complaint Report
form directed to the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General asserting claims against Adyemi arising
from Little’s alleged involuntary commitment (id. at 112-15); August 16, 2023 correspondence from the
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division acknowledging receipt of a complaint from Little and
rejecting his request for assistance (id. at 116); October 19, 2023 correspondence from the Office of
Constituent Services of the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General acknowledging receipt of Little’s
complaint and rejecting his request for assistance (id. at 117); and medical records from Temple
University Hospital, Open MRI of Bala Cynwyd, and Tri-County Pain Management reflecting results of
various diagnostic tests (id. at 122-32).
in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . .
contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366,
374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)),
abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th197 (3d Cir.

2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Little is proceeding
pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir.
2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019). To conform to Rule 8,
a pleading must contain a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
See Travaline v. U.S. Supreme Court, 424 F. App’x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2011). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that in determining whether a pleading meets
Rule 8’s “plain” statement requirement, the Court should “ask whether, liberally construed, a
pleading ‘identifies discrete defendants and the actions taken by these defendants’ in regard to

the plaintiff’s claims.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). A pleading may still satisfy
the “plain” statement requirement “even if it is vague, repetitious, or contains extraneous
information” and “even if it does not include every name, date, and location of the incidents at
issue.” Id. at 93-94. The important consideration for the Court is whether, “a pro se complaint’s
language . . . presents cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits.”
Id. at 94.
III. DISCUSSION
Little asserts claims based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The vehicle
by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“A civil rights action brought [under] section 1983 is sustainable against state actors only.” Boyd

v. Pearson, 346 Fed. App’x 814, 816 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 380
F.3d 729, 736 (3d Cir. 2004). Additionally, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
A. The MHPA
Little’s claims against Chaplin Ken, Dr. Conlin, and Adyemi, are best understood as
arising from his involuntary commitment to Friends Hospital for emergency psychiatric
evaluation under MHPA, 50 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat § 7301 et seq. The purpose of the MHPA is
“to assure the availability of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill, and . . . to
establish procedures whereby this policy can be effected.” Id. § 7102. The MHPA permits the

involuntary commitment of persons who constitute a “clear and present danger” to themselves or
others. Id. § 7301(a). Section 301 sets forth the factors that must be present to subject an
individual to an emergency psychiatric evaluation, and states, relevantly:
Whenever a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment, he may be made subject to involuntary emergency examination and
treatment. A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of mental
illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the
conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs is
so lessened that he poses a clear present danger of harm to others or to himself.

Id.

Section 301(b) provides guidance to determine what constitutes a “clear and present
danger” warranting immediate emergency care. Qualifying circumstances include recently
inflicting or attempting to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or threats of harm to another
with accompanying acts in furtherance of the threat; an apparent inability to care for oneself such
that there is a reasonable probability of death or serious bodily injury in the absence of adequate
treatment; an attempt at suicide or a threat to commit suicide accompanied by acts in furtherance

of that threat; self-mutilation or a threat to engage in self-mutilation accompanied by acts in
furtherance of that threat. Id. § 7301(b).
Section 302, the provision Little alleges permitted his commitment, allows involuntary
commitment of a person for emergency psychiatric examination for up to 120 hours, where
“reasonable grounds [exist] to believe that [the person] is severely mentally disabled and in need
of immediate treatment.” Id. § 7302(a). Involuntary treatment pursuant to this section may be
obtained with or without a warrant. In the former circumstance, “[u]pon written application by a
physician or other responsible party setting forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe
a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, the county
administrator may issue a warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace officer, to

take such person to the facility specified in the warrant.” Id. § 7302(a)(1). Involuntary
commitment can also be achieved without a warrant pursuant to § 302(a)(2), which provides,
relevantly:
Upon personal observation of the conduct of a person constituting reasonable
grounds to believe that he is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment, any physician or peace officer, or anyone authorized by the county
administrator may take such person to an approved facility for an emergency
examination. Upon arrival, he shall make a written statement setting forth the
grounds for believing the person to be in need of such examination.

Id. § 7302(a)(2). The Third Circuit has recognized a “special needs” exception to relevant
warrant and probable cause requirements in relation to commitment under the MHPA.
Marcavage v. Bd. of Trustees of Temple Univ. of Commw. Sys. of Higher Educ., No. 00-5362,
2004 WL 1151835, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Marcavage v. Bd. of Trustees
of Temple Univ. of Commw. Sys. of Higher Educ., 232 F. App’x. 79 (3d Cir. 2007) (denying
summary judgment on retaliation, false arrest and imprisonment, and substantive due process
claims arising from involuntary commitment under MHPA, but granting summary judgment on

procedural due process claim, discussion contours of the statute) (citing Doby v. DeCrescenzo,
171 F.3d 858, 871 (3d Cir. 1999) (further citations omitted)). In Doby, the Third Circuit held
that “the temporary involuntary commitment of those deemed dangerous to themselves or others
[pursuant to the MHPA] qualifies as a ‘special need’ permitting the state to act without a
warrant.” Doby, 171 F.3d at 871. Doby affirmed the constitutionality of the MHPA, noting the
narrow scope of § 302 (limiting involuntary commitments to emergency situations) and the
procedural safeguards embedded in the statute. The court concluded:
Because the section 7302 procedures exist to respond to emergency cases, . . .
[t]he statutory requirement that the individual appear “responsible” and the
warning on the application form that false statements can subject a petitioner to
criminal prosecution are sufficient safeguards in light of the circumstances to
assure the reliability of information communicated to the delegate.

Id. at 872.
A person committed under § 302 must “be examined by a physician within two hours of
arrival in order to determine if the person is severely mentally disabled within the meaning of
§ 301(b) and in need of immediate treatment,” and released if such a finding is not made. 50 Pa.
Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 7302(b). See also Marcavage, 2004 WL 1151835, at *4. The person also
has certain notification rights, which are as follows:
Upon arrival at the facility, the person shall be informed of the reasons for
emergency examination and of his right to communicate immediately with others.
He shall be given reasonable use of the telephone. He shall be requested to furnish
the names of parties whom he may want notified of his custody and kept informed
of his status. The county administrator or the director of the facility shall:
(1) give notice to such parties of the whereabouts and status of the person,
how
and when he may be contacted and visited, and how they may obtain
information concerning him while he is in inpatient treatment; and

(2) take reasonable steps to assure that while the person is detained, the
health and safety needs of any of his dependents are met, and that his
personal property and the premises he occupies are secure.

Doe v. Wolf, No. 16-6039, 2017 WL 3620005, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017) (quoting
§ 7302(c)(1)-(2)). If additional treatment is required beyond the 120 hours permitted under
§ 302, the facility at which the individual is committed must file an application with the Court of
Common Pleas seeking extended involuntary treatment under § 7303. See Robinson v. Geisinger
Hosp., No. 18-989, 2019 WL 4898778, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4885949 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2019), aff’d, 814 F. App’x. 670
(3d Cir. 2020) (granting motion to dismiss false arrest and false imprisonment claims on Rule 8
grounds in case arising from involuntary commitment under MHPA and discussing requirements
of the Act).
Involuntary civil commitment constitutes a serious liberty deprivation, and a person may
bring a federal civil rights action where the deprivation is achieved by unconstitutional means.
Marcavage, 2004 WL 1151835, at *4 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, (1979)). A
person acting pursuant to the MHPA may not be held civilly liable under state law “[i]n the
absence of willful misconduct or gross negligence.” Id. (citing 50 Pa. Stat and Cons. Stat.
§ 7114.)
B. Claims Arising From Involuntary Commitment
Little alleges that he was brought to Friends Hospital by Adyemi after agreeing to submit
to a voluntary examination under § 201 of the MHPA, but that, upon arriving at the hospital,
Adyemi signed papers to arrange for Little’s involuntary commitment under § 302 of the MHPA.
Little asserts claims against two individuals associated with Friends Hospital and Adyemi, and
the Court liberally construes these claims as related to Little’s commitment.
1. Claims Against Chaplin Ken
Little names Friends Hospital employee Chaplin Ken as a Defendant. (SAC at 17-18.)

Little alleges that, following his commitment and in response to his request for assistance,
Chaplin Ken investigated the circumstances surrounding Little’s commitment. (SAC at 27.)
There are no further allegations describing any conduct engaged in by Chaplin Ken. Little does
not allege that Chaplin Ken participated in his commitment or that any of Chaplin Ken’s actions
resulted in harm. The nature of the claims against Chaplin Ken are unclear. It is also not clear
that Chaplin Ken is a state actor subject to liability under § 1983.
Whether a defendant is acting under color of state law – i.e., whether the defendant is a
state actor – depends on whether there is “such a close nexus between the State and the
challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). “To

answer that question, [the Third Circuit has] outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme
Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists: (1) whether the private entity has
exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the
private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state
has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646
(3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). Additionally, “[a]ction taken by
private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.” Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999). Rather, to support a finding of state
action, “the government must be ‘responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff
complains.’” Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 870 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). Notably, in the context of commitments under the
MHPA, “courts have held that private health care facilities and physicians acting under the

provisions of the MHPA are not state actors for purposes of Section 1983.” Covell v. Smith, No.
95-0501, 1996 WL 750033, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1996) (collecting cases).
Little does not allege that either Chaplin Ken or his employer, Friends Hospital, exercised
powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state, that either acted with the help
of or in concert with state officials, or that the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with either Chaplin Ken or Friends Hospital that the actions of the Friends
Hospital employees must be recognized as a joint participation Little’s commitment.
Accordingly, Little’s constitutional claims against Chaplin Ken are dismissed because he has not
plausibly alleged that Chaplin Ken is a state actor or was acting under color of state law.
Moreover, the factual allegations in the SAC suggest that Chaplin Ken did not participate in

Little’s involuntary commitment but interacted with Little only afterwards. There does not
appear to be any other basis for a claim against Chaplin Ken, and the dismissal, accordingly, will
be with prejudice.
2. Claims Against Dr. Conlin
Little names Dr. Elizabeth Conlin as a Defendant but does not include any factual
allegations in the SAC describing any conduct engaged in by Conlin. He, accordingly, has not
stated a plausible constitutional claim against her. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (“[a] defendant in
a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable).
Moreover, his claim against Conlin does not satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Fabian v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., No. 16-4741, 2017 WL 3494219, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 11, 2017) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that pleadings provide enough
information to put a defendant on sufficient notice to prepare their defense and also ensure that
the Court is sufficiently informed to determine the issue.”) (quotations omitted). In other words,

“[a] complaint must contain sufficient clarity to avoid requiring a district court or opposing party
to forever sift through its pages in search of the nature of the plaintiff’s claim.” Prelle v. United
States by Prelle, No. 22-1453, 2022 WL 16958896, at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (per curiam)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Because Little provides no facts describing any
actions taken by Conlin, the SAC fails to provide fair notice of the grounds upon which claims
against her rest, as required by Rule 8. See Afzal v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Examiners, No. 22-1609,
2022 WL 4533826, at *3 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2022) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of complaint
pursuant to Rule 8 because plaintiff failed to plead adequate factual content to support a
reasonable inference that defendants were liable and failed to present cognizable legal claims to
which defendants could respond on the merits). For these reasons, Little’s claims against Conlin

must be dismissed.
Additionally, as noted, “courts have held that private health care facilities and physicians
acting under the provisions of the MHPA are not state actors for purposes of Section 1983.”
Covell, 1996 WL 750033, at *6. This suggests that any attempt by Little to amend his
constitutional claims against Conlin may be futile. However, in an abundance of caution, and
because in the absence of any allegations describing Conlin’s conduct, the Court cannot state
with certainty that Little cannot state a plausible claim against her, he will be granted leave to
amend his claims against her.
3. Claims Against Adyemi
Little alleges that Adyemi was responsible for his involuntary commitment at Friends
Hospital.15 The Court liberally construes Little’s claims against Adyemi as arising under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. For the following reasons, the claims are not plausible.

a. Fourth Amendment Seizure/False Imprisonment Claim
“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures in civil, as well as criminal, proceedings.
The fundamental inquiry in such proceedings, however, remains whether the government’s
conduct is reasonable under the circumstances.” See Marcavage , 2004 WL 1151835, at *6
(discussing Doby in context of motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure

15 Little also asserts that in the course of arranging for Little’s commitment, Adyemi stole cash
and bus passes. (SAC at 25, 27, 29.) To the extent Little seeks to assert a constitutional claim based on
the conversion of cash and bus passes, the claim fails because adequate post-deprivation remedies are
available in state court. See Spencer v. Bush, 543 F. App’x 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013) (“‘[A]n unauthorized
intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation
remedy for the loss is available.’” (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984))). While the Pennsylvania
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 8541, provides “no local agency shall be liable
for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or
an employee thereof or any other person,” there are exceptions to this grant of immunity. See id. §
8542(b). One such exception is that a political subdivision like the City of Philadelphia may be held
liable:
for damages on account of an injury to a person or property within the limits set forth in
this subchapter if both of the following conditions are satisfied and the injury occurs as a
result of one of the acts set forth in subsection (b):
(1) The damages would be recoverable under common law or a statute creating a
cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available a defense
under section 8541 (relating to governmental immunity generally) or section 8546
(relating to defense of official immunity); and
(2) The injury was caused by the negligent acts of the local agency or an employee
thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties with respect to one of the
categories listed in subsection (b). As used in this paragraph, “negligent acts” shall
not include acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice
or willful misconduct.
See id. § 8542(a). As alleged, Adyemi’s conversion of the cash and bus passes was not negligent and,
therefore, the above exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act does not apply. Little has a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy available for his property loss claim in an appropriate state court, so
his constitutional claim is not plausible and must be dismissed. In the alternative, if Adyemi is not an
employee of the City of Philadelphia, Little can pursue a conversion claim in an appropriate state court.
and false arrest claims following involuntary commitment under MHPA) (further citations
omitted). In determining whether an official’s conduct was reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, “we must decide whether the actions of the [officials] were ‘objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their

underlying intent or motivation.’” Id. at 874 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397,
(1989)). As explained above, in the context of a commitment under the MHPA, the commitment
can be achieved either with or without a warrant, subject to the requirements of the MHPA. The
reasonableness of the conduct resulting in the allege seizure is determinative. Here, the
allegations in the SAC are not sufficient to state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim.
Little alleges that Adyemi arrived at his residence to discuss emails that Little had sent to
former Police Commissioner Outlaw reporting alleged sexual assaults. Following this
discussion, Adyemi allegedly asked whether Little would consent to voluntary treatment under
§ 201 of the MHPA. Little alleges that he agreed to receive treatment and was transported to
Friends Hospital, where Adyemi allegedly signed papers involuntarily committing Little under

§ 302 of the MHPA. (SAC at 25, 28-29). Little does not provide any other facts describing the
circumstances surrounding his commitment. He does not allege, inter alia, whether Adyemi or
the police officer that allegedly accompanied him to Little’s residence presented a warrant, or
whether he was examined by a physician at Friends Hospital. (See SAC.) He does not describe
his state of mind other than to allege that he accepted an offer of voluntary treatment. In these
circumstances, the Court cannot determine whether Adyemi acted unreasonably under the
circumstances so as to make the claim plausible. See, e.g., Robinson, 2019 WL 4898778, at *7
(dismissing pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure false arrest and false
imprisonment claim of plaintiff involuntarily committed under the MHPA where plaintiff alleged
that he was involuntarily committed, and that an extension of his commitment was requested
even though there were no reports on file describing suicidal ideations or violence or the threat of
violence on his part). Little’s Fourth Amendment claim will be dismissed, and he will be granted
leave to amend this claim.

b. Due Process Claims
Little may be asserting due process claims against Adyemi based on his involuntary
commitment. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a
claim under § 1983 for a violation of one’s procedural due process rights, “a plaintiff must allege
that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him
did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d
Cir. 2006).
Three kinds of § 1983 claims may be brought under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). First, a plaintiff may
bring suit under § 1983 for a violation of his specific rights as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. Id. Second, a plaintiff may assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim under the
“procedural” aspect of the Due Process Clause, which guarantees fair procedure for the
deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property. Id. Third, a
plaintiff may assert a claim under the “substantive” prong of the Due Process Clause, which bars
certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used
to implement them. Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. at 331)).
1. Procedural Due Process
The procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause guarantees the availability of certain
procedural mechanisms, typically the right to notice and a hearing before the government can
deprive an individual of a liberty or property interest. To establish a procedural due process

violation, a person must first demonstrate that he has been deprived of a constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 339; Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d
315, 325 (3d Cir. 2010). Only upon finding that a protected interest is asserted does a court
consider the constitutional sufficiency of the procedures associated with the interest. If a liberty
or property interest is found, the next step in the due process inquiry is to determine what process
is due. Stated another way, in order to state a plausible Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is
encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life liberty, or property, and (2)
the procedures available to him did not provide due process of law.” Rosado v. City of
Coatesville, No. 19-2426, 2020 WL 1508351, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2020) (quoting Hill, 455

F.3d at 234). Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place, and circumstance. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997). Rather, “due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Involuntary commitment implicates a liberty interest protected by the due process clause.
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-91 (1980). The Third Circuit has observed that the MHPA
“procedure was created to allow the counties to handle emergency situations. Courts have stated
repeatedly that due process is a flexible notion and that what kind of process is due depends on
the individual and state interests at stake. . . . [Thus] it may be reasonable . . . for a state to omit
a provision for notice and a hearing in a statute created to deal with emergencies, particularly
where the deprivation at issue, in this case detention for a maximum of several hours to permit an
examination, continues for only a short period of time.” Doby, 171 F.3d at 870 (citing Zinermon
v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, (1980); Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1,

(1978)). The MHPA mandates such an examination occur within two hours of an individual’s
involuntary commitment, and the statute provides civil remedies for those improperly detained
under the statute. See Marcavage, 2004 WL 1151835, at *9 (citations omitted). See also Benn v.
Univ. Health Sys., No. 99-6526, 2001 WL 1251207, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2001) (granting
summary judgment on due process claim based on denial of hearing prior to involuntary
commitment under MHPA where facts established plaintiff was examined prior to commitment,
commitment lasted less than 120 hours, and plaintiff was in contact with family, therapist, and
lawyer during commitment). It is unclear whether the MHPA’s requirements were followed in
this case because the allegations describing the events surrounding Little’s commitment are
undeveloped. As a result, Little has not plausibly asserted a procedural due process claim and

this claim will be dismissed. See Hovis v. Cnty. of Lebanon, No. 24-355, 2024 WL 4631830, at
*7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2024) (dismissing procedural due process claim arising from involuntary
commitment under MHPA where it appeared procedures mandated under §§ 302 and 303 were
followed, and hearing before hearing officer and review by the Court of Common Pleas were
alleged to have occurred). Little will be granted leave to amend this claim.
2. Substantive Due Process
Little may be seeking to assert a substantive due process claim. “’[A] substantive due
process violation is established if the government’s actions were not rationally related to a
legitimate government interest or were in fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive.’”
Doby, 171 F.3 at 871 n.4 (quoting Sameric Corp. of Delaware v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582,
590 (3d Cir. 1998)). However, the Third Circuit has determined that “the MHPA meets the
rationality test imposed by substantive due process.” Doby, 171 F.3d at 871. Additionally, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s conduct must “shock the conscience” to

rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. Benn, 2001 WL 1251207, at *6 (citing
Cnty. Of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998)).
The factual allegations in the SAC are too undeveloped to permit the Court to determine
whether the conduct alleged was motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive, and the SAC
includes no allegation that the conduct of any of the Defendants “shocked the conscience.” For
these reasons, any substantive due process claim Little seeks to pursue is not plausible and will
be dismissed. See Hovis, 2024 WL 4631830, at *7 (dismissing substantive due process claim
where plaintiff did not allege that defendant’s conduct shocked the conscience). Little will be
granted leave to amend this claims.
C. Claims Against Former Commissioner Outlaw

The source of Little’s claims against former Commissioner Outlaw appears to be two-
fold. First, he alleges that he emailed Outlaw repeatedly seeking help following an alleged
sexual assault or assaults by the owner and occupants of his rooming home. He alleges both that
Outlaw did not render assistance and that she retaliated by sending police officers to harm him in
response to the emails. (SAC at 28.) Little also alleges that despite numerous text messages,
former Commissioner Outlaw did not provide him with the name of Adyemi’s supervisor
following Adyemi’s alleged commitment of Little. (SAC at 30.) The Court liberally construes
the claims as asserting (1) a failure to protect and investigate and (2) alleged retaliation.
Little’s claim based on Outlaw’s alleged failure to protect him and investigate the alleged
assaults he reported to her is not plausible because, “[a]s a general matter, . . . a State’s failure to
protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).

Additionally, private citizens do not have a constitutionally protected right to investigation of
criminal charges. See Sanders v. Downs, No. 08-1560, 2010 WL 817475 at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9,
2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that police defendants failed to adequately investigate thefts
at his home, since “[t]here is no statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right,
to [such] an investigation”) (quoting Fuchs v. Mercer Cnty., 260 F. App’x 472, 475 (3d Cir.
2008) (alterations in the original); Graw v. Fantasky, 68 F. App’x 378, 383 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quotations omitted) (“[A]n allegation of a failure to investigate, without another recognizable
constitutional right, is not sufficient to sustain a section 1983 claim.”); Boseski v. N. Arlington
Municipality, 621 F. App’x 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Boseski has no cognizable
claim against a government entity for its failure to investigate or bring criminal charges against

another individual.”); Nedab v. Lencer, No. 06-54, 2007 WL 853595 at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20,
2007) (plaintiff lacked standing to assert constitutional violation premised on state police
officer’s alleged failure to investigate and file criminal charges related to assault against
plaintiff). Accordingly, Little’s claims against Outlaw based on the failure of the Philadelphia
Police to investigate his claims of sexual assault is not plausible and must be dismissed. Any
claim based on Outlaw’s alleged failure to respond to Little’s text messages seeking information
about Adyemi’s supervisor fails for the same reason and must also be dismissed.
As to his retaliation claim, Little asserts that in response to his emails seeking protection
from assaults by the owner and occupants of his rooming house, and unspecified abuse by
officers of the 22nd Precinct, Outlaw sent Adyemi and non-Defendant Police Officer Gable to
“harm” him. (SAC at 28.) In order to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, a
prisoner must allege that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered
an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his

constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or
motivating factor” for the adverse action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001);
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Coit v. Garman, 812 F. App’x 83, 86 (3d
Cir. 2020) (per curiam). “An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be
actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417,
423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in
original). The timing of the allegedly retaliatory behavior relative to the constitutionally
protected conduct may establish a causal link between the two for purposes of establishing
motivation. See Watson, 834 F.3d at 422.
Reporting a crime to the police is protected activity. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S.

250, 256 (2006) (citation omitted) (“As a general matter the First Amendment prohibits
government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal
prosecutions, for speaking out.”); Ibarra v. City of Chicago, 816 F.Supp.2d 541, 550 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (quoting Meyer v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Harper City, 482 F.3d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir.
2007) (“The reporting of a crime to police officers ‘constitutes an exercise of the First
Amendment right to petition the government for the redress of grievances.’”) Further,
“[i]nvoluntary civil commitment constitutes a serious liberty deprivation, and a person may bring
a federal civil rights action where the deprivation is achieved by unconstitutional means.”
Marcavage, 2004 WL 1151835, at *4 (citing Addington 441 U.S. at 425). However, the SAC
does not include factual allegations sufficient to state plausibly that Defendant Outlaw arranged
for Little’s involuntary commitment because he reported that he had been the victim of a crime.
Little alleges only in conclusory fashion that Outlaw sent a police officer and Adyemi to his
residence to “harm” him. (SAC at 28.) In other words, he has not alleged that his

constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the involuntary
commitment. He does not specify the nature of the harm Outlaw intended and does not, in the
SAC, allege that she was responsible for his commitment, or that his commitment constituted the
harm to which he referred. (See id.) Rather, he alleges that Adyemi arranged for his
commitment, see id.at 27, and alleges that he sought Defendant Outlaw’s assistance in obtaining
Adyemi’s supervisor’s contact information so that he could report his conduct, id. at 30. In these
circumstances, Little has not plausibly stated a retaliation claim against Defendant Outlaw based
on his involuntary commitment. He will, however, be granted leave to amend this claim.
D. Claims Against District Attorney Krasner
Defendant Krasner is not alleged to have participated in Little’s involuntary commitment,

and the conduct upon which Little’s claims against him are based took place more than a year
after Little’s August 2022 commitment. Little alleges that on November 9, 2023, he sent a
complete copy of a complaint against Adyemi to District Attorney Lawrence Krasner. (SAC at
8.) He further alleges that Krasner did not act on his complaint or respond to a follow-up letter
sent on December 28, 2023. (Id.) Liberally construed, the claim against Krasner appears to arise
from his apparent failure or refusal to prosecute Adyemi based on the allegations contained in
the complaint Little sent to him. This claim is not plausible.
First, prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for acts
that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating
a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31
(1976). Absolute immunity extends to the decision to initiate a prosecution. Imbler, 424 U.S. at
431. Absolute immunity can extend to “the duties of the prosecutor . . . involv[ing] actions
preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.” Mancini v.

Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 994 n.6 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33). This means
prosecutors have absolute immunity from suits challenging their preliminary “strategic
decisions,” such as their decision not to prosecute a case. Harris v. Krasner, 110 F.4th 192, 198
(3d Cir. 2024) (citing Roe v. City and Cnty of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Thus, Krasner is immune from a civil suit based on his decision not to initiate a prosecution
based on the information provided to him by Little.
Even if he were not immune, “[a] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in
the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973) (finding that a citizen lacks standing to contest prosecutorial policies “when he himself is
neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution”) (citations omitted); Lewis v. Jindal, 368 F.

App’x 613, 614 (5th Cir. 2010) (“It is well-settled that the decision whether to file criminal
charges against an individual lies within the prosecutor’s discretion, and private citizens do not
have a constitutional right to compel criminal prosecution.”) (citations omitted). Furthermore,
“an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a
decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 831 (1985). Thus, Krasner’s decision not to initiate a prosecution based on the information
Little provided to him does not give rise to a cognizable constitutional claim. As there appears to
be no other basis for a claim against Krasner, Little’s claims against him will be dismissed with
prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Little leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Little’s claims asserting violations of certain federal criminal statutes, the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendments will be dismissed with

prejudice. Little’s claims against Krasner, Chaplin Ken, and his claim against Outlaw based on
her alleged failure to investigate crimes reported by Little will also be dismissed with prejudice.
Little’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Outlaw, his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Adyemi, and his claims against Dr. Conlin will be dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Little will be
granted leave to file a third amended complaint. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002).
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ R. Barclay Surrick
R. BARCLAY SURRICK, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10804456. Public record. Not legal advice.