# Padmarao Jevaji v. Department of Health and Human Services

> Merit Systems Protection Board · February 20, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10803901

## Case

- **Court:** Merit Systems Protection Board
- **Decided:** February 20, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10803901

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that only after Board jurisdiction is established is the Board required to provide the appellant with a hearing on the merits of an IRA appeal

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PADMARAO JEVAJI, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DE-1221-20-0216-W-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND DATE: February 20, 2025
HUMAN SERVICES,
Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Daniel K.R. Maharaj , Esquire, Tampa, Florida, for the appellant.

Althea Smiley , Esquire, Denver, Colorado, for the agency.

Jennifer Smith , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman*
Raymond A. Limon, Member

*Vice Chairman Kerner recused himself and
did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
denied his request for corrective action in his individual right of action (IRA)

1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section
1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition
for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to VACATE the administrative
judge’s findings that the appellant did not exhaust all alleged disclosures with the
Office of Special Counsel (OSC), we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND
The appellant was a Supervisory Physician (Clinical Director), GP-15, with
the Indian Health Service at the Fort Belknap Service Unit (FBSU) in Harlem,
Montana. Jevaji v. Department of Health and Human Services, MSPB Docket
No. DE-1221-20-0216-W-2, Appeal File (W-2 AF), Tab 14 at 12, Tab 45 at 8. In
January 2020, the agency issued a notice of termination to the appellant during
his 1-year probationary period, and the appellant resigned to avoid termination.
W-2 AF, Tab 14 at 13-14, 27-31. He subsequently filed a whistleblower
retaliation complaint with OSC. W-2 AF, Tab 10. After OSC closed its
investigation into his complaint, id. at 71, the appellant filed an IRA appeal with
the Board, Jevaji v. Department of Health and Human Services, MSPB Docket
No. DE-1221-20-0216-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. The appeal was
3

dismissed without prejudice and automatically refiled by the Board. IAF, Tab 13;
W-2 AF, Tabs 1-3.
The administrative judge issued an order apprising the appellant of the
jurisdictional requirements for an IRA appeal and ordering him to submit
argument and evidence on jurisdiction. W-2 AF, Tab 4. Both parties responded.
W-2 AF, Tabs 10, 13-14. After considering those submissions, the administrative
judge issued a jurisdictional ruling finding that the appellant exhausted four
alleged disclosures with the OSC but made nonfrivolous allegations of only two
protected disclosures. W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 4-20. He also found nonfrivolous
allegations that those disclosures were a contributing factor in covered personnel
actions of a threat of termination and involuntary resignation. Id. at 20-23; W-2
AF, Tab 43. After holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued
an initial decision incorporating his jurisdiction rulings and finding that the
appellant did not meet his burden of proving that he made a protected
whistleblowing disclosure. W-2 AF, Tab 55, Initial Decision (ID).
The appellant has filed a petition for review, reraising all allegedly
protected disclosures raised before the administrative judge, arguing that they
were a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel action, and asserting that the
agency did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have issued
him a notice of termination absent his protected disclosures. Petition for Review
(PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 4.

ANALYSIS

The appellant exhausted his administrative remedies with OSC concerning all
alleged disclosures raised in his Board appeal.
In an IRA appeal based on whistleblower reprisal under the Whistleblower
Protection Act (WPA), 2 an appellant shall seek corrective action from OSC before

2
The WPA has been amended several times, including by the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act. The references herein to the WPA include those amendments.
4

seeking corrective action from the Board. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); Chambers v.
Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 5. This requirement of
administrative exhaustion entails both substantive and procedural requirements .
Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 5. The administrative judge, while finding that the
appellant satisfied the procedural requirements, found that the appellant did not
satisfy the substantive requirements for some of his allegedly protected
whistleblowing disclosures. W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 3-6.
The substantive requirements of exhaustion are met when an appellant has
provided OSC with sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. Chambers,
2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. An appellant may demonstrate exhaustion through his initial
OSC complaint or correspondence with OSC or, in the alternative, through other
sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration attesting that the
appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts in his Board appeal. Id.,
¶ 11. Here, the appellant’s OSC complaint and attached exhibits provided OSC
with sufficient basis to pursue an investigation concerning all alleged disclosures
raised in his Board appeal. W-2 AF, Tab 10. We expressly vacate the
administrative judge’s findings concluding otherwise. W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 4-6.
Specifically, we modify the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order
incorporated in the initial decision to find that the appellant exhausted with OSC
the following additional disclosures: (1) his July 10, 2019 statement that a
supervisor at the FBSU had misused government vehicles, W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 44,
56, 71; (2) his November 2019 complaint that a former chief executive officer
(CEO) of the FBSU had displayed favoritism to a nurse practitioner, id. at 28, 65;
and (3) his contemporaneous complaint regarding this supervisor’s inappropriate
conduct on November 7, 2019, id. at 46-48, 63-65.

The appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that these additional disclosures were
protected whistleblowing disclosures.
The Board must address the matter of jurisdiction before proceeding to the
merits of the appeal. Bishop v. Department of Agriculture, 2022 MSPB 28, ¶ 11.
5

Only after Board jurisdiction is established is the Board required to provide the
appellant with a hearing on the merits. Spencer v. Department of the Navy,
327 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). If an appellant has exhausted his
administrative remedies before OSC, he can establish Board jurisdiction by
nonfrivolously alleging that (1) he made a protected disclosure described under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity
was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Chambers, 2022 MSPB
8, ¶ 14. Thus, we have considered whether the appellant has made nonfrivolous
allegations concerning the three allegedly protected disclosures erroneously
excluded in the jurisdictional order based on the exhaustion requirement.
The Board’s regulations define a nonfrivolous allegation as an assertion
that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). 3 As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Hessami v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020) determined:
“[T]he question of whether the appellant has non-frivolously alleged protected
disclosures [or activities] that contributed to a personnel action must be
determined based on whether the employee alleged sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” 4
A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an
allegation of facts that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a
matter that a reasonable person in his position would believe evidenced a
category of wrongdoing under section 2302(b)(8)(A). Gabel v. Department of

3
The regulation further provides that an allegation generally will be considered
nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation
that (1) is more than conclusory; (2) is plausible on its face; and (3) is material to the
legal issues in the appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). Pro forma allegations are insufficient
to meet the nonfrivolous standard. Clark v. U.S Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 6
(2016), aff’d, 679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and overruled on other grounds by
Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20 n.11.
6

Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 4, ¶ 6. The test to determine whether a putative
whistleblower has a reasonable belief in the disclosure is an objective one:
whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to
and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the
actions of the agency evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety. Id. The disclosures must be
specific and detailed, not vague allegations of wrongdoing. Id.; see El v.
Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Concerning the appellant’s disclosure of a supervisor’s misuse of a
government vehicle, i.e., disclosure (1), the administrative judge made an
alternative finding that the appellant’s disclosure was an example of “vague,
conclusory, unsupported” alleged wrongdoing that did not meet the Board’s
nonfrivolous pleading standard. W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 6 n.6 ( citing El,
123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6). We affirm this alternative finding. The appellant reported
to the CEO of the FBSU that the supervisor “had misused GSA vehicles”
but provided no specifics such as what actions constituted “misuse.” W-2 AF,
Tab 10 at 56. Therefore, the appellant has not made nonfrivolous allegations
concerning this disclosure.
Concerning the appellant’s disclosure of favoritism, i.e., disclosure (2), the
administrative judge also stated that this disclosure was too vague. W-2 AF,
Tab 34 at 6. To the extent that the administrative judge found that the appellant
did not make nonfrivolous allegations of a protected disclosure, we agree. The

4
Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the Federal Circuit on
these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to the All Circuit Review Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file petitions for judicial review of
Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any circuit court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). Therefore, we must consider
these issues with the view that the appellant may seek review of this decision before
any appropriate court of appeal.
7

appellant’s written disclosure, which he allegedly submitted to the acting CEO at
the time, contained assertions that the former CEO had displayed favoritism
towards a nurse practitioner with whom she had a close friendship. W-2 AF,
Tab 10 at 63-65. Specifically, he asserted that the nurse practitioner received
frequent overtime, received a higher retention bonus than others, and was
“rescue[d]” by the former CEO during conflicts with other staff members. Id.
at 65.
In this disclosure, we find no assertion that the former CEO’s actions
violated a law, rule, or regulation, and the appellant has not identified an
applicable law, rule, or regulation in any of his pleadings. See, e.g., W-2 AF,
Tab 10 at 10, Tab 35 at 11; PFR File, Tab 3 at 13-14. Considering whether his
disclosure of favoritism might amount to a nonfrivolous allegation of any of the
other categories listed under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii), we note that the most
relevant category is an abuse of authority. 5 The Board has historically defined an
abuse of authority as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of power by a Federal
official or employee that adversely affects the rights of any person or results in
personal gain or advantage to herself or to other preferred persons. See Chavez v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 22 (2013). Abuse of
authority does not incorporate a de minimis standard. Embree v. Department of
the Treasury, 70 M.S.P.R. 79, 85 (1996). In Smolinski v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 23 F.4th 1345, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2022), the Federal Circuit
defined an abuse of authority more broadly as an arbitrary and capricious exercise
of authority that is contrary to the agency’s mission. In any event, a claim of
non-merit-based favoritism resulting in personal gain to a preferred person
appears to fall within the bounds of abuse of authority.

5
The Board does not require, as a basis for its jurisdiction, that an appellant in an IRA
appeal correctly label a category of wrongdoing. Rzucidlo v. Department of the Army,
101 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 13 (2006).
8

We find, however, that a disinterested observer with knowledge of the
essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the appellant would not
reasonably conclude that the former CEO engaged in non-merit-based preferential
treatment constituting an abuse of authority. We can discern no specific facts
from the appellant’s alleged disclosure or pleadings that support such a belief.
W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 11, 65, Tab 35 at 11; Hearing Transcript, May 5, 2023 (HT-2)
at 52-53 (testimony of the appellant); PFR File, Tab 3 at 13-14. First, the
appellant’s complaint of disproportionate overtime was vague and conclusory:
for example, he asserted that the former CEO had an “overly soft corner towards
[the nurse practitioner’s] frequent overtime grants” and that the timekeeper had
raised questions regarding “unusual overtime.” W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 65. It is
unclear whether the appellant believed that the nurse practitioner was requesting
overtime more frequently than others or whether the former CEO approved her
overtime while denying requests by others under the same circumstances. Id.
at 11, 65; HT-2 at 52-53 (testimony of the appellant); PFR File, Tab 3 at 13.
Similarly, although the appellant asserted that the nurse practitioner was awarded
a higher retention bonus than any other provider, he did not expressly allege that
the CEO was responsible for the alleged disproportionality or provide any facts
regarding her involvement in that decision. W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 11, 65, Tab 35
at 11; PFR File, Tab 3 at 13. Lastly, the appellant’s disclosure that the former
CEO regularly went to the nurse practitioner’s rescue when conflicts arose with
other employees only vaguely alleged wrongdoing and was devoid of details.
W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 65. Accordingly, we find that the appellant’s vague disclosure
of favoritism does not satisfy the Board’s nonfrivolous pleading standard and is
not within the Board’s jurisdiction. See El, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6.
Disclosure (3) involves the appellant’s alleged complaints that a supervisor
temporarily acting as CEO had repeatedly yelled at him during an impromptu
meeting on November 7, 2019, because she was upset on learning that a
complaint that he had submitted about the nurse practitioner had been forwarded
9

to area executives the previous day. W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 46-48, 62-65, Tab 35
at 9-12; HT-2 at 47 (testimony of the appellant); PFR File, Tab 3 at 12-14. We
find that one instance of yelling, alone, would not form the basis of a reasonable
belief in a violation of law, rule, or regulation; abuse of authority; or any other
category of wrongdoing under section 2302(b)(8). Importantly, we find that it
was not a retaliatory personnel action under the WPA because it did not have a
significant impact on the overall nature or quality of the appellant’s working
conditions, responsibilities, or duties. See Skarada v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶¶ 14-16 (explaining that harassment may constitute a
personnel action under the WPA but must be considered on a case-by-case
basis). 6 In other words, assuming arguendo that the appellant held a reasonable
belief that his supervisor perceived him as a whistleblower as a result of his
November 6, 2019 complaint, he did not disclose a matter that a reasonable
person in his position would have believed evidenced whistleblower reprisal. We
also find that he has not made a sufficiently specific disclosure that he was
subjected to a threat of personnel action covered under the WPA, or to threats
that might evidence a reasonable belief in an abuse of authority. W-2 AF, Tab 10
at 63-65; cf. Cooper v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 24, ¶¶ 11-13
(discussing agency actions that amount to a threat to take a personnel action
under the WPA); Murphy v. Department of the Treasury, 86 M.S.P.R. 131, ¶¶ 6-7
(2000) (finding that a supervisor’s use of his influence to denigrate other staff
members in an abusive manner and to threaten the staff members with whom he
disagreed constituted an abuse of authority).

6
The appellant also allegedly disclosed that he was not given a proper orientation, was
excluded from meetings to which he should have been invited, and, when he was invited
to meetings, felt uninvolved in the matters discussed. W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 65. We note
that while these actions together might constitute a retaliatory personnel action covered
by WPA if they involved a change in his working conditions, the appellant complained
that the alleged mistreatment began more or less on his entry to the position. Id. In any
event, he did not clearly link these alleged actions to any specific whistleblower
activity. Id.
10

Because we find that the appellant has not made nonfrivolous allegations
concerning these disclosures, we find no material error in the administrative
judge’s jurisdictional rulings. W-2 AF, Tabs 34, 43; see generally Spencer,
327 F.3d at 1356 (explaining that only after Board jurisdiction is established is
the Board required to provide the appellant with a hearing on the merits of an
IRA appeal).

We affirm the administrative judge’s remaining findings.
Of the four allegedly protected disclosures that the administrative judge
found to have been exhausted with OSC, he found that the appellant made
nonfrivolous allegations with respect to only two allegedly protected disclosures.
W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 6-20. Following a hearing on the merits, he found that the
appellant did not meet his burden of proving by preponderant evidence that he
made a protected whistleblowing disclosure. ID at 6-14. We find no error in the
administrative judge’s thorough and well-reasoned findings on these issues. 7 Id.
Although the appellant challenges these findings on review, his arguments
constitute mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s explained findings
and, thus, are not a basis to disturb the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 3 at 15-19;
see Dieter v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 32, ¶ 14.
Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge correctly found that the
appellant did not make a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal and properly
denied the appellant’s request for corrective action. ID at 15; see 5 U.S.C.
§ 1221(e)(1)-(2); Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 6
(2015). We affirm the initial decision as modified.

7
Applying the definition of abuse of authority in Smolinski, 23 F.4th at 1351-52, we
reach the same result.
11

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
The initial decision, as modified by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:

8
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12

U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
13

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
14

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

9
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10803901. Public record. Not legal advice.