# PRICE v. DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · February 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801554

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801554

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine [the] requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions” (internal quotation marks omitted)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DR. MONICA A. PRICE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:23cv1102
)
DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on the “Motion to Dismiss
Complaint” (Docket Entry 9)1 (the “Dismissal Motion”) filed by
Durham Public Schools (the “Defendant”). For the reasons that
follow, the Court (i) should deny the Dismissal Motion and
(ii) will deem the “Complaint for a Civil Case” (Docket Entry 1)
(the “Complaint”) amended to include the allegations in the
response to the Dismissal Motion (Docket Entry 14) (the
“Response”).
BACKGROUND
Alleging violations of “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964” (“Title VII”), the “Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967” (the “ADEA”), and “The Civil Rights Act of 1991” (Docket
1 For legibility reasons, this Opinion omits bold, all-cap,
and underscored font in all quotations from the parties’ materials.
Entry 1 at 3),2 Dr. Monica A. Price (the “Plaintiff” or “Dr.
Price”) sued Defendant, her former employer. (See id. at 1-6.)
According to the Complaint:
[Plaintiff] began working for [Defendant] on or
about September 16, 2022, as a Student Success Coach and
Testing Coordinator. Student Success Coach and Testing
Coordinator is the most recent position [Plaintiff] held.
For the duration of [her] employment, [Plaintiff]
feel[s] as though [she] ha[s] been treated less favorably
and subjected to different terms and conditions of
employment because o[f her] race, Black, and [her] age
(54). In or around October, November, and December 2022,
[Plaintiff] made several complaints to Human Resources
about the discriminatory treatment toward [Plaintiff].
In or around January, February, March, and May of 2023,
[Plaintiff] made additional complaints to Human
Resources. [Plaintiff] do[es] not believe [her]
allegations have been investigated and [Plaintiff] was
continually being treated differently. On or about April
24, 2023, [Plaintiff] received a negative review.
[Plaintiff] believe[s she] was reviewed negatively in
retaliation for [her] aforementioned complaints regarding
discrimination. In or around June 2023, [Plaintiff’s]
contract was not renewed. [Plaintiff] appealed the
decision to not renew [her] contract through the Durham
County School Board and the decision was upheld.
[Plaintiff] believe[s her] contract was not renewed
because of [her] aforementioned complaints, as well as
[her] age and race.
(Id. at 6.) The Complaint further asserts:
The wrongs against . . . Plaintiff[] are continuing
until this date being that [Plaintiff] continue[s] to
have to report to other educational entities that [her]
contract was non-renewed due to [Plaintiff] being accused
of being a non-diversity friendly employee. [Plaintiff]
was recommended for several positions, but at the point
that [a] reference was requested from [Defendant], the
employment opportunity was denied. The actual damages on
2 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.
2
[Plaintiff’s] personal property, pain and suffering,
reputation, [sic] are still being accrued and
[Plaintiff’s] personal property loss is still of issue.
(Id. at 4.)
Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint “pursuant to Rule
12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (the “Rules”).
(Docket Entry 9 at 1.) Per the Dismissal Motion, “Plaintiff has
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and has failed to
state any claims upon which relief may be granted. As a result,
Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”
(Id.) Notably, ignoring the Complaint’s assertions regarding
retaliation and violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(see Docket Entry 1 at 3-4, 6), Defendant’s memorandum in support
of the Dismissal Motion maintains that “Plaintiff’s Complaint
attempts to allege two claims (1) race discrimination in violation
of Title VII and (2) age in discrimination in violation of the
[ADEA]” (Docket Entry 10 at 1). Defendant accordingly limits its
dismissal arguments to Plaintiff’s claims for race and age
discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. (See, e.g., id. at 4-
7 (arguing for dismissal of Plaintiff’s VII and ADEA discrimination
claims).)
Less than twenty-one days after Defendant filed the Dismissal
Motion, Plaintiff filed the Response. (Compare Docket Entry 9 at
2, with Docket Entry 14 at 1.) Addressing the challenged claims,
the Response provides significant factual detail in support of
3
Plaintiff’s ADEA and Title VII discrimination claims. (See Docket
Entry 14 at 1-7.) For instance, the Response explains “that the
prejudicial behavior of [Plaintiff’s] principal Mrs. Crystal
Medlin[] interfered with [Plaintiff’s] work and ultimately led to
her dismissal” from her remote position at Ignite Online Academy
notwithstanding that Plaintiff “is an expert on the digital divide
and online learning.” (Id. at 3.) According to the Response, Mrs.
Medlin, inter alia, docked Plaintiff’s pay and “presented
information to Human Resources to support [Mrs. Medlin’s] efforts
to remove Dr. Price from her job,” an act “in congruence with what
is believed to be Mrs. Medlin’s overall desire to replace Dr. Price
with a Caucasian, female colleague” (id.; see also id. at 5
(discussing said colleague)). (See id. at 3-4.) The Response
further asserts that “a warning letter was placed in Dr. Price’s
personnel file” (id. at 3) and that Plaintiff remained subject to
an “incorrect performance rubric” that “did not seem to correspond
with Dr. Price’s duties as Student Success Coach and Testing
Coordinator” (id. at 4).
Moreover, per the Response, “[s]hortly after Dr. Price had to

go to DPS Human Resource for help, Mrs. Medlin began to get Dr.
Price’s African American colleagues to take over her work without
her knowing[,] interfering with testing reporting duties.” (Id. at
5.) The Response additionally identifies as “just a few of the
specific examples of the prejudicial and inappropriate behavior by
4
Mrs. Medlin” (id. at 4) the following allegations related to
Plaintiff’s age and race discrimination claims:
There are multiple, documented occasions where Dr.
Price’s actions were reprimanded, and her Caucasian
colleagues’ same actions were allowed and praised.
Specifically, her Caucasian colleagues were allowed to
conduct surveys to receive feedback, but when Dr. Price
did the same, she was strongly reprimanded by Mrs.
Medlin.
Mrs. Medlin asked Dr. Price to present in a faculty
learning community meeting and in the middle of the
meeting, she told Dr. Price that she would not be using
her data, would be taking over the meeting, and would be
using the data of the Caucasian counterpart instead.
However, Mrs. Medlin did not know that the data was
practically identical except for a different color scheme
change for organization and updates. Mrs. Medlin said in
front of the group that Dr. Price’s presentation was
“colorful” but the Caucasian colleague’s information was
the one that she would use as correct.
*****
Mrs. Medlin stated that one of Dr. Price’s Caucasian
colleagues had done a great job with assisting with
testing when Dr. Price had to be away on an occasion.
She stated that the colleague had just had a baby and
insinuated that the position would be good for her to
work from home in the presence of Dr. Price.
Dr. Price is not of the traditional child-bearing
age, so Mrs. Medlin valued the colleague’s age and
childcare needs more than the need to have the
flexibility to take care of Dr. Price’s elderly parents.
Dr. Price believes that skin color allowed Mrs.
Medlin to identify who should be prioritized. She valued
higher the needs of the Caucasian colleague to have Dr.
Price’s job. She has prejudicial beliefs that Dr. Price
should not be in leadership, that Dr. Price’s supposed
inferiority would be the blame if things went wrong, and
that Dr. Price should do as she was told even if it was
untruthful.
(Id. at 4-5 (internal paragraph lettering omitted).)
5
In reply, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s claims remain
subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. (See Docket Entry 15 (the “Reply”) at 1-2.) The Reply
further asserts that “[t]he additional factual allegations raised
for the first time in Plaintiff’s Response still do not state a
colorable claim under Title VII or the ADEA.” (Id. at 2.)
Defendant thus urges the Court to grant the Dismissal Motion. (See
id. at 3.)
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Standards
A. Rule 12 (b) (6)
A Rule 12 (b) (6) motion “tests the sufficiency of a complaint,”
but “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of
a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of
N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added) .° Accordingly, in reviewing a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the
Court must “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and
construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of App., 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010),
aff’d sub nom., Coleman v. Court of App. of Md., 566 U.S. 30
(2012). The Court must also “draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon

3 As such, “claims lacking merit may be dealt with through
summary judgment under Rule 56” rather than through a Rule 12 (b) (6)
motion. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).

Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, a pro se complaint must “be liberally
construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the Court
“will not accept legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” United States
ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455
(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine [the] requirement that
a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The Court can also “put aside any naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” SD3, LLC v.
Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015), as
amended on reh’g in part (Oct. 29, 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
To avoid Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations “to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). To qualify as plausible, a claim needs sufficient factual
content to support a reasonable inference of the defendant’s

liability for the alleged misconduct. See id. The complaint need
not contain detailed factual recitations, but must provide the
defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation
marks and ellipsis omitted). Thus, although a plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts “to state all the elements of her claim,”
Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d Jol, 765 (4th Cir.
2003), she need not plead facts constituting a McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss,
see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514-15 (2002)
(analyzing Title VII and ADEA claims).
B. Title VII Standards
Under Title VII, it constitutes “an unlawful employment
practice for an employer,” inter alia, “to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to hl[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).* For Title VII purposes, liability
attaches if “race .. .was a motivating factor” for the challenged
“employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also Kortor v. Forest at
Duke, No. 1:23cv834, 2024 WL 4367185, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30,

4 Title VII “also prohibits retaliation against persons who
assert rights under [Title VII].” Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587
U.S. 541, 543 (2019).

2024) (“An employer will be held liable for racial . . .
discrimination if ‘a protected characteristic [is] a “motivating
factor” in an employment decision.’” (brackets in original)
(quoting E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S.
768, 773 (2015))). Accordingly, to state a Title VII
discrimination claim, a “plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to
raise a plausible inference that h[er] employer discharged [or
otherwise treated her adversely in the terms or conditions of
employment] because of h[er] race,” Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th
293, 299 (4th Cir. 2022) (analyzing Title VII unlawful discharge
claim). See, e.g., Rageh v. University of N.C., No. 1:24cv336,
2024 WL 5056448, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2024) (analyzing Title
VII discrimination claim and concluding that plaintiff “alleged
sufficient facts to state a Title VII national origin
discrimination claim to the extent that he bases his claim on
denial of training opportunities”).
C. ADEA Standards

The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual
. . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). For
an “age discrimination claim, [a plaintiff] must allege facts
plausibly supporting the inference that (1) [s]he was ‘over the age
of 40,’ (2) [s]he ‘experienced discrimination by an employer,’ and
(3) the discrimination was ‘because of h[er] age.’” Rageh, 2024 WL
9
5056448, at *2 (quoting Tickles v. Johnson, 805 F. App’x 204, 207
(4th Cir. 2020)). Moreover:
Age must be the but-for cause of an adverse employment
action, Palmer v. Liberty Univ., Inc., 72 F.4th 52, 67
(4th Cir. 2023), but a plaintiff “need not establish
but-for causation to survive a motion to dismiss.”
Lattinville-Pace v. Intelligent Waves LLC, No. 22-1144,
2024 WL 1756167, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 2024). “[A]
plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts to plausibly
support a claim of discrimination.” Id.
The adverse employment action does not need to be
significant. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346,
355 (2024). Rather, a plaintiff need only allege “some
injury respecting her employment terms or conditions.”
Id. at 359 (stating employee’s allegations that she was
transferred and given fewer responsibilities would
constitute an adverse employment action even though her
rank and pay remained the same); see also Grant v. N.C.
Dep’t of Transp., No. 23-CV-702, 2024 WL 2789388, at *3
(E.D.N.C. May 30, 2024) (applying Muldrow to an ADEA
claim).
Rageh, 2024 WL 5056448, at *2-3.
II. Analysis
A. Amendment
As an initial matter, Plaintiff filed the Response, which
contains additional factual information regarding her Title VII and
ADEA discrimination claims (see Docket Entry 14 at 1-7), less than
twenty-one days after Defendant moved to dismiss those claims for
lack of supporting factual allegations (see Docket Entry 10 at 5-
7). (Compare Docket Entry 9 at 2, with Docket Entry 14 at 1.)
Pursuant to Rule 15, “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course no later than,” as relevant here, “21 days after
service of a motion under Rule 12(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P.
10
15(a)(1)(B). Given that Plaintiff (i) possessed the right to amend
her pleadings at the time she filed the Response and (ii) proceeds
pro se, the Court will deem the Complaint amended to include the
factual allegations in the Response.
Amending a complaint “normally moots a pending motion to
dismiss.” Flanagan v. Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC, No. 1:17cv202,
2017 WL 3328168, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2017). Here, however,
Defendant addressed the Response in its Reply, arguing that the
facts set out in the Response do not impact resolution of the
Dismissal Motion. (See Docket Entry 15 at 2.) “Under the
circumstances, the Court will ‘consider the Dismissal Motion as
being addressed to the [Complaint as deemed amended by the
Response].’” Flanagan, 2017 WL 3328168, at *2 (brackets omitted)
(quoting 6 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2017)); see also Brumfield v. McCann, No.
2:12cv1481, 2013 WL 943807, at *2-3 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 11, 2013)
(granting motion to amend complaint, but concluding that court
could still consider pending dismissal motions, and collecting
cases).

B. Administrative Exhaustion
Turning to the Dismissal Motion, Defendant asserts that the
Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA discrimination

11
claims for lack of administrative exhaustion. (See, e.g., Docket
Entry 10 at 5.)° This argument misses the mark.
“As a precondition to the commencement of a Title VII action
in court, a complainant must first file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission” (the “EEOC”), Fort Bend Cnty. v.
Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 543 (2019); “[h]owever, ‘[p]rerequisites to
suit like Title VII’s charge-filing instruction are not’
jurisdictional; rather, ‘they are properly ranked among the array
of claim-processing rules that must be timely raised to come into
play,’” Bush v. Frederick Cnty. Pub. Schs., No. 23-1127, 2024 WL
639255, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2024) (quoting Davis, 587 U.S. at

5 Rather than restricting its argument to the assertion that
Plaintiff’s pleadings did not mention or otherwise evidence the
filing of a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(the “EEOC”), Defendant’s memoranda repeatedly maintain that
“Plaintiff has not filed a charge of discrimination before the
EBEROC” (Docket Entry 15 at 2; see also Docket Entry 10 at 5
(“Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging claims under Title VII and
the ADEA without first raising her claim before the EEOC.”)) and
that, “‘[b]ecause Plaintiff failed to file a charge of
discrimination’ with the EEOC, her Title VII and ADEA claims ‘must
be dismissed with prejudice’” (Docket Entry 10 at 5; accord Docket
Entry 15 at 3). Notably, though, after Defendant filed the Reply,
Plaintiff filed a copy of a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC dated
long before Defendant filed the Dismissal Motion, addressed to
Plaintiff with a “Cc:” to Defendant’s address. (See Docket Entry
16 at 1-5; see also Docket Entry 1 at 2.) Although consideration
of the Dismissal Motion will remain focused on the Complaint as
amended by the Response, see, e.g., E.I. du Pont, 637 F.3d at 448,
this filing calls into serious question the veracity of Defendant’s
assertion that “Plaintiff has not filed a charge of discrimination
before the EEOC” (Docket Entry 15 at 2). Defendant’s counsel
should take care to ensure the accuracy of representations made to
the Court. See Six v. Generations Fed. Credit Union, 891 F.3d 508,
519 (4th Cir. 2018).
12

543-44).6 “That is, a defendant must raise this issue as an
affirmative defense.” Id. Moreover, “the burden of establishing
the affirmative defense rests on the defendant.” Goodman v.
Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Importantly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “generally cannot reach
the merits of an affirmative defense.” Id. Thus,
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which addresses the
sufficiency of the complaint, generally does not enable
the [C]ourt to determine whether the exhaustion
requirement has been satisfied or whether it has been
waived or should be excused, because exhaustion is
treated as an affirmative defense. When, however, facts
sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense[,] such as
exhaustion[,] are alleged in the complaint, the defense
may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule
12(b)(6). But this principle applies only in the
relatively rare circumstances when all facts necessary to
the affirmative defense clearly appear on the face of the
complaint. And even to succeed in these rare
circumstances, the defendant must show that the
plaintiff’s potential response to the affirmative defense
was foreclosed by the allegations in the complaint.
L.N.P. v. Kijakazi, 64 F.4th 577, 585-86 (4th Cir. 2023) (brackets,
citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Complaint and Response lack any information
regarding whether Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC. (See
Docket Entries 1, 14.) Accordingly, the Court does not confront
“the relatively rare circumstance[] where . . . . all facts
necessary to the affirmative defense clearly appear on the face of
6 “Courts in the Fourth Circuit have applied Davis to the
ADEA, which has a similar administrative exhaustion requirement.”
Yang v. Lai, No. 1:22cv5, 2022 WL 2440834, at *3 (M.D.N.C. July 5,
2022).
13
the complaint,” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original), precluding Rule
12(b)(6) relief on this ground, see id. at 466. The Court should
therefore reject Defendant’s administrative exhaustion argument.
C. Discrimination Claims
Defendant also contends that “Plaintiff fails to state . . .
colorable [Title VII and ADEA discrimination] claim[s].” (Docket
Entry 10 at 5.) In particular, Defendant asserts that “the
Complaint is entirely devoid of any allegations of a connection
between any alleged discriminatory treatment and any alleged
adverse employment action.” (Id. at 6.) As discussed above,
Plaintiff responded to this contention by offering additional
factual allegations in support of the challenged claims. (See
Docket Entry 14 at 1-7.) Nevertheless, the Reply maintains that
“[t]he additional factual allegations raised for the first time in
Plaintiff’s Response still do not state a colorable claim under

Title VII or the ADEA.” (Docket Entry 15 at 2.) This argument
falls short.
As an initial matter, Defendant fails to develop its argument
regarding the Response’s purported deficiencies. Instead, as the
final paragraph in its “Argument” section, which (i) contains a
singular heading proclaiming that “Plaintiff’s Response to the
[Dismissal Motion] does not address her failure to exhaust
administrative remedies” (id. at 1) and (ii) otherwise focuses
14
exclusively on administrative exhaustion (see id. at 1-2), the
Reply asserts:
The additional factual allegations raised for the
first time in Plaintiff’s Response still do not state a
colorable claim under Title VII or the ADEA. Even if
they could establish such a claim, which they cannot,
they are allegations that must be brought before the EEOC
before Plaintiff may file suit in federal court. Walton
v. Harker, 33 F.4th 165, 172 (4th Cir. 2022) (“It is well
settled that before filing suit under Title VII or the
ADEA, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative
remedies by bringing a charge with the EEOC.” (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d))).
(Docket Entry 15 at 2.)
“It is not the Court’s job to undertake the analysis and legal
research needed to support a perfunctory argument, nor should a
party expect [the C]ourt to do the work that [the party] elected
not to do.” Hill v. Carvana, LLC, No. 1:22cv37, 2022 WL 1625020,
at *5 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 2022) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The failure to develop this argument alone
justifies its denial. See, e.g., Sanders v. Colvin, No. 1:14cv163,
2015 WL 471588, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 4, 2015) (observing that,
because party failed to develop argument, “[t]he Court could deny
relief on that ground alone,” and collecting cases), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:14cv163, 2015 WL 12564213 (M.D.N.C.
Mar. 6, 2015); see also Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d
307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an argument . . . by
failing to develop its argument — even if its brief takes a passing
15
shot at the issue.” (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
In any event, construed liberally in light of Plaintiff’s pro
se status, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and with all reasonable
inferences drawn in her favor, see E.I. du Pont, 637 F.3d at 440,
the Complaint as deemed amended by the Response plausibly alleges
Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims. The Complaint identifies
Plaintiff as a “Black” woman aged “54” who worked “as a Student
Success Coach and Testing Coordinator” for Defendant between
September 2022 and June 2023, when “[her] contract was not
renewed.” (Docket Entry 1 at 6.) According to the Response, her
role at Ignite Online Academy allowed Plaintiff, “an expert on the
digital divide and online learning,” “to work remotely” until “the
prejudicial behavior of her principal Mrs. Crystal Medlin[]
interfered with [Plaintiff’s] work and ultimately led to her
dismissal.” (Docket Entry 14 at 3.) As examples of this conduct,
the Response asserts that, on multiple occasions, Plaintiff’s
“actions were reprimanded,” but “her Caucasian colleagues’ same
actions were allowed and praised,” including specifically on the

use of “surveys to receive feedback.” (Id. at 4.) The Response
further asserts that, in the middle of Plaintiff’s presentation at
a faculty learning community meeting, Mrs. Medlin “told [Plaintiff]
that [Mrs. Medlin] would not be using [Plaintiff’s] data, would be
taking over the meeting, and would be using the data of the
16
Caucasian counterpart instead,” even though “the data was
practically identical except for a different color scheme change
for organization and updates.” (Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 5
(“Mrs. Medlin said in front of the group that [Plaintiff’s]
presentation was ‘colorful’ but the Caucasian colleague’s
information was the one that she would use as correct.”).)
Moreover, per the Response, Mrs. Medlin (i) praised the work
of one of Plaintiff’s “Caucasian colleagues” who “assist[ed] with
testing when [Plaintiff] had to be away on an occasion” and
(ii) “stated that the colleague had just had a baby and insinuated
that [Plaintiff’s] position would be good for [the colleague] to
work from home in the presence of [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 5.) The
Response maintains that, as Plaintiff “is not of the traditional
child-bearing age, . . . Mrs. Medlin valued the colleague’s age and
childcare needs more than [Plaintiff’s] need to have the
flexibility to take care of [her] elderly parents.” (Id.)
Additionally, according to the Response, Mrs. Medlin “presented
information to Human Resources to support her efforts to remove
[Plaintiff] from her job,” an action “in congruence with what is

believed to be Mrs. Medlin’s overall desire to replace [Plaintiff]
with [that] Caucasian, female colleague.” (Id. at 3.)
“These allegations plausibly allege that Plaintiff’s race and
[age] directly resulted in her being treated differently from other
employees and that she was specifically targeted for adverse
17
treatment because of these characteristics, resulting eventually in
her termination . . . .” Kortor, 2024 WL 4367185, at *4; see
also Rageh, 2024 WL 5056448, at *3 (concluding that the plaintiff
“alleged sufficient facts to state an ADEA discrimination claim
based on denial of training opportunities,” where “[h]e alleges
that he was over 40 years old during his fellowship, and that Dr.
Zhang, who supervised [the plaintiff] on behalf of [the defendant],
provided him with fewer training opportunities than younger
residents, eventually refusing to train him,” after “express[ing]
concerns about [the plaintiff’s] age before his fellowship even
started” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII
and ADEA discrimination claims survive Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6)
challenge. The Court should therefore deny the Dismissal Motion.
See, e.g., Holloway, 32 F.4th at 299 (vacating Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal of unlawful termination claim, “find[ing] the[ alleged]
facts sufficient to raise the inference of a Title VII violation
above a speculative level,” even though “[the] complaint [wa]s thin
on facts (as opposed to conclusions) suggesting racial motivation,”
as “[its] pretext allegations . . . support[ed] an inference of

race discrimination” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
CONCLUSION
Given the timing of Plaintiff’s assertion of additional
factual allegations and her pro se status, the Court will deem her
pleadings amended. Given that amendment, Plaintiff plausibly
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alleges Title VII and ADEA claims for race and age discrimination.
Additionally, Defendant’s administrative exhaustion argument fails
at this stage of the proceedings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Complaint (Docket Entry 1) is
DEEMED AMENDED to include the factual allegations in the Response
(Docket Entry 14).
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court deny the Dismissal Motion
(Docket Entry 9).
This 18th day of February, 2025.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801554. Public record. Not legal advice.