# Chandler v. Fine

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · February 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801492

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801492

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that prison officials were not liable under the Eighth Amendment when the plaintiff was randomly attacked by inmates who were not identified as potential security threats to him

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

RASHAD CHANDLER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Civ. No. 2:23-02325-SHM-tmp
)
SERGEANT ROBERT FINE, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 9), DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ECF NO. 11) WITH PREJUDICE IN PART AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART,
DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND, DENYING PENDING MOTIONS (ECF NOS. 10 & 12),
CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH,
DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL, AND
CLOSING CASE

On May 18, 2023, Plaintiff Rashad Chandler, an inmate currently incarcerated at the
Riverbend Maximum Security Institution (the “RMSI”), in Nashville, Tennessee,1 filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 2
& 3.) On June 15, 2023, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the
civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. (the
“PLRA”). (ECF No. 7.) On February 23, 2024, the Court entered an order dismissing the

1 See Tennessee Department of Correction, Felony Offender Information,
complaint with prejudice in part and without prejudice in part and granted leave to amend the
claims dismissed without prejudice. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 106.)2
On March 21, 2024, Chandler filed a Motion for Extension of Time for Good Cause Shown
requesting an extension of forty-five (45) days to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) On

April 29, 2024, Chandler filed a Motion to Set the Matter for Mediation (ECF No. 10.) On April
29, 2024, Chandler filed an amended pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (the “Amended
Complaint”) (ECF No. 11.) On January 16, 2025, Chandler filed a motion for status of motion to
amend. (ECF No. 12.)
The Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) and the motions (ECF Nos. 9, 10 & 12) are before
the Court.
I. MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME (ECF NO. 9)
Chandler represents that he received the Court’s February 23, 2024 Order dismissing his
complaint and granting leave to amend (ECF No. 8.) on March 4, 2024 (ECF No. 9 at PageID
109.) Chandler’s deadline to file his Amended Complaint was March 15, 2024. (ECF No. 8 at

PageID 107-108.) Chandler filed the motion for extension on March 21, 2024. (ECF No. 9.)
Chandler represents that he requires an extension of time to file his Amended Complaint because
of reduced library hours, staff shortages, conflicts with library hours, and Chandler’s work
schedule. (See id. at PageID 111-112.) For good cause shown, the Motion for Extension of Time
(ECF No. 9) is GRANTED.
II. AMENDED COMPLAINT
Chandler filed his Amended Complaint on April 29, 2024 (ECF No. 11.) The Amended
Complaint is deemed timely filed. In the Amended Complaint, Chandler alleges that: (1) he was

2 The claims dismissed without prejudice are for: (1) gross negligence against HCCF
Defendants in their official capacities; and 2) for failure to protected against WTSP Defendants in
transferred from the West Tennessee State Penitentiary (the “WTSP”), in Henning, Tennessee, to
the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (the “HCCF”), in Whiteville, Tennessee, on May 14,
2022 (ECF No. 11 atPageID 134-143.) and (2) “3 other inmates…began attacking” Chandler with
a “6-inch homemade knife” when Chandler arrived at the HCCF (Id. at PageID 145.) Chandler’s

forty-nine-page Amended Complaint is construed to allege claims of (1) failure to protect (Id. at
PageID 124-171.); and (2) gross negligence (Id. at PageID 125-171.)
Chandler sues eight (8) Defendants: (1) WTSP Sergeant Robert Fine; (2) WTSP Lieutenant
F/N/U Ivory; (3) WTSP Sergeant F/N/U Jones; (4) WTSP Lieutenant F/N/U/ Macklin; (5) WTSP
Warden Johnny Fitz (Defendants (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) are referred to as the “WTSP
Defendants”); (6) HCCF Sergeant F/N/U/ Maynard; (7) HCCF Captain F/N/U/ Cochran; and (8)
HCCF Warden Hilton Hill, Jr. (Defendants (6) (7) and (8) are referred to as the “HCCF
Defendants”). Defendants (1) through (8) are referred to collectively as the “Individual
Defendants.” (Id. at PageID 124, 125-128.) Chandler sues the WTSP Defendants in their
individual capacity only. (Id. at PageID 125-128.) Chandler sues the HCCF Defendants in their

official capacity only. (Id.)
Chandler seeks: (1) service of process on the Defendants; (2) a jury trial; (3) fifty thousand
dollars ($50,000.00) in punitive damages from Fine, Ivory, Fitz, Jones, and Macklin; (4) fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000.00) in compensatory damages from Fine, Ivory, Fitz, Jones, and
Macklin; (5) ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) in punitive damages from Cochran, Hill, and
Maynard; (6) ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) in compensatory damages from Cochran, Hill, and
Maynard; and (7) other, further or general relief . (Id. at PageID 156-157.)
For the reasons explained below: (1) the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) is
DISMISSED WITH AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE; (2) leave to amend is DENIED; and (3) the
motions to set mediation (ECF No. 10) and for status of motion to amend (ECF No. 12) are
DENIED AS MOOT.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint —
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court
applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007).
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court accepts
the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the
allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations
are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported
by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides
guidance on this issue. Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It also requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
n.3.
Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted
by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011)
(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”

and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”
(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
IV. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER § 1983
Chandler sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 125.) To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
“Constitution and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting
under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Chandler alleges that, during his confinement at the WTSP “from 2010 until 2022”, he was
a member of the “Cicero Insane Vice Lord Nation.” (ECF No. 11 at PageID 128.) Chandler has

been a recorded member of this designated “[s]ecurity [t]hreat [g]roup” since 2001, when he
entered the WTSP.3 (Id.) Chandler describes the hostility between the Traveling Vice Lords
(“TVL”) and the Cicero Vice Lords (“CVL”) beginning around 2018, and the “clashes” between
them that had occurred throughout the Tennessee prison system and on the “streets.” (Id.)
Chandler estimates that those clashes caused at least twenty serious stabbing[s] and beatings inside
the Tennessee prison system and resulted in more than one hundred CVL members being placed
in administrative segregation at various prisons in Tennessee. (Id.)

3 It is unclear from the Amended Complaint whether Chandler’s use of 2001 was a
Chandler alleges that he and Defendant Fine had a conversation in 2019 about the hostility
between the two rival Vice Lord groups and three stabbing incidents in which TVL attacked CVL
at HCCF and Trousdale Turner Facility. (Id. at PageID 129.) Chandler alleges that the prison
system initially “took steps” to keep these two rival groups separated, but that “this did not last

long.” (Id.) Chandler alleges offenders throughout Tennessee are not properly screened before
being transferred to participate in institutional programs for offenders who suffer from drug
addiction or who have suffered an overdose. (Id.) Chandler alleges “incompatible” prisoners
participating in the drug program were kept at WTSP and allowed to remain on prison grounds
after completing the program because of institutional need. (Id. at PageID 130.)
Chandler alleges he was attacked by two TVL members, Leon Bell and Cordaro Hughes,
with metal pipes on May 3, 2020. (Id.) Chandler was able to fend off the attack without sustaining
“serious bodily injury” until six CVL members were able to chase the attackers away. (Id.) Bell,
one of Chandler’s attackers, asked prison authorities to place Bell in protective custody. (Id. at
PageID 132.) Chandler alleges that, on May 4, 2020, Defendant Fine and other officers came to

Chandler’s unit and “locked up” Chandler and nine members of his group. (Id.) Chandler alleges
that Hughes was locked up on the same day. (Id.) Chandler alleges he and the CVL members
with him were issued disciplinary infractions for: (1) participation in security threat group activity;
(2) possession of a weapon; and (3) assault with a weapon with the intention of creating violence.
(Id.) Chandler and five other CVL members were classified to maximum security. (Id.) “During
this time, [Bell and Hughes] were sent to [the WTSP’s] S[pecial] M[anagement] U[nit] Program.”
(Id.)
Chandler alleges that he left maximum security at the WTSP on May 5, 2022, after he had
completed a six-month step-down program. (Id.) Chandler alleges that he and five other members

of his group were to return to the main compound together, but that Warden Fitz refused to allow
them to return to the compound because a TVL chief, Johnny Peterson, had told Fine that Chandler
and other CVL would be seriously injured or killed if allowed to return to the WTSP main
compound. (Id. at PageID 133.) Chandler alleges Fine came to the “max unit” and informed all
CVL that they would not be released to the WTSP main compound until “Johnny Peterson and the

other members of TVL were transferred” to the HCCF. (Id.)
Chandler alleges that, on May 11, 2022, Fine told Chandler and another inmate that a “new
policy” required that they be “shipped” instead of being released to the WTSP main compound.
(Id.) While discussing the new policy, Fine told Chandler that Chandler could not be transferred
to Trousdale Turner, HCCF, or any other CoreCivic location because Fine and Warden Fitz had
sent Johnny Peterson and the “rest of the Traveling Vice Lords” to HCCF and Whiteville. (Id. at
PageID 134.) Fine said that “CoreCivic prisons were full of Traveling Vice Lords and that he was
well aware there was [sic] a large number of these enemy gang members at both Hardeman County
and Whiteville.” (Id.) Chandler alleges that he “expressed concerns for his safety in the event he
were sent to one of the CoreCivic facilities.” (Id.) Chandler alleges that “Fine assured [Chandler]

that [Fine] was well aware of the danger to [Chandler] and that due to those safety concerns, he
could not transfer [Chandler] to Hardeman County or Whiteville Correctional Facility.” (Id.)
Chandler alleges that Fine said an intelligence alert had been placed on Chandler and, as a result,
Chandler could not be transferred to Hardeman County or Whiteville. (Id.)
Chandler alleges that, on May 14, 2022, he “was told … he was being transferred to [the]
[HCCF].” (Id.) Chandler alleges that he “protested[,] refused to pack his belongings[,] [and] told
the property room officer that he could not go to Hardeman County because he had enemies at that
facility and, if he were to be transferred, it would place his life in danger.” (Id. at PageID 134-
135.) Chandler alleges that Ivory, Jones, and Macklin came to Chandler’s cell. (Id. at PageID

135.) Chandler alleges that as Ivory, Jones, Macklin, and Chandler were walking, Jones pulled
Chandler aside and told him in a hushed tone “they got around your [i]ntel alert.” (Id.) Chandler
alleges the intelligence alert in TDOC policy prohibits a prisoner from being transferred without
the prison commissioner’s express approval and shows that an inmate is a security risk or concern.
(Id.)

Chandler alleges Fine and Fitz manipulated safety protocols to avoid the intelligence alert
to have Chandler injured or killed. (Id.) Chandler alleges he could not have been transferred to
HCCF without Fitz’ approval and that Fitz’ approval could not have been given without Fitz
knowing an intelligence alert was active on Chandler that precluded Chandler’s transfer to HCCF
because his “enemies” were housed there. (Id. at PageID 135-136.) Chandler alleges that the
intelligence alert would have been placed on him around June 2020 and that it would have stated
Chandler should not be housed at any facility where there was a high number of TVL and that
Chandler should not be housed with Johnny Peterson.4
Chandler alleges that both Fitz and Fine “sought to have [Chandler] injured or killed
because [Chandler] had been a thorn in Fine’s side for many years.” (Id. at PageID 136.) Chandler

believes Fitz and Fine intentionally placed his life in danger because Chandler had been in more
than one hundred incidents ranging from disobedience to violence while at WTSP. (Id. at PageID
136-37.) Chandler alleges that there is a culture in the Tennessee prison system where guards and
administration engage in a “form of sadistic chess” to inflict physical injury and harm on state
prisoners by intentionally placing prisoners in or creating hostile living environments. (Id. at
PageID 137.)
Chandler alleges he told Ivory an intelligence alert had been placed on him, and he could
not be transferred to HCCF. (Id. at PageID 138.) Chandler alleges Ivory, Jones, and Macklin had

4 Chandler admits that he does not have access to the intelligence report, but claims to know
access to the intelligence alert and were prohibited from transferring him. (Id.) Chandler alleges
Ivory said he would call Fine to confirm. (Id. at PageID 139.) Chandler overheard a portion of
the conversation between Ivory and Fine through Chandler’s cell door. (Id.) When Ivory ended
his call with Fine, Ivory came back to Chandler’s cell to inform him Ivory was putting Chandler

on the bus to HCCF and that Chandler would only be on the HCCF compound for three days before
being transferred to RMSI to be placed in a staff position. (Id.) Chandler alleges that the only
reason to transfer him to HCCF, instead of directly to RMSI, is that Fine and Fitz were deliberately
attempting to have him injured or killed in violation of the intelligence alert. (Id.) Chandler alleges
he could only be transferred with the express approval of the commissioner or a coordinator at
HCCF, and that approval was not obtained. (Id.) Chandler alleges that “[e]ach of these officers,
including Lieutenant Ivory[,]” knew Chandler could not be transferred because it is an integral part
of their training and security protocols. (Id.) Chandler alleges that transferring him to HCCF,
where WTSP officials had previously sent Johnny Peterson and other TVL, was a deliberate effort
by WTSP “officials” to have Chandler injured or killed. (Id. at PageID 140.)

Chandler told Ivory that Chandler’s transfer was not going to work because Chandler
would not be able to protect himself with more than seventy-five rival gang members at HCCF
and that Chandler was likely to be attacked as soon as he set “foot on the compound.” (Id.) Ivory
told Chandler that if he did not pack up his belongings, Chandler would be abandoning his
property. (Id.) Chandler alleges Ivory deliberately refused to follow TDOC policy about the
intelligence alert and joined in the conspiracy with Fine and Fitz to have Chandler injured or killed.
(Id.)
Ivory and all other officers left for twenty minutes and then the “Lieutenant”5 returned
with six other officers armed with tasers and video cameras. (Id.) Jones unlocked Chandler’s cell
door and Jones, Macklin, and Ivory entered Chandler’s cell with tasers drawn. (Id. at PageID 141.)
Macklin ordered Chandler to submit to handcuffs or Chandler would be tased and extracted for

transport to HCCF. (Id.) Chandler complied. (Id.) Chandler alleges that both Macklin and Jones
knew or should have known they were violating TDOC policy about the intelligence alert, and that
they knew Chandler’s enemies were waiting for him at HCCF. (Id.) Chandler alleges Macklin
and Jones refused to protect Chandler and forced Chandler into a “kill-or-be-killed scenario.” (Id.)
Chandler alleges the officers could have called Fitz or the commissioner and objected to
Chandler’s transfer, but failed to do so. (Id.)
Chandler was transferred to intake and not allowed to take his personal property. (Id.)
Chandler was strip-searched, placed in restraints, and placed on the transportation bus with another
prisoner. (Id. at PageID 141-142.) Chandler alleges the WTSP “officials” knew Chandler and the
other prisoner were the subjects of an intelligence alert because they were separated on the

transport bus. (Id. at PageID 142.) A few hours later Chandler was transferred to a transportation
van at the DeBerry Special Needs Facility, a bus changeover area for TDOC. (Id.) Chandler
advised the officer driving the van that Chandler was concerned for his life and safety, and an
intelligence alert had been placed on him. (Id.) The officer told Chandler to speak with Maynard
when he arrived at HCCF. (Id.)
Chandler arrived at the HCCF around 5:00 p.m. on May 14, 2022. (Id.) At the HCCF
intake area, Chandler “explained to Sergeant Maynard that [my] life was in danger,” that an
intelligence alert had been placed on him, and that he could not be housed at HCCF due to the

5 Chander refers to Lieutenant Ivory in the surrounding paragraphs, but does not include a
number of TVL at HCCF. (Id. at PageID 143.) Maynard told Chandler that HCCF had recently
hired a new security threat group coordinator, but the new coordinator would not start until
Monday. (Id.) Chandler knew at that point how Fine was able to “get around” the intelligence
alert because there was no coordinator at HCCF to object to Chandler’s placement. (Id.) Chandler

told Maynard that Chandler “desperately needed to speak with someone, anyone, at the facility
that could help him.” (Id.) Maynard offered to call Cochran, who was the only officer present at
that time, but Cochran’s whereabouts were unknown. (Id.)
Maynard told Chandler he could not go into protective custody because a hearing was
required, and there was no one at HCCF who could conduct one. (Id. at PageID 143-144.)
Maynard told Chandler that punitive segregation was not available without a disciplinary
infraction and that, even if there were an infraction, no cells were available. (Id. at PageID 144.)
Chandler continued to tell Maynard that Chandler had an intelligence alert and could not be housed
at HCCF. (Id.) Maynard told Chandler, “There’s nobody here. [Y]ou’ll have to wait till (sic)
Monday.” (Id.) Chandler alleges Maynard could have contacted the nearby prison at Whiteville

to find a safe location or placed Chandler in punitive segregation despite Chandler’s stating that
Maynard told Chandler no cells were available. (Id.)
Chandler alleges “someone” had to “override” the security protocols and accept Chandler
at HCCF. (Id.) Maynard offered to take Chandler to the transit unit to wait, but because all of
those cells were full, Maynard placed Chandler in Cell 205. (Id.) After arrival at his cell, Chandler
alleges that he “spotted an old acquaintance in cell 110 and went down to speak with him. The
two men were in the cell for approximately five minutes when three other inmates [the
“Assailants”] rushed in and began attacking [Chandler] … with [a] 6-inch homemade knife …
[Chandler’s] acquaintance, who lived in the cell, was allowed to exit without being assaulted.”
(Id. at PageID 145 (the “Incident”).) Chandler and the Assailants engaged in a physical altercation.
(Id.)
A corrections officer placed a medical emergency call and escorted Chandler to the
HCCF’s clinic, where he received medical care. (Id. at PageID 146.) Chandler alleges that he

should have been transported to an outside hospital, but “transportation officers had went [sic] to
some nearby retirement party somewhere in the community and were inebriated and unable to
return.” (Id.) While waiting for transport in a hallway, Chandler alleges overhearing “radio
chatter” that approximately five life flights were landing at HCCF and Whiteville to transport drug
overdose prisoners to the hospital. (Id. at PageID 147.)
Chandler was transported to a hospital nine (9) hours later. (Id.) On arrival at the hospital,
a doctor examined Chandler’s wounds. The doctor told Chandler his wounds could not be stitched
because they had already begun to heal. (Id.)
Chandler alleges that he sustained leg “injuries” and “blows to his face” during the
Incident. (Id.) Chandler alleges that, as a result of the Incident, he now has temporomandibular

joint disorder (“TMD”), suffers from acute pain and jaw popping when he eats, and experiences
sporadic and uncontrollable aching in his jaw when at rest. (Id.) Because of the Incident, he has
a limp and experiences pain and weakness when walking. (Id.) Chandler has leg scars, pain in his
calf muscle, and an uncomfortable and restrictive tightening in his calf muscle because of injuries
he received during the Incident. (Id.)
Chandler alleges that he was charged with fabricated disciplinary violations because of the
Incident. (Id. at PageID 148.) Chandler alleges CoreCivic and TDOC have a practice of hiding
violence and disguising fentanyl overdoses as “offender illnesses” within their facilities to achieve
higher scores during audits to make their facilities “look better.” (Id.)
Chandler alleges that, on May 17, 2022, security officer Hurt at HCCF approached
Chandler’s segregation cell, admitted to Chandler that Chandler was not “suppose[d] to be at this
institution [HCCF]”, and told Chandler he would be on the next available transport bus to RMSI.
((Id. at PageID 148-149.) On May 19, 2022, Chandler was transferred to the RMSI. (Id. at PageID

149.) Chandler filed a grievance on May 20, 2022, about “his treatment by [WTSP] officials”, but
he has received no response. (Id.)
VI. ANALYSIS
A. GROSS NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST HCCF DEFENDANTS IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES

Chandler alleges that Hill was “grossly negligent” because he:
(1) “owed [Chandler] a statutory and constitutional duty to provide adequate health
care to [Chandler]… includ[ing] providing adequate and reasonable transportation
to an area hospital” (ECF No. 11 at PageID 155); and

(2) “he failed to provide the necessary transport officers…[b]ecause Warden Hill’s
transportation officers were allowed to drink alcoholic beverages while on call and
working under the color of state law. [Chandler’s] injuries [from the Incident] were
not treated in time.” (Id.)

Chandler alleges that Maynard was “grossly negligent” because she “owed [Chandler] a
state constitutional and statutory duty to protect him from the foreseeable risk to his life and
personal safety after being made aware of that risk, but failed to explore all options available in
order to avoid that risk when she knew that an active [i]ntelligence [a]lert prohibited [Chandler]
from being at [HCCF].” (Id. at PageID 153-154).
Chandler alleges that Cochran was “grossly negligent” because he “owed [Chandler] a state
constitutional and statutory duty to protect him from the foreseeable risk to his life and personal
safety. (Id. at PageID 154). Chandler alleges Cochran took no steps to ensure incoming prisoners
were “reasonably compatible” with current prisoners at HCCF and failed to ensure Chandler was
housed in a safe and secure cell. (Id.)
Chandler’s allegations that Maynard, Cochran, and Hill are guilty of gross negligence are
claims that they violated Tennessee law. (Id. at PageID 153-156.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “[i]f there is some basis for original jurisdiction, the default
assumption is that the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related

claims.” Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705, 716 (6th Cir.
2012) (quoting Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 892 (6th Cir. 1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Section 1367 grants district courts broad discretion in exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. See Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d
949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010). Courts should “weigh several factors, including ‘values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Id. at 951–52 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Chandler’s federal claims are being dismissed, and it is not in the interest of judicial
economy or comity for the Court to hear and determine Chandler’s state law claims. The Court
DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Chandler’s claims arising under Tennessee

law. Chandler’s state law claims against Maynard, Cochran and Hill in their official capacities are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
B. FAILURE TO PROTECT CLAIMS AGAINST WTSP DEFENDANTS IN
THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES

Chandler alleges that Fine “knew of the foreseeable risk to [Chandler’s] life and personal
safety that would result if [Chandler] were to be shipped to [HCCF].” (ECF No. 11 at PageID
150.) Fine knew of the intelligence alert that “forbade” Chandler’s transfer to HCCF. (Id.) Fine
knew of the “danger that awaited [Chandler] because Fine had personally sent the Chief of the
enemy gang and the rest of the Traveling Vice Lords, whom [Fine] knew where (sic) hostile
enemies of [Chandler].” (Id.) Fine “was deliberately indifferent to, and showed a reckless
Ivory to send [Chandler] to [the HCCF], where he knew rival gang members were housed and
would cause harm to [Chandler].” (Id.)
Chandler alleges Fitz “knew of the foreseeable risk to [Chandler’s] life and personal safety
that would result if [Chandler] were sent to [HCCF]. (Id.) “[A]s the final approving authority for

[Chandler’s] transfer, [Fitz] knew of the [i]ntelligence [a]lert that existed and forbade the transfer
of [Chandler] to [HCCF].” (Id.) Fitz “was deliberately indifferent to, and showed a reckless
disregard for [Chandler’s] safety, and failed to act reasonably in response to that danger when he
approved [Chandler’s] transfer to [HCCF][,] where he knew rival gang members were housed and
would cause harm to [Chandler].” (Id. at PageID 151.)
Chandler alleges that Ivory “knew of the foreseeable risk to [Chandler’s] life and personal
safety that would result if [Chandler] were to be shipped to the [HCCF].” (Id.) Ivory told Chandler
on May 14, 2022, that Chandler could not be transferred because of the intelligence alert that
forbade Chandler’s transfer to HCCF. (Id.) Ivory verified Chandler’s contentions with Fine within
Chandler’s hearing. (Id.) “Instead of adhering to the [i]ntelligence [a]lert …Ivory was deliberately

indifferent to, and showed a reckless disregard for [Chandler’s] safety, and failed to act reasonably
in response to that danger when he completely ignored all security protocols and the present danger
to [Chandler’s] life and safety and sent [Chandler] to [the HCCF][,] where he knew rival gang
members who were sent by WTSP officials were housed and would cause harm to [Chandler].”
(Id. at PageID 151-152.)
Chandler alleges that Jones “knew of the foreseeable risk to [Chandler’s] life and personal
safety that would result if [Chandler] were to be shipped to the [HCCF].” (Id.at PageID 152.)
Chandler told Jones on May 14, 2022, that Chandler could not be transferred because of the
intelligence alert that forbade Chandler’s transfer to HCCF. (Id.) Jones knew of the many

conversations Chandler and Fine had concerning Chandler’s incompatibility with Traveling Vice
Lords members. (Id.) Jones knew that Chandler was not supposed to be transferred and told
Chandler that the intelligence alert had been “circumvented” to place Chandler in “jeopardy.” (Id.)
“Jones was deliberately indifferent to, and showed a reckless disregard for [Chandler’s] safety,
and failed to act reasonably in response to that danger when he completely ignored all security

protocols and the present danger to [Chandler’s] life and safety and sent [Chandler] to [the
HCCF][,] where he knew rival gang members were housed and would cause harm to [Chandler].”
(Id.)
Chandler alleges that Macklin “knew of the foreseeable risk to [Chandler’s] life and
personal safety that would result if [Chandler] were to be shipped to the [HCCF]. (Id. at PageID
153.) Chandler told Macklin on May 14, 2022, that Chandler could not be transferred because of
the intelligence alert that forbade Chandler’s transfer to HCCF. Instead Macklin was deliberately
indifferent to, and showed a reckless disregard for that safety, and failed to act reasonably in
response to that danger when he assisted in extracting [Chandler] from his cell and under threat of
bodily injury, for the sole purpose of sending him to [the HCCF][,] where he knew rival gang

members were housed and would cause harm to [Chandler].” (Id.)
VII. FAILURE TO FOLLOW POLICY
Chandler’s allegations are liberally construed to allege the WTSP Defendants violated
TDOC policy by failing to follow the intelligence alert prohibiting his transfer. (See id. at PageID
149-156.) Even if the WTSP Defendants failed to follow TDOC policy, Chandler does not state a
claim of constitutional magnitude. An inmate’s allegation that correctional officials failed
to follow a correctional facility’s administrative policies does not by itself rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 580 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007). After the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995), mandatory language in prison

regulations does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Rienholtz
v. Campbell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 721, 728–30 (W.D. Tenn. 1999), aff'd, 198 F.3d 247 (6th Cir.
1999) (citing Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violating state laws or regulations. Lewellen
v. Metro. Gov't, 34 F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Storm v. Swiger, No. 4:07 CV 2387,

2007 WL 3171491, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2007) (finding a violation of a prison regulation is
not actionable under § 1983) (citing Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir.
1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995)).
Chandler does not have a constitutional right to have prison personnel follow TDOC’s policies.
1. FAILURE TO PROTECT
Chandler’s Amended Complaint against Fine, Ivory, Jones, Macklin, and Fitz in their
individual capacities (see id. at PageID 126-127.) for failure to protect, fails to allege facts stating
a claim to relief.
“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is
confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”6 Rhodes v. Michigan, 10 F.4th

665, 673 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). The Eighth
Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of ...
inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). A prison official is liable under the
Eighth Amendment for failure to protect an inmate when: (1) the deprivation alleged is,
objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the
inmate’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. For the objective prong, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Bishop v.
Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). For the subjective

6 Chandler was a convicted inmate at the time of the Incident. (See
https://foil.app.tn.gov/foil/details.jsp (TDOC website showing that Chander’s sixty-year sentence
prong, a plaintiff must show that a prison official “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed]” that risk. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837). See also Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff seeking to
assert an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect the plaintiff from other inmates “must
show that the prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk [of] serious

harm”).
Chandler fails to satisfy either prong of a claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to
protect.
a. EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S OBJECTIVE PRONG
Chandler alleges that he “now has TMJ (temporomandibular joint disorder) … [d]ue to the
blows [he] sustained to his face [during the Incident].” (ECF No. 11 at PageID 147.) Several
courts have held that temporomandibular joint disorder causes substantial pain and suffering and
can satisfy the objective prong under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Nelson v. Jong Choi, No.
15-13101, 2016 WL 8708468, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 6, 2016) (internal citations omitted).

Chandler, however, alleges no facts about the symptoms and pain, if any, from temporomandibular
joint disorder other than “acute pain” and “popping” when he chews, and “sporadic and
uncontrollable aching” in his jaw when at rest. (Id. at PageID 147.) There is nothing in the record
from which to infer that the vaguely alleged temporomandibular joint disorder “pain” that
Chandler alleges he suffers (see ECF No. 11 at PageID 147) qualifies as “substantial pain and
suffering” for the purpose of the Eighth Amendment’s objective prong. See Nelson, 2016 WL
8708468, at *4.
Chandler also alleges generally that he suffered leg injuries, “blows to his face”, and leg
scars, and that he limps. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 147.) Chandler alleges he experiences “pain and
weakness” when walking. (Id.) The complaint alleges no facts about, dates, diagnoses, or

treatments for the leg injuries, facial “blows”, leg scar, or “limp.” Without those facts, there is
nothing in the record from which to plausibly infer that such injuries are sufficiently serious for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment’s objective prong.
b. EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S SUBJECTIVE PRONG
Chandler alleges that: (1) he told Fine on May 11, 2022, that Chandler had “concerns for

his safety [if] he were sent to one of the CoreCivic facilities” (Id. at PageID 134.) Fine knew of
the “danger that awaited [Chandler] at [HCCF] because Fine had personally sent [Johnny Peterson]
and the rest of the Traveling Vice Lords” he knew were Chandler’s enemies to HCCF. (Id. at
PageID 150.); (2) Chandler told Ivory on May 14, 2022, that Chandler “could not go to [the HCCF]
because his life was in danger from rival gang members.” Chandler reminded Ivory that Chandler
had an intelligence alert and could not be transferred to a facility where Traveling Vice Lords and
Johnny Peterson were housed. (Id. at PageID 138).7; (3) Chandler told Jones on May 14, 2022,
that Chandler “could not be transferred to [the HCCF] because of the [i]ntelligence [a]lert” that
forbade his transfer to HCCF because his enemies had been transferred there. (Id. at PageID 152.);

(4) Chandler told Macklin on May 14, 2022, that Chandler “could not be transferred to [the HCCF]
because of the [i]ntelligence [a]lert” that forbade his transfer to HCCF because his enemies had
been transferred there. (Id. at PageID 153.); and (5) Fitz knew of the “foreseeable risk to
[Chandler’s] life and personal safety that would result if [Chandler] were to be shipped to
[HCCF].” (Id. at PageID 150.) Fitz knew of the intelligence alert that forbade the transfer of
Chandler to HCCF. (Id.) “[Fitz] also knew of the danger that awaited [Chandler] at [HCCF]
because he and Fine had personally sent [Johnny Peterson] and the rest of the Traveling Vice

7 Chandler does not allege that he told Macklin about particular risks to Chandler’s safety
from inmates at the HCCF. (See ECF No. 11 at PageID 141 (alleging only that Macklin entered
Lords” to HCCF and Fitz knew they were Chandler’s enemies.8 (Id. at PageID 151.) Chandler’s
allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s subjective prong.
“[A]n inmate’s communications about ‘generalized safety concerns’ or ‘vague concerns of
future assault by unknown individuals’ are insufficient to provide knowledge that the inmate is

subject to a substantial risk of serious harm …. ‘In failure to protect cases, a prisoner normally
proves actual knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials
about a specific threat to his safety. Mere negligence (for example if a prison guard should know
of a risk but does not) is not enough.’” Bradshaw v. Anucci, No. 9:23-cv-0602, 2023 WL 4744735,
at *18 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2023) (internal citations omitted). “A policy of permitting members of
different gangs to be housed together is not itself an Eighth Amendment violation. It ‘would place
an unmanageable burden on prison administrators were they required to separate inmates by
gangs.’ [A] [p]laintiff [must] show[] that [a defendant] had, or failed to act upon, particularized
information that plaintiff’s safety was at risk.” Castillo v. WCC Superintendent, No. 3:18-cv-
05796, 2020 WL 1033663, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2020) (internal citations omitted).

Chandler’s allegations about Fine, Ivory, Jones, Fitz, and Macklin’s alleged failure to
protect Chandler are materially similar to the plaintiff’s allegations in Gant v. Campbell, 4 Fed.
Appx. 254 (6th Cir. 2001). In Gant, the plaintiff, on learning of his impending transfer to another
facility, told the defendants that “he feared he would be in grave danger of attack by gang members
because his brother had been attacked at [the facility to which Gant was scheduled to be
transferred].” Gant, 4 Fed. Appx at 256. A year after his transfer, Gant was attacked by gang
members. Id. Gant held plaintiff had failed to state a cognizable claim for failure to protect

8 Chandler refers to “Fine” in this allegation, presumably in error. The allegation is in the
“Claims against Warden Johnny Fitz” section of the Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 11 at
because, “[a]lthough Gant expressed a general concern, he had not received any threats prior to
being transferred, nor did he identify any particular gang members whom he feared.” Id.
Chandler has alleged facts demonstrating that Fine, Ivory, Jones, Fitz, and Macklin knew
Chandler was a member of a particular gang but, as in Gant, Chandler has not alleged that the

Assailants were members of a gang, that the WTSP Defendants should have known Chandler
would unexpectedly be placed in cell 205 at the HCCF on May 14, 2022, or that the WTSP
Defendants should have known the Assailants would pose a risk of harm to Chandler.
The Amended Complaint does not allege the names of the Assailants, whether they were
affiliated with a gang, or that the WTSP Defendants had knowledge of risks the Assailants posed
to Chandler. The court in Moore v. Olsen found a plaintiff’s showing that he was randomly
assaulted insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. No. 17-2095, 2018 WL
4488910, at *2 (6th Cir. June 4, 2018); see Miller v. Turner, 26 F. App'x 560, 563-64 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that prison officials were not liable under the Eighth Amendment when the plaintiff
was randomly attacked by inmates who were not identified as potential security threats to him).

Chandler’s allegations about Fine, Ivory, Jones, Fitz, and Macklin do not, without more, establish
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
Chandler does not allege facts demonstrating Fine, Ivory, Jones, Fitz, or Macklin’s: (1)
subjective knowledge of a substantial risk that specific gang members at the HCCF would threaten,
harass, or assault Chandler; or (2) disregard of that alleged risk. The complaint’s allegations do
not satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s subjective prong for a claim of failure to protect.
Chandler’s claim of failure to protect against the WTSP Defendants in their individual
capacities is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief.
VIII. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA
The Sixth Circuit has held that a District Court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint
to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.
2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every other

circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to
amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see also
Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for
failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies
in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be
cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean,
of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua
sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree
with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged

by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts”).
Chandler has amended his claims previously in this cause. The Court DENIES leave to
amend again.
IX. APPELLATE ISSUES
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), it is
CERTIFIED that any appeal in this matter by Chandler would not be taken in good faith. If
Chandler nevertheless chooses to file a notice of appeal, he must either: (1) pay the entire $605
appellate filing fee or, if he is confined at that time, (2) submit a new in forma pauperis affidavit
and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust account statement for the last six months, in

compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b).
X. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
A. Chandler’s motion for extension of time (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED;
B. The Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Chandler’s state

law claims and those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
C. The Amended Complaint’s claims against the WTSP Defendants in their individual
capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in their entirety for failure to allege
facts stating a claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1)-(2);
D. Leave to amend is DENIED;
E. Because the Court has dismissed Chandler’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11),
Chandler’s Motion for Mediation (ECF No. 10) and Motion for Status of Motion
to Amend (ECF No. 12) are DENIED AS MOOT;
F. The Court CERTIFIES that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and DENIES

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal; and
G. This case is DISMISSED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 18th day of February, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801492. Public record. Not legal advice.