# State of Tennessee v. Robert King Vaughn, Jr.

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · February 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801193

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 18, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801193

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that “the facts surrounding the offense suggest[ed] the defendant realized his conduct was wrongful”

## Opinion text

02/18/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs January 22, 2025

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROBERT KING VAUGHN, JR.

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Trousdale County
No. 2019-CR-74 Brody N. Kane, Judge
___________________________________

No. M2024-00028-CCA-R3-CD
___________________________________

Defendant, Robert King Vaughn, Jr., appeals his convictions for attempted first degree
murder and aggravated rape, for which he received a total effective sentence of 120 years’
confinement. Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder; (2) no reasonable trier of fact
could find that he failed to establish the insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence;
and (3) the prosecutor engaged in improper argument by misstating Tennessee law and
vouching for witnesses during the State’s closing argument. Following a thorough review,
we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.
WEDEMEYER and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Kendall Stivers-Jones (on appeal), Assistant Public Defender—Appellate Division of the
Tennessee District Public Defender’s Conference; Shelley Thompson Gardner; District
Public Defender; and Kelly A. Skeen, Nick Clemmons, John A. Gholson, IV, and Sharon
J. Linville (at trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, Robert King
Vaughn, Jr.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Richard D. Douglas, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Jason Lawson, District Attorney General; and Ian Daniel Bratton and
Thomas H. Swink, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of
Tennessee.
OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural History

On August 30, 2019, Defendant, an inmate at the Trousdale Turner Correctional
Center (TTCC), assaulted, raped, and repeatedly stabbed a female counselor while the two
were inside her office. In connection with the offense, the Trousdale County Grand Jury
indicted Defendant for aggravated rape and attempted first degree premeditated murder
with serious bodily injury. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a notice of his intent to assert the
affirmative defense of insanity.

At trial, Chianne Golden, a former corrections officer at TTCC, testified that days
before August 30, 2019, she heard Defendant say that, if he was denied parole, he was
going to stab the victim. Ms. Golden stated that she wrote up Defendant after he threatened
to stab the victim.

On cross-examination, Ms. Golden agreed that Defendant also threatened to stab
her and Sergeant Anderson. She stated that Defendant told her he was not on his
medication; she said that she believed this because Defendant was “up all night” and not
acting like himself. Ms. Golden testified that she reported Defendant’s behavior to her
sergeant but that “[n]othing was done” to address the issue.

On redirect, Ms. Golden agreed that one reason Defendant could have been denied
medication at TTCC was the use of methamphetamine. Ms. Golden stated that she also
wrote up Defendant for misconduct, explaining that he was “grabbing his genital area in a
sexual manner” and that she “asked him to stop repeatedly and he did not.”

The victim1 testified that she had worked at TTCC as a mental health coordinator in
August 2019 and that, as part of her job, she had provided mental health therapy to
Defendant and other inmates. She said that Defendant had a care “level of two,” which
meant that he had a mental health diagnosis. The victim explained that on August 30, 2019,
she was in the process of moving out of her office in the Whiskey-Alpha pod into an office
in the Whiskey-Bravo pod when she had an unplanned encounter with Defendant. The
victim stated:

[Defendant] came to my door, and knocked on it, to talk about seeing
. . . the mental health psychiatric provider . . . for medication. I explained to
him that I could not give him a referral . . . because he was using at the time.
And so, . . . we discussed that. He was more than willing to attempt to get

1
It is the policy of this court to protect the identity of victims of sexual offenses.
-2-
clean that day. He wanted to bring me his drug paraphernalia. And so, he
left my office.

The victim explained that Defendant had been taken off his medication after a failed
drug test. She said that, when Defendant returned to her office, he sat down holding a book
and a coffee bag. She testified:

[Defendant] flipped through the book and it had . . . brown paper in it, which
was used to roll cigarettes, you know, and items they smoked. And the coffee
bag had a brand new light bulb in it, which was odd to me, because normally
the light bulb would have been used to smoke other drugs in it. I turned and
. . . got my, the trash bag or the trash out from under another table, and I
turned for him to drop it in it, I remember twisting the corner of the bag and
turning back around, and the next thing, [Defendant] was around my table,
and that’s when he hit me.

The victim testified that she did not remember much after “the first punch[.]” She
said that she recalled a nurse working on her and telling her that her pants had been
removed. She said she remembered “the sound of the life-flight helicopter” and water
“streaming down [her] face, when they stapled [her] . . . skin back together.”

The victim testified that she was taken to Vanderbilt University Medical Center
(“Vanderbilt”), where she stayed for twelve days after the assault. Regarding her injuries,
the victim stated, “They . . . had to remove my left eye, and they rebuilt the upper eye
socket, the lower eye socket, the right bottom floor. They had to redo my nose.” She
explained that she had stitches above her eyebrow and staples in her head. She said that
she still had scars from knife wounds on her cheek, chin, collarbone, arm, fingers, ear, and
neck. The victim recounted that she had undergone approximately seven surgeries and that
she had needed a tube placed in her chest because of a collapsed lung. She said that she
had permanent scarring on her face and suffered from migraines. The victim said that she
had been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder following the assault and that her
ability to concentrate and her memory had been impaired. She testified that she had a
master’s degree in counseling but that she was permanently disabled due to Defendant’s
assault and was not able to work.

The victim testified that she never consented to any sexual contact with Defendant.
She further testified that she had not been menstruating at the time of the assault and that
she had not had sexual contact with anyone in the week leading up to August 30, 2019.
She stated that she did not have large bruises on her thigh before the incident.

-3-
On cross-examination, the victim explained that “the reason [Defendant] needed to
get clean” was because the advanced practice nurse would not prescribe Defendant his
medication otherwise. The victim testified that, when speaking to Defendant immediately
prior to the attack, he did not express to her that he was having any “mental health issues[.]”

Monica Thames testified that, on August 30, 2019, she was working in the Whiskey-
Charlie pod at TTCC as the “pod officer.” She explained that she was not a corrections
officer but a case manager and that she was serving as the pod officer that day because the
facility was understaffed. Ms. Thames recalled that a “code” was called by the pod officer
in the Whiskey-Bravo pod. She said that she ran to the victim’s office in that pod, where
she saw the victim “lying on the floor in a puddle of blood.” Ms. Thames said that the
victim was not responsive. Ms. Thames testified that inmates in the pod began attacking
Defendant and that she “was trying to get them to stop and stand down and return to their
. . . bunk area.” She recalled that, as inmates moved away from Defendant, he ran out of
the pod. When Ms. Thames followed Defendant, he told her that he “didn’t do anything.”

On cross-examination, Ms. Thames testified that Whiskey Unit contained roughly
520 inmates and that they were divided into four pods, with each pod having one pod
officer. She said that each pod also had an office for a case manager. Regarding her role
as a case manager, Ms. Thames explained that she helped inmates “with their
programming, rehabilitative services, stuff like that.” Ms. Thames said that Defendant
complied with her orders after she followed him out of the pod.

Brooke Peterson testified that, at the time of the offenses, she was a licensed
practical nurse employed at TTCC as a “floor nurse” and mental health nurse. She recalled
that on August 30, 2019, she was passing out medication in Charlie Unit when she heard a
“man-down button pressed” and the victim “in distress.” Ms. Peterson stated that she ran
to the victim’s office in the Whiskey-Bravo pod and found her lying on the floor unclothed
from the waist down. She said that the victim had “a massive amount of bleeding coming
from her head and lower part of her body” and that she was “unrecognizable[.]”

Ms. Peterson described her assessment of the victim’s injuries as “life-threatening.”
She testified:

The most concerning injury was the lung puncture that [the victim]
had. She had her lungs filling up with blood. She had a hemopneumothorax
and, which is a massive hemorrhaging, which can cause death and, and can
be fatal within no time, unless treated. So, we immediately applied oxygen
to supplement her with oxygen. And applied intravenous fluids to
supplement for all the blood loss that she was having, because her blood
pressure was rapidly dropping to fatal rate.
-4-
She continued:

As soon as I got into the room, I alerted the officers to make sure they had
911 on the phone . . . and tell them to automatically have Air Evac in flight.
She had multiple stab wounds to the head, eyes, face; she had a lung puncture
and a few on the back and front, in front of her chest[.]

Ms. Peterson said that she saw blood coming out of the victim’s “vaginal area” and
on the victim’s inner thighs; she stated, “[T]here was a pretty good amount of blood, more
than usual, even if a woman was on her cycle, coming from her vaginal area.” Ms. Peterson
testified that she recovered a prison shank, or knife, from underneath the victim’s head.
She said that the shank was a curved piece of metal and made from the handle of a
wheelchair.

Ms. Peterson testified that, prior to the assault, she had helped with Defendant’s
mental health treatment. She said, however, that Defendant was non-compliant in taking
his medication “[m]ost of the time[.]” She testified:

He either just didn’t want to take it. He didn’t want to get out of bed
to take his medicine or he was an avid drug user, so that made non-
compliance, because we would have to take their medication away for 90
days at a time, until they could prove that they were sober. Because it would
cause adverse reactions if they were doing drugs on top of taking mental
health medications.

On cross-examination, Ms. Peterson testified that TTCC was not a facility where
employees could force inmates to take medication. She explained, “They can refuse up to
three times, and then we do counseling. But if they choose not to take the medication, we
can’t make them.” She said that counselors would explain to inmates “what could be the
adverse reactions of not taking . . . medication.” She said that the victim had been
counseling Defendant to make sure he was stable while not taking his medication. She
recalled that Defendant had been off his medication because he had tested positive for
methamphetamine use.

Meredith Boggs, a registered nurse, testified that she worked as a sexual assault
nurse examiner, or SANE, at Vanderbilt. She stated that, on the evening of August 30,
2019, she was consulted to see the victim. Ms. Boggs said that, when she entered the
victim’s hospital room and introduced herself, she noted that the victim had “severe
physical trauma” such that she was surprised the victim was conscious and able to
communicate.

-5-
Ms. Boggs testified that, after the victim consented to an exam, she took
photographs of the victim’s injuries, completed a full physical assessment, and documented
her findings. She noted that the victim denied any recent sexual activity within the past
five days. The victim told Ms. Boggs that she lost consciousness during the attack but
recalled being hit “five to six times in the face[.]” Ms. Boggs stated that she documented
sixteen injuries to the victim’s head alone—twelve of which were deep puncture-type
wounds.

Regarding the victim’s pelvic exam, Ms. Boggs testified that she found no injury
internally or externally that she could visualize. She noted, however, that there was a small
amount of blood in the victim’s vagina and what appeared to be dried blood on her inner
thighs. Ms. Boggs stated she believed the blood was the result of “microabrasions” to the
vagina; she said that, although such abrasions cannot be seen with the naked eye, they
produce bleeding. Regarding the blood on the victim’s inner thighs, Ms. Boggs noted that
the victim had no lacerations to her legs. She stated that she “had no reason to suspect that
that blood was derived from anywhere else. It seemed that it was what . . . was coming
from her vagina, where it was found to be bleeding.” Ms. Boggs testified that she collected
vaginal and oral swabs from the victim as part of the examination.

Ms. Boggs stated that the victim’s vaginal bleeding was consistent with forced
penetration. She testified, “Usually when there’s forced penetration, there is lack of
lubrication, and there’s also, so the tissues are not relaxed, the muscles, the tissue is not
relaxed, and so that forced penetration will cause bleeding in the microabrasions that I
referred to.” Ms. Boggs said that she also documented bruising to the victim’s right inner
thigh, which was also a sign of forced penetration. Ms. Boggs recalled that she asked the
victim if she had any physical pain to the genital region and that the victim “did complain
of physical pain. And [the victim] also said . . . that she had vaginal pressure.” Ms. Boggs
explained that victims of sexual assault often describe vaginal pain, pressure, or fullness
when asked about any sensation post-assault. She said that the victim’s description of
vaginal pressure was consistent with forced penetration.

Ms. Boggs recalled that the victim had been air-lifted to Vanderbilt as a Level 1
trauma, which Ms. Boggs described as “the most severe.” She described the victim’s
injuries as life-threatening. Ms. Boggs testified that she conducted the examination at
approximately 10:00 p.m. on August 30, 2019, about four hours after the assault.

Ramon Sherrell testified that he worked as a Special Agent in Charge for the
Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) and that he investigated criminal and
administrative matters within the department. He said that on August 30, 2019, he
responded to TTCC after the victim had been life-flighted to Vanderbilt. He said that he
gathered evidence, including surveillance video footage from inside the Whiskey-Bravo
-6-
pod. This surveillance video footage was entered as an exhibit to his testimony and shown
to the jury. Agent Sherrell explained that the windows of the victim’s office had been
covered because the office was located next to the inmate showers. He said that the
surveillance video showed Defendant entering the victim’s office at 5:55 p.m. and sitting
down across from the victim at her desk. He said that the initial meeting lasted about thirty
minutes and that the door to the victim’s office remained open the entire time. The video
then showed Defendant getting up and leaving the office to go upstairs; when Defendant
returned to the office, he entered and shut the door behind him. Agent Sherrell noted that
Defendant was carrying a book and a coffee bag. Agent Sherrell testified that the video
next showed Defendant’s walking around the victim’s desk and striking her several times.
He testified, “And if you look at the very bottom, you can see [Defendant’s] movements.
[The victim] is laying on the floor at this time. As she testified to, she got knocked out.”

Agent Sherrell testified that, at the time of the assault, inmates were having dinner
and that it was a “very loud” environment inside the pod. Agent Sherrell recounted from
the video:

[Defendant’s] about to look out the window to see if anybody’s
watching or has seen what was going on. And when he realizes no one’s
watching, he goes back.

....

So, [Defendant] gets up, comes to the door, walks out, and he walks
along the back wall.

....

You will see his movement to that trash can after the sink area. This,
this is [Defendant] and he throws something away inside the trash can. It
was . . . later found to be his blue shirt that he was wearing when he initially
walked into this room. And it had blood splatter and blood stains on it, as
well as his ID card that says [Defendant’s name] and his TDOC number.

....

[Defendant] just reentered the office to grab his books and papers and he
walks behind the desk, to look at [the victim], who’s lying on the floor. And
then, he exits and closes the door.

-7-
Agent Sherrell testified that other inmates began attacking Defendant and that
Defendant took off his shirt to show that he did not have any weapons; Agent Sherrell
noted, however, Defendant had a knife sheath wrapped around his chest. Agent Sherrell
said that Defendant was also later assaulted by a staff member at TTCC and that Defendant
suffered broken ribs and a punctured lung. He testified that there was a pending federal
investigation into the staff member’s assault of Defendant.

Agent Sherrell said that, after viewing the surveillance video, he conducted
interviews, photographed the scene, put a “mail cover” on Defendant’s mail, spoke with
nurses and prison staff, collected evidence, and obtained a DNA sample from Defendant.
Agent Sherrell said that he also interviewed Defendant around 1:00 a.m. on August 31,
2019. Agent Sherrell said that, after reading Defendant his Miranda rights, Defendant
waived his rights and agreed to speak to him. He said that he noticed blood on Defendant’s
hands during the interview, so he swabbed Defendant’s hands for DNA evidence.

In the recorded interview, which was played for the jury, Defendant began by
stating:

It wasn’t my fault. It wasn’t like I was controlling my hand. It wasn’t
like I was so mad at her that I want to hurt her. It’s, that’s something I’ve
been having. I went to her to get help for, I hear voices and see things. I
have depression, anxiety, and OCD. And I was, I sat there for quite a while
explaining to her the symptoms I’ve been having and telling her that, you
know, I’ve been having thoughts, bad thoughts, and seeing, I’ve been going
through a lot.

Defendant claimed that “what happened with” the victim was the result of his
“problems with mental health.” He admitted that he had stabbed the victim but claimed
that he “wasn’t in control” and that it “wasn’t like [he] was actually doing it . . . when it
started happening.”

Defendant admitted that he used methamphetamine three to four hours before he
attacked the victim. He admitted that he had used methamphetamine previously, and he
said that, when he used it, he would remove his clothes and “touch” himself. Defendant
told Agent Sherrell that he “kept trying to quit drugs” but would only be able to do so for
two days or so. Defendant continued, “[B]ut mixed with mental health, I guess it’s a bad
combination cause I’ve been hearing influencing voices trying to tell me, you know, to do
stuff and I, I resist and I resist, but my, I don’t know.” Defendant suggested that he may
have taken some “bad drugs” on the day of the offense.

-8-
When Agent Sherrell asked Defendant if he was taking medication, Defendant
stated:

I wish. I need Zyprexa. I’ve been taking it eight years. I’ve been off
it two months. It’s been getting worse and worse. Hearing voices, seeing
things. My OCD has really been acting up. Depression from nowhere.
That’s what I was going to see [the victim] about, trying to get back on my
meds.

Defendant claimed that, while in the victim’s office, he told the victim that he had
been hearing voices. He said that, as he was giving the victim the rolling papers and light
bulb, he began thinking about giving her his needles too so that he would not be tempted
to use drugs again. Defendant said that, during those thoughts, “It start[ed] . . . the
stabbing.” Defendant admitted that he had obtained a knife in the days before the assault
and that he had concealed it in a sheath, which he hung around his neck with a shoestring
under his shirt. He claimed that he had the knife for his own protection, but he admitted
that he had made a statement before the assault that he wanted to stab Sergeant Anderson
if he did not make parole. Defendant denied saying that he wanted to stab the victim and
Ms. Golden. He claimed that he was not angry with the victim before he went into her
office, and he did not recall her saying anything to upset him.

Defendant told Agent Sherrell that he had paranoid schizophrenia, which caused
him to hear voices and see things, and that he usually resisted when the voices told him to
do things. Defendant admitted that he pulled down the victim’s pants and underwear but
claimed that he did not know why he did it. Defendant acknowledged that he “violated”
the victim by pulling down her pants and touching her hair. He denied raping the victim
but said that he remembered being on top of her. He said that he did not recall pulling
down his own pants but acknowledged that he later needed to fix the drawstring on his
pants.

Defendant claimed that he had previously heard voices, which had made him
unstable; he said, however, that he was not hearing voices during the interview with Agent
Sherrell. Defendant repeatedly expressed remorse for the victim’s injuries and asked if the
victim was “okay.” He told Agent Sherrell that he “hate[d] that this happened,” that he
prayed that the victim was “alright,” and expressed gratitude that the victim was still alive.

Agent Sherrell testified that, as part of his investigation, he submitted numerous
items of evidence to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Crime Laboratory,
including the sexual assault examination kit collected by the SANE nurse at Vanderbilt.
When asked about his reference to a “mail cover,” Agent Sherrell testified:

-9-
Inmates inside of a prison send and receive mail regularly. And if
they are under investigation by me, I put a mail cover on them. Which
basically means that when an inmate sends mail or an inmate receives mail,
the prison copies that mail, that is not legal, legal mail, such as attorney/client
privilege mail, we do not copy that type of mail.

Agent Sherrell said that, during the use of the mail cover, he discovered a letter
written by Defendant in June 2021 to another inmate that contained statements about the
events of August 30, 2019. In the letter, which Agent Sherrell read to the jury, Defendant
claimed that he had “psych meds” but that his medication had been stopped “for a while”
after he failed a drug test. He said that Defendant admitted to purchasing the knife about
a week before the attack, and he said that he was “smoking,” “snorting,” and “shooting”
methamphetamine. He said that methamphetamine was a “sexual drug for [him]” and that
he “got into the habit of stripping down naked and flashing female guards.” Defendant
claimed that he “started getting verbal messages” from his knife; he said that the knife told
him to kill certain people but that it told him “not to kill anyone until [he] had gone up for
. . . parole.” Defendant claimed that he “almost killed a punk the day before the incident”
but that he “told him that it’s not the time for that crazy yet” because he “had parole the
next day.”

Defendant wrote that he was denied parole and told that he would start serving his
five-year sentence in August 2021. He commented, “When I heard that, I knew I didn’t
even want to live that long.” Defendant said that, after being denied parole, he went to the
victim’s office and tried to resume his medication. He said that he “was going to try one
last time to get back on . . . Zyprexa” and then he was going to “go down the list” of people
he was going to kill. Defendant said that he gave the victim his drug contraband to show
her that he was trying to quit drugs. He claimed that the victim told him that he sounded
“like a junkie begging for dope.” Defendant said that, after giving the victim the drug
contraband, he “reached under [his] shirt and started stabbing” the victim “in the head.”
Defendant claimed that he “saw it happen before it happened.” He claimed not to
remember where he stabbed the victim but only to remember that he was not “in control.”
Defendant admitted to pulling down the victim’s pants, but he claimed not to remember
whether he raped her. Defendant further admitted that he did not think that he was “capable
of such evil and violence.” He said that he saw “there was blood everywhere” once he
“came to [his] senses.”

Agent Sherrell testified that Defendant’s parole hearing was held hours before the
attack and that Defendant was denied parole. He testified that Defendant was seen by
Trousdale Medical before his interview and that, after the interview, Defendant was taken
to Riverbend Maximum Security Institution and then transported to Skyline Medical
Center for further treatment. Agent Sherrell agreed that Defendant had been prescribed
- 10 -
Zyprexa while at TTCC and that Defendant had been taken off the medication after he
failed a drug screen.

Gabriel Mendes Vasquez testified that he was incarcerated at TTCC on August 30,
2019. He said that he had just finished exercising and was going upstairs in the Whiskey-
Bravo pod when he saw through “a little square” on the door to the victim’s office “a white
leg” and “somebody’s butt.” Mr. Vasquez testified that it looked like someone was having
sex inside the office and that he saw one person on top of another. He agreed that
Defendant was on top of the victim, moving in a “thrusting motion” and that he thought
Defendant and the victim were having sex. Mr. Vasquez testified that he was surprised
and thought “wow, what a lucky man. That’s incredible, incredible.” Mr. Vasquez testified
that Defendant “kind of turned around and looked at [him]” and that Mr. Vasquez kept
going up the stairs. He said that he told his friends what he saw happening in the victim’s
office and that they “couldn’t believe it.” Mr. Vasquez recalled that, as he and his friends
started down the stairs, Defendant “came running upstairs” with specks of blood on his
face. He stated that he and another inmate went to inform Officer Bass what was
happening.

On cross-examination, Mr. Vasquez explained that inmates were allowed to move
from pod to pod within Whiskey unit. Regarding the windows in the victim’s office, Mr.
Vasquez said that there were two windows but that they were covered. He said that he
looked through “a clear, small square” on one of the windows.

Stacy Flemming testified that he had been an inmate housed in the Whiskey-Bravo
pod at TTCC on August 30, 2019, and that he had been friends with Defendant. Mr.
Flemming said that he arrived at TTCC in December 2018 and that he met Defendant upon
his arrival. He said that Defendant “wasn’t gang related or anything and he wasn’t any
type of trouble[.]” Mr. Flemming said that because he and Defendant were housed in the
same pod, he saw Defendant daily and that he became friends with Defendant because
Defendant did not cause him “any kind of stress [or] trouble.”

Regarding the incident on August 30, 2019, Mr. Flemming stated that he had
witnessed Defendant’s coming into the pod with some paperwork in his hand and that
Defendant then went into the victim’s office. Mr. Flemming explained that he had been
watching Defendant because he had been wanting to talk to Defendant about something.
Mr. Flemming said:

And I seen [Defendant], I thought maybe [the victim] had him doing
some kind of therapeutic exercise, you know, because he would be up one
second and me and him made eye contact. He frowned up, and you know,

- 11 -
he’d go down and come back up. And I thought maybe she had him doing
some kind of therapeutic exercise, until I realized what had happened.

Mr. Flemming testified that, after Defendant exited the victim’s office, Defendant
went into the bathroom and changed his shirt. He said that Defendant “came out and he
put his shirt and ID in the trash can.” He testified that he had spoken to Defendant daily
and that his last interaction with Defendant was on the day before the attack. Mr. Flemming
testified that Defendant was “highly intelligent,” and he described Defendant’s day-to-day
behavior as “normal.”

TBI Special Agent Kenna Icet, an expert in forensic biology, stated that she tested
several items of evidence in connection with Defendant’s case. Agent Icet said that she
first tested the victim’s belt for blood and DNA. She said that the DNA profile found on
the belt was consistent with the victim’s but that, due to the limited minor contributor
profile obtained, “interpretation of the minor contributor profile [was] deemed to be
inconclusive.” Agent Icet testified that she performed a presumptive test for semen on the
victim’s pants, underwear, and vaginal swabs, which did not indicate the presence of
semen. She said that it would lower the likelihood of discovering sperm if a person did not
ejaculate; she further explained that blood from the victim’s vagina could have removed
any sperm. Agent Icet stated that the victim’s vaginal swab did not include enough DNA
for her to generate a profile and that the presence of blood could make it difficult to develop
a DNA profile. She stated that she also tested the knife found by the victim’s head and
determined that the victim’s blood was on the handle.

Patricia Stallings, Defendant’s mother, testified that Defendant began taking
Zyprexa after high school and that he was prescribed the medication for “at least” twenty
years. She said that Defendant hallucinated and was “restless” and “fidgety” when he was
not on the medication. Ms. Stallings recalled one occasion when Defendant was off his
medication, stating:

[W]e [were] driving around, and [Defendant] was, Momma, look, in that car
over there, it’s aliens, aliens. I said . . . [t]here’s nothing over there, and he
would be kind of like running from them. He was, that day, he was running
from them. He was just trying to get away.

Ms. Stalling said that Defendant was a “totally different person” when he was on
the medication and that he did not experience the hallucinations and restlessness. Ms.
Stallings agreed that Defendant sometimes chose not to take his medication. She testified
that she was unaware if Defendant’s use of illicit drugs ever caused him to hallucinate.

- 12 -
Following deliberations, the jury found Defendant guilty as charged. The trial court
sentenced Defendant, as a career offender, to consecutive terms of sixty years for attempted
first degree murder and sixty years for aggravated rape, for a total effective sentence of 120
years’ confinement.

Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was denied in a written order
following a hearing. This timely appeal follows.

II. Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the evidence

Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support
his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Defendant argues that no rational trier of
fact could have found that he had the necessary premeditation and intentional mens rea for
attempted first degree murder. He asserts that there was “not enough evidence to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant prepared for the assault in advance or that it was
his conscious objective or desire to kill” the victim. Defendant contends that the proof is
sufficient only to show that he acted knowingly, and he asks this court to vacate his
conviction and remand for entry of a judgment reflecting a conviction for attempted second
degree murder. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant’s
conviction for attempted first degree murder as the proof amply establishes that Defendant
acted with premeditation.

Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). Questions
of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and weight of the evidence are resolved by the fact
finder. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). This court will not reweigh the
evidence. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. Our standard of review “is the same whether the
conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d
370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

A guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence, replacing it with a
presumption of guilt. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914
(Tenn. 1982). On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of proving why the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction, Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659, and the “State must be
afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).
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A person commits criminal attempt when, acting with the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the offense, he “[a]cts with intent to cause a result that is an element
of the offense, and believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the
person’s part[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101(a)(2) (2019). First-degree premeditated
murder is the unlawful, intentional, and premeditated killing of another. Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 39-13-201, -202(a)(1) (2019). Premeditation is defined as “an act done after the exercise
of reflection and judgment. ‘Premeditation’ means that the intent to kill must have been
formed prior to the act itself.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(e) (2019). However, the
purpose to kill need not exist in the mind of the accused “for any definite period of time.”
Id. “The mental state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must
be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free
from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.” Id.

To determine an accused’s mental state at the time of the decision to kill, courts
frequently look to the circumstances surrounding the killing to ascertain if the proof is
sufficient to support a finding of premeditation. See State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 108
(Tenn. 2006); State v. Jackson, 173 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tenn. 2005). Circumstances
indicative of premeditation may include the use of a deadly weapon on an unarmed victim;
lack of provocation by the victim; declarations of an intent to kill; the failure to render aid
to the victim; facts indicative of a motive to kill the victim; the particular cruelty of the
killing; the procurement of a weapon prior to the killing; preparations to conceal the crime
before the crime is committed; destruction or secretion of evidence of the killing; and
calmness immediately after the killing. See State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 222 (Tenn.
2005); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is sufficient to
support Defendant’s conviction for attempted first degree premediated murder as any
rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted
intentionally and with premeditation. First, the State offered proof that Defendant made
statements that he was going to stab the victim, Ms. Golden, and Sergeant Anderson if he
was denied parole. Defendant’s parole was denied on August 30, 2019, and he carried out
his threat on the victim later that evening. Additionally, that Defendant intended to kill the
victim can be reasonably inferred from the number and location of the victim’s stab
injuries. Defendant repeatedly stabbed the victim in the face, head, and neck. Ms. Boggs
testified that the victim had life-threatening injuries, including twelve deep puncture
wounds to her head alone.

Other facts from which the jury could have reasonably inferred premeditation
include Defendant’s procurement of a weapon, his unprovoked attack on an unarmed
victim, his failure to render aid to the victim, and his secretion of evidence after the attack.
Defendant admitted both to Agent Sherrell and in his letter to an inmate that he had
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purchased the knife several days before the attack. After leaving the door open in his first
meeting with the victim, Defendant returned to her office with the knife and closed the
door. The victim was unarmed, and she did not provoke Defendant. After repeatedly
stabbing the victim, Defendant did not render aid to the victim nor did he alert any of the
guards or other inmates that the victim needed medical assistance. Instead, Defendant
began secreting evidence of his attack. Defendant dropped his bloody shirt and
identification badge into a trash can and then attempted to wash blood off his hands at the
sinks. He then returned to the victim’s office to retrieve some of his items that he had left
there.

In his brief, Defendant argues that a knowing mens rea more aptly fit the “out-of-
body experiences” that he described when attacking the victim. However, the jury was
free to disregard Defendant’s explanation of the offense; it is the role of the jury to assess
credibility, and it is not the role of this court to reassess the jury’s credibility
determinations. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. Clearly, by its verdict, the jury rejected
Defendant’s claim that he was not in control of his actions, as was its prerogative.

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for
attempted first degree premediated murder and that he is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Insanity defense

Defendant next asserts that he presented clear and convincing evidence that he “met
the two criteria for the affirmative defense of insanity[.]” Defendant argues that no
reasonable jury could have had any serious or substantial doubt that he suffered from a
severe mental disease or defect at the time of the offenses and was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his acts. The State responds that the jury reasonably rejected Defendant’s
insanity defense.

With respect to Defendant’s insanity claim, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-
11-501 provides:

(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature or
wrongfulness of the defendant’s acts. Mental disease or defect does not
otherwise constitute a defense. The defendant has the burden of proving the
defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.

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(b) As used in this section, “mental disease or defect” does not include
any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.

(c) No expert witness may testify as to whether the defendant was or
was not insane as set forth in subsection (a). Such ultimate issue is a matter
for the trier of fact alone.

“[A]ppellate courts in Tennessee should reverse a jury verdict rejecting the insanity
defense only if, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no
reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant’s insanity at the time of
the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence.” State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d
540, 554 (Tenn. 2002). This standard of review is similar to the reasonableness standard
reviewing courts apply when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence; appellate courts
“should consider all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the [S]tate in
determining whether the jury appropriately rejected the insanity defense.” Id. When the
evidence is disputed, this court will “rarely reverse a jury’s rejection of the insanity defense
under this deferential standard of review.” Id. at 556.

The defendant has the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of insanity. Id.
at 554. The Tennessee Supreme Court has “explicitly reject[ed] the notion that the State
must rebut defense proof of insanity with substantial evidence.” Id. “In determining
whether a defendant is insane, a jury is entitled to consider all the evidence offered,
including the facts surrounding the crime, the testimony of lay witnesses, and expert
testimony.” Id. at 556. In determining the defendant’s mental status at the time of the
alleged crime, the trier of fact may look to the evidence of his actions and words before,
at, and immediately after the commission of the offense. State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607,
616 (Tenn. 1995); Humphreys v. State, 531 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
“Where there is a conflict in the evidence, the trier of fact is not required to accept expert
testimony over other evidence and must determine the weight and credibility of each in
light of all the facts and circumstances of the case.” Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 554 (citing
Edwards v. State, 540 S.W.2d 641, 647 (Tenn. 1976)). It is not the role of this court to
reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the jury’s credibility determinations. Id.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that
a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant’s insanity at the time of the offenses
was not established by clear and convincing evidence. See id. In unsworn statements made
to Agent Sherrell in his interview, Defendant claimed that he suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia, but Defendant did not present any expert testimony to establish that he had
been diagnosed with schizophrenia or that schizophrenia qualified as a severe mental
disease or defect. Although the victim testified that Defendant had a care “level of two,”
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which meant that he had a mental health diagnosis; she did not identify Defendant’s
diagnosis, and she said that Defendant did not express having any mental health issues the
day of the attack. Defendant’s mother testified that Defendant had taken Zyprexa for about
twenty years, but she did not testify as to why he was prescribed Zyprexa; she only stated
that she believed he hallucinated when he was off the medication. While Defendant
claimed to experience hallucinations and to hear voices, he also admitted to using
methamphetamine, and he acknowledged that his drug use, in combination with mental
health issues, caused him to hear voices. Thus, we agree with the State that Defendant fell
well short of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a severe
mental disease or defect.

Moreover, Defendant failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
he was unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of his actions due to a severe mental
disease or defect. In his interview with Agent Sherrell, Defendant acknowledged that it
was wrong to stab the victim and to sexually assault her. Defendant expressed remorse,
stating that he “hate[d] that this happened,” and he repeatedly expressed his hope that the
victim was “alright.” He also acknowledged that he violated the victim by pulling down
her pants and touching her hair.

As noted by the State, this court has repeatedly concluded that a defendant’s
statements acknowledging wrongdoing and expressions of remorse support a rejection of
an insanity defense. In State v. Colvett, this court relied in part on the defendant’s
statements that he regretted killing the victim and that he knew that killing the victim was
wrong to affirm the rejection of an insanity defense. 481 S.W.3d 172, 198 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2014); see also Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 909, 912 (stating that a finder of fact may rely
upon the “words of the defendant . . . after the commission of the offense” when concluding
that a defendant failed to establish insanity by clear and convincing evidence). As in
Colvett and Holder, Defendant’s expressions of remorse and acknowledgement of
wrongdoing after his attack on the victim suggest that Defendant was aware of the nature
or wrongfulness of his actions and, therefore, support the jury’s rejection of an insanity
defense.

Additionally, Defendant’s actions before and after his assault on the victim
demonstrate that he appreciated the nature or wrongfulness of his actions. When Defendant
returned to the victim’s office with his drug paraphernalia, he closed the door, thereby
limiting the ability of others to see inside the office. Then, during the attack, Defendant
looked out the small window at the door to the office to see if anybody was watching or
had seen what he was doing. Defendant left the office shortly after making eye contact
with Mr. Vasquez, and then he immediately attempted to conceal evidence of the crime by
throwing away his bloody shirt and identification badge and washing his hands. Based
upon Defendant’s efforts to conceal the crime, the jury could have reasonably inferred that
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he was aware of the wrongfulness of his actions. See Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 556 (observing
that “the facts surrounding the offense suggest[ed] the defendant realized his conduct was
wrongful”).

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury
could have found that Defendant’s insanity at the time of the offenses was not established
by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, Defendant is not entitled to relief.

C. Improper prosecutorial argument

Defendant contends that the prosecutor engaged in improper argument in closing by
misstating Tennessee law and vouching for witnesses. Specifically, Defendant asserts that
that the prosecutor improperly told the jury during closing argument that voluntary
intoxication by methamphetamine negated the affirmative defense of insanity, inquired as
to whether Defendant should be given “license” to commit offenses merely because he was
hallucinating, vouched for the State’s witnesses by calling them “heroes,” and compared
Defendant to a Nazi. Defendant acknowledges that he did not object to any of the alleged
improper arguments and that he did not raise this issue in his motion for new trial. He
maintains, however, that he is entitled to relief via plain error. The State responds that
Defendant has not established all the requisite factors for plain error relief.

A trial court has wide discretion in controlling the course of arguments and will not
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 156 (Tenn. 2001).
Closing argument by a prosecutor “is a valuable privilege that should not be unduly
restricted.” State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 425 (Tenn. 2001). That said, Tennessee courts
have recognized numerous prosecutorial arguments as improper. It is improper for a
prosecutor to engage in derogatory remarks, appeal to the prejudice of the jury, misstate
the evidence, or make arguments not reasonably based on the evidence. State v. Banks,
271 S.W.3d 90, 131 (Tenn. 2008). “A criminal conviction should not be lightly overturned
solely on the basis of the prosecutor’s closing argument.” Id. Rather, “[a]n improper
closing argument will not constitute reversible error unless it is so inflammatory or
improper that i[t] affected the outcome of the trial to the defendant’s prejudice.” Id.

In State v. Goltz, 111 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), this court listed five
general areas of improper prosecutorial argument during closing: (1) intentionally
misstating the evidence or misleading the jury as to the inferences it may draw; (2)
expressing a personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of the evidence or
defendant’s guilt; (3) making statements calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices
of the jury; (4) injecting broader issues than the guilt or innocence of the accused; and (5)
intentionally referring to or arguing facts outside the record that are not matters of common
public knowledge.
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“In determining whether statements made in closing argument constitute reversible
error, it is necessary to determine whether the statements were improper and, if so, whether
the impropriety affected the verdict.” State v. Pulliam, 950 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1996). In Judge v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976), this court
listed the following factors to be considered when determining whether the improper
argument of a prosecutor affected the verdict to the prejudice of the defendant:

1. The conduct complained of viewed in context and in light of the facts and
circumstances of the case.

2. The curative measures undertaken by the court and the prosecution.

3. The intent of the prosecutor in making the improper statement.

4. The cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the
record.

5. The relative strength or weakness of the case.

Id.

In this case, Defendant failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to any of the
alleged improper arguments. The Tennessee Supreme Court has previously stated that “[i]t
is incumbent upon defense counsel to object contemporaneously whenever it deems the
prosecution to be making improper argument[,]” explaining that a timely objection gives
the trial court the opportunity to assess the State’s argument and to take appropriate
curative action. State v. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1, 57-58 (Tenn. 2010). By failing to raise a
contemporaneous objection and by failing to raise the claim in his motion for new trial,
Defendant waived plenary review of the issue on appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a));
State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692, 700-01 (Tenn. 2022); Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 58.

However, “when necessary to do substantial justice,” this court may “consider an
error that has affected the substantial rights of a party” even if the issue was waived. Tenn.
R. App. P. 36(b); State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 808 (Tenn. 2010). Plain error relief
is “limited to errors that had an unfair prejudicial impact which undermined the
fundamental fairness of the trial.” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 642 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1994). In order to be granted relief under plain error, five criteria must be met: (1)
the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (2) a clear and
unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (3) a substantial right of the accused
must have been adversely affected; (4) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical
reasons; and (5) consideration of the error is “necessary to do substantial justice.” Id. at
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640-41; see also State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000) (Tennessee Supreme
Court formally adopting the Adkisson standard for plain error relief). When it is clear from
the record that at least one of the factors cannot be established, this court need not consider
the remaining factors. Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 283. The defendant bears the burden of
persuasion to show that he is entitled to plain error relief. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d
349, 355 (Tenn. 2007).

Here, the record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial court. Regarding the
prosecutor’s argument about Defendant’s admitted use of methamphetamine on the day of
the assault, this court has previously observed that a jury could reasonably rely on a
defendant’s drug use to reject an insanity defense. See State v. Smith, No. E2023-00182-
CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 3177927, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2024) (noting that
“Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-501(b) states that insanity cannot be based on
‘criminal’ or other ‘anti-social’ behavior” and that “[a] reasonable jury could have found
that the [d]efendant’s drug use was the underlying cause of his psychosis[.]”). Thus, the
prosecutor’s argument that Defendant’s methamphetamine use undercut his claimed
insanity defense was not improper.2

Next, the record reflects that the prosecutor referred to a Winston Churchill quote
from the Netflix series “The Crown” and argued that Mr. Churchill said that he had
“witnessed scenes here today, the likes of which we have not seen since the darkest days
of the blitzkrieg from the war. But along side this suffering, I have also seen heroism. And
where there is heroism, there will always be hope.” The prosecutor then stated that several
witnesses had “demonstrated heroism” and again referred to the Churchill quote, saying
that “[w]here there’s heroism, there will always be hope.” In making these comments, the
prosecutor did not compare Defendant to a Nazi or to Nazi Germany. Additionally, the
prosecutor did not vouch for the State’s witnesses; the prosecutor made a fleeting reference
to witnesses demonstrating “heroism” and was not expressing a personal belief in the truth
or falsity of their testimonies.

In any event, even assuming all of these alleged errors and considering them
cumulatively, we conclude that no substantial right of Defendant was adversely affected
by the claimed errors. “For a ‘substantial right’ of the accused to have been affected, the
error must have prejudiced the appellant. In other words, it must have affected the outcome
of the trial court proceedings.” State v. Rimmer, 623 S.W.3d 235, 278 (Tenn. 2021)
(quoting State v. Maddin, 192 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)). In this case,
overwhelming evidence established Defendant’s guilt. The evidence showed that

2
We note that the jury was properly instructed on the State’s burden of proof in establishing the
mens rea for the underlying offenses and on the proof required to establish that Defendant was insane at the
time of the offenses.
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Defendant threatened to stab the victim if he did not make parole and then, hours after he
was denied parole, he attacked and repeatedly stabbed the victim with a knife that he
obtained days before the assault. The victim, who was unarmed and did nothing to provoke
the attack, suffered life-threatening injuries as a result. Regarding the aggravated rape,
Defendant admitted that he removed the victim’s pants and underwear; Mr. Vasquez saw
Defendant thrusting on top of the victim and engaging in what he thought was sexual
intercourse; and Ms. Boggs testified that the victim had multiple injuries consistent with
forced penetration. Finally, as previously discussed, the proof fell well short of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant suffered from a severe
mental disease or defect that rendered him unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness
of his actions. Under these circumstances, Defendant has failed to show that the alleged
instances of improper prosecutorial argument affected the outcome of the trial court
proceedings. Thus, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to relief via the plain error
doctrine.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

s/Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801193. Public record. Not legal advice.