# Dukuzumuremyi v. Martin

> Ohio Court of Appeals · February 18, 2025 · 2025 Ohio 508

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801191

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** February 18, 2025
- **Citations:** 2025 Ohio 508
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Eklund
- **Cited by:** 3 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

[Cite as Dukuzumuremyi v. Martin, 2025-Ohio-508.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY

RASHIDAH S. DUKUZUMUREMYI, CASE NO. 2024-L-047

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Civil Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas

CANDICE R. MARTIN,
Trial Court No. 2022 CV 001615
Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION

Decided: February 18, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed

Mark P. Herron, 5001 Mayfield Road, Suite 318, Lyndhurst, OH 44124 (For Plaintiff-
Appellee).

David Glenn Phillips, The Brown Hoist Building, 4403 St. Clair Avenue, Cleveland, OH
44103 (For Defendant-Appellant).

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Candice R. Martin (“Candice”),1 appeals the judgment of the

Lake County Court of Common Pleas, following a bench trial, in which the court (1)

awarded her $750.72 in damages on her breach-of-contract counterclaim against

Appellee, Rashidah S. Dukuzumuremyi (“Rashidah”); (2) granted judgment to Rashidah

on her replevin claim; and (3) granted judgment to Rashidah on Candice’s conversion

counterclaims.

1. The Court will refer to the parties by their first names for the sake of brevity. No disrespect is intended.
{¶2} Candice raises four assignments of error, arguing that the trial court erred

by granting judgment to Rashidah on the replevin claim and the conversion counterclaims

and by awarding Candice only $750.72 in damages on her breach-of-contract

counterclaim.

{¶3} Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we find Candice’s

assignments of error to be without merit. The trial court committed no errors of law, and

its judgments are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm

the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.

Substantive and Procedural History

{¶4} Rashidah and Candice had an “on-and-off” relationship between 2007 and

2012. In 2007, Candice purchased a house in Euclid, Ohio, where the parties and

Rashidah’s two daughters lived between 2007 and 2012 and again between 2020 and

July 2022. During the latter period, the parties agreed to share certain household

expenses, including the mortgage, utilities, and car insurance.

{¶5} In December 2021, Rashidah purchased a Shih Tzu dog (“Gizmo”) from

relatives for $500. Rashidah was given a sales receipt listing her as the sole purchaser.

Candice claims that the parties jointly purchased Gizmo and that her half of the purchase

price ($250) was applied toward Rashidah’s outstanding portion of household expenses.

Rashidah denies that claim.

{¶6} In December 2021 and March 2022, Rashidah took Gizmo to the

veterinarian for vaccinations, allegedly at her sole expense. The certificate of vaccination

identifies Rashidah as Gizmo’s owner. Gizmo was groomed on several occasions at the

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pet store where Candice’s cousin worked. Candice alleged involvement in many of those

appointments.

{¶7} In July 2022, the parties ended their relationship. On July 21, 2022,

Rashidah obtained Gizmo’s dog license in Cuyahoga County. On July 22, 2022, Candice

took possession of Gizmo and moved to Lake County. Candice alleged that while moving

her belongings out of the Euclid house, she placed a book bag containing $5,600 in cash

on the front seat of her car; when she came outside, however, the bag was empty and

Rashidah was walking down the street. Rashidah denied taking the money.

{¶8} On July 26, 2022, Candice applied for Gizmo’s dog license in Lake County.

On July 28, 2022, Candice had Gizmo certified as her emotional support animal.

{¶9} In September 2022, Rashidah was ordered to vacate the Euclid house. One

of Rashidah’s daughters remained at the house as Candice’s tenant. Candice alleged

that she later performed a walk-through of the Euclid house and noticed that items of

personal property were allegedly missing, including appliances, furniture, tools, and

equipment. Rashidah denied taking Candice’s property.

{¶10} On September 1, 2022, Rashidah, through counsel, filed a civil complaint in

the Willoughby Municipal Court asserting claims against Candice for replevin and

conversion regarding Gizmo. On the same date, Rashidah filed a motion for an order of

possession for Gizmo. Candice requested a hearing on the motion, which was held

before the magistrate on October 14, 2022. On October 18, 2022, the magistrate filed a

decision finding probable cause to support Rashidah’s motion and recommending an

order of possession in Rashidah’s favor. Candice posted a bond to retain possession of

Gizmo pending final judgment. Neither party filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.

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{¶11} On October 26, 2022, Candice, through counsel, filed an answer and six

counterclaims. Candice alleged that Rashidah breached the parties’ oral agreement to

share household expenses. According to Candice, the parties’ agreement encompassed

the purchase of Gizmo. Candice also alleged that Rashidah wrongfully took her cash and

personal property. On the same date, Candice filed a motion to certify the proceedings

to the court of common pleas because her claims sought relief in excess of the municipal

court’s jurisdictional limit. On November 16, 2022, Rashidah filed a reply to Candice’s

counterclaims.

{¶12} On December 5, 2022, the municipal court filed a judgment entry. The court

adopted the magistrate’s decision and stated that an order of possession for Gizmo “shall

issue.” It also noted that the parties had 14 days from the filing of the magistrate’s

decision to file objections.

{¶13} On December 13, 2022, the municipal court filed an order awarding

possession of Gizmo to Rashidah. On the same date, the municipal court granted

Candice’s motion to certify and transferred the proceedings to the Lake County Court of

Common Pleas.

{¶14} After the case was transferred to the common pleas court, the parties

engaged in discovery. On December 1, 2023, Rashidah filed a motion for partial summary

judgment and for a final award of possession for Gizmo, which Candice opposed. The

trial court denied Rashidah’s motion and scheduled a settlement conference for March

19, 2024, and a bench trial for April 25, 2024.

{¶15} On April 11, 2024, Candice filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude

Rashidah from introducing and testifying about the sales receipt for Gizmo’s purchase.

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Candice argued that the document did not meet the requirements to establish valid dog

ownership pursuant to R.C. 955.11(B).

{¶16} On April 25, 2024, the parties appeared for the bench trial. The trial court

denied Candice’s motion in limine, stating that it would consider the sales receipt for “what

purpose the court should consider it for when it is presented.” Rashidah testified at trial

and submitted several exhibits relating to Gizmo’s expenses, including the sales receipt,

receipts for dog licenses, records involving grooming and veterinarian appointments, and

a certificate of vaccination. She also submitted records regarding payments she made to

Candice for household expenses. The trial court admitted the sales receipt into evidence

over Candice’s objection.

{¶17} Candice testified at trial and presented testimony from a friend and her

mother. She also submitted several exhibits, including a spreadsheet she prepared that

purportedly calculated Rashidah’s unpaid portion of household expenses, copies of bills,

and records of payments that she received from Candice. Both parties filed post-trial

briefs.

{¶18} On May 30, 2024, the trial court filed a judgment entry. First, the trial court

granted judgment to Rashidah on her replevin claim and determined she was Gizmo’s

lawful owner. The court relied on the fact that Rashidah paid the entire purchase price

and procured the original dog license. The trial court found that while Rashidah’s sales

receipt did not comply with R.C. 955.11(B), it provided “some indicia” of the parties’ intent

regarding ownership. Second, the trial court granted judgment to Rashidah on Candice’s

conversion counterclaims, finding that Candice failed to prove Rashidah exercised

dominion or control over the cash or property. Third, the trial court found that the parties

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entered into an oral agreement to share household expenses for utilities, car insurance,

and the mortgage and that Rashidah breached that agreement; however, Candice failed

to prove damages for utilities and car insurance. The trial court awarded Candice $750.72

in damages for the mortgage.

{¶19} On June 13, 2024, the trial court granted Candice’s motion to stay execution

of its judgment.

{¶20} Candice timely appealed and raises four assignments of error.

Standard of Review

{¶21} Candice’s assignments of error involve the trial court’s findings following a

bench trial. “[O]n appeal from a bench trial we review the trial court's factual findings

under the manifest weight standard of review . . . .” Ultimate Salon & Spa, Inc. v. Legends

Constr. Group, 2019-Ohio-2506, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the

inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one

side of the issue rather than the other. . . . Weight is not a question of mathematics, but

depends on its effect in inducing belief.’” (Emphasis deleted.) State v. Thompkins, 1997-

Ohio-52, ¶ 24, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). “‘The [appellate] court,

reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers

the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of

justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary

power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the [judgment].’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin, 20

Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). “Judgments supported by some competent,

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credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by

a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.” C.E. Morris Co.

v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978), syllabus.

{¶22} “[A] court of appeals [must] be guided by a presumption that the findings of

the trier-of-fact were indeed correct. . . . The underlying rationale of giving deference to

the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to

view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use

these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal

Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). “‘[I]n determining whether the

judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable

intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment

and the finding of facts. . . . If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction,

the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the

verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” Id. at 80,

fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, § 603, at 191-192 (1978).

{¶23} “[T]he trial court’s legal findings,” by contrast, “are reviewed de novo.”

Ultimate Salon at ¶ 30. De novo review generally means the appellate court

independently reviews the record and affords no deference to the trial court’s decision.

In re Placement of A.R.V., 2016-Ohio-4929, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.).

Replevin

{¶24} Candice’s first assignment of error states: “The Trial Court Erred in Ruling

for Appellee on her Claim For Replevin and Possession of Gizmo, Based on the Weight

the It [Sic] Provided to the Evidence on the Claim.”

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{¶25} “A replevin action provides the means to obtain possession of specific

personal property that one has a right to possess” and lies “against one having, at the

time the suit is begun, actual or constructive possession and control of the property.” Lacy

v. State, 2020-Ohio-3089, ¶ 62 (11th Dist.). Under Ohio law, dogs are personal property.

Id.; R.C. 955.03 (dogs “shall be considered as personal property”). Therefore, dogs are

subject to replevin actions. Butera v. Beesler, 2023-Ohio-2257, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.).

{¶26} Candice argues that Rashidah’s sales receipt for Gizmo did not comply with

the requirements in R.C. 955.11(B); therefore, it had no evidentiary value, and the trial

court should have excluded it.

{¶27} R.C. 955.11(B) provides:

Upon the transfer of ownership of any dog, the seller of the dog shall give
the buyer a transfer of ownership certificate that shall be signed by the
seller. The certificate shall contain the registration number of the dog, the
name of the seller, and a brief description of the dog. Blank forms of the
certificate may be obtained from the county auditor. A transfer of ownership
shall be recorded by the auditor upon presentation of a transfer of
ownership certificate that is signed by the former owner of a dog and that is
accompanied by a fee of five dollars.

{¶28} Candice cites Eltibi v. Kocsis, 2021-Ohio-2911 (9th Dist.), a case in which

the plaintiff established sole ownership of a dog based on an adoption contract that

contained necessary information to qualify as a transfer of ownership certificate under

R.C. 955.11(B). Id. at ¶ 17.

{¶29} Here, there is no dispute that the sales receipt did not qualify as a “transfer

of ownership certificate” under R.C. 955.11(B). However, “R.C. 955.11(B) does not

specify that creation of the certificate effectuates the transfer of ownership.” Butera,

2023-Ohio-2257, at ¶ 29 (11th Dist.). In fact, “[c]ourts have determined ownership without

reference to R.C. 955.11(B) or a requirement of a transfer certificate.” Id. at ¶ 31.
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{¶30} Further, noncompliance with R.C. 955.11(B) does not necessarily mean the

sales receipt was inadmissible evidence. “All relevant evidence is admissible,” except as

otherwise provided by law or rule. Evid.R. 402. “Relevant evidence’ means evidence

having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court found that neither party produced a

document that complied with R.C. 955.11(B). Therefore, the sales receipt was “some

indica” of the parties’ intent regarding ownership. In other words, the receipt was relevant

because it had some tendency to make the fact of Rashidah’s ownership more probable

than without it. Given the nature of the ownership evidence presented to the trial court,

we agree that the sales receipt was relevant. Therefore, it was admissible.

{¶31} Candice next argues that the trial court improperly focused on the lack of

law in Ohio regarding the “best interest of the dog.” We disagree. The trial court stated

as follows:

In Ohio, a dog is considered chattel or personal property. See R.C. 955.03.
There is no “best interest of the dog” law in Ohio. See State ex rel. Lewis
v. Bd. Of Jackson Cty. Commrs., 2002-Ohio-1424, at ¶ 9 (4th Dist.) Thus,
if [Rashidah] can establish she is the rightful owner of the dog, she will be
awarded the dog in replevin.

{¶32} The trial court’s statement correctly identifies the legal issue in a replevin

claim as involving property rights. The court did not state or imply that Candice had

asserted a “best interest of the dog” argument. We acknowledge that the case cited by

the trial court (Lewis) does not use the phrase “best interest of the dog.” However, there

is caselaw support for the trial court’s statement. See, e.g., Green v. Animal Protection

League of Mercer Cty., 2016-Ohio-2767, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.) (“the trial court’s assertion that

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the dog should be returned to [plaintiff] because it is in the dog’s best interest is also

erroneous since the best interest of the dog is not relevant in adjudicating an action in

replevin”) (Emphasis added.)

{¶33} Candice next argues that trial court’s judgment in Rashidah’s favor is

against the manifest weight of the evidence. According to Candice, the trial court

improperly assigned “significant” weight to the sales receipt and to Rashidah’s purchase

of the original dog license. In addition, she argues the court failed to assign “proper

weight” to her evidence of ownership.

{¶34} It is well established that “[o]n the trial of a case, either civil or criminal, the

weight to be given the evidence . . . [is] primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass,

10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. While Candice disagrees with

the trial court’s weighing of the evidence, she does not assert, much less demonstrate,

that the trial court “‘clearly lost its way’” and “‘created such a manifest miscarriage of

justice that “the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins, 1997-

Ohio-52, at ¶ 25, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175. Therefore, Candice has not met

her burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court’s judgment is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. See Hileman v. Hileman, 2024-Ohio-2404, ¶ 17 (11th

Dist.); App.R. 16(A)(7).

{¶35} In addition, the evidence that Candice cites on appeal was not entitled to

significant weight. First, Candice contends that the trial court failed to properly weigh her

possession of Gizmo before the parties ended their relationship in July 2022. “[P]roof of

possession of a chattel is at least some evidence of ownership, which, of course, may be

overcome by proof of ownership in another.” Mielke v. Leeberson, 150 Ohio St. 528, 533

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(1948). However, Candice cites no portion of the record establishing that she possessed

Gizmo before the parties ended their relationship. The trial court found just the

oppositive—that Candice “took Gizmo in July of 2022 after the relationship between the

parties ended.” (Emphasis added.) The trial testimony supports the trial court’s finding.

{¶36} Second, Candice contends that the trial court failed to properly weigh her

“emotional attachment” to Gizmo. The trial court acknowledged that Candice “may have

formed a significant bond and attachment to Gizmo.” However, the court found that

Candice’s bond/attachment did “not give her superior property rights.” Candice relies on

this Court’s decision Frederick v. Frederick, 2000 WL 522170 (11th Dist. Mar. 31, 2000),

to argue that her relationship with Gizmo was a “significant factor” in determining

ownership. Frederick involved an appeal from the division of marital property in a divorce

decree. See id. at *1. Candice cites our discussion of the concept of “transmutation,”

pursuant to which a domestic relations court considered multiple factors to determine

whether “property that would otherwise be separate is converted into marital property.”

Id. at *10. One such factor was the property’s “significance to the parties.” Id. This case

involves a replevin claim, not a divorce, the division of marital property, or transmutation.

Therefore, Frederick is distinguishable. In addition, the cited discussion in Frederick does

not reflect current Ohio law. This Court noted in Frederick that “the doctrine of

transmutation was effectively supplanted by the concept of traceability” pursuant to

statute. Id.

{¶37} Third, Candice contends that the trial court failed to properly weigh the fact

that Gizmo became her certified animal assistant. The trial court acknowledged that

Candice “had Gizmo certified as her emotional support animal on July 28, 2022.”

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However, that certification indisputably occurred after the parties ended their relationship.

The trial court found that Candice’s evidence did not establish her ownership “during the

relevant time period of December 2021 through July 2022.” Candice does not dispute

that was the relevant time period.

{¶38} Candice next challenges the trial court’s credibility determinations. She

emphasizes her “credible” testimony that the parties intended to obtain a dog together

and that she contributed to Gizmo’s purchase price. Candice also argues that the trial

court assigned too much credibility to Rashidah’s testimony despite its falsity being

demonstrated on “at least six separate instances.”

{¶39} It is well established that “[t]he choice between credible witnesses and their

conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact[,] and an appellate court may not

substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d

120, 123 (1986). “A fact finder is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of

each witness appearing before it.” State v. Fetty, 2012-Ohio-6127, ¶ 58 (11th Dist.).

{¶40} We find no valid reason to disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations.

The trial court viewed the parties’ respective demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections

and found that Rashidah’s testimony was more credible. That decision was within the

province of the trial court as the trier of fact. While Candice points to evidence that

purportedly contradicts Rashidah’s testimony, the existence of conflicting evidence, by

itself, does not mean that Rashidah testified falsely.

{¶41} Accordingly, Candice’s first assignment of error is without merit.

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Breach of Contract

{¶42} Candice’s second assignment of error states: “The Trial Court Erred in Its

Ruling with Respect to Appellant’s Claim for Amount the Due [sic] on the Parties’ Oral

Agreement.”

{¶43} In order to establish a breach-of-contract claim, oral or written, a plaintiff

must prove (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by

the defendant; and (4) damages. Shaffer v. Triple Diamond Excavating, 2010-Ohio-3808,

¶ 18 (11th Dist.). As stated, the trial court found that the parties entered into an oral

agreement to share expenses for utilities, car insurance, and the mortgage and that

Rashidah breached that agreement; however, Candice failed to prove damages for

utilities and car insurance. Therefore, the trial court awarded Candice only $750.72 in

damages for the mortgage.

{¶44} Candice argues that the trial court’s award is against the manifest weight of

the evidence. According to Candice, the trial court failed to give proper weight to her

“undisputed” testimony regarding the amount Rashidah owed. In addition, she argues

the court assigned too much weight and credibility to Rashidah’s testimony.

{¶45} Candice’s argument misapprehends the trial court’s judgment as being

based on the parties’ respective testimony. The trial court found that Candice’s

calculation of damages was based on the spreadsheet she prepared, which the court

admitted into evidence over Rashidah’s objection. However, the court found that the

documents underlying Candice’s spreadsheet, which were also admitted into evidence,

lacked “specificity and accuracy.” The trial court relied on Evid.R. 1006, which provides:

The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which
cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of
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a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a
reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in
court.

{¶46} Courts have noted that when the underlying documents used in comprising

a summary are admitted into evidence, the finder of fact has the ability to independently

ascertain the accuracy of the information contained in the summary. State v. Clark, 2021-

Ohio-559, ¶ 41 (10th Dist.); State v. Edwards, 2004-Ohio-4015, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.). Candice

does not argue that the trial court’s review of the underlying documents was inaccurate.

She also fails to assert and demonstrate that the trial court clearly lost its way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial

ordered. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, at ¶ 25.

{¶47} Accordingly, Candice’s second assignment of error is without merit.

Conversion

{¶48} Candice’s third assignment of error states: “The Trial Court Erred in Its

Ruling with Respect To Appellant’s Claim Against Appellee for her Taken Cash Money.”

{¶49} Candice’s fourth assignment of error states: “The Trial Court Erred in Its

Ruling with Respect to Appellant’s Claim Against Appellee for her Taken Personal

Property.”

{¶50} Candice’s third and fourth assignments of error involve her counterclaims

for conversion. “[C]onversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the

exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding it from his [or her] possession under a

claim inconsistent with his [or her] rights.” Joyce v. Gen. Motors Corp., 49 Ohio St.3d 93,

96 (1990). “The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership and right to

possess the property at the time of the conversion; (2) the defendant’s conversion by
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wrongful act of plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) damages.” Martin v. MAHR Machine

Rebuilding, Inc., 2017-Ohio-1101, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.).

{¶51} Candice argues that the trial court’s judgment in Rashidah’s favor is against

the manifest weight of the evidence. According to Candice, the court failed to give “proper

weight” to her testimony and gave “too great weight or credibility” to Rashidah’s testimony.

Once again, Candice fails to assert and demonstrate that the trial court clearly lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed

and a new trial ordered. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, at ¶ 25.

{¶52} In addition, the evidence that Candice cites on appeal was not entitled to

significant weight. Candice testified that on the day she moved out of the Euclid house,

she put a book bag of cash in her car. At some point, she heard Rashidah leave the

house. When she came outside, she saw items from her book bag on ground outside the

car. When she opened her car door, the book bag was “dumped,” and the cash was

missing. She saw Rashidah walking down the street. Candice’s mother testified to a

similar version of events.

{¶53} The trial court found that Candice “failed to demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that [Rashidah] exercised dominion or control over

[Candice’s] cash.” The court noted the lack of evidence that Rashidah was “carrying

anything, let alone a large sum of cash in small bills, which would clearly require

something to carry the cash.” The court also noted the lack of evidence that Candice

“filed a police report,” “yelled or seemed alarmed at the time about the incident,” “ran after

[Rashidah],” or “made any effort to immediately inquire about what happened to her cash.”

According to the trial court, Candice’s argument “also fails to consider the possibility of

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some other person taking the cash.” The court further found that Candice’s claims “lack

credibility.”

{¶54} Candice also testified that she conducted a walk-through of the Euclid

house after Rasidah moved out and noticed that specific items were missing. The trial

court found that Candice “failed to present any evidence that [Rashidah] exercised

dominion or control over the household items. At best, [Candice] may have established

the items went missing.” However, she was “unable to link [Rashidah] to the taking of the

items.”

{¶55} Upon review, we find no error in the trial court’s assessment of Candice’s

evidence. This Court has defined “circumstantial evidence” as evidence that is “not

grounded on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts at issue, but of other

facts from which inferences are drawn, illustrating indirectly the facts sought to be

established.” State v. Dietrich, 2024-Ohio-2039, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.). Candice’s evidence,

if believed, showed that Rashidah had an opportunity to take the cash and the personal

property. Without more, there were insufficient facts upon which to infer that Rashidah

actually did so.

{¶56} Accordingly, Candice’s third and fourth assignments of error are without

merit.

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{¶57} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10801191. Public record. Not legal advice.