# Thomas Sr. v. Hyler

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10800855

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10800855

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”
- stating that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “identified malicious prosecution as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and a viable constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983.” (citing Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003))

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

DERREL L. THOMAS, SR., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2777-MSS-AAS

DETECTIVE T. HYLER, et al.,

Defendants.
/

ORDER
Derrel L. Thomas, Sr., sues Detective Troy Hyler and Hernando County Sheriff Al
Nienhuis for federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. An earlier order explained
the applicable law governing Thomas, Sr.’s, claims and dismissed without prejudice his
claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and failure to train. (Doc. 12) Thomas, Sr., was
permitted an opportunity to amend, and he now proceeds pro se on his Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 13)
Before the Court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc.
14) The Court granted Thomas, Sr.’s, motion for an extension of time to respond to the
defendants’ motion to dismiss and ordered him to respond by December 13, 2024. (Doc. 17)
That order was mailed to Thomas, Sr., at his current address and was not returned as
undeliverable.1 To date, Thomas, Sr., has not responded to the defendants’ motion to dismiss,
nor has he sought an additional extension of time to do so. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss

1 The address on record for Thomas, Sr., is his residence in Brooksville, Florida.
is construed as unopposed. M.D. Fla. Loc. R. 3.01(c) (“If a party fails to timely respond, the
motion is subject to treatment as unopposed.”).
For the reasons stated herein, the unopposed motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and
the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. Amended Complaint
Thomas, Sr., again asserts claims of false arrest and false imprisonment against
Detective Hyler in his individual capacity, and he adds a claim for trespassing. He asserts a
failure-to-train claim against Sheriff Nienhuis. He seeks to recover compensatory and punitive
damages.
Despite having an opportunity to amend, Thomas, Sr., neglects to allege a discernable
set of facts. The Amended Complaint mostly contains disorganized legal arguments with
minimal facts randomly inserted throughout those arguments. Attached to the pleading are
three arrest affidavits, which were absent from Thomas, Sr.’s original complaint. The first

and second arrest affidavits concern the arrest of Thomas, Sr.’s son, Derrel Thomas, Jr., and
the third arrest affidavit concerns the arrest of Thomas, Sr., himself. (Doc. 13-1) It is from
these arrest affidavits, and their supporting probable cause affidavits, that the Court can
discern the events that form the basis of this action.
In the probable cause affidavits, Detective Hyler avers that on June 28, 2023, and again
on July 6, 2023, Thomas, Jr., sold cocaine to a confidential informant at his residence located
at 821 Moonlight Lane, Brooksville, Florida. (Id. at 2 and 5) On July 20, 2024, Detective
Hyler executed a search warrant at the same address and arrested Thomas, Jr., for the two
drug transactions. (Id.)
During the search of the residence, Detective Hyler reported that he found the
following: 1.8 grams of cocaine inside a kitchen drawer, 7.5 grams of fentanyl inside a two-
drawer nightstand in the living room, and 1.0 grams of fentanyl inside a dining room armoire.
(Id. at 7) Thomas, Sr., who was present at the residence during the search, was arrested and

charged with trafficking in fentanyl, possession of crack cocaine, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (Id.) Detective Hyler avers that Thomas, Sr., stated that he was the
homeowner and that Thomas, Jr., moved out four days before the execution of the search
warrant. (Id.)
In his Amended Complaint, Thomas, Sr., alleges that the affidavit supporting the
search warrant (which is not attached to the pleading) contained unspecified, false
information. Specifically, he alleges: “The issuance of a search warrant on Plaintiff property
was unlawful, sufficient probable cause did not exist to issue a warrant on Plaintiff’s property.
The information in the affidavit was false, and the information in the affidavit was believed

to be true at the time of submission, but later was found to be false.” (Doc. 13 at 3)
Furthermore, he alleges that: (1) he told Detective Hyler that his son never lived at the
residence, and that (2) Detective Hyler had access to the common areas of the house and
planted the drugs.
II. Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
pleading must include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). Labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action

are not sufficient. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Furthermore, mere naked assertions are not sufficient. Id. “[A] complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The court, however,
is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion stated as a “factual allegation” in the
complaint. Id.
III. Analysis
A. Detective Troy Hyler
1. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution
The defendants move to dismiss the false arrest and false imprisonment claims because
Thomas, Sr.’s, allegations lack sufficient factual detail to show that his arrest was unlawful
and because probable cause existed to arrest Thomas, Sr. (Doc. 14)

In its earlier order, the Court set forth the legal standards governing false arrest and
false imprisonment claims, identified the deficiencies in the original complaint, and permitted
Thomas, Sr., an opportunity to amend. (Doc. 12 at 4–7) Nevertheless, he fails to cure the
deficiencies in his Amended Complaint.
Thomas, Sr.’s, false arrest and false imprisonment claims must fail because he was
arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, which is attached to his Amended Complaint. See
Carter v. Gore, 557 F. App’x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2014) 2 (“Given that Carter was arrested
pursuant to a warrant, the district court properly concluded that Carter’s only available claim

2 11th Cir. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be
cited as persuasive authority.")
against Gore under § 1983 was for malicious prosecution.”). Instead, the Court generously
construes Thomas, Sr.’s Amended Complaint as an attempt to plead malicious prosecution.
See Cruitt v. Alabama, 647 F. App’x 909, 909 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Federal courts have an
obligation to look behind the label of a pleading filed by a pro se [plaintiff] and determine

whether it is, in effect, cognizable under a different remedial statutory framework.”)
(quotations and alterations omitted).
A claim of malicious prosecution arises under the Fourth Amendment. See Grider v.
City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals has “identified malicious prosecution as a violation of the Fourth Amendment
and a viable constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983.” (citing Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872,
881 (11th Cir. 2003))). Malicious prosecution is a “‘shorthand way of describing’ certain
claims of unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Williams v. Aguire, 965 F.3d 1147,
1157 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 (11th Cir. 1996)).

To establish such a claim, Thomas, Sr., must “prove both a violation of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures and the elements of the common law
tort of malicious prosecution.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1157 (quotations and brackets omitted).
To prove a Fourth Amendment violation, Thomas, Sr., must prove “that the legal process
justifying his seizure . . .was constitutionally infirm and that his seizure would not otherwise
be justified without legal process.” Id. at 1165. “[The plaintiff] can prove that his arrest
warrant was constitutionally infirm if he establishes either that the officer who applied for the
warrant should have known that his application failed to establish probable cause, or that an
official . . . intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or omissions necessary to support

the warrant.” Id. (citations omitted). A warrant is void if the affidavit supporting such
warrant contains “deliberate falsity or . . . reckless disregard” for the truth and if “with the
affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to
establish probable cause.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978). To establish the
common law elements of malicious prosecution, Thomas, Sr., must show that the officers

“instituted or continued a criminal prosecution against him, ‘with malice and without
probable cause,’ that terminated in his favor and caused damage to him.” Williams, 965 F.3d
at 1157 (quotations omitted); see also Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2019)
(listing the common law elements of malicious prosecution).
Thomas, Sr., vaguely alleges that the search warrant that Detective Hyler obtained
“never should have been issued on [his] property” because “the information in the affidavit
was false, and the information in the affidavit was believe[d] to be true at the time of
submission, but later was found to be false.” (Doc. 13 at 3) To the extent he intends to
challenge the search warrant as constitutionally infirm, these vague allegations are insufficient

to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677–78. The affidavit supporting the search
warrant is not attached to the Amended Complaint and is absent from the record. Thomas,
Sr., neglects altogether to describe the false information in the search warrant affidavit or
provide any other details to support this vague allegation.
Thomas, Sr., alleges the arrest affidavit contains false information because he did not
tell Detective Hyler that his son moved out four days before the search, but rather, that he
told Detective Hyler that his son never lived at the residence. (Doc. 13 at 4) To the extent he
intends to challenge the arrest affidavit as constitutionally infirm, such claim is insufficient
because he neglects to allege that Detective Hyler “intentionally or recklessly made
misstatements or omissions necessary to support the warrant.” See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165.
Furthermore, even if the affidavit contains false information about whether Thomas, Jr., lived
at the residence, he alleges no facts to support the finding that “the affidavit’s remaining
content is insufficient to establish probable cause.” See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. Thomas, Sr.,

does not dispute that he lived at the residence where drugs were found.
In one sentence, and without any details, Thomas, Sr., alleges that Detective Hyler
“had access to the common area of the house, and he planted those drugs.” (Doc. 13) Even
if such allegation was sufficient to state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, he
nevertheless cannot proceed on a malicious prosecution claim because he has not alleged any
facts to establish the common law elements of malicious prosecution. He alleges no facts to
show that Detective Hyler “continued a criminal prosecution against him with malice and
without probable cause that terminated in his favor and caused damage to him.” Williams,
965 F.3d at 1157 (quotations omitted). The pleading is entirely devoid of any allegations

about Thomas, Sr.’s prosecution, such as his confinement after arrest or whether he was
adjudicated guilty and sentenced. He alleges neither that the prosecution terminated in his
favor nor that the prosecution caused him damage. See Paez, 915 F.3d at 1285.
Accepting as true Thomas, Sr.’s, meager factual allegations, he fails to state a claim
for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. Because the Court already
permitted Thomas, Sr., an opportunity to amend his false arrest and false imprisonment
claims, and he neglects to cure their deficiencies, the false arrest and false imprisonment
claims are dismissed with prejudice. See Horn v. Estate of Camacho, 817 F. App’x 872, 874
(11th Cir. 2020) (“Where a more carefully drafted complaint might cure the deficiencies in a
complaint, a pro se plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend before it is dismissed
with prejudice[.]”) (citations omitted).
And, although this is the first time the Court has generously construed the allegations
as a claim for malicious prosecution and set forth those elements, the Court need not grant

Thomas, Sr., another opportunity to state a claim for malicious prosecution. By failing to
timely respond to the defendants’ motion to dismiss after the Court granted him an extension
of time to do so, Thomas, Sr., “clearly indicates he does not want to amend his complaint[,]”
and the motion to dismiss is considered unopposed. See Horn, 817 F. App’x at 874 (“A court
need not grant leave to amend . . . if the plaintiff clearly indicates he does not want to amend
his complaint[.]”). Accordingly, the claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution are dismissed with prejudice.
2. Trespass
In one sentence, and without any further elaboration, Thomas, Sr., attempts to state a

claim against Detective Hyler for trespass “for disregarding [his] human rights and [his]
property.” (Doc. 13 at 7) The defendants argue that sovereign immunity bars this claim.
(Doc. 14 at 16–17) The Court agrees.
Florida’s sovereign immunity statute reads:
An officer, employee, or agent of the state or any of its
subdivisions may not be held personally liable in tort or named
as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage
suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the
scope of his or her employment or function, unless such officer,
employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose
or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human
rights, safety, or property.

Fla. Sta. § 768.28(9)(a). Detective Hyler acted within the scope of his employment when he
entered Thomas, Sr.’s, residence and arrested him. Thomas, Sr., alleges no facts to support a
finding that Detective Hyler acted outside the scope of employment, in bad faith, with
malicious purpose, or with a wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or
property. Accordingly, sovereign immunity bars Thomas, Sr.’s, state law trespass claim
against Detective Hyler.

Although this is the first time that Thomas, Sr., attempts to state a trespass claim, the
Court need not grant leave to amend because, by failing to timely respond to the defendants’
motion to dismiss, Thomas, Sr., “clearly indicates he does not want to amend his
complaint[,]” and this motion is considered unopposed. See Horn, 817 F. App’x at 874.
Accordingly, the trespass claim is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Sheriff Al Nienhuis
The defendants move to dismiss the failure-to-train claim asserted against Sheriff
Nienhuis for failure to state a claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Doc. 14 at 17–22) They argue that Thomas, Sr., fails to identify a

custom or policy that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations.
In its earlier order, the Court set forth the legal standards governing a failure-to-train
claim, identified the deficiencies in Thomas, Sr.’s, pleading, and permitted him an
opportunity to amend. (Doc. 12 at 7–10) Nevertheless, Thomas, Sr., failed to cure those
deficiencies in his Amended Complaint.
Thomas, Sr., again, describes his claim against Sheriff Nienhuis in one sentence. He
alleges that Sheriff Nienhuis “has a policy, custom, or practice . . . [of] arresting without
probable cause, violating citizen rights under the Fourth Amendment, [and] conducting
unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Doc. 13 at 5–6) He provides no factual allegations to
support this claim. The Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion stated as a
“factual allegation” in the complaint. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677–78.
Thomas, Sr., neglects to allege any supporting facts to show a deliberate or conscious
choice by Sheriff Nienhuis (or the county) to decline to train its employees. Nor does

Thomas, Sr., identify any other incidents in which county employees falsely arrested others
without probable cause. And, he does not allege that the county knew of a particular need to
train and deliberately chose not to undertake such training. Accordingly, Thomas, Sr.’s bare
allegation is insufficient to state a claim for failure to train against Sheriff Nienhuis.
Because the Court already permitted Thomas, Sr. an opportunity to amend and he
neglects to cure the deficiencies of this claim, the failure to train claim asserted against Sheriff
Nienhuis must be dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, to the extent that Thomas, Sr. intends to state a claim against Sheriff
Nienhuis in his individual capacity, such claim must be dismissed with prejudice. He alleges
no facts that Sheriff Nienhuis was “personally involved in acts or omissions that resulted in

the constitutional deprivation.” Hale v. Tallapoose Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995).
And, the Court need not permit Thomas, Sr., another opportunity to plead an individual-
capacity claim against Sheriff Nienhuis because, by not responding to the motion to dismiss,
Thomas, Sr., “clearly indicates he does not want to amend his complaint.” See Horn, 817 F.
App’x at 874.
C. Punitive Damages
The defendants correctly argue that Sheriff Nienhuis is immune from liability for
punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore, the claim for punitive damages

should be dismissed. As the Court explained in its earlier order, “punitive damages are
unavailable in a suit against a county and, hence, in a suit against a county employee in his
or her official capacity.” Chatham v. Adcock, 334 F. App’x 281, 287 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing
Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (stating that “a municipality is immune from
punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”)). Accordingly, because Sheriff Nienhuis is
immune from liability for punitive damages, the claim for punitive damages is dismissed with
prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons explained herein, the unopposed motion to dismiss (Doc.
14) is GRANTED, and the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREUDICE. The
Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants and to CLOSE this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 13th day of February,
2025.

MARYS. SORIVEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10800855. Public record. Not legal advice.