# NEWTON v. LOCKLEAR

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · February 12, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10798777

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 12, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10798777

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming the grant of summary judgment on a supervisory liability claim where inmate “only makes conclusory allegations without any specific facts”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JAMES EARL NEWTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:22CV388
)
DEAN LOCKLEAR, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND
RECOMMENDATIONOF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff James Earl Newton’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 46); Defendants Dean Locklear, Shawn Britt,
Twankeish Clark, Travis R. Bridges, Adam Sayre, Timothy Locklear (“T. Locklear”), Brian
Bradley, Deven Wallace, Triston J. Dial, and Jose L. Osuna’s (collectively “Defendants”)
Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Enty 53), Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File
Video Exhibit Manually (Docket Entry 55); and “Plaintiff’s Request to Grant Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” (Docket Entry 57). For the reasons stated below, the
undersigned grants Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File the Video Exhibit Manually.
Further, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
and denying Plaintiff’s motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
I. Background
Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants in both their official
and individual capacities surrounding an alleged excessive force incident that occurred on June

16, 2021, at the Scotland Correctional Institution. (See Am. Compl., Docket Entry 8 at 4.)1
Specifically on that morning, Defendants T. Locklear and Bradley allegedly gave Plaintiff “the
wrong food tray,” which subsequently “fell on the floor.” (Id. at 14.) Defendants Britt and
Clark thereafter arrived, and Defendant Britt “told the Plaintiff to submit to the handcuffs,”
but he refused “out of fear of being assaulted.” (Id.) As a result, the water to Plaintiff’s cell
was turned off. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he then “started a small fire in the corner of the cell door then put
it out with a cup of water.” (Id.) Defendants T. Locklear, Sayre, Bradley, Wallace, Dial, Osuna,
Clark and Bridges procured a fire extinguisher and stood in front of Plaintiff’s cell. (Id.)
Plaintiff then asked about being handcuffed, which Defendant Bradley stated, “it’s too late for
that.” (Id.)
Plaintiff then placed his mattress against the cell wicket door to avoid being pepper

sprayed. (Id.) Defendant Sayre, however, pushed the mattress with his baton so that
Defendant Wallace could discharge the fire extinguisher through the opening of the wicket
door although there was no fire at this point. (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendants he could not
breathe and asked to be handcuffed, which another offender heard. (Id. at 14-15.) An officer
laughed, then Defendant Clark told Defendant Wallace “that was enough.” (Id. at 15.)

1 Unless otherwise noted, all citations herein refer to the page numbers at the bottom right-
hand corner of the documents as they appear in the Court’s CM/ECF system.
After Plaintiff’s cell door opened, he dropped the mattress and “balled up on the bunk
in a fetal position as Defendants Sayre, [Dial], [O]suna, Wallace and Bradley rushed in and
began to beat” Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendants Wallace and Bradley both beat him with batons,

but Defendant Wallace specifically struck Plaintiff in the head with a heavy blow. (Id.) During
the beating, Defendants Clark and Bridges “did not intervene to prevent these kicks and
blows” and may have also participated in the beating. (Id.) Defendant T. Locklear also hit
Plaintiff. (Id.) Afterwards, Defendants Sayre and T. Locklear handcuffed Plaintiff and
removed him from the cell, at which point, Plaintiff “reached inside his shorts and dropped a
homemade weapon on the floor,” which Defendant Sayre picked up. (Id.) While walking in

the hallway and in the presence of Defendant Britt, Plaintiff stated that he was hit in the head
with a baton by Defendant Wallace. (Id.) Defendant Britt replied, “that’s the beautiful tools
the state gave us to work with.” (Id.)
After the incident, Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to main medical, then “outside
medical,” for his head laceration. (Id. at 17.) He suffered a concussion, had to get four staples
in his head, and had a contusion in his upper right rib cage. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims he suffers

from “migraines, dizzy spells and short-term memory loss” as a result of the incident. (Id.)
He further asserts that he has exhausted all administrative remedies and attached a copy of his
grievance forms to his Amended Complaint. (See id. at 6-7, 19-29.)
Plaintiff requests relief in the form of a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants
Clark, Bridges, T. Locklear, Wallace, Bradley, Sayre, Osuna, and Dial violated his rights,
Defendant Dean Locklear failed to prevent physical abuse of prisoners, and that Defendant

Britt ordered the beating. (Id. at 17.) He also requests an evaluation by a “medical practitioner
with expertise in the treatment of head trauma,” along with compensatory and punitive
damages. (Id. at 18.)
After discovery, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment as to the issue of liability

on the part of Defendants’ alleged use of excessive force and failure to intervene. (Docket
Entry 46.) Along with a brief in support of his motion, Plaintiff filed a declaration on his own
behalf, medical records, and records and policies maintained by the North Carolina
Department of Adult Correction (“NCDAC”).2 (See Declaration in Support of Pl.’s Mot. for
Partial Summary Judgment (“Newton Decl.”), Docket Entry 47; see also Docket Entry 48 at 5-
35.) In his declaration, Plaintiff reiterates that he was assaulted by prison staff on June 16,

2021, which required outside medical treatment for his injuries. (Newton Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) He
also reiterates that he set the fire in his cell but put it out before Defendants arrived. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Pointing then to the related incident reports, Plaintiff declares that “Defendant Sayre stated .
. . there was no fire before prison staff entered the cell” and that video footage shows “there
is no visible fire” before Defendants come into the cell. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff further states
that video evidence reveals that Defendants Clark and Bridges entered the cell with other

Defendants, and that they failed to intervene to stop the assault despite the opportunity to do
so. (Id. ¶ 11.) Last, Plaintiff states that the weapon he had which was tossed on the floor
while being escorted away is the same weapon Defendants “alleged they retrieved inside the

2 Plaintiff also filed a statement of what he believes is undisputed facts. (See Docket Entry 49.)
cell to justify the unnecessary excessive use of force that was exercised as punishment.” (Id. ¶
12.)3
Defendants also moved for summary judgment, arguing that there are no genuine

issues of material fact and that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law as to all claims
against them. (Docket Entry 53.) Along with a brief in support of their motion, Defendant
Dean Locklear filed a declaration. (See Declaration of Dean Locklear (“Dean Locklear Decl.”,
Docket Entry 54-1.) In addition, attached to Dean Locklear’s declaration is video footage
surrounding the alleged incident and records maintained by the NCDAC4 regarding Plaintiff.
(See Docket Entries 54-2 through 54-7.)5 Defendants also filed the declaration of Amy

3 In his brief and declaration, Plaintiff frequently references “video footage;” however, he does
not submit such video footage. (See Newton Decl. ¶ 14 (“All exhibits are attached . . . except Exhibit
A (video footage) because I am a prisoner.”).)

4 Many of Plaintiff and Defendants’ records are redundant.

5 Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to File the Video Exhibit Manually (Docket Entry 55),
which the undersigned will grant. Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court, arguing alteration and/or
tampering of the restricted housing video by defense counsel. (See Docket Entry 61.) Defendants
filed a response contending that there had been no alterations and “Defendants’ narrative description
provided within Defendants’ Memorandum in Support indicates the time and events Plaintiff claims
were edited out of the video he saw on July 25, 2024, but which he did see in the video from April.”
(Docket Entry 62 at 4.) In addition, defense counsel filed a declaration that a copy of the video
evidence was sent to the Court, and a copy was sent to the facility where Plaintiff is housed without
any edits or modifications from counsel. (See Declaration of Counsel, Docket Entry 62-1.) Both
parties filed additional responses. (Docket Entries 66, 67.) Upon review of the documents and the
video footage, there is no reason to believe there has been any alteration of the evidence. From the
Court’s copy, the portions of which Plaintiff complains have been omitted—the mattress blocking
the cell door upon opening, and Plaintiff appearing to reach into his shirt/waist area and toss an item
on the floor—have not only been observed in the video footage, but as Defendants state, were part
of their video narrative summary in the memorandum in support originally filed with the Court (see
Docket Entry 54 at 5). Further, the video size of the Court’s copy is consistent with the file size noted
by defense counsel. (See Counsel Declaration ¶ 4; see also Docket Entry 67.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s
assertions that defense counsel tampered or edited this video are unsupported, and his related request
for appointment of counsel is not warranted. See Curry v. Dich, No. 1:22CV70 (LMB/IDD), 2023 WL
4002476, at *4 n.8 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2023) (“[P]laintiff appears to believe that the video tape
submitted by Deputy Storrs has been somehow altered, . . . but the video presented to the Court does
LaRosa, medical records custodian for the NCDAC, who attached Plaintiff’s medical records
from June 16, 2021, to June 30, 2021. (See Declaration of Amy LaRosa ¶ 2, Docket Entry 54-
8 (and attachments).)

In pertinent part, Defendant Dean Locklear attests that he was not personally involved
in the alleged use of force incident; instead, as Associate Warden V, he has custody and control
over incident reports at the prison. (Dean Locklear Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Dean Locklear
does not personally know Plaintiff, and states that he did not act outside of a supervisory role
regarding the incident. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) The incident reports6 conclude that the force used was
“minimal and justified to achieve a corrections objective.” (Id.) Plaintiff was charged with

disciplinary infractions for possessing a weapon and starting a fire. (Id.; see also Docket Entry
54-6.) Specifically, the incident reports reflect that on the day of the incident, Plaintiff rejected
and threw down his food tray, then started a fire in his cell. (Docket Entry 54-2 at 3; Docket
Entry 54-3 at 1-2.)7 Smoke was observed coming from the cell, and several officers responded,

not possess the characteristics he alleges.”); Harvey v. Landauer, No. 7:18-CV-00097, 2020 WL 1904458,
at *3 (W.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2020) (“[The plaintiff’s] naked and speculative assertion that defendants or
their counsel tampered with the [video clips], absent any additional information or proof supporting
that assertion, is insufficient to refute defendants’ sworn allegations or counsel’s representations to
the court as officers of the court.”); Harris v. Faulcon, No. 3:23CV149, 2024 WL 4712695, at *2 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 7, 2024) (“[The plaintiff] insists that Defendant Faulcon, somehow, edited the video
evidence. . . . Th[e] examination [of the evidence] reveals that [the plaintiff’s] challenge to the video
evidence is frivolous.”).

6 The first report appears to be initiated due to the alleged incident on June 16, 2021. (See
Docket Entry 54-2.) The second incident report has a “Reported by Time” of July 12, 2021, and
reflects a summary of an additional investigation into the June 16, 2021 incident after Defendant Dean
Locklear’s receipt of a letter concerning Plaintiff’s allegations of use of force. (See Docket Entry 54-3
at 1.)

7 According to Plaintiff’s verbal statement within one report, Defendant Britt went to
Plaintiff’s cell to find out what the issue was with Plaintiff’s food tray, but after seeing the tray on the
floor, Defendant Britt “refused to replace the tray.” (Docket Entry 54-3 at 1.)
including Defendants Clark, Bridges, Sayre, T. Locklear, Bradley, Wallace, Dial, and Osuna.
(Docket Entry 54-2 at 1-4; Docket Entry 54-3 at 2-4.) With a fire extinguisher, officers made
efforts to spray inside the cell, but they were hindered because Plaintiff blocked the wicket

door with his mattress. (Id.)8 Plaintiff was given several direct orders to submit to handcuffs
but refused. (Id.) The cell door was then ordered to be opened, and there was low visibility
due to the smoke in the cell. (Id.) Plaintiff became combative and officers observed a
homemade weapon in his hand. (Id.) Hands-on force was used to retrieve the weapon and to
restrain Plaintiff with handcuffs. (Id.) Plaintiff was subsequently escorted to receiving and
searched. (Id.) He was then assessed by prison medical staff and referred outside the facility

for medical treatment and further evaluation. (Docket Entry 54-2 at 1-4, 8; Docket Entry 54-
3 at 8.)
Defendants also attach Plaintiff’s disciplinary infraction history and incarceration
summary, the former which notes that he is currently serving a sentence for manslaughter with
a criminal history including arson and possession of a firearm by felon. (Docket Entry 54-7.)
Plaintiff has incurred many prison infractions, including multiple infractions for possessing

weapons, assaultive behavior, and threatening to injure staff. (Docket Entry 54-6.)
Defendants have also submitted soundless video footage in support of their motion.
The first video is of the restricted housing East D Unit where Plaintiff’s cell was located. For
several minutes, an officer is observed inside the gated area near the prisoner cells on the first

8 The prison officers’ statements each generally summarize unsuccessful and hindered efforts
to extinguish the fire in Plaintiff’s cell. To the extent their stories slightly deviate on this point, it is
immaterial and nothing more than a distinction without a difference.
floor of the unit.9 (Housing Unit video at 00:00-06:49.) An officer then enters and opens the
gate, followed by seven other officers, approaching the cells in the bottom-right corner. (Id.
at 06:49-07:39.) An inmate is escorted out of a cell near Plaintiff’s, and other officers thereafter

enter the area in front of Plaintiff’s cell, one with a fire extinguisher. (Id. at 07:48-09:15.) The
officers appear to discharge the fire extinguisher towards the cell’s wicket door as the area in
front of Plaintiff’s cell gets cloudy. (Id. at 09:15-09:52.) One officer appears to shove a baton
towards the cell’s wicket door. (Id. at 09:27-09:47.) The extinguisher is placed on the ground
while officers are still standing in front of Plaintiff’s cell door. (Id. at 09:54-10:23.) An officer
picks the extinguisher back up, and the cell door is subsequently opened with Plaintiff’s

mattress blocking the entry. (Id. at 10:25-10:44.) A cloud of smoke departs the cell as officers
enter and one officer kicks what appears to be a burned pile of items from the cell as he exits.
(Id. at 10:44-11:00.) Additional officers exit, and moments later, Plaintiff exits the cell in
handcuffs. (Id. at 11:00-11:37.) Prior to exiting the gated area to the cell block, Plaintiff
appears to reach into his shirt and toss an item on the floor, which the escorting officer slides
under his foot and another officer then picks up the item. (Id. at 11:38-11:51.) Additional

officers then exit Plaintiff’s cell, one with a baton in his hand. (Id. at 11:51-12:12.)
The second video is of the intake processing area where officers escort Plaintiff in
handcuffs through the area. (Intake Area video at 00:00-00:12.) Several officers remain in the
area, with one officer placing an object in a napkin and another officer holding it. (Id. at 00:13-
01:21.) Plaintiff eventually reenters the area and walks through the metal detector before
receiving further instruction by officers. (Id. at 02:36-03:07.) Several minutes later, Plaintiff

9 Another individual is sitting to the far-left door of the unit.
in handcuffs and escorted by officers, reenters the area and exits through a door. (Id. at 06:21-
06:36.)
II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Zahodnick
v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 913 (4th Cir. 1997). The party seeking summary
judgment bears the initial burden of coming forward and demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir.
1991) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Once the moving party has met their

burden, the non-moving party must then affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine
issue of material fact which requires trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the non-moving party for a fact finder to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th
Cir. 1995). Thus, the moving party can bear their burden either by presenting affirmative

evidence or by demonstrating that the non-moving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish
his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
When making the summary judgment determination, the Court must view the
evidence, and all justifiable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Zahodnick, 135 F.3d at 913; Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196
(4th Cir. 1997). However, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest on mere

allegations or denials, and the Court need not consider “unsupported assertions” or “self-
serving opinions without objective corroboration.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80
F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. “When faced with cross-
motions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately on its own

merits ‘to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.’”
Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Excessive Force
Defendants argue that the excessive force claims against them should be dismissed
because it is undisputed that there is no objectively serious injury, Defendants acted in a good-

faith effort to maintain control, and Defendants did not act maliciously or sadistically in the
process. (Docket Entry 54 at 7-16.) “The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 878 F.3d 89,
97 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Prison officials have “an
affirmative obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee [inmates’] safety.” Id. (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, when evaluating an excessive force claim, the

Court “must determine ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Id. at 98 (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)). To make this determination, the Court considers two
elements: “whether the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind
(subjective component) and whether the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate
was sufficiently serious (objective component).” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008)

(internal quotations and citation omitted).
The objective component:

focuses not on the severity of any injuries inflicted, but rather on
“the nature of the force,” which must be “nontrivial.” Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39 (2010) (citing Hudson[, 503 U.S. at 7]); cf.
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (explaining that the extent of injury
suffered may indirectly “provide some indication of the amount
of force applied”). Not every “malevolent touch by a prison
guard” is necessarily a constitutional violation. Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 9. The Eighth Amendment “excludes from constitutional
recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the
use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.” Id. at 10 [internal quotation and citation omitted].

Garris v. Gober, No. 1:10-CV-504, 2013 WL 4502261, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2013), aff’d,
554 F. App’x 211 (4th Cir. 2014). In other words, “there is no ‘significant injury’ threshold
to sustain an excessive force claim because a de minimis injury, if the product of malicious
and sadistic use of force, can sustain the claim.” Parker v. Stevenson, 625 F. App’x 196, 198
(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38).
As for the subjective component, “[t]he state of mind required in excessive force claims
is ‘wantonness in the infliction of pain.’ ” Iko, 535 F.3d at 239 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 322 (1986)). The Supreme Court has considered four non-exclusive factors to assist
courts in determining wantonness conduct: “(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the
relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of any
reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) any
efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321)
(internal quotations omitted). “From such considerations inferences may be drawn as to
whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary, or instead evinced such
wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing
willingness that it occur.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. In reviewing the record, “[i]f a reasonable
jury could find . . . that correctional officers used force maliciously to punish or retaliate against

an inmate, then summary judgment is not appropriate.” Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 302-03
(4th Cir. 2021).
In the prison context, “[c]orrections officers act with a permissible motive not only
when they confront immediate risks to physical safety, but also when they attempt to preserve
internal order by compelling compliance with prison rules and procedures.” Freeman v. Deas,
No. 20-7345, 2023 WL 8230805, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 28, 2023) (quotations and citation

omitted); see also Boose v. Adkins, No. 3:18-cv-1480, 2020 WL 3086885, at *13 (S.D. W. Va. May
20, 2020) (explaining that “[c]ourts in this Circuit have routinely held that law enforcement
and correctional officers may deploy force in response to threatening, disruptive, or assaultive
behavior”) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:18-1480, 2020 WL
3078333 (S.D. W. Va. June 10, 2020). In addition, courts “owe officers ‘wide-ranging
deference’ in their determinations that force is required to induce compliance with policies

important to institutional security.” Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 113 (4th Cir. 2019); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“[T]he problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a
corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore
should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to
maintain institutional security.”)).
Here, considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and considering the
Whitley factors, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the use of force by
Defendants during the June 16, 2021, incident was excessive. As summarized above, video

footage from the prison captures portions of the incident but does not show inside Plaintiff’s
cell where the alleged excessive force occurred. Also, the parties dispute many of the facts.
Nevertheless, the record reflects that Defendants acted in a good-faith effort to maintain and
restore discipline, rather than maliciously or sadistically to cause harm.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s own allegations admit that because of his displeasure about his
food tray, he did not comply with orders and instead set a fire in his cell. Beyond that, the

record reflects that the officers made efforts to spray inside the cell, but they were hindered
because Plaintiff blocked the wicket door with his mattress, and that Plaintiff possessed a
homemade weapon. Defendants needed to restore order upon facing an emergency and
dangerous situation in which Plaintiff, with a violent history, had himself created. Within
about a minute from entering Plaintiff’s cell, Plaintiff was extracted and in the control of
officers. Here, “[t]he officers were entitled to use the force necessary to get Plaintiff under

control and extract Plaintiff safely from his cell.” Davidson v. Davis, No. 3:13-CV-590-FDW,
2016 WL 206478, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2016). In addition, while a de minimis injury is
not dispositive, the minor injuries Plaintiff sustained indicate that the use of force was not
excessive but rather necessary to gain control over Plaintiff. See McCall v. Div. of Corr., No. CV
PX-22-913, 2023 WL 2537542, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2023) (inmate, who set fire to his cell,
“sustained minor injuries consistent not with excessive force, but with a force necessary to

gain control over a volatile and dangerous inmate”); Cox v. Gaskins, No. 501CT936H, 2003
WL 23857306, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 30, 2003) (plaintiff who “suffered two lacerations to his
head and an injury to his nose” experienced “nothing more than de minimis injuries”), aff’d, 78
F. App’x 310 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Geddings v. Roberts, No. 1:15CV264, 2018 WL 1626116, at

*12 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2018) (Biggs, J.) (“[T]he record shows that the extent of Plaintiff’s
injuries were relatively minor . . . Although . . . Plaintiff’s injuries are sufficient to satisfy the
objective component of the Eighth Amendment analysis, they are not, in themselves,
sufficient to weigh in Plaintiff’s favor in the subjective determination.”).
Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. First, to the
extent Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to produce discovery requests (Docket Entry 65

at 1), Plaintiff never properly sought to compel its production during discovery, nor is there
any reason to permit such at this time.10 See Rule 56(d) (setting forth grounds to warrant
additional discovery during summary judgment stage); Evans, 80 F.3d at 961 (“[T]he
nonmoving party cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery
unless that party had made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time
was needed for discovery . . . before the district court ruled.”). Second, Plaintiff argues that

the video footage has been altered. (Docket Entry 65 at 2.) As previously stated, this argument
fails. (See supra n.5; see also Forbes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 222CV02398BHHMHC, 2023
WL 4409922, at *1 n.3 (D.S.C. June 14, 2023) (“Plaintiff’s mere assertion that the video was

10 Plaintiff filed a letter document with the Court in early July 2024 referencing some discovery
requests that he was seeking from defense counsel. (See Docket Entry 52.) This was well beyond the
April 15, 2024, discovery deadline. (See Docket Entry 40 at 13 (setting new discovery deadline).)
Moreover, Plaintiff does not explain how the discovery sought would aid in opposing Defendants’
summary judgment motion. (See Docket Entry 65 at 1.) For example, to the extent Plaintiff relies on
other inmate’s statements about his request to be handcuffed (id. at 4), it would not alter the
recommendation herein.
‘edited’ is not enough to throw the authenticity of the video into question, nor does it create
a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment.”), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-CV-2398-BHH, 2023 WL 4409052 (D.S.C. July 7, 2023)).

Beyond that, Plaintiff points to several other things which he believes supports his
claim that Defendants engaged in excessive force: Defendants’ “nonchalant” responsive
nature to the incident and the lack of fire in the cell upon their entrance; Defendants and other
prison officials’ violation of prison policy by not obtaining a video recorder during incidents
involving use of force; smoke in the video from the discharge of the fire extinguisher rather
than from Plaintiff’s cell; officers seen with batons exiting the cell; Plaintiff asking to be

handcuffed; and Plaintiff tossing a weapon after leaving the cell. (Docket Entry 65 at 2-4.)
However, none of this refutes that Defendants acted in a good-faith effort to maintain and
restore discipline under the totality of the circumstances. To some extent, the video evidence
“‘quite clearly contradicts [some portions of] the version of the story told by [Plaintiff] ... so
that no reasonable jury could believe it, [thus, the C]ourt should not adopt that version of the
facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.’” Witt v. W. Va. State Police,

Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007));
see also Bostic v. Rodriguez, 667 F. Supp. 2d 591, 605 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (citation omitted) (“[T]o
the extent plaintiffs’ recollection and the video are inconsistent, the video ‘speak[s] for itself,’
and the court considers the facts as displayed in the video.”). Moreover, a “prison officials’
failure to follow internal prison policies are not actionable under § 1983 unless the alleged
breach of policy rises to the level of a constitutional violation.” Jackson v. Sampson, 536 F.

App’x 356, 357 (4th Cir. 2013). “Therefore, any failure by prison officials to follow [NCDAC]
policies is insufficient, without more, to support [Plaintiff’s] claim[s].” Id. at 358; King v. Riley,
76 F.4th 259, 267 (4th Cir. 2023) (“Not every violation of prison policy is a violation of the
constitution.”).

Even more important, while Plaintiff contends that the homemade weapon he
retrieved from his waistband and tossed while being escorted outside the gate discredits
Defendants’ claim that use of force was necessary inside the cell, the undersigned finds this
argument unpersuasive. Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute that he possessed a weapon during
the incident. Thus, adopting his version, Plaintiff continued to possess a weapon upon exiting
his cell and while being escorted by prison officials, thereby demonstrating a serious risk of

danger to himself, other inmates, and the prison officials. See McMillan v. C. Jones, No. 5:14-
CT-3240-H, 2016 WL 8674243, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2016) (“Possession of contraband
within the prison facility creates a cognizable danger for both inmates and prison officials.”),
aff’d sub nom. McMillan v. Jones, 673 F. App’x 321 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d
625, 631 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he availability of contraband weapons in the prison context
obviously facilitates violence and injury.”); United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1143

(10th Cir. 2011) (“There is no legitimate purpose for a prisoner to carry a weapon designed to
kill, injure or disable another. On the contrary, the only reason to carry such a weapon is to
use it to attack another or to deter an attack.”).
Ultimately, after considering the record evidence and viewing all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, see Scott, 550 U.S. at 378, the undersigned concludes
that “no reasonable jury could find that [Defendants] applied force maliciously and sadistically

for the very purpose of causing harm[.]” Geddings, 2018 WL 1626116, at *12. The Court should
therefore grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff’s excessive force
claim.11
B. Supervisory Liability

Defendants next argue that Defendant Dean Locklear should be entitled to summary
judgment as to any claim based on supervisory liability. (Docket Entry 54 at 16-18.) To prevail
on this claim, Plaintiff would need to demonstrate “actual or constructive knowledge of a risk
of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference to that risk, and an affirmative causal link
between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff.” Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d

791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “the conduct
engaged in by the supervisor’s subordinates must be ‘pervasive,’ meaning that the ‘conduct is
widespread, or at least has been used on several different occasions.’” Randall, 302 F.3d at
206. Also, deliberate indifference generally is not satisfied “by pointing to a single incident or
isolated incidents” but rather showing a supervisor’s continued inaction in the face of
documented widespread abuses.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

11 To the extent Plaintiff attributes liability to Defendants Clark and Bridges for failing to
intervene, (see Am. Compl. at 15), such claims would also fail. See Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302
F.3d 188, 203 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that, “if a bystanding officer (1) is confronted with a fellow
officer’s illegal act, (2) possesses the power to prevent it, and (3) chooses not to act, he may be deemed
an accomplice and treated accordingly”); Brandon Chrishon Polk v. Stanly Cnty., No. 1:22CV613, 2024
WL 1287372, at *11 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2024) (“[T]here is no underlying constitutional violation with
regard to Defendant [officers’] encounter with Plaintiff. Therefore, bystander liability cannot attach,
and Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law.”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Polk v. Stanly
Cnty., No. 1:22CV613, 2024 WL 1286241 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2024); Dodson v. Prince George’s Cnty., No.
CV JKS 13-2916, 2016 WL 67255, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2016) (“[I]f no excessive force is applied by
the fellow officer, the officer witnessing the conduct cannot be held liable under bystander liability for
a failure to intervene.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
Here, the undersigned need not resolve Defendants’ argument. As explained above,
Plaintiff’s underlying excessive force claim implicating supervisory liability fails to establish a
constitutional violation. “It is well settled that there can be no supervisory liability when there

is no underlying violation of the Constitution.” Phillips v. Bailey, 337 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807
(W.D. Va. 2004); Williams v. Cullins, No. 5:18-CT-3366-FL, 2022 WL 948083, at *5 (E.D.N.C.
Mar. 29, 2022) (“Given the fact that there is no underlying constitutional violation, plaintiff’s
supervisor . . . claims against defendants . . . also lack merit.”); Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg,
W.Va., 81 F.3d 416, 420 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that absent an underlying constitutional
violation, a supervisory claim under § 1983 also fails). Thus, any claim based upon supervisory

liability fails as a matter of law.12
C. Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Docket
Entry 54 at 18-19.) Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982); see also Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from
personal-capacity liability for civil damages under § 1983[.]”). Thus, the traditional two-step

12 In any event, Plaintiff’s claims toward Defendant Dean Locklear are conclusory and
therefore would fail. See Thompson, 878 F.3d at 111 (affirming the grant of summary judgment on a
supervisory liability claim where inmate “only makes conclusory allegations without any specific
facts”).
qualified immunity inquiry requires a court to determine: “(1) whether the official violated a
constitutional right; and if so, (2) whether the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of its
violation.” Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 Fed. App’x 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation

omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a violation of a constitutional right. Instead, the
undisputed evidence illustrates that Defendants did not use excessive force during the June
2021 incident. Therefore, the undersigned concludes that Defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity. See Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 415 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[i]f
[an official] did not violate any right, he is hardly in need of any immunity and the analysis

ends right then and there”).
D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them in their official capacity
should be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Docket Entry 54 at 19-20.) The
Eleventh Amendment prohibits actions in federal court by individuals against a state unless
the state has consented to suit or unless Congress has lawfully abrogated the states’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). The doctrine
of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment applies not only to actions in which
the State of North Carolina is a named defendant, but also to actions against its departments,
institutions, and agencies. DeMurry v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 673 S.E.2d 374, 380-81 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009). Additionally, in North Carolina, “[a]ctions against officers of the State in their
official capacities are actions against the State for the purposes of applying the doctrine of

[sovereign] immunity.” Green v, Kearney, 203 N.C. App. 260, 268, 690 S.E.2d 755, 762 (2010)
(citation omitted). Indeed, “[w]here [Section 1983’s] provisions allow for suit against a
‘person,’ and in suits for money damages, neither the state nor a state agency is deemed a
‘person,’ [thus] this claim cannot be maintained by plaintiff against [the State].” Savage v. N.

Carolina Dep’t of Corr., No. 5:06-CV-171-FL, 2007 WL 2904182, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29,
2007). Additionally, compensatory and punitive damages are unavailable in official capacity
suits under § 1983. Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995).
Here, to the extent Plaintiff has filed suit against Defendants in their official capacities,
it would be against the NCDAC and the State of North Carolina. Green, 203 N.C. App. at 268,
690 S.E.2d at 762. Neither has consented nor waived immunity; therefore, any monetary

claims against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed.13 Floyd v. N. Carolina
Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:11-CV-80-RJC, 2011 WL 1499669, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 19, 2011) (“[T]he
Eleventh Amendment protects state employees acting in their official capacities from suits for
damages.”) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)); Kelly v. Maryland,
267 Fed. Appx. 209, 210 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (“It is now well settled that a state
cannot be sued under § 1983.”).

Plaintiff’s Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
Plaintiff also moves for partial summary judgment as to the issue of liability on the part
of Defendants’ alleged use of excessive force and failure to intervene in this matter. (Docket

13 Furthermore, to the extent prospective injunctive and declaratory relief is sought, (see Am.
Compl. at 17-18), such is relief is moot as Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at Scotland Correctional
Institution. See Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]s a general rule, a prisoner’s
transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with
respect to his incarceration there.”). Moreover, having found no constitutional violation, an official
capacity claim for injunctive relief also warrants dismissal. McMillan, 2016 WL 8674243, at *4.
Entries 46, 57.) As determined above and based on the facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, he has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment
should be granted in favor of Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motions should be denied.

See Grady v. McPhearson, No. 5:17-CT-3211-FL, 2020 WL 5821840, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30,
2020) (“Because the court has determined that, based on facts in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, he has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment on his claims, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment must fail.”), aff’d sub nom.
Grady v. McPherson, 840 F. App’x 745 (4th Cir. 2021); Polk, 2024 WL 1287372, at *15
(concluding that defendants’ summary judgment motion should be granted and plaintiff’s

cross motion be denied).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons sated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion
for Leave to File Video Exhibit Manually (Docket Entry 55) is GRANTED.14
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket Entry 53) be GRANTED, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment and “Plaintiff’s Request to Grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment”
(Docket Entries 46, 57) be DENIED, and this action be dismissed with prejudice.

/s/ Joe L. Webster
United States Magistrate Judge

February 12, 2025
Durham, North Carolina

14 As previously explained (see supra n.5), the video exhibit has already been received by the
Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10798777. Public record. Not legal advice.