# Delaney v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma

> District Court, N.D. Oklahoma · February 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10797955

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** February 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10797955

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the three-part test of deliberate indifference is a "workable" means for a factfinder "to determine whether a particular problem is likely to recur enough to alert [policymakers] to an obvious deficiency in the training"

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MICHAEL DELANEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 21-CV-544-GAG-SH

CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ, Circuit Judge.1
Before this Court are the following four motions: (1) Defendant City of Tulsa, Oklahoma's
("Defendant Tulsa") motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 56); (2) Defendant Aaron Russell
("Defendant Russell") motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 61); (3) Defendant Russell's
motion in limine (Dkt. No. 67); and (4) Defendant Tulsa's motion in limine (Dkt. No. 68). For the
reasons set forth herein, both motions for summary judgment are DENIED, Defendant Russell's
motion in limine is DENIED, and Defendant Tulsa's motion in limine is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from the March 21, 2020 shooting of Plaintiff Michael Delaney
("Plaintiff") by Defendant Russell, an officer at Tulsa Police Department ("TPD"). (Dkt. No. 56
at 7-8; Dkt. No. 61 at 8-9, 11-13; Dkt. No. 71 at 6-8; Dkt. No. 72 at 2-4.)

1 The Honorable Gustavo A. Gelpí, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, sitting by designation.
A. The Events of March 21, 2020
At approximately 1:15 a.m. on March 21, 2020, Coy Brown called 9-1-1 to report that a
red and white GMC Yukon had been stopped—for a long time and with its lights on—in the street
in front of the home at which Brown was located. (Dkt. No. 56 at 7; Dkt. No. 61 at 9; Dkt. No. 71
at 6; Dkt. No. 72 at 2-3.) Defendant Russell was the first officer to arrive at the scene, followed

shortly thereafter by Officers Andrew St. John ("Officer St. John") and Kevin Pentecost ("Officer
Pentecost"). (Id.) After having parked his patrol vehicle behind the vehicle that matched the
caller's description, Defendant Russell approached the driver's side of the suspect vehicle. (Id.)
Plaintiff, a Black male, was sleeping inside the vehicle. (Dkt. No. 56 at 8; Dkt. No. 61 at 10; Dkt.
No. 71 at 6; Dkt. No. 72 at 2.)
What occurred next is largely disputed by the parties. For its part, Defendant Tulsa
contends that, Defendant Russell shined his flashlight into the vehicle and observed various
disorganized tools and household items—a sign to him that crime was afoot. (Dkt. No. 56 at 7.)
After Defendant Russell reached the driver's side window, Defendant Tulsa says, he turned the
flashlight on Plaintiff and asked him to roll down the window. (Dkt. No. 56 at 8.) Plaintiff partially
opened the window. (Id.) From Defendant Russell's vantage point, Plaintiff appeared disoriented:
he had watery and bloodshot eyes, and his responses to Defendant Russell's questions appeared
slurred and incoherent. (Id.) At some point during the exchange, Defendant Russell was joined

at the driver's side window by Officer Pentecost. (Id. at 9.)
As Defendant Russell scanned the rest of the vehicle with his flashlight, Defendant Tulsa
contends, he noticed what he thought was a pistol grip and trigger of a handgun. (Id.) Although
Defendant Russell had no reason to believe that Delaney wrongfully possessed the firearm (which
was later identified as a pellet gun), he reacted by shouting "gun!"; drawing his weapon; and
ordering Plaintiff out of the car. (Id. at 8.) Because Plaintiff did not comply with that order,
Defendant Russell attempted to physically remove him. (Id.) Defendant Tulsa asserts that Plaintiff
resisted Defendant Russell by leaning away, putting the vehicle in drive, closing the door, and
driving off. (Id.) It is undisputed that Defendant Russell responded to Plaintiff's flight by
discharging his firearm, firing five rounds at the vehicle and striking Plaintiff's shoulder. (Id.)
Defendant Tulsa admits, Officer Pentecost was not in the way of Plaintiff's vehicle; instead, he

was approximately three feet away from it on the driver's side. (Id. at 9.)
Defendant Russell recounts the events differently. He contends that he responded to the
9-1-1 call because of his concerns about Officer Pentecost—the primary officer dispatched to the
scene. (Dkt. No. 61 at 9.) Defendant Russell asserts that Officer St. John shared his concerns
about Officer Pentecost, pointing to Officer St. John's testimony that Officer Pentecost was
"sloppy," lackadaisical," and someone who did "not tak[e] things very seriously." (Id. at 9.) And
Officer Pentecost, Defendant Russell asserts, acted in accordance with his low expectations during
the encounter with Plaintiff. (Id. at 11-12.) Defendant Russell indicates that Officer Pentecost
approached Plaintiff's vehicle with his hands tucked into his protective vest—an allegedly
"unsound tactical position"—and stood next to Defendant Russell but in front of the open driver's
side door. (Id.) So, as Plaintiff began to flee, Defendant Russell says, he thought—albeit
mistakenly—that Officer Pentecost was in danger of being hit by the vehicle. (Id. at 20.)
Defendant Russell further recalls that he could not see Officer St. John, which led him to believe

that Officer St. John, too, could be in danger. (Id.)
Plaintiff's perspective is, of course, distinct from that of both Defendants. Plaintiff asserts
that, at the beginning of the encounter, he did not know whether the men who approached his
vehicle were police officers. (Dkt. No. 71 at 6; Dkt. No. 72 at 5.) Moreover, he contends,
Defendant Russell's bright flashlight was disorienting and temporarily blinding. (Dkt. No. 71 at
7; Dkt. No. 72 at 6.) That confusion and disorientation, Plaintiff posits, is crucial context. He
asserts that he complied at first when he heard Defendant Russell draw his gun, yelling "Hands
up! Hands up!" (Id.) However, moments later, Defendant Russell ordered Plaintiff to "[g]et out
of the fucking car," and from Plaintiff's view, Defendant Russell lunged toward him. (Id.) Plaintiff
then said, "you going to shoot." Disoriented and believing that Defendant Russell was going to
kill him, Plaintiff began to flee. (Id.) He was then struck in the shoulder by one of Defendant

Russell's bullets.
B. Investigation and Charges
Following the events of March 21, 2020, Lieutenant Brandon Watkins of the Homicide
Unit conducted an investigation. (Dkt. No. 56 at 9.) After viewing the body-warn camera footage,
Lt. Watkins determined that there was no evidence to support a charge against Plaintiff for assault
and battery with a deadly weapon. (Id.)
Defendant Russell was also investigated. Following grand-jury proceedings, Defendant
Russell was indicted on a misdemeanor charge of Reckless Conduct with a Firearm, in violation
of 21 O.S. § 1289.11. (Dkt. No. 56 at 9; Dkt. No. 72 at 4.) Defendant Russell entered a plea of
no contest, admitting that the witnesses and evidence against him could prove the charge. (Dkt.
No. 56 at 10; Dkt. No. 72 at 4.) TPD's Internal Affairs division—specifically, its Deadly Force
Review Board—also reviewed the events of March 21, 2020. Finding Defendant Russell's conduct
to be out of compliance with TPD policy, TPD terminated Defendant Russell's employment. (Id.)

C. Procedural History
On December 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court, alleging claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act against both Defendants. (Dkt.
No. 2.) Following discovery, Defendants moved each moved for summary judgment and filed
motions in limine.
This Court turns first to the motions for summary judgment.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A
fact is only "material" for purposes of summary judgment if a dispute over that fact "might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248. A dispute is "genuine" if "the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The
dispute is not genuine if it merely involves "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsuhita Elec. Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "In applying this
standard, we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Wise v. Caffey, 72 F.4th 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp., 814 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016)).
B. Defendant Russell's Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant Russell moves for summary judgment on one ground: qualified immunity. "[A]
defendant's assertion of qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 results in a

presumption of immunity." Est. of Taylor v. Salt Lake City, 16 F.4th 744, 757 (10th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Bond v. City of Tahlequah, 981 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 2020), rev'd on other grounds,
595 U.S. 9 (2021) (per curiam)). To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff must show that: "(1)
the officer['s] alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly established at
the time of the violation, such that every reasonable official would have understood, that such
conduct constituted a violation of that right." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Russell violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizure. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Andersen v. DelCore, 79 F.4th 1153, 1163
(10th Cir. 2023) ("Excessive force claims arising out of a law enforcement investigation implicate
the Fourth Amendment and its protections against unreasonable seizures." (citation omitted)). "As
with all seizures, '[t]o establish a constitutional violation, the plaintiff must demonstrate the force

used was objectively unreasonable." Andersen, 79 F.4th at 1163 (quoting Est. of Taylor, 16 F.4th
at 759). To assess the reasonableness of an officer's use of force, courts employ a balancing test,
weighing the three nonexclusive factors originally propounded by the Supreme Court in Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): "[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Andersen, 79 F.4th at 1163 (quoting
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Courts must "assess the reasonableness of 'a particular use of force'
from 'the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight." Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97). In qualified immunity cases, however,
courts typically resolve factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, which "usually means
adopting . . . the plaintiff's version of the facts." Wise, 72 F.4th at 1205 (quoting Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)).
Here, genuine issues of material fact preclude this Court from finding that Defendant

Russell's use of force was reasonable. For instance, the body-warn camera footage does not resolve
any of the issues in Defendant Russell's favor, i.e., it does not conclusively demonstrate that
Defendant Russell reasonably feared that his or his fellow officers' lives were at risk. What is
more, the record evidence seems to suggest that Officer Pentecost was, in fact, not in imminent
danger from Plaintiff's flight. In any event, even if this Court were to give credence to Defendant
Russell's belief that either Officer Pentecost or Officer St. John was in harm's way, it would seem
counterintuitive to discharge his firearm five times in the direction where he believed his fellow
officer to be standing. In short, it is better left to a jury to decide whether Defendant Russell's use
of force was reasonable.
The inquiry does not stop there, however; the plaintiff must also "show that 'the
constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated were clearly established at the

time of the conduct at issue.'" Id. at 1208 (quoting Nelson v. McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th
Cir. 2000)). "To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation
in then-existing precedent." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 589 (2018). The rule
must be firmly settled, i.e., "[t]he plaintiff must show there is a 'Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit
decision no point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found
the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.'" Wise, 72 F.4th at 1208-09 (quoting Doe v. Woodard, 912
F.3d 1278. 1289 (10th Cir. 2019)). The precedent need not be "directly on point"; it need only
"involve[] 'materially similar conduct' or appl[y] 'with obvious clarity' to the conduct at issue."
Vogt v. McIntosh Cnty., Okla., Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs, 98 F.4th 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2024) (first
quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018); and then quoting Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864
F.3d 1071, 1076 (10th Cir. 2017)).
Here, Plaintiff has provided such clearly established precedent. The Tenth Circuit has held
that an officer's "use of deadly force to stop a fleeing vehicle is unreasonable unless there is an

immediate threat of harm to himself or others." Reavis Est. of Coale v. Frost, 967 F.3d 978, 995
(10th Cir. 2020). There are material factual disputes as to whether there was an immediate threat
of harm to Defendant Russell or his fellow officers. Indeed, the record evidence suggests that
neither Russell nor his fellow officers were in front of the moving vehicle. And, again, Defendant
Russell's decision to shoot in the direction of the vehicle—where, he claims, he believed his fellow
officers to be—undermines his position. This issue is best left to the jury to resolve.
Therefore, Defendant Russell's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 61) is denied.
C. Defendant Tulsa's Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant Tulsa moves for summary judgment, arguing (1) that Plaintiff's Monell claim
must fail because he cannot prove that a constitutional violation resulted from a city policy,
custom, or practice; and (2) that Plaintiff's negligence claim falters, too, because Defendant Russell

acted beyond the scope of his employment. This Court addresses each contention in turn and finds
them unpersuasive.
i. Monell Claim
To prevail on claim of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—i.e., a Monell claim—
a plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a municipal policy, practice, or custom by which the
plaintiff was denied a constitutional right, and (2) that said policy, practice, or custom was the
moving force behind the constitutional violation (i.e., "whether there is a direct causal link between
a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation"). City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 389 (1989). The Tenth Circuit has delineated several types of actions
that may constitute a municipal policy, practice, or custom:
(1) "a formal regulation or policy state"; (2) an informal custom
"amoun[ting] to 'a widespread practice that, although not authorized
by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well
settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law'"; (3)
"the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority"; (4)
"the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions—and
the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was
delegated subject to these policymakers' review and approval"; or
(5) the "failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long
as that failure results from 'deliberate indifference' to the injuries
that may be caused."

Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brammer-Hoelter v.
Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff pursues only a failure-to-train theory.2 Although the record is thin in support of
Plaintiff's position, this Court will permit the failure-to-train claim to proceed to trial.
To establish a failure-to-train claim under Monell, a plaintiff must put forth evidence of
three elements: (1) "the existence of a county policy or custom involving deficient training"; (2)

"the policy or custom's causation of an injury"; and (3) "the county's adoption of a policy or custom
with deliberate indifference." Lance v. Morris, 985 F.3d 787, 800 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Waller
v. City & Cnty of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2019)).
Here, Plaintiff has put forth sufficient proof for a reasonable juror to find in his favor. First,
the extent to which TPD trained Defendant Russell on when it is appropriate to approach and go
"hands-on" during vehicle stops—as opposed to retreat and wait for backup—is disputed. Indeed,
Defendant Russell that he was not adequately trained on how to approach this encounter. Thus, it
is best left for a jury to decide whether the training policies were, in fact, deficient. Second, the
record suggests that Defendant Russell's decision to grab hold of Plaintiff during the vehicle
extraction resulted in Plaintiff's flight, the risk to Defendant Russell's fellow officers, and in turn,

the shooting of Plaintiff. Third, although Plaintiff does not establish Defendant Tulsa's notice by
pointing to a pattern of similar misconduct, he does so by reference to his constitutional injury
which, he contends, is "highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality's
action or inaction." Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1241 (10th Cir.
2020) (quoting Waller, 932 F.3d at 1284). Put differently, police officers routinely conduct stops
of vehicles, and decisions to approach or to retreat and call for back up are highly likely to recur.

2 As such, Plaintiff has abandoned any claim based on the other policy or custom theories of Monell
liability. See Barre v. Ramsey, 601 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1064 (N.D. Okla. 2022) (holding that
plaintiff's failing to oppose motion for summary judgment with respect to a claim resulted in
abandonment of said claim).
Inadequate training in that context could very well lead to highly predictable constitutional
violations. As such, given the factual disputes as to the extent of training TPD provided its officers
in approaching vehicles and conducting extractions, this Court finds the question is better left to a
jury. See Lance, 985 F.3d at 802-03 (holding that the three-part test of deliberate indifference is a

"workable" means for a factfinder "to determine whether a particular problem is likely to recur
enough to alert [policymakers] to an obvious deficiency in the training").
ii. Negligence Claim
Defendant Tulsa moves for summary judgment, too, on Plaintiff's negligence claim.
Defendant Tulsa's only argument is that it cannot be held liable for Defendant Russell's actions
committed beyond the scope of his employment.3 This argument is unpersuasive.
Oklahoma law employs the following test to determine whether a law enforcement officer
acted within the scope of employment: "'liability exists for acts of officers that can be described as
abuses of lawful power' but not for 'an unlawful usurpation of power the officer did not rightfully
possess.'" Barnes v. United States, 707 F. App'x 512, 517 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (quoting
DeCorte v. Robinson, 969 P.2d 358, 361-62 (Okla. 1998)). "[C]onduct may be within the scope
of employment, even if it is unauthorized, if it is of the same general nature as that authorized or

is incidental to the conduct authorized." Id. at 518 (citation omitted). Importantly, an officer who
uses excessive force, although unauthorized to do so, may still be acting within the scope of
employment. See id. (explaining that under test adopted by Oklahoma courts, an officer who uses

3 Defendant Tulsa, a city, does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977) (explaining that Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts does not extend to counties or cities); see also
Mascheroni v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 28 F.3d 1554, 1559 (10th Cir. 1994), abrogated on
other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) ("[A]rms of the state
enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, whereas political subdivisions such as counties and cities
do not." (citations omitted)).
excessive force may still be acting within scope of employment).
Here, there is no dispute that Defendant Russell was acting within the scope of his
employment when he initially responded to the 9-1-1 call and began investigating the stopped
vehicle. Nor do Defendants seem to dispute that all of Defendant Russell's acts before firing his
weapon were conducted within the scope of his employment, even if contrary to policy. In

addition, Defendant Russell testified in his deposition that he acted in accordance with Defendant
Tulsa's policies during the encounter with Plaintiff. Given this record, this Court cannot say that
Defendant Russell's discharging his firearm during the course of performing his duties was beyond
the scope of his employment. See Tuffy's, Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City, 212 P.3d 1158, (Okla.
2009) ("Whether a police officer's actions were taken within the scope of employment is a jury
question unless only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts alleged."); cf. O'Shea
v. Welch, 350 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing a "volume of authority" for the proposition
that "scope of employment is generally a jury question").
III. MOTIONS IN LIMINE
"The purpose of the motion in limine is to aid the trial process by enabling the Court to rule
in advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely
set for trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial." Mendelsohn v. Sprint United
Mgmt. Co., 587 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1208 (D. Kan. 2008), aff'd, 402 F. App'x 337 (10th Cir. 2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure, such motions can streamline the trial process;
however, "a court is almost always better situated during the actual trial to determine the probative
value of evidence. For this reason, some courts defer making in limine rulings unless the 'evidence
is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.'" Id. (quoting Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T
Techs., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993)). This Court is guided by those familiar
principles in ruling on the motions below.
A. Defendant Tulsa's MIL
Defendant Tulsa seeks to exclude three pieces of evidence: (1) testimony suggesting that
Defendant Russell pleaded guilty to a charge of reckless use of a firearm only because the Chief
of Police promised him that he would keep his job; (2) testimony suggesting that terminating
Defendant Russell's employment was irrelevant; and (3) testimony or other documentary evidence

about unrelated lawsuits or claims against the City of Tulsa.
Plaintiff concedes the first two points, so this Court will grant Defendant Tulsa's motion in
limine in that respect. As to the evidence about other lawsuits or claims against the Defendant
Tulsa, this Court denies the motion without prejudice. Such evidence may be permissible at trial.
Plaintiff shall have until March 1, 2025, to file with this Court a brief list explaining, specifically,
the lawsuits he would like to address at trial, their relevance, and the legal bases for admitting the
lawsuits as evidence.
B. Defendant Russell's MIL
Defendant Russell's motion in limine requests exclusion of the following evidence: (1) any
evidence related to the criminal case; and (2) evidence of policy violations, which, he contends,
are not sufficient grounds for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court will likewise deny the
motion without prejudice. Defendant Tulsa and Plaintiff both oppose Defendant Russell's motion
and rightly observe that there are permissible purposes for the admission of the evidence that

Defendant Russell wishes to exclude. This Court will consider timely objections to the use of that
evidence at trial.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that both motions for
summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 56, 61) are DENIED, Defendant Russell's motion in limine (Dkt.
No. 67) is DENIED, and Defendant Tulsa's motion in limine (Dkt. No. 68) is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Russell and Tulsa may renew their
evidentiary objections when appropriate at trial, and this Court will consider such objections that
are timely raised; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff has until March 1, 2025, to file with this Court
a brief list explaining, specifically, the lawsuits he would like to address at trial, their relevance to

his claims, and the legal bases for their admissibility as evidence.
SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 11, 2025

s/ Gustavo A. Gelpí
GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ
United States Circuit Judge, Sitting by Designation

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10797955. Public record. Not legal advice.