# Florentino, E. v. Ramlochan, N.

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · February 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10797706

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 11, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Lazarus
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
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## Opinion text

J-A24014-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

ELBA FLORENTINO : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
NAIPAUL RAMLOCHAN : No. 32 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 27, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s):
002482-CV-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2025

Elba Florentino (Wife) appeals from the divorce decree, entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, following the court’s order denying

in part and dismissing in part Wife’s and Naipaul Ramlochan’s (Husband’s)

exceptions to the master’s report and recommendation. After our review, we

affirm based on the opinions authored by the Honorable C. Daniel Higgins, Jr.

The parties were married on September 10, 2015. They separated on

December 10, 2019. Wife filed a complaint in divorce on April 1, 2019, and

Husband filed an answer and counterclaim on February 26, 2020.

In March 2020, Husband filed a petition seeking exclusive possession of

the marital residence and an order to list the residence for sale. Husband had

purchased the residence prior to the marriage and it remained titled solely in

his name. Wife filed an answer to Husband’s petition. Thereafter, the parties

agreed to resolve the matter by permitting Wife a limited opportunity to
J-A24014-24

purchase the marital residence. On October 21, 2020, the trial court entered

an order giving Wife the right to purchase the marital residence for

$230,000.00 on or before December 1, 2020. In the event that Wife did not

effectuate the purchase, the court would order Husband be given exclusive

possession of the home and promptly list the house for sale.

On November 9, 2020, Wife filed a petition to amend the divorce

complaint to add a claim for common law marriage, alleging that she and

Husband had entered into a common law marriage in New York as of

December 20, 1992, on her seventeenth birthday. The trial court held a

hearing. Following the hearing, the court determined that Wife failed to meet

her burden of proof to establish a common law marriage. See Order, 7/19/21;

Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/21, at 4-6.

Wife was unable to obtain to obtain financing and, therefore, she failed

to purchase the marital residence by December 1, 2020, in accordance with

the court’s October 21, 2020 order.

On January 26, 2022, Husband requested the appointment of a divorce

master. Following a hearing, the divorce master issued a report and

recommendation on January 12, 2023. Both parties filed exceptions, which

the court denied or dismissed, and the court entered a divorce decree adopting

the master’s recommendations. Wife filed this timely appeal, and both Wife

and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Wife raises two issues for our review:

-2-
J-A24014-24

1. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in failing to
find that the parties were validly considered to be married
in a common law marriage in 1994?[1]

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of
law in accepting the Master’s recommendation that included
his undervaluation of the Husband’s 401[k] Pension with
Verizon, thereby denying [Wife] equitable distribution on
the true value of the asset, which is not a fair and equitable
distribution?

Appellant’s Brief, at 3.

First, Wife argues she and Husband entered into a common law marriage

on December 20, 1992, despite the fact that in her complaint in divorce Wife

averred the parties were married in 2015. See Complaint, 4/1/19, at ¶ 4

(“The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married on September 10, 2015, in

Reeders, Pennsylvania.”) (emphasis added).2 Notably, at the master’s

hearing on December 27, 2022, Wife testified on direct examination that the

date of the marriage was September 15, 2015, that she and Husband were

married in Monroe County, and that she and Husband separated on December

10, 2019. See N.T. Master’s Hearing, 12/27/22, at 9-10. Additionally, there

is no dispute that, prior to marrying Wife, and during the time that Wife claims

she and Husband were in a common law marriage, Husband was married in
____________________________________________

1 Wife’s statement of issues and argument asserts 1994 as the year a common

law marriage was established, however in her testimony she gave the
December 20, 1992 date. See Hearing on Wife’s Petition to Amend Complaint,
3/5/21, at 11-12. Based on our disposition, we find this discrepancy
immaterial.

2 In his Answer and Counterclaim, Husband admitted to this averment.
See
Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint in Divorce and Defendant’s
Counterclaim in Divorce, 2/26/20, at ¶ 4.

-3-
J-A24014-24

New York City on December 11, 2001, to Yanniris A. Fortuna, and was divorced

on November 19, 2003. Further, Wife acknowledged that Husband’s words to

her on her seventeenth birthday were a “proposal,” and, thus, did not

establish the relationship of husband and wife. See Staudenmayer v.

Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1020-21 (Pa. 1998) (party alleging common

law marriage “must show by clear and convincing evidence that the couple

came to an `express agreement’ – or verba in praesenti – `uttered with a

view and for the purpose of establishing’ the marital relationship.”) (citation

omitted). See also id. at 1020 (common law marriage “can only be created

by an exchange of words in the present tense, spoken with the specific

purpose that the legal relationship of [a marital partnership] is created by

that” exchange).3

After our review of the certified record on appeal, we conclude that the

evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Wife failed to establish

a common law marriage by clear and convincing evidence. Staudenmayer,

supra; Perrotti v. Meredith, 868 A.2d 1240, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2005). We,

therefore, find no merit to Wife’s claim of common law marriage.

____________________________________________

3 Effective January24, 2005, the General Assembly amended the Domestic
Relations Code to abolish common law marriage, but the legislature provided
that common law marriages lawfully entered into on or before January 1, 2005
would continue to be recognized. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103, as amended by
Act of Nov. 23, 2004, P.L. 954, No. 144.

-4-
J-A24014-24

In her second issue, Wife claims the court erred in accepting the

master’s recommendation of the valuation of Husband’s 401(k). We find no

error.

It is within the province of the trial court to weigh the evidence and

decide credibility and this Court will not reverse those determinations so long

as they are supported by the evidence. Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 822 A.2d

732, 742 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2003). Further, “a master’s report and

recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest

consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of witnesses, because

the master has the opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and

demeanor of the parties.” Moran v. Moran, 839 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Pa. Super.

2003) (citing Simeone v. Simeone, 551 A.2d 219, 225 (Pa. Super. 1988).

See also Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455–56 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Here, the only objective evidence introduced to prove the value of the

401(k) account was the statement attached to Husband’s pretrial

memorandum, which showed the balance of the account as $65,014.74 at the

date of separation. See Husband’s Objection to Wife’s Pretrial Statement,

4/20/22, Exhibit C (statement period 1/10/15-12/04/19). Wife failed to

present any evidence indicating otherwise. See Master’s Hearing, supra at

12 (Wife testifying she has no documentation to indicate value of Husband’s

401(k)). Wife seeks to have us reweigh and reassess the evidence. That is

not our function.

-5-
J-A24014-24

The trial court’s determination is free from legal error and is supported

by the evidence. We, therefore, affirm the divorce decree based on the

opinions authored by Judge Higgins. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/21, at 3-

7; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 2/26/24, at 7-8. We direct the parties to attach

a copy of those opinions in the event of further proceedings.

Decree affirmed.

Date: 2/11/2025

-6-
Received 1/15/2024 10:50:33 AM Superior Court Eastern District

Filed 1/15/2024 10:50:00 AM Superior Court Eastern District
32 EDA 2024
IN TI"i[ COURT OF CCIMMCIN FLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY-THIRD JUNICIAL NI$TRICT
COMMONWEA LTH OT PEhINSYLVANIA

HLBA FL,CIRENTINO.
No.24B2 CV 2019
l.Jo. 318 nR ?S19
Plairrtiff,

I,,J A I PA U L RA|'|/! LCIC I-.IAI.J,

DIVORCE HXCEPT]iSNiS
Deferrdarrt

SRDfR
ANn NOW lf rrs l? I 'rt-i;j'i ,-,i f'J;::",yi)il:r:f ;jil:1.j aiter r:lrilr,jrralic:rr i;{ tl

ltitC,liiit|ri:ilt.:;jrtnr]llartsr:lipttlli':lt,1;.:::.'.rrsFii..l1'tt',ii;.lltilR*lL.l;

cri:i.li:ttlrig ;rr"ill afr]itiitcnts rn thrs rl,li',r:r lT lS ORnIRED:

BY THT COURT:

t'
. ..-i..-.'*--*-,i*-:-
C" nANlEt Hlccit{$, JR., Judge
c(: Sl:illl fu4 Arliir [sc lvl.lsl,,,rl
ilrrltcv,; J Kelsock lri [::til
iilett ,l ilrege I Isq
CC}UP.T CF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE CCUNTY
FORTY.TI-{IRD JUDIC IAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PEilINSYLVANIA

ELBA FLORENTII.IO, l.lc. 2482-CV-20"f s
No.318 DR 2g1g
Plaintiff,
IN NIVORCH

NAIPAUL RAMLOCHAN,

Defendant.

ORDER

AND Now this 19th dav of July, 2azj, folrowing a hearing in whir;h
both
parties appeared and were represented h.,y .;,"1p5e1,
lT ls oR.DERED the petitiori oi
Plaintiff for Leave to Amenc Her complaint in Divorce is
DENIED

BY THE COURT:

C. DANIEL .iudge

cc. AnCrew Katsock, Esq
Breit Riegei Esq.
lN Tl'lE couRT oi:.coMMoN pLEAs
oF MoNRoE
FoRry-THTRD JUDrcrAr- orsinici- couNw -
c omniro NwEALTH or pnN
Nsvlvar,la

ELBA FLORENTINO.
NO.2482.CV.201e
plaintiff, Np, 318 DR 2019
vs,
NAIPAUL RAMLOCHAN.

Defendant.

oRpEg
AND NOW, this 1Orn day of March,
2021 ,foflowing an evidentiary
heiaring on
the Plaintiff's Emergency Petition for
speoial Refief, ancl the court determining
Plaintiff has not shown good cause that
existing to gqant the rerief reguested,
lT ls ORDERED the Emergency
Petition for Special Relief is DENIED.
lr ls FURTHER oRDERED Plaintiff shall
be permitted to retrieve herclothing
and other personal property and effects
from the residerrce owned by De.l,endant
located at 308 Appenzelt rerrace,
stroudsburg, pennsytvania, plaintiff,s
rr."trieval
shall be upon a single occaeion for
a maximum period of one (1) hour
and shall be
scheduled by providing Defenclant or
Defendant's attorney at teast forty
eight (48)
hours advance ttotice of the time and
date of such personal property retrievar.
Plaintiff shall perform this retrieval on
or before March Bi, 2021, unless extended
by mutual agre€ment of the parties,

BY THE COURT:

Lr->*t
C. DANIEL Hi
O
cc, \Brett J. Riegel, Esq,
Andrew J. Katsock, lll, Eso,

P
a!:catij*i,!r.,fri;,rPf l.:iiiL,.,.1:eiy;:i'+t; l:irrr'*lrri.r*i -ll. ?0.r:, .:! I$il,i

IN THT COURT OF COMMCIN PLEA$ OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY-THIRL] JUDICIAL DI$TRICT
COMIVIONWEALTH OF PEN NSYI*VAN IA

f;LBA FLORHNTINS"
No. 248? CV ?ilI9
No. 318 DR ?$19
Plaintiff.

hJAIPAUL ftAMLOCHAN-

: DIV0RCE LX{:EPTIONS
Def* nda rrt"

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1'{
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PEN NSYL\IANIA

ELBA FLORENTINc, No.2482-CV-20i9
No.318 DR 2019
Plaintiff,

IN DIVORCE
NAIPAUL RAMLOCHAI\!,

Defendant.

oPtNtoN
Before this court is the Petition of the Plaintiff, Elba
Florentino (,,wife,,),
seeking leave to amend the complaint in Divorce for
the sore purpose of a<Jdinc a
claim for common law marriaqe.

I. BACKGROUND
wife anci Defendant, Naipaul Ramlochan (,,Husband") are alleged
by,i//ife io
have met in high school and later started a romantic relationship.
she assets that
on December 20, 1992 they entered a common law marriage
while living in New
York state The parties' relationship in subsequent years
bore three ci.iildren,
Arnanda Angelica, and Alyssa, born respectivelv in 1996,
2000 , and2002.

on December 11 , 2001, Husband married an individual narned yanniris
A.
Forluna at a ceremony performed at the office of
the city clerk in Bronx Borough
of New York City. Husband later divorced from Ms. Fortuna
on November 1g, 2003.
Years later, on September 10,2015, wife and Husband
were married during a
marriage ceremony held in Reeders, Pennsylvania. wife
filed a complaint iri
Divorce on April 1,2019. !-{er Compiaint solely alleges the
ciiecl mari.iaqe of the
parties during 2015 and is devoid
of any claim of the exisience of the cited ccmmon

lair" rnar-rlage. on February 26, 202a, Husband
fileci an Answer to the llivorce
Cr:mplaini. triciuding a Counterclairn irr Divorce

The lnstant Petition of VVife to amend the Divorce Complaini
was tiied on
Ncvember I , 2a20 - Later, on Novem ber 17 , 2020, Husband
fiied an Answer to the
Fetition denying the existence of a common law
marriage. \ffife filed a Request fcr
a riearing on Deceinbei 15, 2020. Tfrereafter, f.:liowirrg two continuarces
of the
hearing requested by the panties, we held an evidentiary
hssping with the parties
and their counsei on Marcfr 5.2021 The pariies have
submitted briefs anc v,re are
now i'eady tc rule in this matter.

il. BrssusslqN

Although common law marriage has been abrogated by
statr_rte in this
Commonlvealth since 2005, an exception exists if a common
law nrarriage began
on or before January 1, 2005. 23 pa C S A
S 1 103. Tl^rus, follovu!ng the evidentiary
hearing in this matter", our analysis is focused on whether
evidence exists
establishing a common law mar.riage.

Even before it was abolished in 2005, corrtrnon law marriage
was gerierally
disfavored in Pennsylvania, ancj a narty alleging the existence
of a ccmriorr law
rnarriage bears a "heavy burden." Sfa
,v14 A.2d 1A16,
1020 (Pa 19gB). Wherr an attempt is maCe to establish
a marriage without the
Lisuaj formaliijes, the ciairr'i must be vreweci with "great scruiiny.'Fsrare
cr_earte!,
.159
A.3d 970 (Super. Ct 2017)

-lhere
are two ways in which a party can prove the exisience clf r ccmil-rcr-r

latv nrarriage. Geirerally, the nariy alleging ihe conrmon la,,v
rnar-riage must shcw bV

cleai" and convincing evioence that the couple came to an 'expi"ess
agreement,' -
o( verDa trt praesenfi - "uttered with a vie'r.,anC for the pui"pose of establishing"
the
rnarital relaiionship. staucienmaver, at1020-21. pennsyivania law
also provitjes for
a reilui:tacia pi"t-'sum;tir-'rn of a comi-non lavr marria5ie ihai rnay be raised
wherre the

oroponent of the rnarriage demonstrates (i) constant cohabitaticn
by the pariies anci
(ill a reputation of marriage "which is not partial or divided
but is broad and
general." $tay.d.e1uBypi, V14 A.2d at 1020-21 (citation
omitted); see a/so Fs tate nr

*rte! 159 A.3d 970 (Super. Ct. 20.j7)
Hovriever, this rebuttable presumpiion is ,,is one of necessity
to be applied
only'in cases... [where there is an] inabilitS, io present cjirect testlmonv reg;arding

the exchange of v,erba rn praesenti.,' SlaAieUreyet, 714 A.2d at 1021(citation

omitteC).

V/here the parties are available tc testify r-egarding verha iri praesenfr,
the
burden rests wiih the party claiming a corrlmcn l;:w rnarriage to produce
clear ancj
convinciirq evidence of the exchange of woi'ds in the present tense spoken
wiih the
pLlrpose of establishing the relationship of husbancl and
wife, in other wor<Js. ihe
mari'iaqe contract In those sitr,rations, the reburttable presumption irr favor
of a
common law marrtaqe upon sufficient proof of constant cohabitation ancj
reputatron
for marriage, does rrot arise. tcl ai 1A21.
i,'ere, following our analysis of ihe evideniiary record, we finC Wife
clici not
rireei her burden of provlng blr clear arid coniirncing evidence
il-re exlstence clf a
comrnon ia';'; rnarriage. Th!s result folloivs Wife's restimorry whrc!.:
r,vas devcic r_.rf the

excirange of words in the present tense foi- the puil-r63g
of establishinu the
reiationshrp of husbarrcl and wife.

At the hearing in this ntatter, Vr/ife r,vas questionec byr her atiorney
ai:out tne
daie on which she believed she mari-ieci Fiusband via comi.ncn iaw
mar;-izroe. as;
foiicivs"

Q: Can you _tell Judge Higgins anci Attor-neyr Riegel wlrat date r/otr locli6y..1
Vou married iVlr- Remlochan?
A: Decenrber20, lgg2.

t l.
Decembei"2A, igg7?
Yes.

n Okay. Anrj he proposect tc Vou on that cjate?
'/es. He proposecj and i-re celebrate my birthday.

G; !'t/ell, let's see, when he proposed to vcu, lvhar clid he
say to ycu?
He askei rilc ir' i coulci be il:. v,,ife _

0 Okay
-- and I said, yes.

AnC you saicl, yes'?

I gJ-
\,1 Aricj djc voLr say. Ves to being his wife'i
Yes.

Anc again, ihe daie was Decernber Z0,1gg1,?
Vpq

Q' An'j r'vhy do vo{-l rernember thai date, sc specificailv. besrdes
il-re fact thaf
[rir. Ranrlochan askeC yr:u ro niarrv him?
A: V\ie celebi-ate my birthcJav

Itj
'i'pi:' 1i-12
'fl/ife's iesttmonv. if believec, is that at rnost on the ciate
ai: issr_re
Husband nrade a proposal to r,'Vife tc be mari'ieci
at some point in the fr-rture. ,Abserrt
frorri her testinionv is "the exchange of words in
the present tense for tire pur-pose
cf estabrishing rhe rerationship of husbancj and
wife." sfaudel.;2/er, at 1a21, citing
Commonweatth v Wilspn,54 j pa. 429,672 A.2a
293 (pa. 1996) As is iui-thei-
evldent fr-om wife's iestirnonv of the citeci conversation,
even if she herself believeci
at that ntomeni she 'rya:s married, tlrere was no testimony
offered to confi"m ti-ie
present acknovvledgement of a marriage
having ,:)ccLirreo betuleen the oariies.

fulcrecver, wife presenteci the testinrony of
her cjaughter, Amanda Mai-ia
RanrlOchan. i,t'ho ock:roir,,iedged tnat her mother,
being wife, ,,!vas propose,J ic in
1u32 " see i\j -i- p zig ii is aiso significant
that wife adrnitted thai other th:rn hei-
claims tr',' getting rnarriecj to Husbancl on Deceni*her.
2C, 1gg2 by way cf comnroir la,rr.,
rilai"riaoe, tlie oniy oihei'cate s!'re acknowle<jged
mar-rying Husband was thr: clate
stated irr her o'iginar divorce conrpraini, being septembe
r ia, 20i5. N.T at p. 34.
Thus, no evidence was presentecj that what wife
described in her testimonv as a
pi'oposai tn 1992 ever iesulted in a later consummation
of the proposai iri the
succeeding months or years thereaiter.

As we find the party alieging the cf,rrp6po" lavr,, mar;-ragle.
v'Vife, \,vas a\,,arlabl*a

ai'lcj prcvidec testimo;'t1; Lrltinrateiy failing tr: provicle clear
arrd convincrng evrcience

of ari express agreemeni of marflaEe. tirere is no i"eascn for
the couri lc firrlher
analyze yrhethei' Wife has raisecj a rebuttable presumption
of marriaqe b),
provl!'19 constant cohabttation and a reputation
of mai"riage yrhich is not r:ar1al cr
ciivi''-eij bLrt is broi'id etnd genei-ai. lf a putaiive spouse
wr-io is abie io testifv arr,:j feiis

to prove, by ciear anci conrrincing evidence, the esiabiishment of
ihe nierrriage
contract through th-' exchange of verba irt praesr:nfi
then ihat party has ri,rt rlet rts
''heavyr" burclen
to prove a comnrori iaw marrjaqe. since he or she rloes not
en,oy
any presiJrnptiorr basec.i c'rri erricience o,' ccnstant cohabitatron
and reputairori of
irrari'riage. Stattdenmayer, at 1021, citing Fierce
v. pierce, 3SS pa. 175,1g1 , 4{i A.2d
346.349 (1946)

III. CONCLUSION

As Plaintiff has not net her burden of proving a common laur
marriag:, her'
petition must be denied. we enter the followinq
cri"der.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PI.EAS OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

ELBA FLORENTINO, NO. 2482-CV-2019
NO. 318 DR 2019
Plaintiff.
VS"

NAIPAUI- RAMLOCHAN,

Defendant.

ORDER

AND NoW this 21't day of Octobe r,2a2O, following a hearing on the
Deferrdant,s
Petition for Exciusive Fossession of the Nlarital Residence, and
the pl;aintiff,s
responses theretc, lT lS ORDERED:

1 ' On or before December , 2020, Piaintirr shall have the right to purcherse the
1

marita! residentiai property locateci at 308 Appenzell Terrace.
Strouclsburg,
Fennsylvania frorn ihe Defendant, based upon the foliowing terms:
A. The purchase price shali ne $230,000. wiih an initial deposit
toward the purchase price of no iess than $100 such deposit
shali be held in escrow by Defendant's counsel untii setlement
to be appiied to the purchase: shoulci settiement not occur anv
deposits shali be prompilv i.eturned to piaintiff
B. At time of setilemeni, the following rtems, if outstanding and
unpaid, will be prorated on a daily basis between plaintiff
and
Defendant: current property taxes, curnent homeowner,s
association fees (if applicable), current water and/or sewer fees.
along with any other municipal lien able service fees. Any such
applicable unpaid charges will be prorated for the period(s)
covered should either party have previously paid the current
year's propefty taxes, there shail be no reimbursement
of such
payment to such party
c" Defendant shari not encumber the tiile to
the property, and the
conveyance frorn Defendant to plaintiff shail
be bv a fee simple
deecj of special warranty prepared by Defencjant.
D. This conveyance shail be exempt from the requirements
of the
Real Estate seiler Discrcsure Law, 6g Fa.c.s.bs710.i
-Ts1?.
E. Plaintiff is purchasing tfre prrcperty ,,as is, l,riith ail fauris.,,
F. The nei proceecrs of such purchase shari be praced in escro,a,for
rJrst'ioution upon resolutron of the ciivcrce
action of il-re pa,,ties.
2' In the event Plaintiff does not purchase the martial residential propedy
on
oi' before December 1, 2020, Defendant shalr be
entiiled to excrusive
possessicn of the property after such
date. Upon taking excrusive
possession of the property, Defendant
shall promplv list the same foi- sale
at a listing price of no less than $230,000 with a qualified
Fennsylvania
licensed realtor at a standard realtor,s commission.
Upon the sare of the
propefiy' the net proceecJs of sucl-r saie shail
Lie piaceo irr escro,* for
ciistribution ,pon iesolurtion of the drvorce action
of thr-, pariies.

BY THE COURT:

i;E;l
e-mffi
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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

FLORENTINO ELBA, : No. 002482-CV-2019
:
Plaintiff/s, :
:
vs. :
:
RAMLOCHAN :
NAIPAUL,
Defendant/s :
:
:

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF (ORDER)(JUDGMENT)(VERDICT)(OPINION AND ORDER)

NOTICE IS GIVEN UNDER PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
236(a)(2) THAT AN (ORDER)(JUDGMENT)(VERDICT)(OPINION AND ORDER) WAS
ENTERED IN THIS CASE ON February 28, 2024.

GEORGE J. WARDEN, Prothonotary

By:_________________________
Michelle Warsaw

cc: ANDREW KATSOCK, ESQ
BRETT J RIEGEL, ESQ
Circulated 01/15/2025 03:43 PM
t•90r ?; qP CUttnty Pr(1ihcJr' ;':i; y
;'
eiNuver ne. 21. 20'_- L'-' 4:18 PM
,

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

ELBA FLORENTINO,
No. 2482 CV 2019
No. 318 DR 2019
Plaintiff,

NAIPAUL RAMLOCHAN,

DIVORCE EXCEPTIONS
Defendant.

OPINION

This matter is before the Court on exceptions to the divorce masters

report and recommendation filed by Plaintiff Elba f-lorentino ( Wife) and separate

exceptions also filed by Defendant, Naipaul Ramlochan ( Husband).

By way of background, Vlife and Husband were ma med on

September 15. 2015 in I`vllonroe Col nty. Pennsylvania A complaint in divorce was

filed by Wife agair!st. Husband an April 1 2019. Their date of separation ,
vas

December 10, 2019 as agreed by the parties at the time of the divorce masters

hearing jr) this matter A n-aster sherring was he id by alternative comr7•unications

te-hndogy before the divorce rr1aster on Decer7lber 2i.2022, wh.ch was atteanded

by t;he partie s and their respe ctive counsel The master's report and

recommendation was filed on January 12. 20'2.3. Both Wife arrd Husband filed

exceptions, respectively, on February 1, 202.3, and February 24. 2023.

The oral argurnent on the exceptions was initially scheduled for April

21. 2023. however, upon the Court being made aware by the parties that the
hea~ing transcript had yet to be completed, the Court rescheduled the oral ,argument

to commence on June 2, 2023

After considering tyre record in this matter, including the hearing

transcript, the master's report, and the exceptions and arguments of the parties

counsel we are ready to decide this matter

DISCUSSION

When determining exceptions to the divorce master's

recommendations the court Must first exarr:ine the Master's reao;~ in

Pennsylvania. aMaster's report ; sonly advisory however it is to be given full

consideration especially in regards to the question of the credibility of witnesses

because of the Master's opportunity to observe and assess the behavior of the

witness. Mot -
an v. Marao 839 A.2d 1001. 1095 ( Pa Super, 2003). A revievAng

court is not bound by the Master sreport and it does riot come to the Court with any

preponderate weight or authority that must. be overcoarie. ROthfrck v. Rofhrick 765

A.2d 400 404 ( Pa. Super- 2000) Even if the; evi : ence before the Nilaster is

adegr_.rate to support the recommendation, atrial court is not required to adopt it.

Ei ing v Ewing, 84:3 A.2d 1282 1286 Pa. Sniper 2004) While a master sreport is

advisory only it is given great deference F=ior;lli v Fiornl,i, 198 A.2d 369 , Pa Sl-rper

1964) A court will though affirm the master srecommendation if ; tis supported by

the record.

Wife filed 12 ExcePtions to the Masters report. All of which will be

addressed hereunder segUentially f=urther after addressing Wife's exceptions we

will also thereafter address Husbands exceptions ,COrisecutively.

2
1 Me contends she has reserves aticjttt to supplf,rnant exceptions

Wife's first exception asserted her right to supplement her exceptions with

additional or more comprehensive exceptions forthwith after her receipt. of the

hearing transcript as the same had not been received before the time required to file

exceptions Such initial exception is hereby dismissed as moot as Wife never

sought 'if) supplement tier exceptions follov:ing completion of the hearing transcript

2 Wife corttencIs the iriasi r-erred iii* farting to find that that Elha Flcrentino

and Nail)aul Ramkach<an b:-ete parties to acomenon law marritaye

The Court previously ruled upon and denied this claim of common, law

marriage by Wife in its opinion and order dated ,July 19. 2.021 Therefore. this issUe

is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. or claim preclusion. which prohibits parties

involved in prior, concluded litigation frorn subsequently asserting claims in a later

action that were raised. or could have been raised. in the previous adju- i.c•ltiorI

Linton v W C.A.B (AiTicast Indus. Corp.). 991 A,2d 376 ( Pa.Cmwlth. 2010;

As such this exception denier.!.

3 Wife contertcis ttte master erred in failing to equitrahly dmde marital
property of the prarfif•s haled upon aco ninon law rnarnage

Supra, this exception is denied

4. Wife contends the ntatite► erred in boar ;nliar:,and fact in tit OervahnItg the
Husbands 407(k) 1)ension with Ve►izon

Wife argues the inaster erred by undervaluing an asset held by Husband

described by Wife in her exceptions as a "401(k) pension." I►nport.antly. in the

evidence presented in this action an asset known as a -401(k) pension does not

exist. Ttie hearing showed two separate and distinct financial instruments exist

3
the Verizon Pension and the Vernon 401(k) plan. When the U-lrfe notes a401(k)

pension in this exception, it is unclear what she is referring to. The Court hesitates

to address this exception because of the lack of specificity. Wife sinstant exception

could refer to either the 401(k) plan or the Verizon pension plan.

However. concerning the evidence, the limited assets derived front

Husband semployinent included a401(k) plan and aVerizon pension plan. At the

time of the masters hearing, the parties through their counsel stipulated to VV;fe's

receipt of a portion of FLIlsband sVerizon pension plan through HusbandFS

obligation to implement a Qualified Domestic Relations Orde., in order to fully

resolve: this issue Such stipulation was also contained in the master's report and

recommendation.

Thius, presurning in this exception that Wife meant ;A01 ( k) plan' rattler than

the already stipulated Verizon pension plan. we will deem it to be such. and 1"e1'

following analysis applies. At the master's hearing. Wife was questioned ry her

counsel as to vdh;;ther she agreed with the value of the Husbands 401(k) pram cat

time of sr_parat on. as stated by Husband, being SG5..014 74 Wife disagreed with

such value, claiming the accurate value of the 4u1(k) plan was 5400.000.00. She

furtner ciaime ; HUsbaind had a loan against the 401(k) plan ri ttie alTIOUT1t of

$200 000 00 Wife thereafter admitted she had no documentation to present the

master to corroborate either of her cited contentions as to the value of the 401(k)

plan or a loan Husband had taken against the plan Notably. however. Wife

requested the master recommend she be awarded fifty percent of the value of the

401(k) plan.

4
Subsequently :Wife upon cross-examination admitted that in her pre-trial,

statement she asserted that hiusband s401(k) plan was worth $ 500,000.00. Further

upon cross-examination, Wife agreed that the statement of I-iusband's 401(k) plan

received from Verizon as attached to t-lusband spre-trial staterent co il' it the

same account balance information claimed by Husband being S65.014.74

1hIp master iii his report ultimately found mat the testimony and other

evidence established the 401( k) plan had a valur e of 58.217.32 on the date -of the

par{.es' mairia•ae an $65.014 74 at tine date of see arat!on 1• thereupon foi,lnd an

increase: in value during the marriage. being the marital portion subject to equitable

distribution of 556.7 07.42 Also, to the ber1efit of VVife. the master was persuaded

by bVife scontention that the marital portion of the: plan should not be reduced by

payments husband had made against Husband's cited loan against the: plan

This Court agrees v•,rith the master's conclusions in regards to the valuation of

the 401(k) plan and his decision not to reduce such value by the loan against such

plan. The only portion of vie accot.rnt subject to =•.gijitable distribtitrorl is the

increase(! value, accrued during the marriage 23 Pa.C.S §§ 3501(a). ( a 1)

Significantly. in this irlsttance the report must be (.1
,ver) full consideration since the

master had the oppoitunity to fully oi,,serve the i an;; demeanor of the

witnesses in this matter toward making credibility determinations. .
Moran :supra

As such. this exception is denied.

5. Me contends the master erred in the entire; structure of his proposed
equitabte distribution scheme in ! trot the masterattlarded Husband rnost of a// the
liquid assets of the nrrrrlage all(I Wife ::ugly ivith fixed assets

5
Initially. ais notable that this exception by VVIfe appears misplaced as the

divorce master's report and recommendation did not award only fixed assets to

Wife, but also clearly awarded her liquid assets=. Separately if this exception is

premised upon Wife's prior exceptions concerning the existence of acommon law

mar!iage between the parties, this exception is denied for the reasoning set forth

previ0LJSiy ► t) section► 2of this Opinion.

Nonetheless. we will address this exception deeming it to be achallenge to

the rnast{ , ' sproposed equitable distribution schu ne In his ; eport the: waster drev.,

attention to three issues of equitable distribution of assets which required h:s

decision since at the time of the master's hearing the parties agreed by stipulation

to have aQualified Domestic Relations Order prepared for division of the HuS") ano s

pension. First. the Verizon 401(k) Man, second. the former marital residence: and

third. the motor vehicles of the parties.

The master determined the marital portion of the Verizon 401(k) plan to be

555,79 7 42. as addressed previously in section 11 he►eln As far as the r;lartial

residence was concerned, similar to Husband s4i 1(k) plan. the master determined

liquid asset. S

current asset. ::a ...... :3: 1'E?:1.. •. _
ltiL , :'i°:. . . ' c rhr'l'.. •r:..,•

6
that the only portion of the ;Marital residence subject to egUitable distribution would

be any increase in value that accrued during the marriage. See 23 Na.C.S. §§

3501(a), ( a. 11. The residence was sold during the pendency of the divorce

following the previous order of the Court determining a common law marriage did

not exist The sales proceeds of the residence are currently held i . escr^w for later

distributionl We find under the evidence presented the Maser prop"erly assessed

the increase of valu(•• that was attributable to the approximately four-year marital

term from. Suptember 15. 2015 until December 10 2019. beinc S5,000.00

Thus. ti ,,« master found the total rnantal estate to be distributed from the

cited two assets was 561.797.42. The master recom.m.ended suciI total should be

divided upon a basis of fifty percent to Wife and afifty percent to husband. In

making this deterrYaination, the master took in to account the relatively short duration

of the marriage of approximately four years and three months.

t_astly :when determining other rema in ing assets of value that were ire

existence, the evidence: snowed there were two r C;tor vehicles from the marriage.

'rhe master split them essentially on the same distribution basis since each party

retainer: the vehicle in their respective possession anti renaa nee responsible for any

obi.gations tier to sLIcti vehicles

After Eava'u_atIIIg the evi dence presen ted at t.ie haaring in this matter as well,

as the master s report and recommendation. this Court finds no error in the

distribution scheme of such marital assets. Accordingly this exception is denied.

7
6 Wife ca►tends the master erred by deletimni►;g the Husband had rnet his
burden of proof

Upon review of the hearing transcript and the masters report and

recommendatio;,, the Court is entirely unaware of any finding or other determination

by the master that l-lrrisband had met his burden of proof. This exception is Without

merit and is denied

7 Wife Co! &-,/ fire 17iastel .et ed in fri, tit ig to cottstdet all of the eviJe:`tice
conceitnii(I the factors set forth in Section 350.'2(a) of the Divoice code when makintf
his equitable disttjbUtiotr clefertnination

A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an equitable dstributlor,

award. Bitrbaket v. Brubaker, 201 A.3d 180, .
184 ( citation omitted). In making its

decisior, regarding equitable distribution, the trial court must cor cider at least tit:

eleven factors enumerated in 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a) lsralsky v. /sralsky. ,
824

A.2d 1178. 1101 ( Pa. Super 2003). However. there is no standard formula

guiding the division of marital property and the Method of distribution de. reps

from the facts of the individual case Wang v. Ff ng. 888 A 2d 882. 888 ( Pa

Super 2005) ( citation omitted) While the list of factors in Section 3502 serves

as aguideline, for consideration :the list is neither exhaustive: nor specific as to

the weight to be given the various factors. /d ( citation omitted) Accordingly: the

court has tiex: ai!ity of method and concor;irtantly assumes resp ., nsibiirty it

rendering its decisions kl (
citation omitted)

Notably. in the instant exception before this Court, Wife completely fails to

identify at any point which evidence. and therefore by implication. which factors

of equitable distribution the master purportedly failed to consider in making his

recommendation as to equitable distribution scheme Issues that are not

8
developed or supported by citation to appropriate iegal authority are waived.

Treasure Lake Property Owner'
sAssociation Inc.. v. MUer. 832 A.2d 477 ( Pa.

Super. 2003). Accordingly. as Wife has not developed or identified any support for

this contention. this exception is waived and otherwise is derived

8. Wife contends the master erred by not adequately takil7g into acoo-Unt
the srrhstCrtrlia/ contrrivitlorrs of the 'rVife concerrrirrg the nlalitraf residence

Upon review of the entire transcript of the master's hearing In this case the

Court is unaware of any evidence presented by Wife at such hearing regarding

Wife's aleged substantial contrib ution s to the ma-ital reside- E, As sLIch. this

exception Is without merit and is denied

9. Wife contends the mastui ,rred by not ,Sufficiently corrside illy and
analyzitry a/1 of the testimony and draoolrg conr::lusions that are eilth--r not hawed on.
or are conhoverted by. the testimony

Wife in this exception has not identified or cited to any specific hearing

testimony or Conclusions of the master in support of this contention.. issues that are

not developed or supported by citation to appropriate legal authority are waived.

Treasure Lake Plop-ily U••mer sAssociation. In;:. v. Mever 832 A 2d 477 •`•' a

Super 2003) Accordingly. this exception is w,--
rived and otherwise is denied

10 Wife contetids the mpaster (-? t7E,d by iiot lc"initig Nrto acC:ot. nt afl off tike
•7s•':.'t,.; ni ?rl snOUice of to -:,omo of,Ij 1lt1S:i•Nlit

Wife in this exception argues the maste( erred by not considering "all o4 the

assets and sources of inc;on',e of the Husband ' t:pon revie.•j the record in this

matter. however. it is clear that Husband testified to and Submitted evidence

detailing his income and assets at the master's hearing. Husband clearly testified

that his inc,orne was derived frorn his continuing employment at Verizon. and Vjife

did not dispute this evidence. Also, presuming VVIfe in this exception is challenging

9
the master's valuation of Husband's 401(k) plan. Wife was qu--stioned by her

counsel as to whether she agreed with the value of the Husband's 401(k) plan at

time of separation. as stated by Husband. being $ 65.014.74 Wife disagreed with

such value, claiming she believed the accurate value of the 401(k) plan was

$400.000.00. Yet, Wife thereupon adritted she had no documentation to present

the mast< rto corroborate her claim ;as to the 5400 000.00 value of the 4`j1(k) plan

Moreover, Wife upon cross-examination admitted that in her pre-trial

statement she asser-
teci that Husband s401(k) plan was worth 5500,000.00. Upon

further gUestior.ing. Wife agreed that the s!atenient of Husband s401(k) plan

received from Verizon as attached to Husband's pre-trial statement contained the

same account balance information clairned by Iiusband. being S55,014 74 After

evaluating the evidence presented at the hearing in this matter. as well as the

master's report and recommendation this Court finds no error in the masters

valuation of Husbands Verizon.401(k) plan at SC35.014.74, particularly in view of the

varying; and uncorroborated testimony of 1,Nife regarding such plan. Additionally. the

report r::ist be given full c.Onsideratitm since the master had 'Vie oPporturrty to fully

observe the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses in this !matter in makinc;

cre::ibili ,-v (.let:- rrnina1 ion s .Mot air. s,qutja.

Therefore, this exception is denied.

11. Wife contencls the master erred io tlr: tthe assets an(I Ocr}tne <:athibute;l
to Husband are incoir-uct 7&(.1 to error

The Court denies this exception as being duplicative and otherwise for all of

the reasons set forth previously in sections 4 and 10 of this Opinion

10
12. Wife takes c,,xceptton to the mastei's report and re orn.men(latron to that
impositiol► of the master's aviard as per the report and recorrlmenclation -would
cause unnecessary har(Iship and preju(lice to the Plabltiff/Wife. and constitutes an
abuse of the trlaster's discretion mid commission of an error of law,

Upon review of the record and the entire transcript of the master shearing ire

this case. the Uourt is una:vvrare of any evidence: developed or identified by Wife that

in any way SupPorrs the contentions set forth in this exception.

As such this final exception of Wife is Without merit and is denied

Separately. Husband also filed five exceptions which vie will address

hereafter seliatiril.

1. HUsbat -idconten(Is he l)as reserves aright to supplern(•nt excef)tiorls

Husband sfirst exception asserted has riclht to supplerrrent his exceptions

pending his receipt of the hearing transcript as the same had not been received

before they time req , r
t:!d to file exceptions. SuCt' initial exception is hereby

dismi•ssFcl as ntyot as Flusband never sought to s Lipp iC;m In his, exceptions

following cornpletioln, of the hearing transcript

2. /-iusb ana (:ootemis the rn,astc:r e: led in 1, ;; lrr)cd,rlyti c,i i-ilct to faitorig to rr ►id
the correct value of Deferl(lant s401(0 by riot )r LJII(inc7 tfx; r0l.r,'?yrnent ()fthe loan
paid by Oeffvndent prior to the mar- fiag ,

Husbands second exception asserts the master serror in not inclLrdi►tg the

amount of Husband srepayment of the loan paid by Defendant prior to the

marriage tlusband testified at the masters heanrg that he took out a'oan before

his marriage to Wife of approximately $ 56,000 against his Verizor, 401(k) plan He

1i
stated that the proceeds of this loan were used for maintaining his household.

paying bills and otherwise " keeping the house." He also testified that during the

marriage he repaid approximately $45.000 00 of the cited loan. Husband,

contended that such loan repayment amount should be deducted from the va!Lie of

the Verizon 401(k) plan since the loan piedated the marriage of the par ties and

further that a large part of the repayment aionios :Vere to benefit the household.

including Plaintiff and the children of the parties

Contrarily. Wife z`Ir,.Gued any increase in va;,- ; of Husband's Verizon 401(k)

plan following the marriage. no matter the source. is marital property subject to

distribution. The master intimately found no deduction from the cited 401(k) plan

was warranted in that Ilusband failed to introduce documents corroborating the

dates of the loan repayments or the use of such funds In view of ;he evidence

presented on this issue. or otherwise. the lack thereof. vve find the master had a

reasonable basis to determine that no deduction for loan repayments shorn^: tie

made agunst the value of 1•-iusband's..01 ( k) plan

Accordingly, Husband ssecond exception is den,ed

3. P... usba►ad conterrrls the fnaste , Erred in Iris Find ngs c;f Fact i►2 billing to find
Wrie haf
-1 1 tak ,-!, wit :-
-
rlarge /oan ! lrltum the ► na!'tiag . hich , IMM& tent to a
third anct wh►ch loan was paicl back bi Wif-,usir]y mac► al farads

Husband asserts in his next exception that the master erred in his Findings Of

Fact in failing to find Wife had taken out alarge loan during the marriage, which

Wife lent to athird party, and which loan was paid back by Wife using marital funds

At the time of the master's hearing. Husband's counsel elicited testimony

from Wife indicating that in 2019 Wife was awarded ajudgment in the amoL.nt of
12
$19.750.OJ against three individuals. Wife also testified she had lent those sarlle

individuals money and that such money carne directly from her as she was working

at the time.

Husband's counsel at the hearing also questioned Husband about whether

Wife consulted Husband about the loan of $ 19.750.00. which Husband denied.

Husband also testified tie was not named on the moan and V,
1Yft3 ne'",ef made hire

aware of this lean.

Notably howc: vt,r, the master in his report spec, ically in, the findings as to

marital debts. provided "to the extent not addressed elsewhere iii this Masters

Report. the parties' respective debts and obligations in their sole names shall

rema;n their respective sole obligations after the entry of the aivorce " Tie i; ourt

determines here that the master's cited finding as to each parties responsibility for

their own debts contemplates this matter as there was no evidence presented that

Wife had paid off this purported loan or that the judgment in lle•r narne had been

partially or fully satisfied Additionally, the raster's report and recommendation

nn;st b:' given the fullest t•Jnsi de. ion. especia lly in C-.•; drd5 to the quc,tran of the

credibility of Njitrresses, because of the Master hri; , the opportunity to observe and

assess tilt, bet avior and demeanor of the., witnezzses Mot -
an supra. In this ristance

we affirm the recornnlendation of they master as wl: find it is supported by the

record Husband's third exception is denied

4 Husband contends the Master,erred in fug; Findings of Fact in failing to award
Defetnclant ie-payment of lergal fees. as WifF has purposely held tip the finalizing of
the Dtvotc.•e causing Defendant trtnnec;essary costs

13
In his fOUrt hexception. Husband argues the master erred in his Findings of

Fact in failing to award hin-, repayment of legal fees. claiming it is warranted by Wife

purposely holding up the finalizing of the Divorce and causing Defendant

unnecessary costs. The master in his report concluded that neither party had

provided any compelling evidence or documentation showing entitlement to an

awa,ci ct c:vunsel fees or costs After athorough review of tt ,:; t!anscnpt, the Court

agrees an sward of counsel fees or costs is not Lvarranted here. Husbands fourth

exception is therefore denied

5 Husf••rr•! ccrrrtctrtl fre reserves arigirt try ;; r;lrclrt••• tl,c•sc• f,xi;e•ptior•s irr the
evert the Jrrclge finds m favor of his Motion to Strike Ekcepiicrrs that Husbarld filed
on }=elurrraty 17. 2.023.

This fifth and final exception of Husband is dismissed as moot as Court

denied Husbands Motion to Strike Exceptions by the Cor.irt soral notice to the

parties acrd their counsel at the time of oral argUments heici on the L,arties'

exceptions

Ac:coidingly the foilowing order is entered

14
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

ELBA FLORENTiNO, No. 2482-CV-2019
No. 318 DR 201 g
Plaintiff,
V.

IN DIVORCE
NAIPAUL RAMLOCHAN,

Defendant.

OPINION

Before this Court is the Petition of the Plaintiff, Elba Florentino ("Wife"),

seeking leave to amend the Complaint in Divorce for the sole purpose of adding a

claim for common law marriage.

I. BACKGROUND

Wife and Defendant, Naipaul Ramlochan (" Husband") are alleged by'vvife to

have met in high school and later started a romantic relationship. She asserts that

on December 20, 1992 they entered a common law marriage while living in New

York State. The parties' relationship in subsequent years bore three children,

Amanda, Angelica, and Alyssa, born respectively in 1996, 2000, and 2002.

On December 11, 2001, Husband married an individual named Yannins A.

Fortuna at a ceremony performed at the Office of the City Clerk in Bronx Borough

of New York City. Husband later divorced from Ms. Fortuna on November 19, 2003.

Years later, on September 10. 2015, Wife and Husband were married during a

marriage ceremony held in Reeders, Pennsylvania. Wife filed a Complaint in
Divorce on April 1, 2019. Her Complaint solely alleges the cited marriage of the

parties during 2015 and is devoid of any claim of the existence of the cited common

law marriage. On February 26, 2020, Husband filed an Answer to the Divorce

Complaint, including aCounterclaim in Divorce,

The instant Petition of Wife to amend the Divorce Complaint was filed on

November 9, 2020. Later, on November 17, 2020, Husband filed an Answer to the

Petition denying the existence of acommon law marriage. Wife filed a Request for

a Hearing on December 15, 2 020. Thereafter, following t
wo con ti nuances of the

hearing requested by the parties, we held an evidentiary hearing with the parties

and their counsel on March 5. 2021. The parties have submitted briefs and we are

now ready to rule in this matter.

li. DISCUSSION

Although common law marriage has been abrogated by statute in this

Commonwealth since 2005, an exception exists if a common law marriage began

on or before January 1, 2005. 23 Pa.C.S.A. S1103. Thus, following the evidentiary

hearing in this matter, our analysis is focused on whether evidence exists

establishing acommon law marriage.

Even before it was abolished in 2.005, common law marriage was generally

disfavored in Pennsylvania, and a party alleging the existence of a common law

marriage bears a " heavy burden." Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016,

1020 ( Pa. 1998). When an attempt is made to establish a marriage without the

2
usual formalities, the clairn must be viewed with " great scrutiny.' Estate of Carter.

159 A.3d 970 ( Super. Ct. 2017).

There are two ways in which a party can prove the existence of a ccimnion

law marriage. Generally, the party alleging the cornmon law marriage must show by

clear and convincing evidence that the couple came to an ;; express agreement" -

or verba it',praesenh - guttered with a vl-=w and for the purpose of establishing' the

marital relationship. Staudenmaver, at 1020-21. Pennsylvania law also provides for

a rebutta- ,Ie pr e: urn„t;oj-j of acommon ! a-
vv marriage that may be raiser. INherr-- the

proponent of the marriage demonstrates ( i) constant cohabitation by the parties and

(ii) a reputation of marriage "which is not partial or divided but is broad and

general." Staudenmaye;-, 714 A.2d at 1020-21 (
citation omitted); see also Estate of

darter. 159 A.3d 970 (
Super. Ct. 2017).

However, this rebuttable presumption is " is one of necessity to be applied,

only in cases ... [where there is an] inability to present direct testimony regarding

the exchange of verba to praesenti." Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d at 1021 ( citation

omitted).

Where the parties are available to testify regarding verba in praesenti, the

burden rests with the party claiming a common law marriage to produce clear and

convincing evidence of the exchange of words in the present tense spoken with the

purpose of establishing the relationship of husband and wife, in other words, the

marriage contract. In those situations, the rebuttable presumption in favor of a

common law marriaae upon sufficient proof of constant cohabitation and reputation

for marriage, does riot arise. lcl at 1021.

3
Here, following our analysis of the evidentiary record, we find Wife did not

meet her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a

common law marriaae. This result follows Wife's testimony which was devoid of the

exchange of words in the present tense for the pur,pose of establishing the

relationship of husband and wife.

At the hearing in this matter, Wife was questioned by her attorney about tiIle

date on which she believed she married Husband via common law marriage, as

•oliJ4'"/s.

Q: Can you tell Judge Higgins and Attomey Riegel what date you believed
you married 1,nr. Ramlochan

A: December 20, 1.992.

Q: December 20, 1992?

A: Yes.

0: Okay. And he proposed to you on that date?

A: Yes. He proposed and he celebrate my birthday.

Q-. VVell, let's see, when he proposed to you, what did he say to you?

A 'He asked' we if lcould be his wife —

Q.- Okay,

A' -- and Isaid, yes.

'And you said, yes'?
.

/•
A: Yes.
Q. Anu d,d you say. y/es to being his wif 'i

A: Yes,.

Q: And again, the date was December 20, 1992?

A: Yes.

C): Any; why do yoL, remember that date, so specifically, besides the fact that
Ramlochan asked you to marry him

A: VVe celebrate my rbirthday.

N.T . ps
-,.11-12. Vife's testimony, if believed, is that at most on the date a,: issrie.

Husband made aproposal to i,Vife to be married at some point in the future. Absent

from her testimony is " the exchange of words in the present tense for-the purpose

of establishing the relationship of husband and wi₹e.° Staude 1r-; •, ver at 1021, citing

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 543 Pa. 429, 672 A.2d 293 ( Pa. 1996). As is further

evident from Wife's testimony of the cited conversation, even if she herself believed

at that moment she mi'c'as married, there was no testimony offered to confi-m-;the

present acknowledgement of a marriage having occurred between the parties.

IV'loreover, Wife presented the testimony of her daughter, Amanda Maria

Ramlacnan. ''Aft, acknov ledged that her ,mother, being Vn\Ii e, "was proposed to i:I

y•= SC-e p 49. it is also significant that Wife admitted that other than her

clair;ns to getting married to Husband on December 20, 1992 by way of common law

marriage, tf,e only other date she acknowledged marrying Husband was the date,

stated in her original divorce complaint, being September 10, 2015. N.T. at p. 34.

Thus, no evidence was presented that what Wife described in her testimony as a

5
Proposal in 1992 ever resulted in a later consummation of the proposal ir, the

succeeding months or years thereafter.

As we find the party alleging the commcr, law marriage. VVife, vas available

acid provided testimony ultimately failing to provide clear and convincing evidence

of an, express agreement of marriage, there is no reason for the COL!q ,
o further

analyze whether Wife has raised a rebuttable presumption of marriage b,

proving constant cohabitation and a reputation of marriage which is not partial or

divrJed but !S bro~id and general. If aputative spouse who is able to testify and! falls

to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the establishment of the marriage

contract through the exchange of verba irr praesenti, then that party has met its

"heavy" burden to prove a common lain; marriage, since he or she does riot enjoy

any presumption based on evid ence ofconstant cohabitation and reputation of

marriage. Staudenmayer, at 1021, citing Pierce v. Pierce, 355 Pa. 175, '181, 49 A.2d

345, 349 ( 1946).

Ill. CONCLUSION

As Plaintiff has not net her burden of proving a common farm marriage, her

petition must be denied. We enter the following Order.

6

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10797706. Public record. Not legal advice.