# Pietryka v. United States

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · February 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10795510

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10795510

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the CSRA “provides for administrative review of ‘[p]rohibited personnel practices,’ meaning any ‘personnel action’ motivated by an impermissible ground, including whistleblower reprisal and discrimination unrelated to the employee’s work performance.”

## Opinion text

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID F. PIETRYKA, HELEN
PIETRYKA, and DAVID P. PIETRYKA

Plaintiffs, : 3:24-CV-00915
: (JUDGE MARIANI)
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is Defendant United States of America’s motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. (Doc. 5). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion will be granted in part
and denied in part.’
I. INTRODUCTION & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs David F. Pietryka, Helen Pietryka, and David P. Pietryka initiated this action
against the Defendant United States of America by filing a complaint (the “Complaint”) on
June 4, 2024. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs bring claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA’),
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seg. and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment & Collection Law

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

(‘PWPCL"). On August 12, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 5).
ll. © FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges the following facts:
Helen Pietryka has been employed full-time by the Tobyhanna Army Depot (“TYAD")
for approximately twenty-four (24) years. (Doc. 1 at J 10). Most recently, her position with
the TYAD was “Branch Chief (Supervisory Production Management).” (/d. at ] 11). “At all
times relevant hereto (aside from the improper lapse in coverage)” Mrs. Pietryka has been
enrolled in the TYAD Government-Wide Service Benefit Plan through the BlueCross
BlueShield Federal Employee Program (“BCBS”). (/d. at J 12).
On July 22, 2021, Mrs. Pietryka fell in a stairwell while on duty and broke her right
arm. (/d. at J 13). She took an initial forty-five (45) days off from work, and then went on
Worker's Compensation (“WC”). (/d. at § 14). “Her WC began on September 13, 2021, and
ended on November 8, 2021.” (Id. at ] 15). Mrs. Pietryka returned to work full-time on
November 9, 2021. (/d. at J 16)
On January 12, 2022, David P. Pietryka, Mrs. Pietryka’s son, who was covered
under her insurance plan, attempted to schedule a necessary surgery, but learned that his
mother’s government-issued health insurance had been terminated at some point in time.
(Id. at 17). Mrs. Pietryka “immediately contacted BCBS, who told her that TYAD
terminated her insurance on November 9, 2021, despite Mrs. Pietryka returning to work that

.

day.” (Id. at □ 18). She further learned that the grace period for cancellation of her BCBS
health insurance was thirty-one (31) days, or until December 10, 2021. (/d. at ] 19). “Mrs.
Pietryka never received a cancellation notice from TYAD, or a COBRA notice.” (/d. at {| 20).
Mrs. Pietryka also contacted TYAD Human Resources as soon as she learned her
insurance was cancelled, as she was having health issues that required medical treatment
and she needed prescriptions that were previously covered by her health insurance. (/d. at
21). She “had to abruptly stop taking these medications due to lack of insurance

coverage, which was detrimental to her health.” (/d. at § 22). David F. Pietryka, Mrs.
Pietryka’s husband, was also covered by her government-issued health insurance. (/d. □□
23). He has Type II diabetes and is insulin-dependent. (/d.). “When the insurance was
terminated, David F. Pietryka was unable to obtain his medications, including Humalog, due
to the high out-of-pocket costs of these medications.” (/d. at ] 24). He “requires
approximately 3,960 units/month (66 units in the morning and 66 units at night each day),
which would total $5,505/month.” (Id. at § 25). David F. Pietryka further had to a cancel a
January 25, 2022 appointment due to lack of insurance coverage. (/d. at { 26).
On January 13, 2022, Stacey Royce, TYAD Human Resources Assistant, wrote an
email to Rebekkah Morganweck, TYAD Lead Human Rights Specialist, stating that she
spoke with the Army Benefits Center (“ABC”) regarding Mrs. Pietryka’s insurance
cancellation. (/d. at | 27). Ms. Royce wrote that ABC Human Resource Benefit Specialist
looked up Mrs. Pietryka filed and did not see a Federal Employees Health Benefits Program

Form SF-2810 (Notice of Change in Health Benefits Enrollment) “to terminate Mrs.
Pietryka’s health insurance which, Ms. Royce stated, was required for cancellation.” (/d. at
28) (emphasis in original). “ABC recommended that Mrs. Pietryka call BCBS again to find
out why her insurance was cancelled, and what form(s) were received to terminate her
coverage.” (/d. at J 29). The ABC further recommended that Mrs. Pietryka check her leave
and earning statement (“LES”) to determine if she was still paying for her insurance plan.
(Id. at 30).
On January 14, 2022, Mrs. Pietryka wrote to Ms. Morganweck informing her that she
called BCBS but they did not have access to any forms. (/d. at ] 31). BCBS “could only
see that Mrs. Pietryka’s coverage was terminated on November 9, 2021 at 12:01 a.m., and
nothing else.” (/d. at § 32). BCBS further told Mrs. Pietryka that the likely reason for the
termination was “that she was still hard coded as WC on November 9, 2021, despite
returning to work that day.” (/d. at 33). Mrs. Pietryka’s LES for pay periods ending on
December 18, 2021 and January 1, 2022 show that she paid $1,686.75 for health
insurance, but she did not have health insurance during those times. (/d. at ] 34). “In
closing, Mrs. Pietryka stressed, ‘! cannot be without insurance.” (/d. at § 35). Mrs. Pietryka
“could not refill necessary medications, such as oxycodone and duloxetine, due to her lack
of insurance through no fault of her own.” (/d. at 36). She further has voiced these
concerns, among others, during appointments with medical providers. (ld. at | 37).

On January 16, 2022, Mrs. Pietryka was taken by ambulance to Moses Taylor
Hospital in Scranton, Pennsylvania for a medical issue. (/d. at 38). “Specifically, Mrs.
Pietryka developed a urinary tract infection (“UTI”) in December 2021 and could not obtain
the prescription medication needed to treat it due to lack of insurance coverage.” (/d. at J
39). The UTI worsened, which led to Mrs. Pietryka’s hospitalization on January 16, 2022.
(Id. at] 40). Mrs. Pietryka was subsequently diagnosed with sepsis secondary to her
untreated UTI. (/d. at 741). She spent seven days in the hospital and was discharged on
January 22, 2022. (Id. at ] 42). “Mrs. Pietryka was not covered under insurance during this
time and her hospital bills totaled approximately $58,500.00, which understandably alarmed
her.” (Id. at 43). Her Patient Registration Form from Moses Taylor Hospital reflects the
absence of insurance coverage as follows: “Prior Insurane [sic] inactive as 10-1-21 tried to
call patient on phone for new insurance.” (/d. at J 44).
Mrs. Pietryka’s health insurance coverage was eventually reinstated by the end of
January 2022. (Id. at ] 45). Since her hospitalization in January 2022, Mrs. Pietryka
continues to treat with doctors regarding complications for her sepsis diagnosis, including
screening for multiple sclerosis. (/d. at ] 46). As part of this screening, Mrs. Pietryka had a
magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scan of her lumbar spine on March 11, 2022, an
EMGINCS test on April 13, 2022, an MRI scan cervical spine without contrast on May 13,
2022, and an MRI scan of brain ataxic gait on July 28, 2022. (Id. at 47). Mrs. Pietryka
has also “been dealing with discomfort across both hips and proximal leg areas,” “stumbling,

catching her right toe,” “having a hard time with balance and... feeling unsteady,” “diffuse
weakness in her arms,” “aching pain into the anterior thighs bilaterally,” and “having a hard
time standing and ambulating” all since her sepsis diagnosis. (/d. at 48). “Mrs. Pietryka’s
medica! issues continue to-date.” (/d. at 49).
In addition to her health coverage lapse, Mrs. Pietryka has also incurred damages in
the form of lost wages and the inability to accrue leave stemming from the incorrect WC
hard coding. (/d. at 50). “Specifically, Mrs. Pietryka did not get paid for the pay period
ending September 11, 2021 and for both pay periods in November 2021.” (Id. at 51).
Mrs. Pietryka’s LES for the pay period ending November 20, 2021 incorrectly reflects that
she took eight (8) or nine (9) hours each day between November 8, 2021 and November 19,
2021 for WC. (Id. at 952). However, “Mrs. Pietryka was on WC from September 13, 2021
until November 8, 2021, and returned to duty on November 9, 2021.” (/d. at 753). A letter
from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, dated December 18, 2021, incorrectly
states that Mrs. Pietryka was overpaid for the period of September 11, 2021, because she

was also collecting sick leave. (/d. at 54). Mrs. Pietryka has been working diligently to
rectify these payment issues and discrepancies for years, but still has not been made whole
despite TYAD Human Resources members recognizing the mistake and acknowledging that
Mrs. Pietryka is correct. (/d. at J 55).
On or about May 11, 2023, Mrs. Pietryka filed a Claim for Damage, Injury or Death,
Standard Form 95, with TYAD in the amount of $284,005.72, along with supporting

documents. (/d. at ] 56). On or about August 17, 2023, David F. Pietryka and David P.
Pietryka also filed Claims for Damages, Injury, or Death, Standard Form 95 with TYAD in
the amount of $25,000 each, along with supporting documents. (/d. at 57). “By letter
dated December 20, 2023, the Department of the Army denied the Pietrykas’ claims, which
is the final denial of the administrative claims. See 28 C.F.R. ¥ 14.9.” (/d. at 58).
“The foregoing demonstrates the Government's negligence in failing to restore Mrs.
Pietryka’s health insurance—after it was wrongfully cancelled—and return-to-duty.” (/d. at J
59). “The foregoing demonstrates the Government's negligence in failing to end the WC
hard coding on or about November 9, 2021, which led to Mrs. Pietryka’s lost wages and
inability to accrue leave. (/d. at ] 60). “The foregoing demonstrates that Mrs. Pietryka’s
sepsis diagnosis, continuing complications from same, and her inability to obtain required
prescriptions would not have occurred but for the negligent acts of TYAD employees acting
within the scope of their employment.” (/d. at 961). “The foregoing demonstrates that
David F. Pietryka’s inability to obtain his required medications, including medications

necessary to help manage his Type I! diabetes, would not have occurred but for the
negligent acts of TYAD employees acting within the scope of their employment.” (/d. at J
62). “The foregoing demonstrates that David P. Pietryka’s inability to schedule his

necessary surgery on January 12, 2022, causing a two (2) month delay, would not have
occurred but for the negligent acts of TYAD employees acting within the scope of their
employment.” (/d. at J 63).

lll. ©§ STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d
391 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
[T]he federal courts are without power to adjudicate the substantive claims in a
lawsuit, absent a firm bedrock of jurisdiction. When the foundation of federal
authority is, in a particular instance, open to question, it is incumbent upon the
courts to resolve such doubts, one way or the other, before proceeding to a
disposition of the merits.
Carlsberg Res. Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1256 (3d Cir. 1977).
“[T]he burden of establishing the [existence of subject-matter jurisdiction] rests upon the
party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (internal citations omitted). Since
the federal courts’ jurisdiction is strictly limited by Constitution and statute, “[i]t is to be
presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” /d.
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is properly made under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). “A district court has to first determine, however,
whether a Rule 12(b)(1) motion presents a ‘facial’ attack or a ‘factual’ attack on the claim at
issue, because that distinction determines how the pleading must be reviewed.”
Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014).
A facial attack, as the adjective indicates, is an argument that considers a claim
on its face and asserts that it is insufficient to invoke the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court because, for example, it does not present a question of
federal law, or because there is no indication of a diversity of citizenship among

the parties, or because some other jurisdictional defect is present. Such an
attack can occur before the moving party has filed an answer or otherwise
contested the factual allegations of the complaint. A factual attack, on the other
hand, is an argument that there is no subject matter jurisdiction because the
facts of the case — and here the District Court may look beyond the pleadings
to ascertain the facts — do not support the asserted jurisdiction.
Id. at 358.
When a party files a motion attacking jurisdiction prior to filing an answer to the
complaint or otherwise presenting competing facts, the motion is “by definition, a facial
attack.” Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358. Where, as here, the Defendant presents a facial attack

on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, “we treat the allegations of the complaint as true
and afford the plaintiff the favorable inferences to be drawn from the complaint.” NE Hub
Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2001).
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to dismiss this matter for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the
theory that Plaintiffs claims are precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1101
et seq. (“CSRA’).2 (Doc. 5).
A. The Civil Service Reform Act Does Not Preclude Plaintiffs’ FTCA Claim
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FTCA claim alleging negligence by arguing
that the CSRA precludes the district court from reviewing Plaintiffs’ claims. The CSRA,
“governs the rights and obligations of most federal employees.” Manivannan v. United

2 The Court and all parties agree that Defendant has presented a facial attack on the Complaint.
(Doc. 6 at 4); (Doc. 7 at 7).

States Dept. of Energy, 42 F.4th 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2022). The CSRA “provides exclusive
administrative and judicial review procedures for disputes falling in its ambit.” /d. The
statutory framework of the CSRA offers “an integrated scheme of administrative and judicial
review, designed to balance the legitimate interests of the various categories of federal
employees with the needs of sound and efficient administration.” United States v. Fausto,
484 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 688, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988)). “It does so by channeling
certain employment disputes—primarily, those arising from ‘actions based on unacceptable
job performance,’ ‘adverse action[s],’ and ‘prohibited personnel practices’—to the Merit
System Protection Board, with judicial review of its decision available in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” Manivannan, 42 F.4th at 170 (quoting Fausto, 484 U.S. at
445-47).
In Manivannan, the Third Circuit rejected the Government's argument that the CSRA
“blocks district court review whenever the plaintiffs status as a federal employee is central
to his complaint.” 42 F.4th at 171. Rather, the Circuit found that “[t]he language of the
CSRA itself supports a more tailored approach.” Id. The CSRA “funnels only certain
employment disputes to the Protection Board. An employee may, for instance, appeal to it
‘adverse actions’ defined to include certain removals, suspensions, furloughs, and
reductions in grade or pay.” /d. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7512).
In addition, the CSRA “provides for administrative review of ‘[p]rohibited personnel
practices,’ meaning any ‘personnel action’ motivated by an impermissible ground, including

10

whistleblower reprisal and discrimination unrelated to the employee’s work performance.”
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(1), (b)(1)-(14)). The statute specifically notes covered
personnel actions:
(2) For purposes of this section—
(A) “personnel action” means—
(i) an appointment;
(ii) a promotion;
(iii) an action under chapter 75 of this title or other disciplinary or
corrective action;
(iv) a detail, transfer, or reassignment;
(v) a reinstatement;
(vi) a restoration:
(vil) a reemployment;
(viii) a performance evaluation under chapter 43 of this title or under
title 38;
(ix) a decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards, or concerning
education or training if the education or training may reasonably be
expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance
evaluation, or other action described in this subparagraph;
(x) a decision to order psychiatric testing or examination;
(xi) the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy,
form, or agreement; and
(xii) any other significant changes in duties, responsibilities, or working
conditions.

5 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2)(A)(i)-(xii).
As noted by the Third Circuit, “[t]he Government points to no statutory language
suggesting that any dispute primarily involving a plaintiff's federal employment needs to be
heard by the Protection Board. Congress has instead carefully defined the types of
employment actions subject to the CSRA’s review scheme, and these statutory definitions
must guide the preclusion analysis.” Manivannan, 42 F.4th at 172. Accordingly, “when
assessing whether the CSRA bars federal jurisdiction over an otherwise reviewable claim,
courts should look to the specific underlying conduct being challenged to determine whether
that conduct is an employment action covered by the statute.” /d. The Court's jurisdictional
analysis “must be tied to the employment actions set out; the mere fact that the challenged
conduct occurred in the federal employment context is not enough to bring it within the
CSRA’s exclusive ambit.” Id.
Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to comply with the
CSRA. (Doc. 6). Specifically, Defendant claims that because Plaintiffs “seek damages for
losing a benefit of federal employment, Helen Pietryka’s medical insurance . . . they must
follow the procedures of the CSRA, and this Court should dismiss the Pietryka’s complaint
for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (/d. at
2). Defendant further claim that “[a]n alleged prohibited personnel practice of denying
medical benefit is well within the statutory structure of the CSRA. Section 2302 provides
examples of ‘prohibited personnel practice[s]’ and specifies that ‘a decision concerning pay,
12

benefits, or awards’ falls under that definition.” (/d. at 6). Moreover, Defendant correctly
acknowledges that “[njot all claims arising out of federal employment . . . are preempted by
the CSRA.” (Id. at 5).
Plaintiffs oppose Defendant motion and argue that the CSRA does not preclude their
claims under either the FTCA or the PWPCL. (Doc. 7). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the
CSRA does not preclude their claims because they “do not raise any ‘adverse actions,’ as
Mrs. Pietryka was not removed, suspended, furloughed, or reduced in grade or pay.” (/d. at
10). They further claim that they “do not raise any ‘[p]rohibited personnel practice,’ including
‘any personnel action motivated by an impermissible ground, including whistleblower
reprisal and discrimination unrelated to the employee’s work performance” and further “do
not raise any ‘personnel actions.” (/d.). Plaintiffs submit that they “properly exhausted their
administrative remedies by timely filing Claims for Damage, Injury or Death (Standard Form
95) with TYAD, which were denied on or about December 20, 2023.”5 (/d.). Plaintiffs
further claims that “[i]n its denial letter, the Government acknowledged that the Pietryka’s
“may file suit in an appropriate United States District Court no later than six months from the
date of the mailing of this letter.” (Doc. 7 at 11) (citing Doc. 1 at § 58) (emphasis in original).

3 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) provides, in part, that “a claim shall be deemed to have been presented when a
Federal agency receives from a claimant... an executed Standard Form 95... . accompanied by a claim
for money damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss of property, personal, or death...”. Moreover, it is
well-settled that “Standard Form 95 is used to present claims against the United States under the FTCA.”
Garcia v. United States, No. 3:17-cv-1910, 2023 WL 8281686, at *2 n.4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2023) (citing
Roma v. United States, 344 F.3d 352, 358 (3d Cir. 2003)).

13

Accepting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, as it must, the Court cannot say at
this stage of the proceeding that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ FTCA
claim alleging negligence. The face of Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not demonstrate that
Plaintiffs’ FTCA claim alleging negligent termination of her health insurance is precluded by
the CSRA. Indeed, none of the facts alleged appear to involve personnel decisions or
personnel actions constituting a prohibited personnel practice such that the CSRA applies
on the face of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Manivannan, 42 F.4th at 172 (noting the CSRA
“provides for administrative review of ‘[p]rohibited personnel practices,’ meaning any
‘personnel action’ motivated by an impermissible ground, including whistleblower reprisal
and discrimination unrelated to the employee’s work performance.”) (emphasis added).
Rather, the Complaint alleges that Defendant negligently and mistakenly terminated Mrs.
Pietryka’s health insurance which caused injury and loss through a series of administrative
and clerical errors and omissions unrelated to any decision by her employer covered by the
CSRA. Plaintiffs further allege that they properly submitted a Standard Form 95, which was
denied, and was informed that they had six months to file a complaint in federal district court
under the FTCA. (Doc. 1 at JJ 56-58).
Because the Court cannot grant Defendant's the relief it seeks on the face of
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, it must deny Defendant's motion. However, should new factual

‘Most, if not all, of the cases cited by Defendant to support its motion involved facts where the
federal ernployee was challenging a termination, suspension, transfer, or downgrade in pay or grade.
Moreover, it is unclear how the facts alleged by Plaintiffs resulted from any “decision” on “benefits,” as
Defendant claims.
14

material become available to demonstrate that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the Court may grant the requested relief at a later stage of the proceedings. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determinates at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss
Count | for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction will be denied.
B. Pennsylvania Wage Payment & Collection Law
In Count Il, Plaintiffs purport to bring a claim against the United States for violation of
the PWPCL. According to Plaintiffs, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this claim pursuant to
its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (Doc. 7 at 13 n.3). Defendant, in
contrast, claims that “[s]eparate actions under state law like claims under the Pennsylvania
Wage Payment and Collection Law are not cognizable against the United States and
plaintiffs may only sue the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for state law
Claims.” (Doc. 6. at 2-3 n.1).
“As a sovereign, the United States may not be sued without its consent.” Richards v.
United States, 176 F.3d 652, 654 (3d Cir. 1999). “The FTCA waives the federal
government's sovereign immunity with respect to tort claims for money damages.” Bear v.
United States, 722 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). The FTCA
vests exclusive jurisdiction in district courts for claims against the United States for money
damages involving “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting

15

within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)).
Here, it is apparent that Plaintiffs cannot bring a claim against the United States for
alleged violations of the PWPCL by alleging this Court has supplemental jurisdiction to hear
this claim. The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for state law claims not
sounding on tort and the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the PWPCL
claim against the United States. Notably, the case law only permits courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction in FTCA claims against non-governmental defendants. See
Tomlin v. Pease, Civil Action No. 14-202, 2014 WL 1340624, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2014)
(noting that in FTCA claim against United States, “the court will exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Tomlin’s claim against the Non-Federal Defendants”); see also Peronis v.
United States, No. 2:16-cv-01389, 2018 WL 4740170, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2018)
(“Jurisdiction in this case is thus proper against the federal government and its agents under
the FTCA. Jurisdiction is likewise proper against the remaining [non-federal] defendants
based on supplemental jurisdiction.”). Plaintiffs do not bring any claim against non-
governmental defendants and sue only the United States for alleged violations of PWPCL.
And both parties fail to direct the Court to any case where the United States has been sued
in federal court for alleged violations of the PWPCL. Accordingly, Defendant's motion will
be granted because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim alleged in Count II of the

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Complaint. Count II will be dismissed without prejudice to allow Plaintiffs to file this claim in

an appropriate forum.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in
part. A separate Order follows. ee

ANAL
Robert D. Mariani
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10795510. Public record. Not legal advice.