# Payne v. Stanbaugh

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · January 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10794771

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10794771

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”
- noting that a defendant has the opportunity to rebut a prima facie case of retaliation by showing it would have taken the same action regardless of any retaliatory motive

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSHUA I. PAYNE, : Civil No. 1:22-CV-2063
:
Plaintiff, :
: (Judge Mariani)
v. :
: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
C.O. STANBAUGH, :
:
Defendant. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a prisoner civil rights case filed by the pro se plaintiff, Joshua Payne,
a state inmate incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. In his amended complaint, Payne
brings his federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendant—
a correctional officer at SCI Camp Hill—violated his First Amendment rights by
confiscating Payne’s legal materials that were in the possession of another inmate,
action which Payne alleges was done in retaliation for Payne’s prior litigation
activity. He also asserts a state law negligence claim. (Doc. 25).
On this score, the facts alleged in Payne’s amended complaint reflect in a more
fulsome manner those asserted in his original complaint: that on or about October
26, 2022, the defendant, Officer Stanbaugh, approached him and informed him that
he had confiscated legal materials belonging to Payne that were in the possession of

another inmate named Smith. (Id., ¶ 6). Payne alleges that Stanbaugh confiscated
these legal materials stating that they were lawsuits filed against his fellow
corrections officers and he did not want Payne showing other inmates how to file

lawsuits against the DOC. (Id., ¶ 7). Thus, liberally construed, Payne alleges that
Stanbaugh indicated that he had confiscated, in part, in retaliation for Payne’s pat
litigation. According to Payne, Stanbaugh rebuffed his request for a confiscation
slip, stating that he would instead be discarding the paperwork since he could not

allow that type of material to be passed around from inmate to inmate and that he
had “some nerve to try and show inmates how to file lawsuits against DOC staff like
my brothers Timpe and Ritchey.” (Id., ⁋ 8-10). The complaint avers that the legal

materials Stanbaugh confiscated comprised of 75 pages of material relating to
several ongoing civil and criminal cases in which Payne was a party. (Id., ⁋⁋ 16-17).
Payne alleges that Stanbaugh destroyed his paperwork without first following the
appropriate DOC procedures. (Id., ⁋ 23). According to Payne, he filed a grievance

through the DOC’s grievance process complaining of the incident and that it was
denied on all levels. (Id., ¶ 14).
Thus, Payne filed the instant action against Stanbaugh, initially alleging

claims of First Amendment retaliation, violation of his right of access to the courts,
and a claim under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc.
1, ⁋⁋ 18-19, 21). The defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,

(Doc. 13), which was granted on April 9, 2024, without prejudice to the plaintiff
filing an amended complaint. (Doc. 24). Payne filed an amended complaint on April
9, 2024, abandoning his Equal Protection and violation of right of access to the

courts claims, but reasserting his claim of First Amendment retaliation and adding a
state law negligence claim. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint on April 30, 2024, alleging that the plaintiff lacks standing to complain
about the destruction of his papers, that he failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies, that his retaliation claim is without merit, and that the defendant is entitled
to sovereign immunity as to the plaintiff’s claim of negligence. The motion is fully
briefed and ripe for disposition. (Docs. 27, 32). For the reasons discussed below, we

recommend the defendant’s motion be denied.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for

the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal
court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards
have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than
the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a
plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has
underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon

which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to
dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.

According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather,
in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has

advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,
the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The
District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as
true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court
must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement
with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a
three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,
attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,
268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic
document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover,
“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no
party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be
considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)

(holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the
pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be
considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary

judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in
determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended
complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. The Defendant’s Motion Should be Denied.

Payne’s amended complaint renews his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of his rights under the First Amendment and, for the first time, also alleges
a claim of negligence relating to the destruction of this property. In considering his
original complaint, we recommended Payne’s retaliation claim be dismissed because
he was unable to overcome the defendant’s showing that the confiscation of his legal

materials would have occurred regardless of the alleged protected activity, Payne’s
pending lawsuits, because the paperwork was considered contraband, which was
confiscated in accordance with DOC policy. However, Payne’s amended complaint

highlights that Stanbaugh’s alleged destruction of this paperwork was done in
contravention of DOC policy, well-pleaded facts which could support the view that
his actions were, in fact, retaliatory and did not serve a legitimate penological
interest. Furthermore, he has adequately pleaded a claim of negligent care of

personal property, a state law tort claim for which Pennsylvania has waived
sovereign immunity. Thus, as explained below, at this juncture where our
consideration of this case is cabined and confined by the well-pleaded facts in this

amended complaint, we conclude that Payne has adequately stated a claim against
the defendant for violations of his constitutional rights and negligence. Accordingly,
we will recommend that the motion to dismiss be denied.

1. The Plaintiff Has Stated a First Amendment Retaliation Claim.
Payne again asserts a civil rights claim pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the
defendant violated the First Amendment when Stanbaugh retaliated against him.

Payne avers that he was retaliated against by Stanbaugh when Stanbaugh confiscated
Payne’s legal materials from inmate Smith and destroyed it before the exhaustion of
the grievance process, which Payne asserts violated DOC policy and was retaliatory
for the lawsuits he had filed against other correctional staff.

In order to state a claim of retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff
must show: “(1) that [he] engaged in a protected activity, (2) that defendant[’]s
retaliatory action was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from

exercising his or her rights, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the retaliatory action.” Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Thomas v. Independence Twp.,
463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006)). Stated differently, the plaintiff must demonstrate

that the protected speech was “a ‘substantial factor’ in the alleged retaliatory action.”
McAndrew v. Bucks County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 183 F.Supp.3d 713, 731 (E.D. Pa.
2016) (citing Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009)). If a plaintiff
makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that, even if
the protected speech had not taken place, it would have taken the same action. Id.

With respect to the third element, there are three ways in which a plaintiff can
establish causation for a First Amendment retaliation claim, showing: “(1) an
‘unusually suggestive temporal proximity’ between the speech and the alleged

retaliatory conduct; (2) a ‘pattern of antagonism coupled with timing’; or (3) that the
‘record as a whole’ permits the trier of fact to infer causation.” McAndrew, 183
F.Supp.3d at 737 (quoting DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267). Additionally, an unusually
suggestive temporal proximity, by itself, can be enough to infer causation. LeBoon

v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74, 121 S.Ct. 1508,
149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001)). However,

While “ ‘suggestive temporal proximity’ is relevant to establishing a
causal link between protected conduct and retaliatory action ... in First
Amendment retaliation cases,” Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 303
F.3d 488, 494 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), it is
not dispositive of the issue. See DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267. Rather, a
plaintiff may also establish the requisite causal connection by showing
“a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”
Id. (citing Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503–04 (3d
Cir. 1997); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920–21 (3d Cir.
1997)). The plaintiff may establish that causal link by offering evidence
which “gleaned from the record as a whole” could lead a reasonable
fact-finder to infer causation. Id. (citing Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers
Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)). Finally, Plaintiff is not required
to show “but for causation;” rather, she is required to show that the
“exercise of free speech rights played ‘some substantial role’ in the
employer's decision.” Marrero v. Camden Cty. Bd. of Social Services,
164 F.Supp.2d 455, 469 (D.N.J. 2001) (citing Suppan, 203 F.3d at 236).

Malone v. Economy Borough Municipal Authority, 669 F.Supp.2d 582, 603 (W.D.
Pa. 2009).
We previously concluded, and the defendant does not contest, that a prima
facie case of retaliation could be made here, where the defendant does not dispute
that Payne’s lawsuits constitute protected activity for purposes of the First

Amendment, and courts have recognized that “a delay in providing access to legal
materials may constitute adverse action sufficient to support a First Amendment
retaliation claim.” Wyatt v. Malisko, 2020 WL 3001936, at * n.7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19,
2020), report and recommendation adopted 2020 WL 2992088 (M.D. Pa. June 4,

2020) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 578–79 & n.1 (1998); Hart v.
Goulette, Civil No. 16-cv-028-PB, 2016 WL 4575581, at *5 (D.N.H. July 22,
2016)). Moreover, as we previously explained, at this stage, Payne has alleged facts

that may support a finding of unusually suggestive timing. Indeed, one of the
lawsuits Payne cites in his complaint was filed in September of 2022, and the alleged
retaliatory action occurred roughly one month later in October of 2022.
But we previously concluded that Payne’s complaint failed to overcome the

defendant’s showing that the action would have been taken regardless of Payne’s
protected activity, specifically that Stanbaugh confiscated his paperwork in
accordance with DOC protocols because it was considered contraband under DOC
policy. The defendant asserts that the legal materials were considered contraband
under DOC policy, as inmates are not permitted to have possessions belonging to

other inmates. Indeed, DC-ADM 815 defines “contraband” as, inter alia, “property
belonging to another inmate.” See DC-ADM 815, § 3C(1)(o) (effective Sept. 13,
2022).1 Payne’s amended complaint concedes that the paperwork was confiscated

from a fellow inmate. 2 Accordingly, in rebutting the prima facie case of retaliation,
the defendant asserts that, regardless of the plaintiff’s pending lawsuits or the

1 https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Pages/DOC-Policies.aspx (last accessed
July 18, 2022). We note that we may take judicial notice of information publicly
available on government websites. Small v. Kauffman, 2022 WL 3036050, at *4
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2022) (citing Vanderklok v. U.S., 868 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir.
2017)).

2 The defendant also argues that the fact that Payne alleges his legal paperwork was
confiscated from another inmate deprives this court of jurisdiction, since Payne does
not have standing to bring his constitutional claim. The concept of standing, while
potentially relevant to a Fourth Amendment illegal search and seizure claim, which
requires the infringement of one’s own personal rights by the search and seizure, see
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968), has no application to this First
Amendment retaliation claim, where the plaintiff alleges he personally engaged in
the protected activity of filing lawsuits against the DOC and was the direct victim of
Stanbaugh’s retaliation for engaging in this protected activity. Indeed, the defendant
provides no legal support for his argument that standing for this First Amendment
claim would require him to have had actual possession of his legal documents at the
time they were confiscated. Indeed, as the Third Circuit has explained, with regard
to the policy behind political retaliation claims, the rights implicated in First
Amendment retaliation claims are much less personal because such retaliation
against one individual could deter others from engaging in protected conduct.
Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 199 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, the concerns
implicated by these claims “are the same whether a plaintiff is the ‘direct’ or ‘indirect
victim of illegal . . . retaliation.” Id.
substance of those lawsuits, his property would have been confiscated from inmate
Smith as contraband in accordance with the DOC’s policy. See Burgos v. Canino,

641 F.Supp.2d 443, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding no retaliatory causation where the
defendant’s actions were taken in accordance with prison policy). The defendant
argues that this policy and the well-pleaded facts averred by Payne, who admits

providing these documents to a third party in violation of prison rules, conclusively
support the defendant’s contention that the same action would have been taken
regardless of Payne’s protected activity. See Starnes v. Butler County Court of
Common Pleas, 50th Judicial District, 971 F.3d 416, 430 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that

a defendant has the opportunity to rebut a prima facie case of retaliation by showing
it would have taken the same action regardless of any retaliatory motive).
However, in his amended complaint, Payne clarifies that it was not the taking

of the contraband that violated policy, but the destruction of his paperwork without
following the proper procedures. Moreover, Payne specifically alleges that the
destruction of the property by Stanbaugh violated DOC policies, and Stanbaugh’s
refusal to document the taking of the property concealed this policy violation.

Indeed, the Third Circuit has acknowledged this distinction, explaining in a similar
case:
Defendants argue that because the legal documents were “contraband,”
the documents were taken for a legitimate penological reason. We can
understand that in the case of the documents seized from inmate Lyons,
the prison might choose to categorize the documents as “contraband”
in the hands of Lyons, but it does not necessarily follow that the
documents should be destroyed, rather than returned to their owner.
Indeed, when Jacobs filed a grievance concerning those documents, a
staff member responded that he would “review the matter with Lt.
Giddens, and, if appropriate, the items will be returned to you.” A jury
could infer that only after Giddens determined that the papers included
a planned lawsuit against him did he decide that the papers should be
destroyed as “contraband.”

Jacobs v. Beard, 172 F. App'x 452, 455 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, the defendant
acknowledges DOC policy referred to by the plaintiff which requires exhaustion of
the appeals process before seized contraband can be destroyed, See DC-ADM 815,
§ 3C (effective March 16, 2021),3 but argues that this policy was not triggered in
Payne’s case because he did not specifically notify the Facility Manager in his
original grievance to retain the property through the grievance process. (Doc. 27, at
10) (citing DCM-ADM 804 Section 1.A.22). At this juncture where we are enjoined
to consider the facts as alleged by Payne, in our view, the plaintiff has articulated
facts which undermine the plaintiff’s same result defense because he alleges that

3 Per this DOC policy:

The facility security office, after consultation with the Major, will
determine when contraband will be destroyed. Destruction of
contraband will ONLY occur after the inmate’s misconduct hearing is
held and the misconduct appeal process is exhausted. When an inmate
files a grievance regarding confiscated contraband, destruction of the
property will only occur after the appeal process has been exhausted.

https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/cor/documents/about-
us/doc-policies/815-personal-property-state-issued-items-etc.pdf (last
accessed January 3, 2025).
Stanbaugh was not simply following DOC policy but was, in fact, bypassing DOC
policy by discarding of his personal property without following the proper

procedures. And, to the extent that the defendant argues this policy should not apply
in the plaintiff’s case, since he did not request that the Facility Manager retain his
legal paperwork throughout the grievance process, a conclusion on this issue would

require us to go far beyond the pleadings, considering the vastly contrasting factual
narratives presented by the parties. Indeed, Payne’s complaint and accompanying
grievance tend to indicate that his paperwork was immediately discarded by
Stanbaugh. Further, determining whether this policy applied in Payne’s case would

require us to determine how these requests to retain personal property were to be
made and in what timeframe, issues that simply cannot be resolved by the court on
the pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage.

These same ambiguities in the grievance process also create questions with
regard to exhaustion that cannot be resolved as a matter of at this stage based solely
upon the pleadings. The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under ... [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or

any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). While this exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional bar to litigation,

this requirement is strictly enforced by the courts. This rigorous enforcement is
mandated by a fundamental recognition that § 1997e's exhaustion requirement
promotes important public policies. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75-76 (3d Cir.

2000).
“Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and
prove; it is not a pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff.” Small v. Camden

Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2013). In accordance with the PLRA, in order
to prevail on this affirmative defense a defendant must show that the prisoner failed
to comply with exhaustion requirements with respect to any claim that arises in the
prison setting, regardless of the type of claim asserted, or the relief sought. See Porter

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (“[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies
to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”);

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (“[A]n inmate must exhaust
irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative
avenues.”). As the statute's language makes clear, the exhaustion of available
administrative remedies prior to filing suit is mandatory. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204

F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is beyond the power of this court – or any other –
to excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement, whether on the ground of
futility, inadequacy or any other basis.”) (quoting Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility,

28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
Whether an inmate has exhausted administrative remedies is a question of law
that is to be determined by the court, even if that determination eventually requires

the resolution of disputed facts. See Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 271 (3d
Cir. 2013) (judges may resolve factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue
without the participation of a jury); see also Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 781

(3d Cir. 2010). Moreover, when assessing an exhaustion claim, it is important to
note that the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA is one of “proper exhaustion.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). Failure to comply with the procedural
requirements of the available grievance system will result in a claim being deemed

procedurally defaulted. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 90 (3d Cir. 2000); Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-32 (3d Cir. 2004).
An inmate cannot circumvent the PLRA's exhaustion requirement by failing

to properly exhaust the prison's administrative review process, or by waiting until
such remedies are no longer available to him. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95. However,
if an inmate shows that the actions of prison officials directly caused the inmate's
procedural default of a grievance, the inmate will not be held to strict compliance

with the exhaustion requirement. Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112-13. Likewise,
“[w]here [the inmate] failed to receive even a response to the grievances addressing
the . . . incidents, much less a decision as to those grievances, the [administrative

remedy] process was unavailable to him.” Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265,
273 (3d Cir. 2013). As the Supreme Court has observed: “the PLRA contains its
own, textual exception to mandatory exhaustion. Under § 1997e(a), the exhaustion

requirement hinges on the ‘availab[ility]’ of administrative remedies: An inmate,
that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.”
Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 642 (2016). We are also enjoined by the Supreme Court

to take a pragmatic approach to the issue of PLRA exhaustion and consider
exhaustion claims in light of “the real-world workings of prison grievance systems.”
Id. at 643. Adopting this pragmatic view, and examining exhaustion claims through
a real-world lens, The Supreme Court has acknowledged that administrative

remedies are effectively unavailable “when prison administrators thwart inmates
from taking advantage of [the grievance process] through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 633.

Judged against these benchmarks, we find that there are issues of fact with
regard to whether Payne sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies which
simply cannot be resolved at this stage. Indeed, this issue of exhaustion is
inextricably bound to the merits of this case, where it appears that Payne appealed

his claim at all levels of review, but the plaintiff describes the grievance process
being frustrated because the administration denied the confiscation ever took place
at every level and cited insufficient evidence, evidence that the plaintiff alleges

Defendant Stanbaugh suppressed and he was never provided.
The defendant argues that Payne failed to exhaust his administrative remedies,
as required by the PLRA because, although he appealed at all levels of review, he

procedurally defaulted by failing to follow the specific grievance procedures by
describing with particularity the grounds for his grievance appeal. The alleged
incident occurred on October 26, 2022. On November 1, 2022, Payne filed grievance

#1004766,4 alleging that Stanbaugh confiscated his legal work from another inmate
and that he had informed him he threw it away “because most of it was against DOC
officials lawsuits . . . and we can’t have you show people how to do that . . .” (Doc.
26-2). His initial grievance was denied because he failed to provide a copy of the

alleged confiscation slip, (id.), which the plaintiff stated in his amended complaint
Stanbaugh refused to give to him. (Doc. 25, ⁋⁋ 8-10). Payne then appealed his
grievance to the facility manager, who determined there was no evidence to support

his confiscation claim, once again seemingly relying upon the fact that Payne could
not produce a confiscation slip. (Doc. 26-2). Thus, at the institutional level, Payne’s
grievances were denied because of what the plaintiff asserts was one aspect of
Stanbaugh’s misconduct—his refusal to document the confiscation. Stymied in this

4 A court may consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant
attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the
[attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993).
fashion, Payne then appealed to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and
Appeals (SOIGA), stating “I am raising all issues and seeking all relief sought in my

initial grievance.” (Id.) But SOIGA determined that he failed to follow submission
procedures because an appeal to final review must contain a clearer statement of the
reason(s) for appealing the Facility Manager’s decision. (Id.)

Applying the Supreme Court’s pragmatic approach to this issue of PLRA
exhaustion and considering exhaustion claims in light of “the real-world workings
of prison grievance systems” and accepting all facts alleged by Payne as true, the
refusal of Stanbaugh to issue any record of the confiscation essentially frustrated

Payne’s attempts to effectively utilize the grievance system since at every level it
was found there was insufficient evidence to prove his claim. Moreover, given the
fact that the institution apparently denies the confiscation ever took place, and the

plaintiff alleges Stanbaugh never issued a confiscation slip for retaliatory reasons,
(Doc. 25, ⁋ 9), it is difficult to see what additional information could have been
provide by Payne to satisfy the prescribed submission procedures that SOIGA
claimed he failed to follow in his final appeal. Accordingly, dismissing this case on

the issue of exhaustion would be improper, since Payne has alleged he properly
exhausted his remedies, but was frustrated in his efforts to document this claim by
C.O. Stanbaugh’s violation of institutional rules, which is all that is required at this

stage. Small, 728 F.3d at 268-69.
In sum, the pleadings demonstrate that there are two conflicting narratives in
this case which require a more fulsome development of the record. But, in our view,

Payne’s more artful pleading of First Amendment retaliation against Stanbaugh in
this amended complaint at least clears the bar of this motion to dismiss where he
alleges Stanbaugh violated DOC policy in disposing of his legal paperwork without

the prescribed process.
2. The Defendant is Not Entitled to Sovereign Immunity from The
Plaintiff’s Negligence Claim.

We also recommend that Payne’s newly minted state law negligence claim
proceed. The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s negligence claim must be
dismissed because he is entitled to sovereign immunity. However, as the defendant
acknowledges, Pennsylvania has specifically waived sovereign immunity in cases
of negligent destruction of personal property, which is precisely what the plaintiff
has alleged in this case.

On this score, the defendant’s sovereign immunity argument stems from the
familiar proposition that the Commonwealth and its employees and officials enjoy
broad immunity from most state law claims, immunity that is expressly embraced
by statute, which provides that:

It is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the
Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope
of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official
immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General
Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 2310; see also Moore v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 56, 538
A.2d 111, 115 (Pa.Commw.1988) (“In other words, if the Commonwealth is entitled
to sovereign immunity under Act 152, then its officials and employees acting within

the scope of their duties are likewise immune”). This grant of immunity:
Applies to Commonwealth employees in both their official and
individual capacities, so long as the employees are acting within the
scope of their duties. Conduct of an employee is within the scope of
employment if “it is of a kind and nature that the employee is employed
to perform; [and] it occurs substantially within the authorized time and
space limits.

Brautigam v. Fraley, No. 09–1723, 2010 WL 480856, *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb.4, 2010)
(cleaned up).
But this wide sweeping immunity is subject to certain statutory exemptions
that have been specifically articulated by the Pennsylvania legislature, including that
Commonwealth parties remain liable for any harm caused by “care, custody, or
control of personal property.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 8522(b)(3). Section 8522, of Title 42,
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes provides a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity in certain specific instances, stating that:
(a) Liability imposed.—The General Assembly, ..., does hereby
waive, in the instances set forth in subsection (b) ..., sovereign
immunity as a bar to an action against Commonwealth parties, for
damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be
recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of
action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the
defense of sovereign immunity.
(b) Acts which may impose liability.—The following acts by a
Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the
Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be
raised to claims for damages caused by:

(3) Care, custody or control of personal property.—The care,
custody or control of personal property in the possession or control of
Commonwealth parties, including Commonwealth-owned personal
property and property of persons held by a Commonwealth agency,
except that the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth is retained
as a bar to actions on claims arising out of Commonwealth agency
activities involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive equipment,
devices and materials.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8522(a) and (b)(3). “Because of the clear intent to insulate
government from exposure to tort liability, the exceptions to immunity are to be
strictly construed.” Lockwood v. City of Pittsburgh, 561 Pa. 515, 751 A.2d 1136,
1139 (Pa.2000) (citation omitted).
With this guiding principle in mind, we turn to the application of 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 8522(a) and (b)(3) to torts that occur in a prison setting. The Pennsylvania courts
have examined the application of § 8522(b)(3)'s “personal property” exception to
sovereign immunity in the context of prison tort claims on several occasions in
different factual settings. As construed by the Pennsylvania courts, this narrow
exception to sovereign immunity applies to damages claims made by inmates for
negligent damage to items of inmate personal property while that property is in the
possession of Commonwealth parties. Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915
(Pa.Cmwlth. 2007). Such claims are permitted against the Commonwealth pursuant
to § 8522(b) (3). In contrast, courts have rejected efforts by inmates to broadly claim
that this exception to sovereign immunity applies to all prisoner personal injury

claims, based upon the notion that the inmates themselves are in some fashion “in
the possession and custody of Commonwealth parties.” Gallagher v.
Commonwealth, 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 516, 545 A.2d 981 (Pa.Cmwlth.1988).

For his part, the defendant contends he was a Commonwealth employee, who
was acting within the scope of his employment in committing the acts alleged in this
complaint. He also insists that none of the narrowly crafted statutory exceptions to
sovereign immunity apply here because, although Payne has expressly pleaded a

claim of negligent care, custody, or control of his personal property, the factual
allegations in his complaint amount to an intentional tort and would not be statutorily
exempt from a grant of sovereign immunity. However, as previously discussed, at

this stage the ultimate fate of Payne’s legal paperwork is still somewhat of a mystery
and the parties assert two contrasting narratives regarding exactly if, when, and how
Payne’s paperwork was confiscated and destroyed. Moreover, while Payne has
alleged that Stanbaugh confiscated and disposed of his personal property in an

intentional and retaliatory manner in stating his First Amendment claim, he is also
entitled to, and indeed has, pled negligent treatment of this property in the
alternative. Moreover, the factual allegations in Payne’s amended complaint that

Stanbaugh breached his duty of handling his property in compliance with DOC
policy describes sufficiently careless conduct to meet the pleading standard of
negligence and therefore survives a motion to dismiss. Since the defendant has not

argued that Payne has failed to state a negligence claim, and we reject the
defendant’s argument that he cannot plead both an intentional constitutional
violation and a negligence in the alternative, we recommend the court deny the

defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the
defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 26), be DENIED.

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.

Submitted this 6th day of January 2025.

S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10794771. Public record. Not legal advice.