# Balt. City. Bd. of Elections v. May. & City of Balt.

> Court of Appeals of Maryland · February 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10792695

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Maryland
- **Decided:** February 3, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Watts
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10792695

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “the operative standard is a question of degree, in this case, the extent to which discretion of the legislative body is precluded by the proposed Charter amendment”

## Opinion text

Baltimore City Board of Elections, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al.,
No. 34, September Term, 2023

CHARTER AMENDMENTS – CONSTRUCTION OF CHARTERS – LOCAL
LEGISLATION – POLICE AND GENERAL POWERS – Supreme Court of Maryland
held that when proposed charter amendment precludes City’s meaningful exercise of
discretion to legislate in area under the ambit of Article XI-A, § 3 of Constitution of
Maryland and encroaches upon City’s police or general welfare power, it does more than
amend form or structure of government originally established by adoption of charter and
is therefore not proper “charter material.” For these reasons, Supreme Court concluded
that proposed charter amendment known as Baby Bonus Amendment that would have
mandated one-time payment of at least $1,000 to every eligible City resident upon birth or
adoption of child violated Article XI-A, § 3 of Constitution of Maryland.

Supreme Court of Maryland declined to overrule Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595,
608-09, 415 A.2d 255, 262 (1980), in which Court held that proposed citizen-initiated
amendment was not “charter material” given that when “[c]onsidered as a whole, the
amendment [was] not addressed to the form or structure of government in any fundamental
sense[,]” and that “[t]o permit the voters by charter amendment, to exercise the City’s
police or general welfare powers would constitute an unlawful extension or enlargement
of the City’s limited grant of express powers and would violate the constitutional
requirement that those powers be exercised by ordinance enacted by the City Council.”
(Footnote omitted). Supreme Court concluded that overruling Cheeks would allow charter
amendment process to be used to enact local laws in contravention of Constitution of
Maryland.

Supreme Court of Maryland declined to sever mandatory payment provision from Baby
Bonus Amendment, concluding that dominant purpose of Amendment would not be
achieved in absence of $1,000 payment provision, which abrogated City’s law-making
authority in violation of Constitution of Maryland.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. C-24-CV-24-001320

Argued: August 28, 2024
IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 34

September Term, 2023
______________________________________

BALTIMORE CITY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS, ET AL.

v.

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE, ET AL.
______________________________________

Fader, C.J.
Watts
Booth
Biran
Gould
Eaves
Killough,

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Watts, J.
______________________________________

Filed: February 3, 2025

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

2025.02.03
11:54:03 -05'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
Childhood poverty is a national crisis that demands attention from citizens,

lawmakers, and businesses alike. In Baltimore City, this reality is impossible to ignore, as

it has been reported that over 20% of children in the city live in extreme poverty, a rate

significantly higher than the national average and twice that of Maryland overall. See A

Profile of Youth and Young Adults in Baltimore, The Annie E. Casey Foundation (Sep.

14, 2024), https://www.aecf.org/blog/a-profile-of-youth-and-young-adults-in-baltimore

[https://perma.cc/NF2F-UBUC]. Growing up in a poverty-stricken community increases

the likelihood that children may suffer violence and experience food and housing

insecurity—factors which contribute to making the prospect of social mobility an elusive

goal for many.

In a well-intentioned effort to mitigate childhood poverty, the Maryland Child

Alliance, Inc. (“the Alliance”), Appellant, sponsored a petition proposing an amendment

to the Charter of Baltimore City, a document which is the functional equivalent of a state

or federal constitution. The proposed amendment would have required payments of at least

$1,000 to all new parents who are residents of the City and is known as the “Baby Bonus

Amendment.” In Maryland, a charter amendment may be proposed by a resolution of the

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City or by the Council of a County. See Md. Const.,

Art. XI-A, § 5. In addition, a charter amendment may be proposed by a petition signed by

at least 20% of the registered voters of the City or of a County, or 10,000 registered voters,

whichever is fewer, see id., and, under those circumstances, would be referred to as a

“citizen-initiated” amendment.

In this instance, after obtaining signatures of registered voters, the Alliance
requested that the Baltimore City Board of Elections (“Baltimore City BOE”) include a

question regarding the citizen-initiated Baby Bonus Amendment on the ballot for the

November 2024 Presidential General Election. Ultimately, the Baltimore City BOE

determined that the Alliance’s petition contained sufficient voter signatures and certified

the Baby Bonus Amendment for placement as a question on the ballot for the November

General Election.

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,

Michael Mocksten, the Director of the Department of Finance of Baltimore City, and

Robert Cenname, the Deputy Director of the Department of Finance of Baltimore City

(together, “the City”), Appellees, sued the Baltimore City BOE, Scherod C. Barnes, the

President of the Baltimore City BOE, and Armstead B.C. Jones, Sr., the Election Director

of the Baltimore City BOE (together, “the City Board”), Appellants, as well as the State

Board of Elections (“the State Board”), Appellee. The City sought judicial review of the

City Board’s certification of the question, a writ of mandamus compelling the City Board

to perform its statutory duties, declaratory judgment, and an injunction keeping the Baby

Bonus Amendment off the ballot.

The Alliance filed a motion to intervene as a defendant, which the circuit court

granted. The City filed a motion for summary judgment; the City Board filed a motion to

dismiss or for summary judgment; and the Alliance filed a motion to dismiss and

conditional cross-motion for summary judgment. On August 9, 2024, in a memorandum

opinion and order, the circuit court declared that the Baby Bonus Amendment violated

Article XI-A, § 3 of the Constitution of Maryland, ruling that it took away any meaningful

-2-
discretion from the City over an area within its legislative purview and that the amendment

was in fact legislative in nature rather than proper charter material.

Pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law (2003, 2022 Repl. Vol.) (“EL”) §§ 6-

209(a)(3)(ii) and 6-210(e)(3)(i)(2), the City Board and the Alliance each noted a direct

appeal to this Court. On August 28, 2024, this Court heard oral argument and, on August

29, 2024, issued a per curiam order affirming the circuit court’s ruling. See Balt. City Bd.

of Elections v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 488 Md. 531, 533, 322 A.3d 77, 78 (2024)

(per curiam).

Accordingly, the Baby Bonus Amendment was not presented as a question on the

ballot for the November 2024 Presidential General Election. We now explain the basis for

our August 29, 2024 order.

BACKGROUND

The Proposed Baby Bonus Amendment

In February 2023, pursuant to EL § 6-202, the Alliance submitted to the Baltimore

City BOE a draft petition for the proposed Baby Bonus Amendment, seeking an advance

determination as to the format of the petition. After several revisions, on March 1, 2023,

the Baltimore City BOE notified the Alliance that the petition was sufficient as to format

but advised that a determination as to the legality of the proposed amendment would be

made at the time the petition and requisite signatures were filed. Thereafter, over a period

of approximately 15 months, the Alliance collected almost 14,000 signatures from

Baltimore City voters in support of the proposed Baby Bonus Amendment.

On July 1, 2024, after validating more than 10,000 signatures, pursuant to EL § 6-

-3-
208(c), the Baltimore City BOE certified that the Baby Bonus Amendment petition

satisfied all requirements established by law related to the petition and qualified for

placement as a proposed charter amendment on the ballot for the November 2024

Presidential General Election. The proposed Baby Bonus Amendment would have added

the following language as Art. I, § 20 of the Charter of Baltimore City:

a. Fund established; provision of payments.

1. There is a continuing, non[-]lapsing Baltimore Baby Bonus Fund,
to be used exclusively for the provision of Baby Bonus Payments
to residents of Baltimore City.

2. A Baby Bonus Payment is a one-time payment to the birthing
parent of a child, upon the birth of a child, unless the conditions in
subparagraph (3) or (4) are satisfied.

3. By Ordinance, or by proper delegation of regulatory authority, the
Mayor and City Council may set forth conditions in which the
guardian of a child other than the birthing parent may receive the
Baby Bonus Payment instead of the birthing parent.

4. By Ordinance, or by proper delegation of regulatory authority, the
Mayor and City Council may set forth conditions in which an
adopting parent or parent(s) may receive a single Baby Bonus
Payment upon the adoption of a child.

5. A Baby Bonus Payment shall be at least $1,000.

6. A timely Baby Bonus Payment shall be made to all Baltimore City
residents who meet the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (2),
(3), or (4).

7. The Fund shall be administered in accordance with the following
standards:

1. [T]o the maximum extent feasible, payments should be
made within a reasonable time frame to ensure that parents
can use the funds to assist with the costs of raising a
newborn child[.]

-4-
2. [T]o the maximum extent feasible[,] surplus monies should
be used to the purposes set forth in paragraph (a)
subparagraph (1).

3. By Ordinance, or by proper delegation of regulatory
authority, the Mayor and City Council shall determine the
annual Baby Bonus Payment amount using all relevant
data, including, but not limited to: surplus monies in the
fund, historical birth rates, estimated future property
values, etc.

b. Revenue Source.

The Baltimore Baby Bonus Fund shall comprise:

1. A mandatory annual appropriation in the Ordinance of Estimates
of an amount equal to at least $0.03 on every $100 of assessed or
assessable value of all property in the City of Baltimore (except
property exempt by law); and

2. Grants and donations made to the Fund.

c. Continuing Nature of the Fund.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Charter, unspent portions
of the Baltimore Baby Bonus Fund:

1. remain in the Fund, to be used exclusively for its specified
purposes;

2. do not revert to the general revenues of the City; and

3. their appropriations do not lapse.

d. Implementation.

By Ordinance, the Mayor and City Council shall provide for the
oversight, governance, and administration of the Baltimore Baby
Bonus Fund, including:

1. methods and criteria for evaluating parental eligibility;

-5-
2. methods and criteria for determining the logistical distribution of
the Fund; and

3. the establishment of any other legislative or administrative rules,
regulations, or standards, consistent with this section, governing
the Fund, its operations, and programs and services funded by it[.]

Proceedings in the Circuit Court and on Appeal

On July 11, 2024, in the circuit court, the City sued the City Board and the State

Board. 1 The complaint included four counts which sought: (I) judicial review of the City

Board’s certification of the question for placement on the ballot; (II) a writ of mandamus

compelling the Defendants to perform their statutory duties under the Election Law Article;

(III) declaratory judgment that the Baby Bonus Amendment is unconstitutional; and (IV)

an injunction keeping the Baby Bonus Amendment off the ballot.

On July 12, 2024, the Alliance filed a motion to intervene as a defendant. On July

18, 2024, the circuit court granted the motion. On July 23, 2024, the City filed a motion

for summary judgment; the City Board filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment;

and the Alliance separately filed a motion to dismiss and conditional cross-motion for

summary judgment. 2 On August 7, 2024, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the

motions.

1
The City also sued Michael G. Summers, the Chair of the State Board, and Jared
DeMarinis, the Administrator of Elections of the State Board, neither of whom is a party
to this appeal.
2
Although the State Board is a party to this appeal, in its response to the City’s
motion for summary judgment, the State Board took “no position on the legality of the
proposed charter amendment at issue[,]” and instead simply “urge[d] expediency in
adjudicating and resolving this ballot question challenge, so that preparations for the 2024
presidential general election [could] be completed lawfully.”

-6-
On August 9, 2024, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion and order in

which it granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, denied the City Board’s motion

to dismiss or for summary judgment, and denied the Alliance’s motion to dismiss and

conditional cross-motion for summary judgment. The circuit court declared that the Baby

Bonus Amendment violated Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3, under which “[e]very charter . . .

shall provide for an elective legislative body in which shall be vested the law-making

power of said City or County[,]” and enjoined the Defendants from placing the Baby Bonus

Amendment on the ballot for the November 2024 Presidential General Election.

In so ruling, the circuit court addressed a contention by the Alliance that the City

lacked standing to bring the action because the City was not “aggrieved” by the

determination to place the Baby Bonus Amendment on the ballot. The circuit court found

that the City had standing to challenge the certification of the Baby Bonus Amendment

because placing the question on the ballot would require the City to draft ballot language

and unnecessarily expend funds in support of a proposed amendment that the City alleged

to be unconstitutional. The circuit court also determined that, even if the City did not have

standing, Mr. Mocksten and Mr. Cenname had standing because, as public officials

responsible for administrating the fund, they faced the dilemma of either refusing to put

the question on the ballot, or doing so and subsequently learning that the question is

unconstitutional. 3

Addressing the merits, the circuit court found that the Baby Bonus Amendment

On appeal, the Alliance did not raise an issue as to the circuit court’s ruling on
3

standing.

-7-
violated Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3 because it “takes away any meaningful discretion from

the City to such a degree as to remove control over an area within its legislative purview.”

The circuit court agreed with the City that, although the Baby Bonus Amendment “provides

discretion to the City in the implementation provisions, this discretion is rendered

meaningless[,] as the proposal defines who is eligible to receive the bonus, the exact

minimum amount [eligible recipients are entitled to], and how it will be financed.”

The circuit court concluded that the Baby Bonus Amendment “[was] not addressed

to the form or structure of government[,]” “[did] not differ in any material respect from a

simple legislative enactment prohibited by Art[.] XI-A, § 3[,]” and “[went] well beyond a

mandatory appropriation crossing the line into legislative material prohibited by Art. XI-

A, § 3.” (Cleaned up). The circuit court distinguished the Baby Bonus Amendment from

another Charter provision, Art. I, § 13 (known as the Children and Youth Fund provision)

of the Charter of Baltimore City, stating that the Children and Youth Fund provision

“leaves discretion to the City to administer the programs and services in accordance with

defined standards” and “does not establish a specific payment to residents, the amount of

the payment, and define who is eligible to receive such a payment.”

On August 12, 2024, the City Board and the Alliance filed notices of appeal. On

August 28, 2024, we heard oral argument in the case. On August 29, 2024, in a per curiam

order, we affirmed the circuit court’s August 9, 2024 order and held that “[t]he circuit court

correctly determined that the Baby Bonus Amendment violates Article XI-A, § 3, of the

Constitution of Maryland because it is not proper ‘charter material.’” Balt. City Bd. of

Elections, 488 Md. at 533, 322 A.3d at 78 (quoting Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595,

-8-
608, 415 A.2d 255, 262 (1980)).

Standard of Review

Whether a circuit court properly granted a motion for summary judgment is a

question of law that an appellate court reviews without deference. See Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs of St. Mary’s Cnty. v. Aiken, 483 Md. 590, 616, 296 A.3d 933, 948 (2023). A

circuit court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment, however, is reviewed for an abuse

of discretion. See Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 486 Md. 616, 674 n.34, 312 A.3d

741, 775 n.34 (2024); Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 165, 913 A.2d 10, 19 (2006).

DISCUSSION

Forms of Local Government

“There are three forms of local [] government in Maryland: charter; code [];[] and

commissioner[.]” Getty v. Carroll Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 713 n.1, 926 A.2d

216, 218 n.1 (2007) (citations omitted). These three terms are shorthand for local

jurisdictions with charters, local jurisdictions with code home rule, and jurisdictions with

the commissioner form of local government, respectively. See id. at 713 n.1, 926 A.2d at

218 n.1. In addition to local jurisdictions with code home rule, local jurisdictions with

charters are also considered to have home rule, which refers to “[a] state legislative

provision or action allocating a measure of autonomy to a local government, conditional

on its acceptance of certain terms.” Home Rule, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

Counties without home rule are most commonly known as “commissioner count[ies,]”

Matter of 2022 Legislative Districting of State, 481 Md. 507, 582, 282 A.3d 147, 192

(2022), though they may also be referred to as “county commissioner counties[,]” Green

-9-
v. High Ridge Ass’n, Inc., 346 Md. 65, 67 n.2, 695 A.2d 125, 126 n.2 (1997).

A “charter is equivalent to a constitution.” Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md.

237, 248, 743 A.2d 748, 754 (1998) (cleaned up). As with a constitution, a charter

“provide[s] a broad organizational framework establishing the form and structure of

government in pursuance of which the [local jurisdiction] is to be governed and local laws

enacted.” Id. at 248-49, 743 A.2d at 755 (citation omitted). “[T]he basic function of a

charter is to distribute power among the various agencies of government, and between the

government and the people who have delegated that power to their government.” Id. at

248, 743 A.2d at 754 (cleaned up).

The Home Rule Amendment and Baltimore City’s Charter

Md. Const., Art. XI-A, was ratified by voters in Maryland in 1915 and is commonly

known as the “Home Rule Amendment.” Cheeks, 287 Md. at 597, 415 A.2d at 256. Art.

XI-A was intended to give local jurisdictions the ability to share, “within well-defined

limits, powers formerly reserved to the General Assembly” through the adoption of

charters. Id. at 597, 415 A.2d at 256; see also Assanah-Carroll v. Law Offices of Edward

J. Maher, P.C., 480 Md. 394, 423, 281 A.3d 72, 89 (2022), reconsideration denied (Sept.

26, 2022) (citation omitted). 4

Art. XI-A, § 1 authorizes a county or Baltimore City to adopt a “charter or form of

government” by popular vote. Art. XI-A, § 2 requires that the General Assembly adopt “a

4
Md. Const., Art. XI-F allows local jurisdictions to have home rule by adopting code
home rule, and Md. Const., Art. VII governs commissioner counties. See Getty, 399 Md.
at 713 n.1, 926 A.2d at 218 n.1.

- 10 -
grant of express powers” for those local jurisdictions adopting a charter and provides that

a local jurisdiction may exercise the express powers delegated to it by the General

Assembly and that those powers “shall not be enlarged or extended by any charter formed

under the provisions of this Article, but such powers may be extended, modified, amended

or repealed by the General Assembly.” Art. XI-A, § 3 requires that each charter “provide

for an elective legislative body in which shall be vested the law-making power of said City

or County.” Art. XI-A, § 3 also provides that, in local jurisdictions that have a charter, the

county council, or the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, “shall have full power to enact

local laws of said City or County including the power to repeal or amend local laws of said

City or County enacted by the General Assembly, upon all matters covered by the express

powers granted” under Art. XI-A, § 2.

In short, under Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3, in a local jurisdiction governed by

charter, only the local legislature may enact local laws, i.e., legislation. A charter itself

cannot consist of provisions that would amount to citizen-initiated legislation, as that would

be tantamount to a charter containing legislation that was enacted by voters rather than by

the local legislature. See Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 249-50, 743 A.2d at 755. The

prohibition against a charter containing legislation extends not only to the initial adoption

of a charter, but also to a charter amendment. See id. at 249-50, 743 A.2d at 755.

Baltimore City is among the local jurisdictions with charters. See Charter of Balt.

- 11 -
City. 5 In Baltimore City, the local legislature is the City Council of Baltimore. See Md.

Const., Art. XI-A, § 3. Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 5 outlines the procedural requirements

that must be met in order to propose an amendment to the Charter of Baltimore City or the

charter of a county. Charter amendments may be proposed by resolution of the Mayor of

Baltimore and the City Council of Baltimore or the Council of a County, or by a petition

signed by at least 20% of the City’s or a County’s registered voters, or 10,000 voters,

whichever is fewer, and filed with the Mayor of Baltimore or President of the County

Council. See id.

A proposed amendment shall be submitted to the voters of Baltimore City or the

County at the next Congressional or Presidential General Election occurring after the

corresponding petition has been filed. See id. If a majority of votes are cast in favor of the

proposed amendment, the amendment becomes part of the Charter of Baltimore City or the

respective County “from and after the thirtieth day after said election.” Id.

Baltimore City’s earliest charter was enacted in 1898 by Ch. 123 of the Acts of

1898. See Cheeks, 287 Md. at 599, 415 A.2d at 257. The express powers granted to the

City by the General Assembly in the 1898 charter were codified as Article 4, Section 6 of

5
Of Maryland’s 24 local jurisdictions, including Baltimore City, half have charters,
a quarter are code counties, and another quarter are commissioner counties. See Md. State
Archives, Local Government (Mar. 11, 2022), https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/
mdmanual/01glance/html/county.html [https://perma.cc/EB6L-DCZH]. The 11 charter
counties are Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Cecil, Dorchester, Frederick, Harford, Howard,
Montgomery, Prince George’s, Talbot, and Wicomico Counties. See id. The 6 code
counties are Allegany, Caroline, Charles, Kent, Queen Anne’s, and Worcester. See id. The
6 commissioner counties are Calvert, Carroll, Garrett, St. Mary’s, Somerset, and
Washington Counties. See id.

- 12 -
the Public Local Laws of Maryland. See id. at 600, 415 A.2d at 257. Article 4, Section 6

granted the City “full power and authority” to “pass ordinances exercising within the limits

of the City of Baltimore all the power commonly known as the Police Power to the same

extent as the State has or could exercise said power within said limits[,]” and ordinances

“maintaining the peace, good government, health and welfare of the City of Baltimore.”

Id. at 600, 415 A.2d at 257 (cleaned up). In 1918, the voters of Baltimore City adopted a

charter that superseded the 1898 Charter. See id. at 599, 415 A.2d at 257.

In 1918, the General Assembly also adopted the Express Powers Act, granting

express powers to counties that adopted a charter under Art. XI-A. See id. at 600 n.2, 415

A.2d at 257 n.2. In 1920, in Chapter 555 of the Acts of 1920, the General Assembly

expressly provided the voters of Baltimore City the power as set forth in Art. XI-A, § 6 to

make changes described in sections 1 through 6 of Art. XI of the Constitution but provided

“that nothing in this section [] shall be construed to authorize the exercise of any powers

in excess of those conferred by the Legislature upon said City . . . as set forth in Article XI-

A of said Constitution.” 6 Cheeks, 287 Md. at 600, 415 A.2d at 258 (ellipsis in original)

6
In Cheeks, 287 Md. at 600 n.3, 415 A.2d at 258 n.3, we described Sections 1-6 of
Art. XI as follows:

Section 1 of Art. XI relates to the Mayor’s election, qualifications,
compensation, powers, duties, and term of office. Section 2 relates to the
composition of the City Council, the qualifications of the members, their
compensation, term of office, powers and duties. Section 3 relates to the
election of members of the City Council. Section 4 relates to sessions of the
City Council. Section 5 relates to the holding of additional offices or
employments by the Mayor and City Council members and prohibits their
interest in certain contracts. Section 6 relates to the removal of the Mayor
from office.

- 13 -
(footnote omitted). In Chapter 548 of the Acts of 1945, the General Assembly amended

the grant of express powers to the City set forth in Article 4, Section 6 of the Public Local

Laws of Maryland. See id. at 601, 415 A.2d at 258. The amendment provided, among

other things, that the “full power and authority” vested in the City to exercise the express

powers granted to it is “power by ordinance, or such other method as may be provided for

in its Charter.” Id. at 601, 415 A.2d at 258. 7 The current Charter of Baltimore City

provides in Article III that “[e]very legislative act of the City shall be by ordinance or

resolution.” Charter of Balt. City, Art. III, § 14(a).

The Parties’ Contentions

In this case, the City Board and the Alliance contend that the Baby Bonus

Amendment does not violate Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3 as it leaves “discretion to the local

legislative body” concerning how the payments required by the amendment will be made

and is, therefore, permissible charter material. The City Board and the Alliance argue that,

although the amendment mandates a $1,000 monetary payment to all new parents, the

amendment leaves sufficient discretion to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to pass

constitutional muster because it does not specify which local agency shall distribute the

7
In Chapter 39 of the Acts of 1979, the General Assembly amended the grant of
express powers to the City set forth in Article 4, Section 6 of the Public Local Laws of
Maryland. The amendment provided, among other things, that the 1979 Edition of the
Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City “shall be deemed and taken in all the courts
of the State and by all public officials of the State and of its several political subdivisions,
to be evidence of the Public Local Laws of Baltimore City.” See 1979 Md. Laws 246 (Ch.
39, § 1). Additionally, the amendment provided that “any Supplement to [the] code is
similarly legalized and effective to contain changes in the Public Local Laws of Baltimore
City.” Id. at § 2.

- 14 -
payments, how payments will be distributed, or how to determine parents’ residency for

payment eligibility. According to the City Board and the Alliance, case law does not

require that the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore retain “unfettered discretion” over

the administration of a charter amendment, and, in this instance, the Mayor and City

Council of Baltimore are not precluded from enacting additional legislation in the area, nor

must they repeal any existing law.

The Alliance contends that the $1,000 mandatory payment does not render the

amendment unconstitutional and points out that the Charter of Baltimore City already

contains several provisions that limit or affect the Mayor and City Council’s budgetary

authority, including provisions that require the City to allocate a percentage of hotel tax

proceeds to tourism promotion, direct that certain employees who are transferred from the

Police Department to another department retain specific pension benefits, and create an

Affordable Housing Trust Fund which mandates that certain payments be deposited into

the fund. Relying in part on this observation, the Alliance argues that this Court’s holding

in Cheeks, 287 Md. 595, 415 A.2d 255, that a charter amendment must concern the “form

or structure” of government, was clearly wrong. The Alliance requests that we overrule

Cheeks and, as a consequence, not apply in this case its holding that a charter amendment

must concern the form and structure of government. The Alliance also asserts that, should

this Court find any provision of the Baby Bonus Amendment to be invalid, the provision

could be severed, leaving the balance of the amendment’s text intact and available for

placement on the ballot.

The City responds that because the Baby Bonus Amendment is not limited to

- 15 -
addressing the “form or structure” of government as charter provisions are required to, it

violates Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3. For the City, the Baby Bonus Amendment is plainly

legislative in nature and encroaches on the police and general welfare powers expressly

delegated to it by the General Assembly and is therefore not proper charter material. The

City describes the Baby Bonus Amendment as “voter-initiated legislation” that, among

other things, deprives the City of any “meaningful discretion” regarding a mandatory

amount of money that must be distributed to new parents who are residents of the City.

The City contends that, for a proposed charter amendment to be constitutional, the local

legislature must be given more than minor “bureaucratic or administrative” responsibilities

in implementation of a mandatory provision. In sum, the City maintains that the Baby

Bonus Amendment is an unconstitutional directive that is legislative in nature and infringes

on its police and general welfare powers, and that the amendment’s monetary payment

provision is not amenable to severability. 8

Relevant Case Law

Our case law furnishes multiple examples of circumstances in which we have held

that charter amendments violated, or did not violate, Md. Const., Art. XI-A. In one of the

earliest cases, Ritchmount P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel

Cnty., 283 Md. 48, 50-52, 64, 388 A.2d 523, 526-27, 533 (1978), when considering

whether a Charter provision that gave voters the right to approve or reject local ordinances

8
The State Board did not make any arguments concerning the constitutionality of
the Baby Bonus Amendment in its brief before this Court. Rather, the State Board urged
this Court to resolve the instant matter before September 6, 2024, so that it could comply
with federal and state deadlines for transmission of mail-in ballots.

- 16 -
through a citizen-initiated referendum was constitutional, 9 this Court held that Md. Const.,

Art. XI-A, § 1 gave voters the right to reserve, “by express charter provision[,]” the ability

to repeal or amend legislation enacted by a county council. We examined the historical

underpinnings of Md. Const., Art. XI-A and noted that the purpose of the Home Rule

Amendment was to “reserve[] to the people of this state the right to organize themselves

into semi-autonomous political communities for the purpose of instituting self-

government” without substantial interference by the State. Id. at 58, 388 A.2d at 530.

We observed, however, that Art. XI-A does not itself confer legislative powers upon

local jurisdictions; instead, it requires that the General Assembly expressly “enumerate and

delegate” those powers to jurisdictions electing a charter type of government. Id. at 57,

388 A.2d at 529. We explained that these legislative powers are usually those affiliated

with the objects of government—namely, “powers to legislate for the benefit of the health,

safety and general welfare of the local community.” Id. at 57, 388 A.2d at 529 (footnote

9
The charter provision stated as follows:

(a) Scope of the referendum. The people of Anne Arundel reserve to
themselves the power known as ‘The Referendum,’ by petition to have
submitted to the registered voters of the County, to approve or reject at the
polls, any ordinance or part of any ordinance of the County Council. The
referendum petition against any such ordinance shall be sufficient if signed
by ten per centum of the qualified voters of the County calculated upon the
whole number of votes cast in the County for Governor at the last preceding
gubernatorial election. Such petition shall be filed with the Board of
Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County within forty-five days after
the ordinance becomes law.

Ritchmount P’ship, 283 Md. at 52 n.4, 388 A.2d at 527 n.4 (quoting Art. III, § 308 of the
Charter of Anne Arundel County).

- 17 -
omitted). There are, however, “certain powers implicit in Article XI-A which do not

qualify as legislative powers and which do not require implementing legislation to render

them operative.” Id. at 58, 388 A.2d at 530. “These powers necessarily proceed from [§]

1 of the Home Rule Amendment and have as their object the initial organization and

formation of charter government in the counties.” Id. at 58, 388 A.2d at 530 (citation

omitted).

We made clear that when voters adopt a charter in a home rule county, they have

the power to propose and adopt any provision concerning the “form of government” they

wish to be subject to, so long as the provision does not violate the federal or state

constitution. Id. at 59, 388 A.2d at 530. We explained that “Article XI-A was intended to

encompass two distinct categories of home rule powers: the power to enact local law

(legislative power) and the power to form and establish local government” and that it was

our job to decide into which of the two categories the referendum at issue fell. Id. at 59,

388 A.3d at 530-31. We expressly stated: “If the referendum is a power arising under [§]

1 of Article XI-A, that is, one respecting the formation and structure of local government,

we need look no further to identify the grounds for upholding [its] constitutionality”

because “the referendum would then have been a power vested directly in the people []

under the Home Rule Amendment.” Id. at 59, 388 A.2d at 531. If, however, the

referendum fell outside the scope of Art. XI-A, § 1, then “its exercise must have been

expressly authorized by the Legislature.” Id. at 60, 388 A.2d at 531.

After setting forth the above framework, we concluded that the citizen referendum

at issue did not require any implementing legislation. See id. at 61-62, 388 A.2d at 532.

- 18 -
We observed that Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3 only requires that the County Council be the

“primary” legislative body. Id. at 63, 388 A.2d at 533. We pointed out that the Framers

intended to denote that a County Council’s “power to legislate over local affairs” was

“ample and complete[,]” not to preclude the existence of a separate entity with coordinate

power. Id. at 63, 388 A.2d at 533. We stated that, “while Article XI-A, [§] 3 bestows upon

the county council ample and complete power to legislate within the limits set forth in the

Express Powers Act, it does not necessarily confer the exclusive power to do so.” Id. at

63, 388 A.2d at 533. Thus, we held that the charter provision was constitutional and that

the citizen referendum initiated pursuant to it was valid. See id. at 64, 388 A.2d at 533.

Next, in Cheeks, 287 Md. at 601-02, 609-10, 612-13, 415 A.2d at 258, 262, 264, we

considered whether voters could amend the Charter of Baltimore City to establish a non-

elective Tenant-Landlord Commission with authority to set rental rates throughout the

City 10 and held that the proposed amendment violated Md. Const., Art. XI-A, §§ 2, 3, 5,

The charter amendment provided for the creation of a non-elective Tenant-
10

Landlord Commission, stating in pertinent part:

(a) Composition: There shall be in the City of Baltimore a Tenant-
Landlord Commission (“the Commission”) composed of five (5) resident,
registered voters of Baltimore City appointed by the City Council. Two (2)
members shall be landlords, one of whom shall be a landlord owning,
managing or having interests in less than ten (10) rental units. Two (2)
members shall be tenants and not own, manage or have interest in any rental
property, one of whom shall be a low to moderate income person. One
member shall be a home-owner and shall not own or have interest in any
rental unit.

Cheeks, 287 Md. at 617, 415 A.2d at 266 (quoting proposed Art. 6(a), § 3 of the Charter
of Balt. City).

- 19 -
and 6 because it allowed voters to circumvent the legislative process and exercise the City’s

police powers. In Cheeks, id. at 607, 415 A.2d at 261, in reviewing the citizen-initiated

amendment, we unequivocally held that a charter amendment must be limited to “amending

the form or structure of government initially established by adoption of the charter.”

Because the proposed charter amendment did not purport to merely establish a new

commission, but also aimed to establish a system of rent control, we concluded that it

Additionally, the charter amendment provided for rent stabilization and a base rent
ceiling, stating in pertinent part:

(a) Rent Stabilization. As of March 1, 1980, and for so long as the
system of rent controls are set forth herein shall be in effect, no landlord may
increase, offer to increase, or give notice of intent to increase the rent for a
rental unit to an amount in excess of the base rent ceiling for that rental unit,
except as provided in this Article.

(b) Base Rent Ceiling. The rent in effect on November 1, 1978 for
any rental unit plus the allowable increase, as set forth below, shall constitute
the base rent ceiling. The allowable increase, calculated as a percentage of
the rent in effect as of November 1, 1978, is as follows:

(1) If the rent includes the cost of all utilities, the allowable
increase is six (6) per cent, if heat only then five and one-half (5.5)
per cent;

(2) If the rent includes the cost of the gas and electric utilities
only, the allowable increase is five (5) per cent;

(3) If the rent includes the cost of gas and electric utilities, but
not both, the allowable increase is four and one-half (4.5) per cent; or

(4) If the rent includes neither heat, gas nor electric utilities,
the allowable increase is four (4) per cent.

Id. at 622, 415 A.2d at 268-69 (quoting proposed Art. 6(a), §§ 9(a)-(b) of the Charter of
Balt. City).

- 20 -
constituted an exercise of the City’s police power and was not “charter material[.]” Id. at

608, 415 A.2d at 261-62. We explained that the power to amend a city charter by vote

“may not be exercised in violation of other powers vested in the City under Art. XI-A.” Id.

at 609, 415 A.2d at 262. We concluded that the proposed amendment violated Md. Const.,

Art. XI-A, §§ 2 and 3 because it divested the City of its ability to legislate on the topic of

rent control and enlarged the City’s “limited grant of express powers[.]” Id. at 609-10, 415

A.2d at 262.

We also held that the parts of the amendment that were unconstitutional could not

be severed from creation of the non-elective Tenant-Landlord Commission. See id. at 609,

614, 415 A.2d at 262, 265. We explained that, although amicus curiae had suggested that

the unconstitutional parts could be severed and that there was a severability clause in the

amendment, the parties took “the position that the amendment is not so severable but rather

is integrated as a whole.” Id. at 614, 415 A.2d at 265. We concluded that, “[a]fter careful

consideration of the amendment’s provisions, we agree[d] with the parties and therefore

[found] that no part of the amendment [was] severable.” Id. at 614, 415 A.2d at 265

(citations omitted).

In Cheeks, id. at 610-12, 415 A.2d at 263-64, we discussed Ritchmount P’ship at

length and stated that, in that case, we held “that the referendum power is a power affecting

the form or structure of local government, as distinguished from the power to enact local

laws which must emanate from an express grant of legislative powers by the General

Assembly.” As such, under Art. XI-A, § 1, the referendum power is implicitly reserved to

the people and is “incorporated into a home rule charter without an express grant of

- 21 -
legislative power, provided that it did not violate any other provision of the Home Rule

Amendment.” Cheeks, 287 Md. at 612, 415 A.2d at 264. We stated that, in Ritchmount

P’ship, the provisions of Art. XI-A, § 3 were not violated because “the County Council

remained as the primary legislative organ of the county, i.e., as the ultimate repository of

all legislative powers possessed by the county and not expressly reserved to the electorate.”

Cheeks, 287 Md. at 612, 415 A.2d at 264. We distinguished Ritchmount P’ship by

explaining that the case “did not involve, as here, a claim of conflict with the provisions of

[§§] 2 and 6 of Art. XI-A or with the legality of a charter amendment under [§] 5.” Cheeks,

287 Md. at 612, 415 A.2d at 264. We stated that nothing in Ritchmount P’ship was “even

remotely at odds with our conclusion that the amendment [at issue] violates [§] 2, is not

authorized by [§] 6, and does not qualify as a charter amendment under [§] 5.” Cheeks,

287 Md. at 612-13, 415 A.2d at 264. We concluded that the proposed charter amendment

violated Art. XI-A, § 3 because it was “legislative in character” and constituted “an exercise

of the police power [in] an attempt to legislate by charter initiative[.]” Id. at 613, 415 A.2d

at 264.

In Griffith v. Wakefield, 298 Md. 381, 382, 390, 470 A.2d 345, 346, 350 (1984),

this Court held that a proposed amendment to the Charter of Baltimore County requiring

that resolution of all labor disputes involving county firefighters be conducted using

binding arbitration was not proper charter material. 11 Relying on Cheeks, we concluded

11
We described the proposed amendment as follows:

- 22 -
that a charter amendment may not prescribe a “detailed” system for managing labor

disputes that left no discretion over the area to county officials. Griffith, 298 Md. at 386,

388, 470 A.2d at 348, 349.

We concluded that the proposed amendment was “essentially legislative in

character” as it would prevent elected county officials from making any independent

decisions regarding the “wages, benefits, hours, and working conditions” of county

firefighters. Id. at 388, 470 A.3d at 349. We explained that the proposed amendment

would require the County Executive to include in the expense budget submitted to the

County Council all funds necessary for an arbitrator’s final decision and that the funds

[T]he amendment mandates that if the certified employee
organization or organizations representing the fire fighters and the county
have not reached a written contract agreement on terms and conditions of
employment by the first day in March in any year, submission to a board of
arbitration is mandatory upon the request of either party. The amendment
sets forth, in minute detail, the composition, function and powers of the
board. The board is to be composed of three members. One member is to
be appointed by the County Executive and one is to be appointed by the
certified fire fighters organization; both of these members must be selected
within four days of the request for arbitration. The third member is to be
selected by the two previously chosen members, also within four days, from
a list of candidates furnished by the American Arbitration Association. In
the event that two arbitrators are unable to agree on the choice of the third
arbitrator, the American Arbitration Association is to select the third
arbitrator, who shall act as chairman of the board of arbitration. The board
is to begin the arbitration proceedings within seven days after the selection
of the chairman and to make its decision within fifteen days after the
commencement of the arbitration proceedings, although the chairman may
extend this time requirement. The board is granted the power to administer
oaths, compel the attendance of witnesses, and require the production of
evidence by subpoena. The proposed amendment also delineates the factors
to be considered by the board in making its award.

Griffith, 298 Md. at 386-87, 470 A.2d at 348 (cleaned up).

- 23 -
could not be decreased or deleted by the County Council and would not be subject to prior

approval by the County Council—meaning that the binding arbitration provision of the

amendment would essentially “divest the elected officials of Baltimore County of any

discretion in reaching an agreement on the wages, benefits, hours and working conditions

of the fire fighters.” Id. at 387-88, 470 A.2d at 349 (cleaned up).

We noted that, in attempting to distinguish the case from Cheeks, the firefighters

association mistakenly relied on Md. Classified Emps. Ass’n v. Anderson, 281 Md. 496,

380 A.2d 1032 (1977). See Griffith, 298 Md. at 388, 470 A.2d at 349. We stated that,

in Anderson, we held that the Harford County Council lacked the authority to enact an

ordinance which mandated that a decision of an arbitration board on wages and benefits

for county employees would be binding upon the county. See Griffith, 298 Md. at 388,

470 A.2d at 349. We pointed out that, in Anderson, we concluded that, absent authorization

by a state public general law or the county charter, the Harford County Council lacked the

authority to delegate what was essentially a legislative function to a board of arbitrators.

See Griffith, 298 Md. at 388-89, 470 A.2d at 349.

In urging that the proposed charter amendment requiring binding arbitration for

resolution of labor disputes was proper charter material, the firefighters association argued

that because Anderson “held that authorization of the charter is required, then the matter

must be one which is concerned with the form and structure of government and is properly

deemed charter material.” Griffith, 298 Md. at 389, 470 A.2d at 350 (cleaned up). We

explained that the association’s reliance on the case was misplaced and that its argument

failed “to distinguish between ‘authorization’ on the one hand and a detailed local

- 24 -
enactment on the other hand.” Id. at 389, 470 A.2d at 350. We stated that, although “[i]t

is common for constitutions or charters to authorize, or preclude, specified types of

enactments by legislative bodies[,]” that “is quite different from a charter itself containing

all of the detailed provisions concerning the subject.” Id. at 389, 470 A.2d at 350.

We explained that, had the proposed charter amendment in the case simply

authorized the Baltimore County Council to enact a binding arbitration system for

compensation of county employees and, pursuant to that authorization, the Baltimore

County Council had exercised its discretion to enact an ordinance containing provisions

similar to those of the amendment, the case would have been distinguishable from Cheeks.

See Griffith, 298 Md. at 389-90, 470 A.2d at 350. We pointed out that because the

proposed charter amendment did not simply authorize the County Council to enact binding

arbitration legislation for county employees and did not authorize any decisions by the

legislative body, but instead contained “all of the law on the subject” and deprived the

County Council “of all decision-making authority concerning the subject[,]” “[n]othing in

the Anderson case support[ed its] validity, under Art. XI-A[.]” Griffith, 298 Md. at 390,

470 A.2d at 350.

In Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Smallwood, 327 Md.

220, 228, 234, 608 A.2d 1222, 1226, 1228-29 (1990), in two cases, one involving two

proposed amendments to the Charter of Anne Arundel County and one involving a

proposed amendment to the Charter of Baltimore County, we explained the reasons for

earlier orders of this Court requiring each county’s Board of Election Supervisors to place

property tax limitation amendments on the ballots, with parts of the amendments severed,

- 25 -
and prohibiting altogether the Anne Arundel County Board of Election Supervisors from

placing a “ballot initiative” amendment on the ballot. We described the proposed property

tax limitation charter amendment in Baltimore County as follows: the amendment “would

have required the property tax revenues for the tax year 1991-1992 to be limited to the

amount of property tax revenues realized for the tax year 1989-1990; [] would not have

allowed the tax revenues to be raised by more than 2% per year, beginning with tax year

1992-1993[;]” and contained an “‘escape clause’ [that] would have permitted the county

council to increase property taxes by more than the 2% maximum when at least two-thirds

of the qualified registered voters in the county approved the increase by referendum.” Id.

at 229, 608 A.2d at 1226. We stated that the proposed property tax limitation charter

amendment in Anne Arundel County “would have limited property tax revenues for the

tax year 1991-1992 to the amount of property revenues raised during the 1988-1989 tax

year[,]” “would have placed the tax cap provision . . . in the context of the constant yield

tax rate provided for in the Tax-Property Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland[,]”

and “contained an ‘escape clause’ that would have allowed the county council to exceed

the cap upon approval by the qualified voters of the county in a referendum.” 12 Id. at 231-

32, 608 A.2d at 1227-28.

With respect to the property tax limitation charter amendments in both counties, we

held that the tax cap portion of the amendments, which “would have placed a percentage

The proposed property tax limitation amendment in Anne Arundel County
12

contained a 4.5% tax cap, unlike the proposed Baltimore County amendment, which
contained a 2% tax cap. See Smallwood, 327 Md. at 242, 608 A.2d at 1233.

- 26 -
cap on the amount of local property tax revenues to be raised each year[,]” constituted

proper charter material but that two other aspects of the proposed amendments were

invalid. Id. at 236, 244, 608 A.2d at 1230, 1234. We explained that a county charter is

analogous to a state or federal constitution because its chief objective is to distribute power

among government agencies and to define the people’s relationship to government. See

id. at 237, 608 A.2d at 1230. We concluded that placing a percentage cap on local property

taxes directly involves the people’s relationship with government because it is a limitation

on the government’s power to tax and raise revenue. See id. at 237-38, 608 A.2d at 1230-

31. We pointed out that the federal Constitution, the Constitution of Maryland, and the

charters of Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties are “replete” with limitations on the

government’s ability to raise and appropriate revenue and we noted that the desire to place

limitations on the government’s ability to tax was “a major cause of the American

Revolution.” Id. at 237-38, 608 A.2d at 1231. We held that “a provision in a county charter

placing restrictions upon the county council’s revenue raising authority is a fundamental

aspect of the form and structure of government and thus is proper charter material.” Id. at

241, 608 A.2d at 1232. 13

13
We rejected the contention that the proposed property tax percentage cap
limitation amendments conflicted with public general law, specifically, Md. Code Ann.,
Tax-Prop. § 6-302(a), which provided that a government body of a county shall set the tax
rate on property for the next taxable year, and Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. § 6-308, which
specified procedural requirements that a county governing body needed to comply with
before it would be permitted to increase the tax rate above the constant yield rate. See
Smallwood, 327 Md. at 241-43, 608 A.2d at 1232-33. We explained that the proposed
property tax limitations would not have had the effect of allowing the voters of the two
counties to set the tax rates and that, instead, as required by Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. §

- 27 -
Although we held that the tax cap portions of the property tax limitation

amendments were valid, we concluded that the two other aspects of the amendments were

invalid, but that those portions of the amendments were severable. See id. at 244, 608 A.2d

at 1234. First, we determined that the “roll back” provisions of the amendments—which

would have limited the amount of property tax revenues for the tax year 1991-1992 to no

more than the amount collected in the tax year 1989-1990 for Baltimore County and no

more than the amount collected in the tax year 1988-1989 for Anne Arundel County—

violated Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. § 6-302(a), which requires “that the governing body of

each county is to set the property tax rate for the next tax year.” Id. at 244, 608 A.2d at

1234. We explained that, “[u]nlike the tax cap provisions that would have simply placed

a limit on the taxing power of each county council, the roll back provisions would have

transferred the county councils’ § 6-302 powers to the voters.” Id. at 244, 608 A.2d at

1234. In other words, the roll back provisions would have impermissibly enabled voters

in the two counties to set property tax rates for the tax year 1991-1992. See id. at 244, 608

A.2d at 1234.

Second, we held that the escape clause provisions of the amendments—which

would have permitted the county councils to increase property tax rates for a tax year above

6-302(a), each county’s legislative body would continue to set the property tax rate. See
id. at 242-43, 608 A.2d at 1233. And, we explained that Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. § 6-
308 “is a procedural provision limiting a county’s authority, rather than an affirmative grant
of power,” and as such did not conflict with the proposed property tax limitation
amendments. Id. at 243, 608 A.2d at 1233. We thus held that the tax cap portions of the
property tax limitation amendments “were facially valid because they constituted proper
charter material and did not conflict with public general law.” Id. at 243, 608 A.2d at 1233.

- 28 -
the rate specified in the tax cap by referring the proposed increase to the voters for

approval—were also invalid and violated Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. § 6-302(a). See id.

at 244-45, 608 A.2d at 1234. We explained that “[t]he effect of the escape clause

provisions would have been that, even if a county council would determine in any given

year that it is necessary to raise the tax rate above the limit specified by the cap, the voters

of the county could have decided whether the rate would be raised to particular levels above

the caps or would remain at cap levels.” Id. at 245, 608 A.2d at 1234. Like the roll back

provisions, the escape clause provisions would have essentially permitted voters to set the

tax rate in violation of Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. § 6-302(a). See id. at 245, 608 A.2d at

1234.

We held that the roll back and escape clause provisions of the property tax limitation

amendments were severable from valid portions of the amendments. See id. at 245, 608

A.2d at 1234. We explained that a strong presumption toward severability exists, and that

this presumption exists even in the absence of an express clause indicating that the drafters

intended for any invalid or unconstitutional provisions to be severed. See id. at 245-46,

608 A.2d at 1234. Where the dominant purpose of an enactment can largely be carried out

despite invalid parts, “courts will generally hold the valid portions severable and enforce

them.” Id. at 246, 608 A.2d at 1235 (cleaned up). We stated that the dominant purpose of

the property tax limitation amendments “was to place a cap on property tax revenues[,]”

that the tax cap provisions were facially valid, and that the purpose of the tax cap could be

achieved without the invalid roll back or escape clause provisions. Id. at 246, 608 A.2d at

1235. Because we determined that severing the invalid parts of the amendments would not

- 29 -
destroy the dominant purpose of the amendments, we ordered the invalid roll back and

escape clause provisions of the amendments severed. See id. at 248, 608 A.2d at 1236.

In Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 240-41, 743 A.2d at 750, this Court considered

whether a proposed amendment to the Montgomery County Charter that would have

prohibited the expenditure of county funds to install or maintain speed bumps and required

removal of all previously installed speed bumps within one year of the amendment’s

effective date was unconstitutional. 14 We also considered whether a proposed amendment

to the Harford County Charter that would have required developers to meet several

“adequacy” standards before expanding private or public property was unconstitutional.

Id. at 243-44, 743 A.2d at 752. 15 We held that both proposed amendments imposed tight

14
The proposed Montgomery County Charter amendment stated as follows:

County funds shall not be spent to install or maintain on any road or
street any permanent physical obstacle to vehicular movement, which for
purposes of this section means any speed bump or hump. Any such device
previously installed shall be removed within twelve months after this section
takes effect, unless the Council by an affirmative vote of seven members
approves its continued use at that location, after a public hearing for which
notice was posted at or near the location of the device.

Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 240 n.2, 743 A.2d at 750 n.2 (quoting proposed § 311(C) of
the Charter of Montgomery County).
15
The proposed Harford County Charter amendment contained, in pertinent part, the
following language:

Adequacy standards for the use or the development of public and/or
private property for residential or commercial purposes are not met where:

(1) the existing County, State and Federal roads, including road
segments and intersections, in all directions from each point of
entrance of the property through the intersection with the first arterial

- 30 -
restrictions on the counties and removed the County Councils’ ability to exercise discretion

and consequently, were unconstitutional. See id. at 239, 255, 743 A.2d at 749, 758.

We reiterated the basic principle that a county charter is the functional equivalent

of a state or federal constitution and is “‘intended to provide a broad organizational

framework establishing the form and structure of government[.]’” Id. at 248-49, 743 A.2d

roadway to the next intersecting collector or higher functional
classification road as defined by the Harford County Transportation
Plan are accommodating vehicular traffic at a level of service of ‘D’
or below as defined by the Highway Capacity Manual or other
equivalent standard in use by the County, or

(2) the existing County, State and Federal roads, or any road
segment within three miles of the property, are accommodating
vehicular traffic at a level of service of ‘D’ or below as defined by the
Highway Capacity Manual or other equivalent standard in use by the
County, or

(3) the existing State and Federal roads, or any road segment,
outside of the County are accommodating vehicular traffic at a level
of service of ‘D’ or below as defined by the Highway Capacity manual
or other equivalent standard, and the low level of service is directly or
proximately caused by vehicular traffic originating from within the
County, or

(4) the police, fire, or emergency medical response services
providing service to the property, are not sufficient to meet the needs
of the existing residential and business population according to
applicable standards established for each type of service, or

(5) the recreational facilities and public open space are not
sufficient to meet the needs of the existing residential population
according to applicable standards established for recreational facilities
and public open space.

Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 242 n.4, 743 A.2d at 751 n.4 (quoting proposed Art. VII, §
710 of the Charter of Harford County).

- 31 -
at 755 (quoting Cheeks, 287 Md. at 607, 415 A.2d at 261). And, “‘[a] charter amendment

within the context of Art. XI-A is necessarily limited in substance to amending the form or

structure of government initially established by adoption of the charter.’” Id. at 249, 743

A.2d at 755 (quoting Cheeks, 287 Md. at 607, 415 A.2d at 261). We concluded that

applying this standard does not mean that any proposed charter amendment expressed as a

limitation on governmental power is necessarily valid under Md. Const., Art. XI-A. See

id. at 252, 743 A.2d at 756. We explained that, under Art. XI-A, “enactment of specific

legislation is left to the elected legislative bodies.” Id. at 252, 743 A.2d at 757 (footnote

omitted). “As Chief Justice John Marshall emphasized early in our nation’s history, a

constitution necessarily provides a broad framework which both empowers and limits a

legislature in its enactment of specific laws[.]” Id. at 252 n.10, 743 A.2d at 757 n.10

(citation omitted).

We concluded that neither of the proposed charter amendments involved the

imposition of “general and fundamental limitations on a governmental power[.]” Id. at

253, 743 A.2d at 757. We determined that both charter amendments were analogous to

those examined in Cheeks and Griffith, as they prescribed detailed legislative schemes.

See Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 253, 743 A.2d at 757. 16 We explained, though, that a

proposed charter amendment simply being “lengthy” or “detailed” is not dispositive as to

16
We explained that the tax cap charter amendments in Smallwood were
distinguishable because they precluded the county councils’ power to enact a particular
type of legislation, which is proper charter material. See Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 253,
743 A.2d at 757. In contrast, we noted that a charter amendment which itself seeks to enact
legislation is not proper charter material. See id. at 253, 743 A.2d at 757.

- 32 -
whether it constitutes legislation or proper charter material. Id. at 253, 743 A.2d at 757.

Rather, a key consideration is the degree to which the local legislative body retains and

may exercise discretion “regarding an area under its authority pursuant to Article XI-A of

the Maryland Constitution.” Id. at 253, 743 A.2d at 757. We noted that a local legislative

body may still exercise substantial discretion over an area when a charter amendment

authorizes or precludes a given type of legislation, like the percentage cap in Smallwood.

See Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 254-55, 743 A.2d at 758. We noted, however, that a local

legislative body does not retain discretion to act where a charter amendment “narrowly

mandate[s]” a particular course of conduct. Id. at 255, 743 A.2d at 758.

In Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 428 Md. 723, 735-36, 749-50, 53 A.3d 1184,

1191-92, 1200 (2012) (“Atkinson I”), we considered whether a charter provision, Charter

§ 812, which directed the Anne Arundel County Council to implement binding arbitration

in labor disputes, violated Md. Const., Art. XI-A by precluding the County Council from

exercising “law-making discretion.” 17 We held that, pursuant to this Court’s precedent,

17
In 1988, a provision was added to the Anne Arundel County Charter that stated
that “[e]mployees in the classified service shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representative employee organizations of their own choosing as
provided by ordinance of the County Council.” Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 734, 53 A.3d at
1191 (brackets in original) (quoting § 811 of the Charter of Anne Arundel County). In
2002, voters amended the Anne Arundel County Charter, adding the following provision
regarding binding arbitration for a select group of uniformed employees:

(a) In addition to the right granted to County employees in Section
811 of this Article to organize and bargain collectively, the County Council
shall provide by ordinance for binding arbitration with authorized
representatives of the appropriate employee bargaining unit in order to
resolve labor disputes with the County’s law enforcement employees. The

- 33 -
the charter provision directing the County Council to adopt a binding arbitration ordinance

was proper charter material. See id. at 747-50, 53 A.3d at 1198-1200. Likewise, we held

that the binding arbitration provision did not preclude the County Council from exercising

“law-making discretion,” as it left all details for implementation to the County Council. Id.

at 749-50, 53 A.3d at 1200.

We explained that it is “settled” law that binding arbitration provisions are fit for

inclusion in a county charter. Id. at 745, 53 A.3d at 1197 (citing Anderson, 281 Md. at

512, 380 A.2d at 1041 (“[H]ad a State public general law or the County Charter authorized

the binding arbitration provisions enacted by the County Council, the provisions would be

valid.”) (Emphasis added)); Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Fraternal Ord. of Anne Arundel Det.

Officers and Pers., 313 Md. 98, 111, 543 A.2d 841, 848 (1988) (“[A] charter county may

ordinance shall provide for the appointment of a neutral arbitrator by the
parties to the arbitration who shall issue a binding decision to be
implemented as part of the following year’s budget process and which shall
take into account the financial condition of the County and the reasonable
interests of the law enforcement employees and the county relating to the
terms and conditions of employment. Law enforcement employees shall be
uniformed officers of the Police Department, Sheriff’s Department, and
Office of Detention Facilities. Any ordinance that is enacted shall prohibit
strikes or work stoppage by the law enforcement employees.

Id. at 735-36, 53 A.3d at 1191-92 (quoting § 812 of the Charter of Anne Arundel County).
Section 812(b) of the Charter of Anne Arundel County extended the binding arbitration
provision to uniformed firefighters. See id. at 736, 53 A.3d at 1192. In 2011, an ordinance
enacted by Council Bill 4-11 amended the Anne Arundel County Code to provide, in
relevant part, that “[e]xcept for those provisions that require an appropriation of funds or
the enactment of legislation to implement, the final written award issued by the neutral
arbitrator and the memorandum of agreed issues shall be final and binding upon the
County[,]” which called the charter provision, § 812, into question. Id. at 738, 53 A.3d at
1193 (cleaned up).

- 34 -
not, absent authorization by public general law or charter provision consistent with Art.

XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, delegate to an arbitrator a discretionary governmental

power or function which the charter vests in the county executive and county council.”)

(Emphasis added)); Freeman v. Local 1802, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps.

Council 67, 318 Md. 684, 691, 569 A.2d 1244, 1247 (1990) (same)).

We rejected the position that only a county council may ultimately decide whether

to adopt a binding arbitration policy for county employees. See id. at 748, 53 A.3d at 1199.

We noted that the charter provision at issue significantly differed from the charter

amendment before the Court in Griffith, as it did not “contain[] all of the law on the subject”

of binding arbitration. Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 747-48, 53 A.3d at 1198. We observed that,

in Griffith, we “illustrated a proper recognition of the Council’s constitutional law-making

power” by “hypothesizing” a charter amendment that provided that the Council may adopt

binding arbitration but “[left] to the Council the policy question of whether, and if so, how,

binding arbitration should operate.” Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 747, 53 A.3d at 1198.

We concluded that the charter provision at issue altered only the “form or structure

of government,” as it provided for a “method or system” for resolving labor disputes. Id.

at 749-50, 53 A.3d at 1199-1200 (cleaned up). We held that, because the charter provision,

Charter § 812, “made [a] policy decision” only, and left all details concerning its

implementation to the County Council, 18 the provision did not “unconstitutionally preclude

Importantly, we underscored that the County Council subsequently adopted Bill
18

1-03, codified at § 6-4-111 of the Anne Arundel County Code. See Atkinson I, 428 Md.

- 35 -
the exercise of the County Council’s law-making discretion.” Id. at 749-50, 53 A.3d at

1200.

In Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 236 Md. App. 139, 179-80, 181 A.3d 834, 857-

58 (2018) (“Atkinson II”), the Appellate Court of Maryland relied on our holding in

Atkinson I, in which this “Court decided that the voters of Anne Arundel County

determined in Charter § 812 that the County Council would not have discretion to reject

the effect of binding arbitration[,]” and concluded that “the voters also determined through

Charter §§ 811 and 812 that the Council cannot define and limit the subject matter of

collective bargaining and arbitration to a de minimis level.” (Cleaned up). The Appellate

Court noted that a permissible charter amendment must afford a county council with

significant “discretion and control regarding an area under its authority pursuant to Article

XI-A of the Maryland Constitution.” Atkinson II, 236 Md. App. at 178-79, 181 A.3d at

857 (cleaned up). We declined the County’s petition for writ of certiorari in Atkinson II.

See Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Atkinson, 460 Md. 5, 188 A.3d 919 (2018).

at 736, 53 A.3d at 1192. We pointed out that the ordinance contained all the relevant details
concerning implementation of the charter amendment, stating as follows:

It cover[s] possible mediation, each step in the selection of the neutral
arbitrator, timing, the powers of the arbitrator, receipt of final offers of each
party, ten factors to be considered by the arbitrator after receiving evidence,
the final, binding award, possible revision thereof by agreement, post-
hearing motion or court action, and implementation of the award as part of
the budget process.

Id. at 750, 53 A.3d at 1200. We noted that the County Council later amended this ordinance
to provide that the binding arbitration system did not require the County Council “to
appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written [arbitration]
award.” Id. at 726, 739, 53 A.3d at 1186, 1193.

- 36 -
The Request to Overrule Cheeks

The Alliance contends that our holding in Cheeks that proper charter material

addresses the form or structure of government was “clearly wrong” and argues that it

should be overruled. We could not disagree more. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, “we

follow and apply our prior decisions even though, if we were starting from a clean slate,

we would reach a different decision today.” Bennett v. Gentile, 487 Md. 604, 621, 321

A.3d 34, 44 (2024) (citation omitted). The doctrine of stare decisis is not absolute, but it

is “[o]nly in rare circumstances” that this Court should overrule its own precedent.

Wadsworth v. Sharma, 479 Md. 606, 630, 278 A.3d 1269, 1284 (2022) (cleaned up). “We

recognize two extremely narrow situations where it would be appropriate” to overrule our

own precedent—“when the decision is clearly wrong and contrary to established principles

or where there is a showing that the precedent has been superseded by significant changes

in the law or facts.” Id. at 630, 278 A.3d at 1284 (cleaned up).

We discern no basis on which to overrule Cheeks. In Cheeks, 287 Md. at 607, 415

A.2d at 261, we held that, to comply with Md. Const., Art. XI-A, a charter amendment

must address the form or structure of government. There has been no change in the law or

development of any circumstances that would lead us to the conclusion that the holding in

Cheeks was clearly wrong. We have consistently relied on our holding in Cheeks when

assessing the constitutionality of proposed charter amendments. In Atkinson I, 428 Md. at

747-48, 53 A.3d at 1198-99, when faced with a request to dispense with application of the

form and structure requirement set forth in Cheeks in assessing the constitutionality of a

proposed charter amendment, we declined to do so. Instead, we concluded that for the

- 37 -
form or structure requirement to have any practical effect, a charter amendment must not

preclude a local legislative body from the meaningful exercise of discretion over an area

under the ambit of Art. XI-A. See Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 749-50, 53 A.3d at 1200. If we

were to take the Alliance up on its request to overrule Cheeks, we would be required to

also overrule its long-standing progeny, such as Griffith, Smallwood, Save Our Streets,

and Atkinson I and II, and we would greenlight an outcome that would permit voters

through the charter amendment process to exercise express powers granted to the local

legislature under Md. Const., Art. XI-A. See Cheeks, 287 Md. at 608, 415 A.2d at 261-62.

Rather than being anywhere even close to clearly wrong, our holding in Cheeks

ensures that a county’s “law-making power” remains vested in a legislative body as

required by Art. XI-A. See Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3. Absent this requirement, voters

would be free to use the charter amendment process to enact detailed legislative initiatives,

including ones like the rent control system that was squarely rejected in Cheeks, 287 Md.

at 608, 415 A.2d at 262. In other words, without this requirement, voters would possess

the “full power to enact local laws,” so long as minor administrative details were left to the

local legislative body. Id. at 608, 415 A.2d at 262. Our Constitution does not condone this

result.

Applying the Principles Above to this Case

Based on our review of the authority above, we hold that when a charter amendment

precludes the local legislature’s meaningful exercise of discretion in an area under the

ambit of Art. XI-A, § 3 and encroaches upon the City’s police or general welfare powers,

it does more than address the form or structure of government and is therefore not proper

- 38 -
charter material. What can be distilled from our Constitution and relevant case law is that

proper charter material addresses the form or structure of local government and does not

preclude a local government from the meaningful exercise of discretion over areas reserved

for local legislation. 19 Based on these principles, we concluded that the Baby Bonus

Amendment did more than address the form or structure of local government and contained

the classic hallmarks of legislation, in violation of Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3.

Although it is a well-meant effort to combat childhood poverty, the Baby Bonus

Amendment is not an amendment that relates to the form and structure of government in

any fundamental sense. The Baby Bonus Amendment is akin to a legislative enactment in

that it mandates the making of mandatory minimum payments to certain residents of the

City and encroaches on the City’s discretion to address matters of public health and welfare

concerning children and new parents, which pursuant to Art. XI-A are areas reserved by

the General Assembly for local legislation. The powers delegated by the General

Assembly to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore in Article 4, Section 6 of the Public

Local Laws of Maryland include actions taken to protect the general welfare of the City. 20

See Cheeks, 287 Md. at 600, 415 A.2d at 257. Article XI-A, § 2 of the Maryland

19
In other words, a proposed charter amendment that does not relate to “the form or
structure of government in any fundamental sense” or one that may relate to the form and
structure of government but sets forth details or requirements that encroach on the ability
of a local legislative body to act in an area reserved for it to legislate in under Article XI-
A, is not proper charter material. Cheeks, 287 Md. at 608, 415 A.2d at 262.
20
The subjects on which counties may legislate are set forth in the Express Powers
Act, which is codified at Md. Code Ann., Local Gov’t (2013, 2024 Supp.) (“LG”) §§ 10-
101 to 10-330. LG § 10-206(a)(2) provides that “[a] county council may pass any
ordinance, resolution, or bylaw not inconsistent with State law that: . . . may aid in
maintaining the peace, good government, health, and welfare of the county.”

- 39 -
Constitution provides that express powers granted to “the City of Baltimore, as set forth

in Article 4, Section 6, Public Local Laws of Maryland, shall not be enlarged or extended

by any charter formed under the provisions of this Article, but such powers may be

extended, modified, amended or repealed by the General Assembly.” By mandating a

minimum payment to the specific groups of individuals identified by the terms of the

proposed amendment, the Baby Bonus Amendment in effect strips the Mayor and City

Council of the “full power and authority to pass ordinances deemed expedient in

maintaining the peace, good government, health, and welfare of the City of Baltimore.”

Cheeks, 287 Md. 600, 415 A.2d at 257 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). In other words, the

Baby Bonus Amendment does not address the form or structure of government in any sense

and strips the City of full power to legislate in the area of addressing childhood poverty.

With its requirement of a mandatory minimum payment to parents and guardians of

newborns, the Baby Bonus Amendment does not permit the City discretion or control

regarding the making of mandatory minimum monetary payments. The proposed

amendment dictates the groups of residents who are to receive payments from the City and

the minimum amount that the payments must be. The Baby Bonus Amendment leaves

nothing for the City Council to resolve aside from procedural matters that do not

meaningfully impact the operation of the Amendment. See Griffith, 298 Md. at 386, 470

A.2d at 348. As such, the Baby Bonus Amendment is analogous to the proposed charter

amendments that we held to be unconstitutional in Cheeks, Griffith, and Save Our Streets.

For instance, in Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 252-53, 743 A.2d at 757, we noted that the

proposed charter amendment was marked by “the specificity characteristic of county

- 40 -
council legislative enactments[,]” as opposed to “the fundamental, general nature of a

charter[.]”

The Baby Bonus Amendment is materially distinguishable from the charter

amendments in Atkinson I and Smallwood that were determined to be valid. In Atkinson

I, 428 Md. at 747-48, 53 A.3d at 1198-99, we held that the charter provision that directed

the county council to implement binding arbitration in labor disputes was proper charter

material as it left “fleshing out of the directive to the County Council.” The county council

retained authority over “possible mediation, each step in the selection of the neutral

arbitrator, timing, the powers of the arbitrator, receipt of final offers of each party, [] factors

to be considered by the arbitrator after receiving evidence, the final, binding award,

possible revision thereof by agreement, post-hearing motion[s] or court action[s], and

implementation of the award as part of the budget process.” Id. at 750, 53 A.3d at 1200.

By contrast, the Baby Bonus Amendment resolves all decisions of any significance with

respect to its mandated minimum payment and leaves essentially nothing for the City

Council to “flesh out,” aside from how to distribute the payments to eligible residents. This

case is much closer to Cheeks and Griffith, which involved, to quote Atkinson I, 428 Md.

at 746, 53 A.3d at 1197, attempts to “includ[e] what amount[ed] to [] entire statute[s] in

the Charter[.]”

In Smallwood, 327 Md. at 238, 608 A.2d at 1231, we held that proposed

amendments that placed a percentage cap on local property taxes were proper charter

material because “a limitation on the power of a legislative body to raise revenue is at the

heart of the form and structure of our government[.]” (Citations omitted). Relying on

- 41 -
overarching principles dating back to Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176-77, 2 L.Ed.

60, 73 (1803), we pointed out that both the United States Constitution and the Maryland

Constitution contain several provisions that limit the government’s ability to tax. Id. at

237-38, 608 A.2d at 1230-31. Conversely, the proposed Baby Bonus Amendment enables

voters to exercise the City’s police or general welfare powers by mandating monetary

payments of at least $1,000 to a specific group of residents in an attempt to address

childhood poverty. See Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 2; Article 4, Section 6, Public Local Laws

of Maryland. At bottom, an amendment requiring payments of at least $1,000 to all new

parents in Baltimore City is not a provision that affects “the form and structure of our

government[,]” and is therefore not “proper charter material.” Smallwood, 327 Md. at

238, 608 A.2d at 1231 (citations omitted).

The Children and Youth Fund

In its brief, the Alliance contended that the Baby Bonus Amendment was directly

analogous to other provisions of the Baltimore City Charter, in particular the Children and

Youth Fund, and pointed out that the funding provision of the Children and Youth Fund is

identical to that of the Baby Bonus Amendment. The Children and Youth Fund amendment

was added to the Charter through City Council resolution and voter ratification. The

Alliance asserted that prior to its adoption the Baltimore City Law Department reviewed

the proposed Children and Youth Fund Amendment and “found no constitutional problems

with the Children and Youth Fund proposal—failing to mention at all any alleged

usurpation of legislative or police powers that it now claims with the Baby Bonus.”

(Cleaned up).

- 42 -
In Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 745, 53 A.3d at 1197, we assumed without deciding “that

a charter amendment recommended by a Charter Revision Commission and proposed by

the legislative body is subject to the requirement that the amendment be charter material to

the same extent as if the amendment had been initiated by a petition of the voters.” We

reiterated:

“This Court has taken the position that the method or system for budgeting
and appropriating revenues set forth in a county’s charter, including the
executive budget system in effect in several counties, constitutes proper
charter material under Article XI-A, § 1. The budgetary and appropriation
system ‘is a fundamental aspect of the form and structure of’ a home rule
county’s government. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel
County v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 241, 608 A.2d 1222, 1232 (1992).”

Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 749, 53 A.3d at 1199-1200 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). After

reaffirming this basic principle, in a footnote, we stated: “In view of our holding, we need

not address Petitioners’ argument that the Cheeks requirement of ‘charter material’ does

not apply to a Charter amendment that is proposed by the Council, as contrasted with those

amendments that are initiated by voters’ petitions for a Charter referendum.” 21 Id. at 750

n.11, 53 A.3d at 1200 n.11.

The City Council’s resolution for the Children and Youth Fund amendment was

ratified by voters on November 8, 2016, in the November 2016 Presidential General

21
Read in context, our holding in Atkinson I does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that we assumed, purely for argument’s sake, that the charter material analysis
applies to County-initiated charter amendments to the same extent as voter-initiated charter
amendments. In light of our discussion in Atkinson I, it is not clear that the factual
distinction between a charter amendment being citizen-initiated versus legislatively-
initiated is dispositive as to whether the charter material test applies. But, this is not a
question before the Court today.

- 43 -
Election. At the time that the City Law Department reviewed the Children and Youth Fund

amendment, based on our case law, it was clear that this Court had not adopted a standard

different from the “charter material” standard set forth in Cheeks for evaluation of the

constitutionality of charter amendments proposed by a local legislature. After its proposal,

the Children and Youth Fund amendment was not challenged, and this Court was not called

upon to review its constitutionality. And we do not do so today. In this opinion, we neither

address nor resolve the issue of whether the charter material analysis applies to

legislatively-initiated charter amendments, or whether the Children and Youth Fund

amendment is constitutional. However, given the comparison made by the Alliance and

the allegation that the City essentially applied a double standard with respect to its review

of the Baby Bonus Amendment, we would be remiss not to address the dissimilarity of the

two amendments under the charter material standard.

Although some of the language of the Baby Bonus Amendment is undeniably

identical to that of Art. I, § 13 of the Charter of Baltimore City, unlike the Children and

Youth Fund, the Baby Bonus Amendment does not leave any meaningful discretion to the

City. The Children and Youth Fund does not require mandatory payments to a select group

of Baltimore City residents. Rather, the Children and Youth Fund establishes a non-lapsing

fund for a broad range of initiatives, all of which are aimed at youth development. Art. I,

§ 13 of the Charter of Baltimore City provides as follows:

(a) Fund established; Scope.

(1) There is a continuing, non[-]lapsing Baltimore City Children and
Youth Fund, to be used exclusively for purposes of establishing
new and augmenting existing programs for and services to the

- 44 -
children and youth of this City.

(2) These programs and services must be from among those designed
to:

(i) ensure that Baltimore’s children and youth are healthy, are
ready to learn and succeed in school, and live in stable, safe,
and supportive families and communities;

(ii) ensure that Baltimore City supports families as an important
part of the City population and civic culture;

(iii) focus on the prevention of problems and on supporting and
enhancing the strengths of children, youth, and their families;

(iv) complement the City’s community development efforts;

(v) strengthen community-based networks of recreation and
after-school services in all neighborhoods; and

(vi) ensure that children and youth with the highest needs receive
maximum benefit from the Fund.

(3) The Fund shall be administered in accordance with the following
standards:

(i) programs and services shall be provided and funds allocated
based on best practices and successful and innovative
models;

(ii) to the maximum extent feasible, funds shall be allocated
equitably among services for all age groups – from infancy
to transitional-aged youth;

(iii) programs and services shall be gender-responsive and
culturally competent; and

(iv) programs and services shall be designed to strengthen
collaboration among service providers for children, youth,
and their families, including collaboration among public
agencies and non-profit organizations.

***

- 45 -
(b) Limitations on use.

The Children and Youth Fund may not be used to substitute for or
replace funding for children and youth programs or services provided
in the Ordinance of Estimates for Fiscal Year 2017, except to the
extent that federal, state, or private agency funds for those programs
or services have since been discontinued.

(c) Revenue sources.

The Children and Youth Fund shall comprise:

(1) a mandatory annual appropriation in the Ordinance of Estimates
of an amount equal to at least $0.03 on every $100 of assessed or
assessable value of all property in the City of Baltimore (except
property exempt by law); and

(2) grants and donations made to the Fund.

(d) Continuing nature of Fund.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Charter, unspent portions
of the Children and Youth Fund:

(1) remain in the Fund, to be used exclusively for its specified
purposes;

(2) do not revert to the general revenues of the City; and

(3) their appropriations do not lapse.

(e) Implementation.

By Ordinance, the Mayor and City Council shall provide for the
oversight, governance, and administration of the Children and Youth
Fund, including:

(1) methods and criteria for identifying specific program and services
eligible for funding by the Fund;

(2) methods and criteria for allocating available funds among eligible

- 46 -
programs and services; and

(3) the establishment of any other legislative or administrative rules,
regulations, or standards, consistent with this section, governing
the Fund, its operations, and programs and services funded by it.

In considering the constitutionality of the Baby Bonus Amendment, the circuit court

noted that the Children and Youth Fund sets forth “broad parameters” for programs and

services for City youth—rather than a detailed legislative scheme—and “leaves meaningful

discretion to the City,” and concluded that the Children and Youth Fund is distinguishable

from the Baby Bonus Amendment. We agree.

Unlike the Baby Bonus Amendment, the Children and Youth Fund does not

mandate what programs the City must establish to support its youth, nor does it provide

that monetary payments to residents are required to support youth. In operating the

Children and Youth Fund, the Mayor and City Council are explicitly tasked with

developing the “methods and criteria for identifying specific programs and services eligible

for funding,” “allocating available funds among eligible programs and services,” and

“establish[ing] [] any other legislative or administrative, rules, regulations, or standards”

that advance the objectives of the Children and Youth Fund. Art. I, §§ 13(e)(1)-(3) of the

Charter of Balt. City. Under these provisions, the Children and Youth Fund may be used

to support a broad range of initiatives, so long as they “ensure that Baltimore’s children

and youth are healthy,” “support[] families,” “strengthen community-based networks of

recreation,” and prioritize “children and youth with the highest needs.” Id. at §§

13(a)(2)(i)-(vi).

The same flexibility is not provided by the Baby Bonus Amendment, which

- 47 -
promulgates one solution for addressing childhood poverty—cash payments of $1,000 or

more to parents of newborns. See Proposed Art. I, § 20(a)(6) of the Charter of Balt. City.

As the circuit court aptly noted, the Baby Bonus Amendment is “devoid of any provisions

directed to the configuration of Baltimore City government.” For example, it does not

establish a commission tasked with identifying solutions aimed at addressing childhood

poverty or identify any potential means for mitigating childhood poverty other than the

required cash payments. And, it does not permit the City to utilize the Baby Bonus Fund

to assist City residents who do not qualify as “the birthing parent,” adopting parent, or

guardian of a newborn child, even if such assistance would help reduce instances of

childhood poverty. Proposed Art. I, § 20 of the Charter of Balt. City. 22

Although the Baby Bonus Amendment affords the City the discretion to establish

the “methods and criteria for evaluating parental eligibility[,]” “the logistic[s] [for]

distribution of the Fund[,]” and “any other legislative or administrative rules, regulations,

or standards” that advance the objectives of the Baby Bonus Amendment, these provisions

22
To be sure, the revenue sources provisions, i.e., funding provisions, for the
Children and Youth Fund and the Baby Bonus Fund are identical and provide that the
respective Funds are comprised of: “1. a mandatory annual appropriation in the Ordinance
of Estimates of an amount equal to at least $0.03 on every $100 of assessed or assessable
value of all property in the City of Baltimore (except property exempt by law); and 2.
Grants and donations made to the Fund.” Art. I, § 13(c) of the Charter of Balt. City
(paragraph breaks omitted); Proposed Art. I, § 20(b) of the Charter of Balt. City (paragraph
breaks omitted). The source of funding, though, is not dispositive as to whether the Baby
Bonus Amendment is proper charter material. The proposed Baby Bonus Amendment
leaves the City responsible for making only a narrow range of procedural decisions
concerning mandatory minimum payments that involve an exercise of the City’s general
welfare power. See, e.g., Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 747, 53 A.3d at 1198 (noting that “the
operative standard is a question of degree, in this case, the extent to which discretion of the
legislative body is precluded by the proposed Charter amendment”).

- 48 -
essentially give the City the ability to determine only the process and manner for

distributing the mandatory payments. Id. at §§ 20(d)(1)-(3). The City is without the

discretion to decline to make the payments, impose conditions on the use of the funds once

received, or impose conditions on who may qualify for the payments. 23 In contrast, the

Children and Youth Fund affords the City with discretion to establish the very substance

of any programs offered to residents. See Art. I, § 13(a)(1) of the Charter of Balt. City

(“There is a continuing, non[-]lapsing Baltimore City Children and Youth Fund, to be used

exclusively for purposes of establishing new and augmenting existing programs for and

services to the children and youth of this City.”) (Emphasis added)). Our precedent

concerning the constitutionality of charter amendments provides that a proposed

amendment cannot intrude on powers reserved to the local legislature under Article XI-A.

See, e.g., Cheeks, 287 Md. at 608-09, 415 A.3d at 261-62. In this case, the proposed

amendment deprives the City of any meaningful decision-making authority in an area

reserved for its control under Article XI-A.

Severance

In Smallwood, 327 Md. at 246, 608 A.2d at 1235, we stated that “when the dominant

23
The Baby Bonus Amendment provided that “[b]y Ordinance, or by proper
delegation of regulatory authority, the Mayor and City Council may set forth conditions in
which the guardian of a child other than the birthing parent may receive the Baby Bonus
Payment instead of the birthing parent . . . [and] in which an adopting parent or parent(s)
may receive a single Baby Bonus Payment upon the adoption of a child.” Proposed Art. I,
§ 20(a)(3) and (4) of the Charter of Balt. City. This provision of the Amendment provided
the Mayor and City Council with only the limited discretion of determining who qualified
as a guardian or adopting parent (versus a parent) and under what conditions a guardian or
adopting parent could receive the payment.

- 49 -
purpose of an enactment may largely be carried out notwithstanding the enactment’s partial

invalidity, courts will generally hold the valid portions severable and enforce them.”

(Quoting O.C. Taxpayers for Equal Rts., Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City,

280 Md. 585, 601, 375 A.2d 541, 550 (1977) (brackets omitted)). We explained that we

have consistently determined that submission to the voters of a proposed charter

amendment that is in conflict with public general law should be enjoined and that, if a part

of a proposed charter amendment is invalid and severable, we have a duty to sever those

parts when they are challenged. See id. at 247, 608 A.2d at 1235. We stated that

“submission of an amendment with invalid and severable portions intact would mislead the

public during the election by asking them to vote on an amendment which, in its present

form, was incapable of becoming part of their charter.” Id. at 248, 608 A.2d at 1236.

Although the Alliance contends that the primary purpose of the Baby Bonus

Amendment may be effectuated without the mandatory $1,000 payment provision and that

if invalid the provision could be severed from the amendment, the plain language of the

Baby Bonus Amendment does not support severability. The dominant purpose of the Baby

Bonus Amendment is to address childhood poverty in Baltimore City through mandatory

payments of at least $1,000 to the birth parents, adoptive parents, or guardians of

newborns. 24 Without the $1,000 mandatory payment provision, the Baby Bonus

Amendment would provide that “a timely Baby Bonus Payment shall be made” to “the

birthing parent of a child, upon the birth of a child” and that “[b]y Ordinance, or by proper

On brief, the Alliance argued that the “dominant purpose” of the Baby Bonus
24

Amendment is to provide support to Baltimore families with new children.

- 50 -
delegation of regulatory authority, the Mayor and City Council may set forth conditions”

in which a guardian of a child or an adoptive parent may receive a single baby bonus

payment. Proposed Art. I, § 20(a) of the Charter of Balt. City. The Amendment would

also require that “[b]y Ordinance, or by proper delegation of regulatory authority, the

Mayor and City Council shall determine the annual Baby Bonus Payment amount using all

relevant data, including, but not limited to: surplus monies in the fund, historical birth rates,

estimated future property values, etc.” Proposed Art. I, § 20(a)(7) of the Charter of Balt.

City.

The $1,000 mandatory minimum payment provision is the heart of the proposed

Baby Bonus Amendment. Without the mandatory payment provision, the Baby Bonus

Amendment would have no practical effect, as the City would be able to enact legislation

authorizing payments in any amount, no matter how small. Unlike the tax caps in

Smallwood, with severance of the mandatory payment amount in this case, absent

meaningful additional implementing legislation from the City Council, the amendment

would have no effect on its own. The only thing that would be clear is that the City would

be directed to make a one-time payment to birthing parents (and adoptive parents and

guardians)—which is a circumstance that in and of itself, under our case law, is a directive

akin to legislation in an area that is reserved for the Mayor and City Council under Art. XI-

A instead of a charter amendment that addresses the form and structure of government.

Given that the dominant purpose of the Baby Bonus Amendment would not be achieved

without the invalid provision requiring at least a $1,000 mandatory payment amount and

that the substance of the proposed charter amendment is not proper charter material,

- 51 -
severance is unwarranted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, in our order of August 29, 2024, we concluded

that the Baby Bonus Amendment did not concern proper “charter material,” and therefore

violated Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3. Balt. City Bd. of Elections, 488 Md. at 533, 322 A.3d

at 78. Because the circuit court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary

judgment and enjoining the defendants from placing the Baby Bonus Amendment on the

ballot for the November 2024 Presidential General Election, we affirmed its August 9,

2024 order. 25

Similarly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the City Board’s
25

and the Alliance’s motions for summary judgment.

- 52 -

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10792695. Public record. Not legal advice.