# Pittman v. Campbell

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · January 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10792198

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** January 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10792198

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the 21st Judicial District Court lacked the capacity to be sued pursuant to Louisiana law
- applying Rule 17(b)(3) to determine the capacity of a state court to be sued

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALKA A. PITTMAN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 24-2168

GERALD CAMPBELL, ET AL SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS
Pro se plaintiff Alka A. Pittman (“Pittman”), proceeding in forma pauperis
(“IFP”), filed this action1 against the father of her children and various Louisiana and
Mississippi governmental entities. Now before the Court are three motions to dismiss
filed by all defendants.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses
plaintiff’s complaint in part for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, in part as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and in part for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I. BACKGROUND
This lawsuit is plaintiff’s third before this Court regarding child-custody
proceedings in the 22nd Judicial District of Louisiana, in which the court, among
other things, granted sole custody of Pittman’s children to their father, Gerald
Campbell, Jr. (“Campbell”).3 In her first lawsuit, Pittman alleged violations of her
federal constitutional rights.4 The Court dismissed the case with prejudice because it

1 R. Doc. No. 1.
2 R. Doc. Nos. 12, 16, 18.
3 E.D. La. Case No. 21-1786, R. Doc. No. 44, at 1–2; E.D. La. Case No. 22-2242, R.
Doc. No. 13.
4 E.D. La. Case No. 21-1786, R. Doc. No. 44, at 2.
concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.5 The complaint
filed in connection with her second lawsuit alleged that Pittman is of Indigenous
American descent and that the child-custody judgment awarding Campbell sole

custody of their children constituted genocide because it interfered with Pittman’s
family continuity.6 The Court likewise dismissed Pittman’s second lawsuit for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.7
Pittman’s complaint in this lawsuit explains that she, “an Indigenous living
woman, seeks immediate judicial intervention and relief to rectify the wrongful
removal and retention of her daughter and son due to jurisdictional errors and

violations of Constitutional and International Rights.”8 The complaint names as
defendants Campbell, the State of Louisiana and several governmental entities
thereof (the Louisiana Attorney General, the 22nd Judicial District Court of St.
Tammany and Washington Parishes, as well as the St. Tammany Parish Clerk of
Court) (“Louisiana defendants”),9 and the State of Mississippi and several entities
thereof (the Mississippi Attorney General, Jasper County Justice Court, and the
Jasper County Chancery Court Clerk) (“Mississippi defendants”) (collectively,

“defendants”).10

5 Id. at 5.
6 E.D. La. Case No. 22-2242, R. Doc. No. 13, at 2.
7 Id. at 5.
8 R. Doc. No. 1, at 1.
9 The St. Tammany Parish Clerk of Court has not yet appeared, although an executed
summons with respect to the Clerk was filed into the record. See R. Doc. No. 19.
10 The State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Attorney General have not yet
appeared, although executed summonses with respect to those two defendants were
filed into the record. R. Doc. No. 9.
The crux of the present complaint is noncompliance with the jurisdictional
provision of the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1911. That statute
provides that “[a]n Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over

any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled
within the reservation of such tribe.” § 1911(a). In Pittman’s view, § 1911 gives a
tribal court, rather than Louisiana state courts, jurisdiction over the child-custody
dispute. Accordingly, she “urge[s] [the Court] to recognize the jurisdictional
precedence of [§ 1911],” which “underscor[es] the need of transferring the proceedings
to the appropriate jurisdiction of her tribe.”11

Pittman’s statement of the facts underlying her claims is terse and consists of
two short paragraphs or four sentences in total.12 In the first, she states that she
seeks immediate judicial intervention to rectify the wrongful removal and retention
of her minor children, which “is necessitated by jurisdictional errors and violations of
Constitutional and International rights.”13 In the second, she explains that the stress,
anxiety, and abuse that her children have experienced as a result of the custody
dispute “necessitate immediate intervention and the application of the Indian Child

Welfare Act to ensure [her children’s] mental health, physical well-being and the
preservation of their cultural and familial ties.”14

11 Id. at 2.
12 See id. at 3–4.
13 Id. at 4.
14 Id.
The complaint asserts three “counts” in the section entitled “causes of action.”15
First, she alleges that defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.16 Pittman does not
explain how defendants did so and provides merely a generalized statement restating

the cause of action.17 Second, Pittman alleges that defendants violated 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242, which make it a crime to deprive persons of rights secured by federal
law and to conspire to deprive such rights.18 Pittman alleges that the wrongful
removal of her children violated these statutes.19 She also alleges that the
misidentification of her and her children’s ethnicity violates their rights under the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.20 Third, Pittman

lists as a count 25 U.S.C. § 1911 together with 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b),21 the latter of which
provides that a person born to a tribe in the United States is a United States citizen.22
She avers that “[t]he relief sought is grounded in the recognition of the [Pittman’s]
and her offspring[’]s citizenship status under these statutes,” which “support[] her
claims and underscores the necessity of the Court’s intervention to protect the rights
and welfare of Indigenous children.”23

15 Id. at 4–5.
16 Id.
17 See id.
18 Id. at 4–5.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 R. Doc. No. 1, at 5.
22 “The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: . . . (b)
a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or
other aboriginal tribe: Provided, That the granting of citizenship under this
subsection shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of such person
to tribal or other property.” 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b).
23 Id.
Pittman’s prayer for relief is voluminous, as it lists no less than 14 requests for
relief.24 Significantly, the very first request for relief is for this Court to “[o]rder the
immediate return of [Pittman’s] minor offspring[] to her permanent custody in her

home state.”25 She also explicitly asks this Court to vacate the judgement awarding
Campbell custody.26 Pittman concludes by moving this Court to consider the
citizenship of her children pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b), to apply § 1911, and to
grant the relief to protect the mental health and “cultural rights” of her children.27
She further explains that “[i]mmediate action is imperative to rectify the
jurisdictional errors” and to “uphold their rights as Indigenous nationals.”28

Defendants have filed three motions to dismiss.29 Some of the Louisiana
defendants filed a motion30 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
advancing several grounds for dismissal, including that this Court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,31 that ICWA does not

24 See id. at 5–7.
25 Id. at 5.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 7.
28 Id.
29 R. Doc. Nos. 12, 16, 18.
30 R. Doc. No. 12. This motion was filed by all Louisiana defendants except the St.
Tammany Parish Clerk. The Clerk was served after the other Louisiana defendants
filed their motion. See R. Doc. No. 19. Although the Clerk has not yet appeared, the
Court nonetheless treats all the Louisiana defendants collectively for the purposes of
ruling on the motion. Since, as will be explained below, IFP complaints may be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) on the Court’s own motion even
before service of process, see Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009), the
Court has authority to dismiss claims against the Clerk although the Clerk has not
appeared or filed a motion to dismiss.
31 Id. at 6–7.
confer jurisdiction because it does not apply,32 and that the Louisiana defendants
enjoy various forms of immunity.33 Campbell filed a motion in which he asserted that
Pittman has manipulated the court system, such as by committing perjury, and he

suggested that Pittman fabricated her indigenous identity in the wake of her losing
custody.34 Finally, the Mississippi defendants filed a motion35 to dismiss asserting
essentially the same grounds as the Louisiana defendants.36
Pittman filed responses37 to all three motions, in which she seems to have
pivoted away from ICWA as the principal basis for relief. Whereas the complaint
emphasized the “jurisdictional precedence”38 of ICWA and repeatedly invoked § 1911,

Pittman’s responses do not mention ICWA nor address its disputed applicability.
Rather, Pittman cites or invokes an array of state statutes, unspecified treaties,

32 Id. at 7–8.
33 Id. at 8–11.
34 R. Doc. No. 16.
35 R. Doc. No. 18. This motion was filed by the Jasper County Justice Court and the
Jasper County Chancery Court Clerk. Although the State of Mississippi and the
Mississippi Attorney General have not yet appeared, the Court nonetheless treats all
the Mississippi defendants collectively for the purposes of ruling on the motion. Since,
as will be explained below, IFP complaints may be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) on the Court’s own motion even before service of process, see Brewster
v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009), the Court has authority to dismiss claims
against Mississippi and the Attorney General although they have not appeared or
filed a motion to dismiss.
36 In her sur-reply, Pittman claims that the Mississippi defendants filed their motion
“long after” the deadline and accuses this Court of applying stricter standards against
her and leniency toward government entities. See R. Doc. No. 29, at 1–2. Pittman’s
claims are baseless and mistaken. The Mississippi defendants that have filed this
motion were served on November 14, 2024. See R. Doc. No. 13. Accordingly, the
deadline for filing their motion was December 16, 2024, on which date they filed their
motion. See R. Doc. No. 18. The motion was therefore timely.
37 R. Doc. Nos. 20–22.
38 R. Doc. No. 1, at 2.
ethical canons, and codes of conduct.39 Further, she alleges for the first time that the
Louisiana and Mississippi defendants violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 Pittman did not cite either clause in her

complaint. In addition, she provides factual information that is absent from her
complaint.
When the Court first considered the motions, the Court discovered that it was
unclear to which Indian tribe Pittman or her children belonged.41 Since Pittman’s
indigenous heritage is central to this matter, the Court ordered Pittman to file
confirmation of tribal membership.42 Pittman complied with the order and filed into

the record confirmation that Pittman herself and her children are members of the
Tchou Tchouma Tchoupitoulas Nation.43 In addition, Pittman filed a sur-reply44 in
response to the reply45 filed by the Mississippi defendants.
II. STANDARDS OF LAW
a. Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred
by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.” In re FEMA Trailer
Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012). Pursuant to

39 R. Doc. No. 21-1, at 2–10; R. Doc. No. 22-1, at 1–9.
40 R. Doc. No. 21-1, at 2; R. Doc. No. 22-1, at 2.
41 R. Doc. No. 23.
42 Id.
43 R. Doc. No. 25.
44 R. Doc. No. 29.
45 R. Doc. No. 24.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “a claim is ‘properly dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate’ the claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Courts must consider a Rule 12(b)(1)

jurisdictional argument before addressing any other arguments on the merits. Id.
(citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court may dismiss an action for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction “on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint
alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record;
or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of

disputed facts.” Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 565–66 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
St. Tammany Par., ex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556 F.3d 307, 315
(5th Cir. 2009)). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the
party asserting jurisdiction.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. When a court determines
that it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over an action, the action is
dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., id.; Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608
(5th Cir. 1977).

b. Grounds for Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, enacted in 1892 and presently codified
as 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful
access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). However,
this statute authorizes courts to dismiss cases on their own motion for several
grounds. See § 19115(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).46 “Dismissals on these grounds are often made
sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the
inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324;

see also Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The district court may
dismiss an in forma pauperis proceeding ‘before service of process or before the filing
of the answer’ as long as certain safeguards are met.” (quoting Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d
438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990))).
Relevant to this case are the first and second grounds for dismissal. The first
ground upon which § 1915(e)(2)(B) authorizes federal courts to dismiss an IFP

proceeding is where the court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious.”
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An IFP complaint “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. “[A] complaint lacks an arguable
basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the
complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”
Thompson v. Tx. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 67 F.4th 275, 279 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate

when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,
whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).

46 “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that: . . . the action
or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Second, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) “requires courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis
proceeding at any time if the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Miller v. Dunn, No. 24-10668, 2025 WL 32818, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).

Dismissals for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are governed by
the same standards applicable to dismissals pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013). “Under
that standard, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
when it does not contain ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). “Thus, a plaintiff must plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). “Allegations of pro se complaints are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Rogers, 709 F.3d at 407. A court
may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim without notice if the
dismissal is without prejudice. See Brown v. Taylor, 829 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2016).

III. ANALYSIS
The Court concludes that the Pittman’s complaint must be dismissed. The
grounds for dismissal turn on the circumstances of certain defendants. The Court will
analyze Pittman’s claims accordingly.
a. The States of Louisiana and Mississippi
With respect to the States of Louisiana and Mississippi, the Court finds that
Pittman’s claims against them must be dismissed because the Court lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction over them on account of their sovereign immunity. “Sovereign
immunity bears on this court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Matter of Entrust Energy,
Inc., 101 F.4th 369, 382 (5th Cir. 2024). It “bars private suits against nonconsenting
states in federal court.” Book People, Inc. v. Wong, 91 F.4th 318, 334–35 (5th Cir.
2024). Since Louisiana and Mississippi have not consented to this lawsuit, it is plainly
precluded by their sovereign immunity. Nor does the so-called Ex Parte Young

exception apply. That exception applies only when a plaintiff “name[s] individual
state officials as defendants in their official capacities.” See Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg,
105 F.4th 313, 325 (5th Cir. 2024) (emphasis added). In turn, it does not operate to
exempt claims directly against the states themselves.
b. The 22nd Judicial District Court and The Jasper County Justice Court
The Court concludes that Pittman’s claims against the 22nd Judicial District
Court and the Jasper County Justice Court (collectively, “the state courts”) must be

dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because these entities
lack the capacity to be sued. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3) governs the
capacity of the state courts to be sued. Cf. McLin v. Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 79 F.4th
411, 416 (5th Cir. 2023) (applying Rule 17(b)(3) to determine the capacity of a state
court to be sued). It provides that the capacity to be sued is determined “by the law
of the state where the [federal district] court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 17(b)(3).
Accordingly, Louisiana law applies.
In Roberts v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 634 So. 2d 341 (La.

1994), the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the test for determining the status of a
governmental entity to be sued. It stated that:
The important determination with respect to the juridical status or legal
capacity of an entity is not its creator, nor its size, shape, or label. Rather
the determination that must be made in each particular case is whether
the entity can appropriately be regarded as an additional and separate
government unit for the particular purpose at issue. In the absence of
positive law to the contrary, a local government unit may be deemed to
be a juridical person separate and distinct from other government
entities, when the organic law grants it the legal capacity to function
independently and not just as the agency or division of another
governmental entity.

Id. at 346.
In McLin v. Twenty-First Judicial District, the Fifth Circuit applied the
Roberts test to conclude the Louisiana judicial district courts are not seperate entities
and therefore lack the capacity to be sued. 79 F.4th 411, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2023)
(holding that the 21st Judicial District Court lacked the capacity to be sued pursuant
to Louisiana law). The analysis emphasized that the judicial district courts are part
of a unified state court system created by the Louisiana Constitution. Id. at 416.
In light of McLin, the state courts lack the capacity to be sued. The holding of
McLin squarely precludes Pittman’s lawsuit against the 22nd Judicial District Court.
And its reasoning clearly extends to the Jasper County Justice Court. Like Louisiana
judicial district courts, Mississippi justice courts are created by the Mississippi
Constitution as part of a unified court system. See Miss. Const. § 171. Accordingly,
the Jasper County Justice Court is not a separate legal entity with the capacity to be
sued pursuant to Louisiana law.
c. Remaining Defendants

The Court having dismissed Louisiana, Mississippi, the 22nd Judicial District
Court, and the Jasper County Justice Court from this lawsuit, five defendants
remain: Campbell, the Louisiana Attorney General, the Mississippi Attorney
General, the St. Tammany Parish Clerk of Court, and the Jasper County Chancery
Court Clerk. Since whether Pittman’s § 1983 claims should be dismissed turns on
facts or circumstances particular to each of the remaining defendants, the Court will

now analyze Pittman’s § 1983 claims with respect to each defendant.47 However, the
Court will analyze Pittman’s claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 as well as
to 25 U.S.C. § 1911 as to all defendants.
i. Pittman’s §1983 claims against Campbell must be dismissed.

Since the Court concludes that Pittman has failed to state valid § 1983 claims
against Campbell, these claims must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “[S]tate action is a prerequisite for bringing an action under Section
1983.” Rundus v. City of Dallas, 634 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2011). This prerequisite
is met “only when the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or
privilege having its source in state authority.” Hernandez v. Causey, 124 F.4th 325,

47 The Court decides not to reach whether sovereign immunity or qualified immunity
applies to the remaining defendants (apart from Campbell) with respect to Pittman’s
§ 1983 claims because the Court does not have sufficient facts to determine those fact-
intensive questions and can dispose of these claims on other grounds.
335 (5th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, “mere
private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is excluded from § 1983’s
reach.” Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). However, “private action may be deemed
state action when the defendant’s conduct is fairly attributable to the State.” Moody
v. Farrell, 868 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Fair attribution may be found where private actors are “willful
participants in joint action with the State or its agents.” Hernandez, 124 F.4th at 335
(cleaned up) (internal quotation and citation omitted). For example, private parties

bribing a state judge so that he would issue an illegal injunction were held to have
engaged in state action for the purposes of § 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,
27–28 (1980).
Although Pittman’s complaint provides little information with respect to
Campbell, her response to his motion to dismiss does elaborate. She accuses Campbell
of abuse, manipulating the court system, making false claims, and neglect.48
Nowhere, either in her complaint or her response, does Pittman even suggest that

Campbell engaged in joint action with state officials such that § 1983 applies to him.
Even with the information outside of the complaint, Pittman has not stated sufficient
factual allegations to show that the state-action requirement is satisfied with respect
to Campbell. She has therefore failed to state valid claims against Campbell pursuant
to § 1983.

48 R. Doc. No. 20-1, at 1–2, 7–8.
ii. Pittman’s § 1983 claims against the Louisiana Attorney General and the St.
Tammany Parish Clerk must be dismissed.

To the extent that Pittman’s claims pursuant to § 1983 arise from the child-
custody order of the 22nd Judicial District Court, the Court concludes that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. In Pittman’s first case, she brought
claims pursuant to § 1983 for due process violations during the custody proceedings
involving her children.49 She prayed for this Court to order that she “have [her]
children back in [her] custody immediately.”50 This Court concluded that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.51
Rooker-Feldman likewise precludes this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction of
Pittman’s similar § 1983 claims in this matter. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds
that “federal district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state

court judgments.” Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994). “The
casting of a complaint in the form of a civil rights action cannot circumvent this
rule[.]” Id. “When a § 1983 suit is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state-court
judgment such that the suit is, essentially, an attack on that judgment, district courts
lack original jurisdiction over the suit.” Batista v. Carter, 796 F. App’x 209, 210 (5th
Cir. 2020) (citing Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 317–18). Rooker-Feldman applies even if the
plaintiff does not explicitly seek to overturn the state-court judgment where the

49 E.D. La. Case No. 21-1786, R. Doc. No. 1, at 6.
50 Id. at 10.
51 E.D. La. Case No. 21-1786, R. Doc. No. 44.
lawsuit “in essence challenges the soundness of that judgment” and impermissibly
seeks to circumvent it. See id. at 209.
In this case, Pittman again seeks to bypass and to undo the state-court

judgment awarding custody of her children to Campbell. Pittman requests that this
Court issue an emergency injunction ordering the immediate return of her children
to her custody.52 In addition, she explicitly requests that this Court “vacate” the
original judgment granting Campbell custody.53 These claims for relief are squarely
precluded by Rooker-Feldman.
Further, Pittman’s other claims for relief,54 including claims for monetary

damages, are also barred by Rooker-Feldman. These claims would require that the
custody proceedings be “re-opened and re-litigated in federal court and, ultimately,
seek[] to nullify the state-court judgment averse to her.” See Turner v. Chase, 334 F.
App’x 657, 660 (5th Cir. 2009). Consequently, these claims are “inextricably
intertwined” with the state-court judgment such that they are essentially an attack
on that judgment. See Batista, 796 F. App’x at 210. Had a constitutional violation
occurred in the course of the child custody proceedings, it was to be resolved by

Louisiana state courts. Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“Constitutional questions arising in state proceedings are to be resolved by the state
courts. If a state trial court errs the judgment is not void, it is to be reviewed and
corrected by the appropriate state appellate court.”).

52 R. Doc. No. 1, at 5.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 5–6.
In her response, Pittman, for the first time, asserts gross negligence and
systemic failures on the part of Louisiana officials and agencies in failing to
investigate reports of abuse.55 She claims that these failures violated Louisiana state

law and have resulted in numerous federal constitutional violations, such as the Fifth
Amendment; the Eighth Amendment; and, it appears to the Court, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 Regardless of whether these
claims are cognizable or valid in light of the facts in the response, these claims must
be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Since
none of these facts are in the complaint, Pittman necessarily failed to state a claim

based on them. See Legate, 822 F.3d at 210.
iii. Pittman’s § 1983 claims against the Mississippi Attorney General and the Jasper
County Chancery Court Clerk must be dismissed.

As she does in her response to the Louisiana defendants’ motion to dismiss,
Pittman provides new factual information in her response and sur-reply with respect
to the Mississippi defendants’ motion. She alleges that the Mississippi defendants
failed to investigate reports of abuse in violation of Mississippi state law.57 She again
claims that defendant’s failure to investigate violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 These claims and the underlying
facts are not pleaded in Pittman’s complaint. Nor does the complaint provide any
other facts in support of these claims. The Court must therefore dismiss Pittman’s

55 R. Doc. No. 21-1, at 3–4.
56 Id. at 3–4.
57 R. Doc. No. 22-1, at 3–4.
58 Id. at 4–5.
claims against the Mississippi Attorney General and the Jasper County Chancery
Court Clerk for failure to state a claim.
iv. Pittman’s claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 must be dismissed as
frivolous.

With respect to Pittman’s claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, the
Court will dismiss them as frivolous. Sections 241 and 242 are criminal statutes that
do not give rise to civil liability or a private right of action. See Farwell v. Rushing,
No. 22-20157, 2024 WL 4708917, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 7, 2024) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (“Moreover, to the extent that they assert that Rushing conspired
against them in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, these are criminal statutes
that do not provide for a private right of action.”); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464
F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We affirm the dismissal of Allen's claims under 18
U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because these are criminal statutes that do not give rise to civil

liability.”). Accordingly, there is no arguable legal basis for Pittman to recover
pursuant to these statutes.
v. Pittman’s claims pursuant to ICWA must be dismissed as frivolous.
Finally, Pittman’s claim pursuant to ICWA is frivolous. As explained above,
Pittman’s complaint centers on the jurisdictional provision of ICWA, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911, which provides that “[a]n Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to
any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or

is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe.” The Louisiana and Mississippi
defendants discuss this provision as part of their argument that this Court’s lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.59 However, the Court discerns a fundamental
problem with Pittman’s invocation of § 1911 with respect to the merits of her claim.
Any reliance by Pittman on § 1911 is “indisputably meritless,” see Thompson,

67 F.4th at 279, and therefore frivolous because § 1911 plainly does not apply.
Pursuant to § 1911, Indian tribes alone have exclusive jurisdiction over custody
proceedings involving Indian children. For the purposes of § 1911, an “Indian tribe”
refers only to “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community
of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary
[of the Interior] because of their status as Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8). The Tchou

Tchouma Tchoupitoulas Nation has not been recognized as eligible for services at all
times material to this lawsuit, and it is therefore is not an Indian tribe for the
purposes of § 1911.60 Consequently, § 1911 does not provide Pittman with an arguable
legal basis for relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,

59 R. Doc. No. 12, at 7–8; R. Doc. No. 18, at 13–14.
60 See Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible To Receive Services From the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 89 Fed. Reg. 944-02 (Jan. 8, 2024); Indian
Entities Recognized by and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 88 Fed. Reg. 54654-01 (Aug. 11, 2023); Indian Entities
Recognized by and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 88 Fed. Reg. 2112-01 (Jan. 12, 2023); Indian Entities Recognized by
and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 87
Fed. Reg. 4636-02 (Jan. 28, 2022); Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible To
Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 86 Fed. Reg. 7554-
01 (Jan. 29, 2021); Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible To Receive Services
From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 85 Fed. Reg. 5462-30 (January 30,
2020).
IT IS ORDERED that Pittman’s claims against the State of Louisiana and
the State of Mississippi are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pittman’s claims against the 22nd Judicial
District Court and the Jasper County Justice Court are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE as frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)G).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pittman’s claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)q).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pittman’s claims pursuant to 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)q).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pittman’s § 1983 claims against Campbell,
the Louisiana Attorney General, the Mississippi Attorney General, the St. Tammany
Parish Clerk of Court, and the Jasper County Chancery Court Clerk are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, January 31, 2025.
Si

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10792198. Public record. Not legal advice.