# JIANG, M.D v. DUKE UNIVERSITY

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · January 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10792165

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** January 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10792165

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that hostile work environment is actionable under the ADEA

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WEI JIANG, M.D., )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) 1:22CV101-1
)
DUKE UNIVERSITY, DUKE )
UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, )
MOIRA RYNN, M.D., in her individual )
and official capacity, and MARY E. )
KLOTMAN, in her individual and official )
capacity, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.
Wei Jiang, M.D., (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action alleging violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)–2000e17 (“Title VII”); the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and 42
U.S.C. § 1985. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1–4.) Plaintiff alleges claims of discrimination, hostile work
environment, and retaliation against her employers Defendants Duke University, Duke
University Health Systems, Moira Rynn, M.D., and Mary E. Klotman (“Defendants”). (Id. at
59–61 ¶¶ 15–30.) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment and Motion to
Amend. (ECF Nos. 14; 15.) For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter
Judgment will be denied and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend will likewise be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a tenured Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Duke
University Medical Center. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 15.) Plaintiff is a female, over the age of 40, and is
of Chinese national origin. (Id. at 59 ¶ 15.) She has worked for Duke University (“Defendant
Duke University”) and Duke University Health Systems (“Defendant DUHS”) since 1989 as
a Research Associate and has been a tenured professor at Duke University since 2014. (Id. ¶¶
14–15). As of 2017, Plaintiff had a salary of over $200,000 and was responsible for managing
a research laboratory that conducted clinical studies funded by federal grants. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 27.)

During Plaintiff’s career, she worked on a research study involving patients called the
“Responses of Myocardial Ischemia to Escitalopram Treatment” (“REMIT”) study. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Based on this study, Plaintiff wrote several scientific papers, including a paper published in a
2013 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”). (Id. ¶¶ 24–25.)
In April 2018, Moira Rynn, M.D., (“Defendant Rynn”) as Chair of the Duke Psychiatry
and Behavioral Science Department and Plaintiff’s supervisor, initiated a departmental audit

of Plaintiff’s REMIT study. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 30, 43.) These audits began an approximately two-year
sequence of additional audits and re-analysis of the REMIT study, all conducted by various
committees at Duke. (See id. ¶¶ 56, 66, 94, 101–02, 119–20, 135.)
While the REMIT study audit was ongoing, Defendants reduced Plaintiff’s salary to
$34,418. (Id. ¶ 32.) Additionally, Defendant Rynn terminated a federal research grant won by
Plaintiff, (id. ¶ 83), advised Plaintiff not to travel to China for work while under investigation,

(id. ¶¶ 93, 95, 136), declined to recommend Plaintiff for a new position at Duke, (id. ¶¶ 107–
15), and instructed another employee to send a letter to the editors of JAMA regarding issues
with the study, (id. ¶ 154).
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brought her original suit alleging discrimination
based on her race, national origin, color, sex, and age, as well as retaliation, in violation of Title

VII, the ADEA, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and alleging a conspiracy to violate her civil rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (Id. at 59–61 ¶¶ 15–30.) Upon Defendants filing a Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim, this Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims and entered a
judgment dismissing the action. (ECF Nos. 12; 13.) Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion to
Alter Judgment and Motion to Amend. (ECF Nos. 14; 15.)
II. MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT AND TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter Judgment simultaneously with a Motion to Amend
Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 14; 15.) Plaintiff filed her Motion to Alter Judgment pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b). (ECF No. 14 at 1.); see Calvary Christian Ctr. v. City of Fredericksburg,
710 F.3d 536, 539 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted) (finding that a plaintiff may only
amend her complaint following a judgment if she files a motion to reopen or to vacate the
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)).

Here, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Ater Judgment within the 28 days required under
Rule 59(e). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed
no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”). Because Plaintiff has sought relief
under 59(e) and met its specifications, this Court will now consider Plaintiff’s Motion to
Amend.
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend seeking to file a proposed Amended Complaint.

(ECF No. 15-1.) Plaintiff alleges that her proposed Amended Complaint cures the deficiencies
in her original Complaint outlined in this Court’s Order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF
No. 15 ¶ 18.) Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, arguing that Plaintiff’s
additional allegations fail to cure the pleading deficiencies identified in this Court’s
memorandum. (ECF No. 16 at 2.)
A. Standard of Review
Under Rule 15(a), courts should freely grant leave to amend a pleading “when justice
so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The determination of whether to grant or deny a motion
to amend a pleading under Rule 15(a) lies within the sound discretion of the district court.
Deasy v. Hill, 833 F.2d 38, 40 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

“This liberal rule gives effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits
instead of disposing of them on technicalities.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir.
2006). Indeed, motions to amend are “[s]o useful . . . and of such service in the efficient
administration of justice that they ought to be allowed as of course, unless some particular
reason for disallowing them appears.” New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 28–29
(4th Cir. 1963).

“[L]eave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be
prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or
the amendment would be futile.” Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)
(citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). “Whether an amendment is prejudicial will often be
determined by the nature of the amendment and its timing.” Laber, 438 F.3d at 427. “The
further the case [has] progressed . . . the more likely it is that the amendment will prejudice the

defendant or that a court will find bad faith on the plaintiff’s part.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). However, delay alone is not a sufficient reason to deny a motion to amend. Id.
Courts must look to the “particular circumstances” of the case to determine whether an
amendment is prejudicial or in bad faith. Scott v. Fam. Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 119 (4th
Cir. 2013).
B. Discussion
In Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint, she alleges the following claims: (1) race,
color, age, and sex discrimination and retaliation against Defendant Duke and Defendant
DUHS under Title VII and ADEA and (2) race discrimination and retaliation against
Defendant Rynn and Defendant Klotman under § 1981. (ECF No. 15-1 at 63 ¶¶ 15–30.)1

Preliminarily, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint would not be
prejudicial to Defendants, and that Plaintiff did not make the proposed amendment in bad
faith. See Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d at 509. Additionally, Defendants do not argue any
prejudice or bad faith. (See generally ECF No. 16.) Therefore, the Court will analyze whether
the proposed Amended Complaint is futile. An amendment is futile when it “fails to satisfy
the requirements of the federal rules.” U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown Root, Inc., 525 F.3d

370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted). “To
determine whether a proposed amended complaint would be futile, [a] court [should] review[]
the revised complaint under the same standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.” Brown v. First Advantage Background Servs. Corp., 700 F. Supp. 3d 380, 382 (M.D.N.C.
Oct. 26, 2023) (citing Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (additional citations omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). Additionally, Rule 15 and Rule 12(b)(6) “should be balanced against Rule 8(a)(2),

1 As Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint removes her previous § 1985 claim, this Court will not
which provides that a complaint need only contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claims
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Mystic Retreat Med Spa & Weight Loss Ctr. v.
Ascentium Cap. LLC., No. 1:21-cv-00515, 2022 WL 3446051, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2022)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). These rules protect against meritless allegations by requiring
sufficient factual allegations to “nudge[] [the] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The Court will now analyze whether Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint sufficiently states a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
1. Title VII Disparate Treatment Claim
This Court in its Order dismissing Plaintiff’s discrimination claim under Title VII
found that the Complaint, “[did] not specifically identify any individual whom Plaintiff claims
are appropriate comparators, nor [did] it state how such individuals were similar, anything

regarding such individuals’ conduct, or how Defendants treated those individuals.” (ECF No.
12 at 6–7.)
To state a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII a plaintiff must show: “(1)
membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment
action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected
class.” Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of Appeals, 626 F. 3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010).

Since in its Order this Court found that Plaintiff’s Complaint satisfied the first three
elements, this Court will only analyze the proposed Amended Complaint regarding the fourth
element. (ECF No. 12 at 5.) In Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint, she does not
specifically name comparators, but she alleges three aliases and says that these are “other
faculty members whose names have not yet been discovered.” (ECF No. 15-1 at 12 ¶¶ 33–
34.) The proposed Amended Complaint does state that these individuals are not members of
Plaintiff’s protected classes, and she alleges that there are adverse actions taken against her
that the comparators did not endure. However, this Court finds that even with these additions,
the amendments to this claim are futile.
Plaintiff’s factual allegations in the Complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In her Reply, Plaintiff states “[t]he fact

that Plaintiff can not identify by specific name at this time the individuals of which she is aware
have been treated more favorably than her is not fatal to her complaint when she has listed
placeholders for them.” (ECF No. 17 at 16.) This Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s support for
this contention includes a number of cases outside this Circuit except for one. In that case,
Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of Appeals, the District Court of Maryland found that Plaintiff’s
allegation that “he was treated differently as a result of his race than white employees who

were similarly situated,” was insufficient to state a claim under Title VII. No. CIV L-08-2464,
2009 WL 8400940, at * 1 (D. Md. May 7, 2009), aff’d 626 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
Plaintiff’s allegations are very similar to those in Coleman. In Coleman the court found
that even with plaintiff naming a comparator, the complaint did allege that they were engaging
in similar actions. Here, while the proposed Amended Complaint alleges comparators that are

white males, (ECF No. 15-1 at 31 ¶ 93), it does not sufficiently allege that they were similarly
situated besides stating that they are researchers. Plaintiff does not allege that they were also
subjected to an audit of their research or some other type of review. The proposed Amended
Complaint simply makes conclusory statements that are not sufficient to state a claim for relief
under Title VII.
2. Title VII and ADEA Hostile Work Environment Claim
In its Order this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim because
“[t]he Complaint contains no allegations that anyone ever remarked on Plaintiff’s race or
gender” and “the Complaint [did] not allege sufficient facts about similarly situated colleagues
who were treated differently to support an inference of discriminatory motive.” (ECF No. 12

at 8.)
To state a claim for hostile work environment Plaintiff must show that: “(1) she
experienced unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her gender, race, or age;
(3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is some basis for imposing liability on the
employer.” Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); see Fox v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that hostile work environment is
actionable under the ADEA). Plaintiff must plead facts to show that her work environment
was so “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff does not state in her Motion to Amend, and this Court does not find, any
instance in the proposed Amended Complaint where Plaintiff pleads factual allegations that
support that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to provide a nexus between the circumstances that allegedly
made her work environment hostile, and her protected classes as required to state a claim
under hostile work environment. Notably, there are no allegations in the proposed Amended
Complaint that anyone made any comments about her race, color, age, or sex. See Bass, 324
F.3d at 765 (upholding a dismissal and finding that plaintiff’s complaint merely tells a story of
a workplace dispute regarding her reassignment and some perhaps callous behavior by her
supervisors).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended Title VII and ADEA claims for hostile work

environment are futile as they do not sufficiently state a claim for relief.
3. ADEA Claim
This Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s ADEA claim because “Plaintiff has not
made any factual allegations about age except that she is over the age of 40.” (ECF No. 12 at
9 (emphasis in original).) To state a claim under the ADEA, Plaintiff must allege that she is
“(1) over the age of 40, and (2) experienced discrimination by an employer (3) because of [her]

age.” Tickles v. Johnson, 805 F.App’x 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint does not allege the third element of an
ADEA claim. Plaintiff’s only factual allegation linking any alleged discrimination to her age is
her allegation that “Plaintiff’s husband was recently informed that Defendants had [been]
providing information to government authorities indicating the Plaintiff has ‘retired’ which
she clearly has not.” (ECF No. 15-1 at 63 ¶ 177.) Plaintiff alleges in the proposed Amended

Complaint that this action is “indicative of Defendants’ discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff
based on her age.” (Id.)
This sole factual allegation pertaining to age-based discrimination is not sufficient to
state a claim under the ADEA as it leaves the Court to “mere speculation.” Tickles, 805 F.
App’x at 207 (affirming dismissal where plaintiff offers no specific allegations such as “the
nature of the requirements for promotion, [a]ppellant’s own qualifications, the qualifications
and rule violations of his proposed comparators, or even the proposed comparators’ proximity
in age to his own (i.e., whether they were substantially younger than him)” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief
of age-based discrimination under the ADEA.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claim

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to state a discrimination claim “a plaintiff must show (1) [her]
membership in a protected class; (2) [her] satisfactory job performance; (3) an adverse
employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside the protected class who
received more favorable treatment.” Tabb v. Board of Educ., 29 F.4th 148, 157 (4th Cir. 2022).
The elements of a claim for discrimination in violation of § 1981 are the same as those
for a claim for employment discrimination in violation of Title VII. Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc.,

288 F.3d 124, 133 n.7 (4th Cir. 2002). The Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Title VII
discrimination claim applies to Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim. Therefore, Plaintiff’s proposed
Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under § 1981.
5. Retaliation Claim
Lastly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was dismissed by this Court because Plaintiff did not
show that the alleged retaliatory actions happened because Plaintiff engaged in protected
activity. (See ECF No. 12 at 9–14.)

The elements of a prima facie claim of retaliation are: “(1) that [plaintiff] engaged in a
protected activity . . . (2) that [plaintiff’s] employer took an adverse employment action against
her, and (3) that there was a causal link between the two events.” Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau
Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
In its Order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, this Court found that Plaintiff engaged in
No. 12 at 12.) Further, the Court found that Plaintiff’s claim that her letter sent to Defendants
notifying them of her discrimination claims was not a protected activity because it was not
mentioned in the Complaint. (Id. at 10–11.) This argument was made only in Plaintiff’s
Response in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
argues that her omission is remedied, however, this Court disagrees. The proposed Amended

Complaint solely states that “[o]n November 12, 2020, and then on November 20, 2020, when
she filed her charge of discrimination, Plaintiff complained about the discriminatory treatment
to which [Defendant Rynn] had subjected her.” (ECF No. 15-1 at 61 ¶ 168.) The proposed
Amended Complaint still does not sufficiently allege protected activity with respect to any
letter sent to Defendants, as there is no mention of said letter in the proposed Amended
Complaint, or descriptions of the contents of it. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s filing of her charge

of discrimination on November 20, 2020, is the only protected activity sufficiently alleged in
the proposed Amended Complaint.
Regarding the second element, Plaintiff alleges that the adverse actions she faced are,
“[o]n December 18, 2020, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by writing to the editor of
JAMA calling into question the legitimacy of the article regarding the REMIT study.” (ECF
No. 15-1 at 61 ¶ 169.) Plaintiff then alleges that Geeta Swamy, M.D., Associate Vice President

for Research at Duke, wrote to JAMA and made allegations that Plaintiff’s study did not
comply with protocols. (ECF No. 15-1 at 62 ¶ 174.)
However, these allegations fail to sufficiently plead retaliation because, as the Court
noted in its Order, contacting JAMA was Defendants plan before Plaintiff even filed her
charge of discrimination. The proposed Amended Complaint states that in October of 2019

it was recommended that “[t]he managing editors of . . . 2013 JAMA . . . publications should
be contacted with the known information about the reporting of [Plaintiff’s] REMIT study
conduct and results.” (ECF No. 15-1 at 54 ¶ 149.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s proposed Amended
Complaint does not plead the third element of a retaliation claim, that there is a causal link
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Thus, the Court has determined that Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint is futile

under the standards of Rule 15, as it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Therefore, the proposed Amended Complaint does not serve as a basis for a Motion to Alter
or Vacate Judgment. See Calvary Christian Ctr., 710 F.3d at 540 (quoting Katyle, 637 F.3d at 471)
(‘“To determine whether vacatur is warranted…[t]he court need only ask whether the
amendment should be granted’ under Rule 15 standards.”).
For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following:

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment, (ECF
No. 14), is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, (ECF No. 15), is
DENIED.
This, the 31st day of January 2025.

/s/ Loretta C. Biggs
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10792165. Public record. Not legal advice.