# Alford v. Deffendoll

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · January 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10788050

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** January 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10788050

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that an officer “is entitled to summary judgment [if], in light of the clearly established principles governing warrantless searches, he could, as a matter of law, reasonably have believed that [the action allegedly in violation of the Fourth Amendment] was lawful”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

LOUIS ALFORD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 3:23-cv-00272
v. ) JUDGE RICHARDSON
)
BRANDON DEFFENDOL, ZACHARY )
SMITH, and CANNON COUNTY, )
TENNESSEE, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 27,
“Motion”) wherein Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor against Plaintiff (“Alford”).
In support of the Motion, Defendants filed a memorandum (Doc. No. 28, “Memorandum”) and a
“Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” (Doc. No. 29). Plaintiff, Louis Alford (“Alford”)1, filed
a response in opposition (Doc. No. 33, “Response”) and a response to Defendants’ statement of
material facts (Doc. No. 32, “RSUMF”). Defendants thereafter filed a reply (Doc. No. 36,
“Reply”). For the reasons stated herein the Motion will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART.

1 The Court refers to Plaintiff as “Alford” when discussing the underlying facts of the case and as “Plaintiff”
when referring to Alford as a litigant in this suit (i.e. making assertions, filing documents, etc.).
FACTS2
Brandon Deffendoll (“Deffendoll”) and Zachary Smith (“Smith”) were police officers

employed by Cannon County Sheriff’s Office during the incidents described in the Complaint. On
March 25, 2022, Deffendoll and Smith stopped Louis Alford and his girlfriend Julie Cass for a
traffic violation. (RSUMF ¶ 3). When they stopped the vehicle, neither Smith nor Deffendoll knew
that Alford was driving the vehicle. (RSUMF ¶ 5). Alford did not own the pickup truck that he
was driving, which did not have working taillights. Deffendoll approached the truck and asked
Alford for the vehicle’s registration and insurance information. (RSUMF ¶ 6). At this point, either
Alford or Cass raised up the vehicle’s dashboard cover, thereby revealing a hypodermic needle
that contained a clear liquid. (RSUMF ¶ 6). Defendants assert that this gave Deffendoll probable
cause to search the truck for evidence of illegal drugs. Deffendoll and other officers conducted a

search, which resulted in Deffendoll recovering scales, small clear baggies, a bottle of medication
containing white pills prescribed to another individual, a black container of needles, and a bag
containing a powdery substance. (RSUMF ¶ 11). Deffendoll believed the presence of scales and
baggies to be consistent with the possession and sale of illegal drugs. (RSUMF ¶ 12). Deffendoll

2 The facts that are stated herein without qualification are undisputed—a term the Court will use to describe
both facts that are not in dispute at all and facts that are not in genuine dispute—and are treated as such.
Alleged facts that are qualified here in some way (as for example by being prefaced with “Defendants assert
that”) are in dispute and are treated as such. Some of the facts herein originate in Defendants’ “Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts” and are not disputed by Plaintiff (in the RSUMF) in response to Defendants’
assertion of them. For these facts, the Court cites the RSUMF.

Other facts contained herein come from record evidence (such as depositions) and are cited (as being
accurate) by the opposing parties in their respective briefing. Other facts (background, uncontroversial
ones) are mutually stated in the parties’ opposing briefing.

There are other purported facts that are disputed but are evidentially supported and are asserted by
Plaintiff and Defendants, respectively, to support their respective views that there is (according to Plaintiff)
or is not (according to Defendants) a genuine issue of material fact as to a particular claim. The Court refers
to these purported facts, and the evidence supporting them, in appropriate places in its analysis below.
claims that he also believed that the clear substance contained in the hypodermic needle was heroin
based on his experience, training and drug interdiction education.3
As a result of this search, Deffendoll made the decision to arrest Alford. (RSUMF ¶ 21).
Deffendoll charged Alford with three crimes: Possession Prescription Unlawful, Simple
Possession of a Schedule I Drug, and Possession of Drug Paraphern[a]lia. Defendants allege that

Deffendoll had probable cause to arrest and charge Alford with these crimes. (RSUMF ¶ 22). The
Affidavits of Complaint that Deffendoll completed were signed by a Judge, Clerk, or Judicial
Commissioner attesting that he or she found there was probable cause that Alford had committed
the crimes.4 (RSUMF ¶ 22). Defendants assert that the information in the Affidavits of Complaint
was truthful and accurate.5 (RSUMF ¶ 23).

3 Plaintiff disputes this alleged fact. RSUMF ¶ 13. The Court adds this fact solely for context. It does not
have to decide whether this alleged fact is in genuine dispute, because the fact is not material. Deffendoll’s
subjective belief does not bear on the legal analysis because the appropriate legal standard is not geared to
the defendant-officer’s subjective beliefs, but rather focuses on what a reasonable officer in similar
circumstances could have determined.

The relevant question in this case, for example, is the objective (albeit fact-specific)
question whether a reasonable officer could have believed Anderson's warrantless search
to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers
possessed. Anderson's subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). See also id. (refuting that “the
qualified immunity analysis [involves an] inquiry into officials' subjective intent”).

4 The RSUMF does not go into detail about who in fact actually signed the affidavit (i.e. if it was a Judge,
Clerk or Commissioner). The exhibits include the form with a signature, which the undersigned has not
been able to accurately decipher. Regardless, Plaintiff has admitted that “a commissioner signed the
warrants” referring to the signed Affidavits of Complaint prepared by Deffendoll.

5 Plaintiff disputes this on the grounds that the Complaint wrongly stated that Deffendoll believed the
syringe contained heroin and that Deffendoll did not in fact believe that.
At the time of the arrest on March 25, 2022, Alford was on parole from a murder charge
that took place in 1990.6 (RSUMF ¶ 25). As a condition of his parole, Alford agreed to warrantless
searches of his property at any time as well as random drug testing. (RSUMF ¶ 26). Following the
arrest of Alford on March 25, 2022, neither Deffendoll nor Smith made any decisions regarding
the criminal prosecution of Alford. (RSUMF ¶ 24). Neither Deffendoll nor Smith were privy to

the purported arrangement where Alford’s charges stemming from the March 25 incident would
have been dismissed in exchange for Alford becoming a criminal informant. (RSUMF ¶¶ 30-31).
That purported arrangement, which ultimately did not come to fruition, was handled exclusively
by the District Attorney’s office. (RSUMF ¶¶ 24, 30-31). The charges against Alford ultimately
were dismissed.7 (RSUMF ¶ 35).
Following Alford’s arrest, the Board of Parole conducted a hearing concerning Alford,
which included testimony from Deffendoll and others. (RSUMF ¶ 27). On May 20, 2022, the
Parole Board made the decision to revoke Alford’s parolee status. (RSUMF ¶ 29). Conversely,
Deffendoll did not make the decision to revoke Alford’s parolee status. (RSUMF ¶ 29).

Alford filed this suit, asserting in his Complaint (Doc. No. 1) one cause of action under
federal law and three causes of action under Tennessee common law. Specifically, the causes of
action were: Count I, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants based on alleged
violations of Alford’s Fourth Amendment right against the unreasonable seizure of his person;
Count II, a false-arrest claim under Tennessee common law against Deffendoll and Smith; Count
III, a malicious-prosecution claim under Tennessee common law against Deffendoll; and Count

6 The Court notes that it is unclear as to what exactly took place in 1990—the murder or the charge (or
both).

7 There is a dispute about the how the charges were actually dismissed. Defendants claim that they were
dismissed by Assistant District Attorney Lampley while Plaintiff claims that they were dismissed by the
judge for failure to prosecute.
IV, an abuse-of-process claim under Tennessee common law against Deffendoll and Smith. (Id. at
9-11; RSUMF ¶ 2).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “By its very terms,
this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is

that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247–48 (1986). In other words, even if genuine, a factual dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary
under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 248.
On the other hand, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is
‘genuine[.]’” Id.
A fact is “material” within the meaning of Rule 56(c) “if its proof or disproof might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.” Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446
F.3d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248), abrogated on other grounds by
Young v. Utd. Parcel Serv., 575 U.S. 206 (2015). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Harris v.
Klare, 902 F.3d 630, 634–35 (6th Cir. 2018). The party bringing the summary judgment motion
has the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine
dispute over material facts. Pittman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 627–28 (6th Cir.
2018) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Alternatively, the moving
party may meet its initial burden by otherwise “show[ing]”—even without citing materials of
record—that the nonmovant “cannot produce admissible evidence to support a material fact (for
example, the existence of an element of a nonmovant plaintiff’s claim).” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(B). If the summary judgment movant meets its initial burden, then in response the non-
moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Pittman,
901 F.3d at 628. Importantly, “[s]ummary judgment for a defendant [that has met its initial burden
as the movant] is appropriate when the plaintiff ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to [her] case, and on which [she] will bear the burden of proof at

trial.’” Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805–06 (1999) (quoting Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322).
Any party asserting that a fact cannot be or genuinely is disputed (i.e., any party seeking
summary judgment and any party opposing summary judgment, respectively) can support the
assertion either by: (a) citing to materials in the record, including, but not limited to, depositions,
documents, affidavits, or declarations, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), or (b) “showing” (i) that the
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to raise a genuine dispute as to that fact or (ii)
that contrary to the claim of the adverse party, the materials cited by the adverse party do not
actually establish the absence or presence (as the case may be) of a genuine dispute as to that fact.8

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tlapanco v. Elges, 969 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Likewise, the court should view the facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Pittman, 901 F.3d at 628. Credibility
judgments and weighing of evidence are improper. Hostettler v. College of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844,
852 (6th Cir. 2018). As noted above, where there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact,

8 Courts (appropriately) at times refer interchangeably to (i) a party being able (or unable) to raise a genuine
issue as to fact and (ii) a reasonable jury being able (or unable) to find in the party’s favor on that fact. This
Court does likewise herein.
summary judgment is not appropriate. Id. The court determines whether sufficient evidence has
been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position will be insufficient to survive summary
judgment; rather, there must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the non-
moving party. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003).

Deffendoll has moved for summary judgement based on qualified immunity, an affirmative
defense, in response to Plaintiff’s 1983 claims.9 (Memorandum at 5). Qualified immunity protects
government officials from civil suits for damages, so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Rieves v. Town of Smyrna, Tennessee, 959 F.3d 678, 695 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The Court is required to employ a two-part test to determine
whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 695. It must consider (1)
whether the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional

9 For whatever reason, Smith’s defense (unlike Deffendoll’s defense) does not rely on qualified immunity,
but instead relies solely on challenging Plaintiff’s ability to make a Fourth Amendment claim against him—
in other words that, irrespective of any qualified immunity defense, Smith is entitled to summary judgment
because (according to Defendants) Plaintiff cannot show that a reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s
favor given the undisputed facts. That is to say, Smith’s defense is based entirely on the merits of Plaintiff’s
claim that Smith is liable for an alleged constitutional violation (which is the subject of the first question in
the qualified immunity analysis), whereas a qualified immunity defense can succeed (based on a negative
answer to the second question) even if such claim is deemed meritorious (based on an affirmative answer
to the first question). As put by one district court in this circuit:

[T]he first prong of the qualified immunity analysis necessarily merges with the Court's
decision on the underlying merits of Plaintiff's claims that the officers used excessive force
against him. If the Court finds that the officers did, in fact, violate Plaintiff's constitutional
rights, the Court must then go on to consider the second prong of the qualified immunity
test. If the officers engaged in [a constitutional violation], but the relevant law was not
clearly established, they cannot be held liable.

Hysell v. Thorp, No. 2:06-CV-170, 2009 WL 262426, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2009).
right was clearly established. Wright v. City of Euclid, Ohio, 962 F.3d 852, 864 (6th Cir. 2020).10
Courts are permitted to address these two questions in either order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If either question is answered in the negative, then the official is entitled to
qualified immunity. Gordon v. Bierenga, 20 F.4th 1077, 1082 (6th Cir. 2021).
This defense alters the “normal” standards that govern a typical motion for summary

judgment. While the Sixth Circuit has issued a number of sometimes-conflicting opinions
regarding the applicable standard for assessing qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage,
this Court is inclined to follow Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 311 (6th Cir. 2000), cited
with approval by Flying Dog Brewery, LLLP v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 597 F. App'x
342, 352 (6th Cir. 2015), given its relative specificity. That case instructed, in pertinent part:
Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the
plaintiff must first11 identify a clearly established right alleged to have been violated

10 In a very recent published opinion, the Sixth Circuit has observed that “some Fourth Amendment
principles, well established though they are, offer little guidance in qualified-immunity cases . . . . General
principles clearly establish the answer only for obvious violations. For everything else, the clarity of the
rule depends ‘very much on the facts of each case’ and the application of refined Fourth Amendment
principles.” Moore v. Oakland County, Mich., No. 24-1563, 2025 WL 274631, *2 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam)). This analysis indicates that courts must look
specifically at the factual circumstances in order to determine whether the constitutional right at issue was
clearly established when conducting a qualified immunity determination. Further, the Court noted that in
order to show that the “right’s contours were sufficiently clear such that every reasonable official would
have understood that the officer's actions violated it” a claimant must usually “identify a case with facts
similar enough that it squarely governs [the current] one[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

11 Given the logical sequencing of briefing on a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, this Court does
not take Gardenhire to mean that the (non-movant) plaintiff must somehow “make the first move” (in the
form of identifying a clearly established right) when trying to overcome a qualified immunity defense
asserted in the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. After all, how could it be the plaintiff who acts
first on such a motion, when (as the non-movant) he or she is responding to what was filed by the defendant,
who as the movant goes first? Instead, this Court reads Gardenhire as establishing that it is incumbent upon
the defendant to make the first move; this is consistent with Gardenhire’s language italicized below and
with general summary judgment principles outlined above that place an initial burden upon the defendant-
movant to do something. Gardenhire identifies the first move that the defendant-movant must make: an
initial showing of something, namely, “facts to suggest that he acted within the scope of his discretionary
authority during the incident in question.” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d at 311 (6th Cir. 2000). What
and second, establish that a reasonable officer in the defendant's position should
have known that his conduct violated that right. See Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49
F.3d 1154, 1158 (6th Cir.1995); Johnson v. Estate of Laccheo, 935 F.2d 109, 111
(6th Cir.1991). The ultimate burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the
defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Wegener v. Covington, 933
F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir.1991). The defendant bears the initial burden of coming
forward with facts to suggest that he acted within the scope of his discretionary
authority during the incident in question. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to establish12 that the defendant's conduct violated a right so clearly
established that any official in his position would have clearly understood that he
was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such conduct. See Rich v. City of
Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir.1992). This Court has held,
however, that:
summary judgment would not be appropriate if there is a factual
dispute (i.e., a genuine issue of material fact) involving an issue on
which the question of immunity turns, such that it cannot be
determined before trial whether the defendant did acts that violate
clearly established rights. Summary judgment also should be denied
if the undisputed facts show that the defendant's conduct did indeed
violate clearly established rights. In either event, the case will then
proceed to trial....
Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 425–26 (6th Cir.1988).
Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 311 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis and
footnotes added). Notably, Gardenhire accounts for the fact that if either of the above referenced
questions is answered in the affirmative, then the officer has qualified immunity. It does so by
making clear that a plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment solely by prevailing on the question
of whether the officer violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right(s); rather, the plaintiff also must

Gardenhire has done here is reframe the description of what a summary judgment movant must initially
show (the absence of a genuine issue of material fact) in terms of what is material when the question is one
of qualified immunity (whether the officer acted within the scope of his authority during the incident in
question). If the defendant has made the specific initial showing required by Gardenhire, then the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue that defendant’s conduct violated a clearly
established right identified by the plaintiff.

12 As indicated above, the Court does not take Gardenhire to require a plaintiff to “establish” this at the
summary judgment stage. Instead, the Court take this to mean that a plaintiff has the burden to show the
existence of a triable issue—i.e., a material issue as to which there exists a genuine dispute—in order to
overcome a qualified-immunity defense as to which a defendant movant has met its initial burden.
prevail on the question of whether that right was “so clearly established that any official in his
position would have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such
conduct,” Id.—which is to say, would have understood “that what he is doing violates that right.”
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Using as it
does the “any official in his position” standard, the question is manifestly an objective one; it “turns

on the objective legal reasonableness of the [officer’s] action, assessed in light of the legal rules
that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Consistent with a footnote herein, the Court takes Gardenhire to mean the following. First,
a defendant who moves for summary judgment relying on a qualified-immunity defense has the
initial burden to come forward with facts suggesting that the official acted within his or her
discretionary authority when the alleged violation took place. If the defendant successfully carries
that burden, the burden then switches to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue showing that the
“defendant's conduct violated a right so clearly established that any official in his position would

have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such conduct.”
Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 311. If a plaintiff successfully carries that burden, then summary judgment
will be denied. Otherwise, summary judgment will be granted.
DISCUSSION
I. Count I: § 1983 Claims
A. Officer Deffendoll
1. False Arrest13

13 The Court notes that the parties’ briefing has addressed the § 1983 claims under the categories of “false
arrest” claims and “malicious prosecution” claims, even though these categories were not so identified in
the Complaint. Instead of using these categories, Count I characterized its claim(s) as being based on a
Claiming that Deffendoll violated his federal constitutional rights, Plaintiff has asserted
and has alleged a claim against Deffendoll under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This kind of claim provides
“a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 (1979). Section 1983 claims require the plaintiff to show “(1) the deprivation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of

state law.” Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Alford asserts that
Deffendoll violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure by arresting him

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right against the unreasonable seizure of his person. The Court
has followed the parties’ lead and divided the § 1983 claim(s) into these two categories in its analysis.
Although the precise meaning and significance of the term “false arrest” can vary with the circumstances,
the Court notes that the Sixth Circuit has referred at times to a violation of an individual’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure as a “false arrest.” See, e.g., Ouza v. City of
Dearborn Heights, Michigan 969 F.3d 265, 280. And the Sixth Circuit has noted that a claim under the
Fourth Amendment for “malicious prosecution is different from a claim of ‘false arrest’ under the Fourth
Amendment.” Tlapanco v. Elges, 969 F.3d 638, 654 n.3 (6th Cir. 2020). Although Tlapanco emphasized
that this difference was due to the former kind of claim being based on the “post-arrest” phase of a
prosecution, recent caselaw has indicated that lack of probable cause resulting in a seizure constitutes an
indispensable element of a malicious-prosecution claim (and not just a false-arrest claim). As the Sixth
Circuit recently stated, “th[e] distinction between a seizure and a prosecution does not matter” for this
analysis—a malicious-prosecution claim (like a false-arrest claim) requires an unreasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment. Lester v. Roberts, 986 F.3d 599, 607 (6th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, there is
commonality between false-arrest claims and malicious-prosecution claims in that an essential element of
both is a Fourth Amendment violation caused by an unreasonable seizure.

Clearly, there are grounds for justifiable frustration with the labels applied to Fourth Amendment
claims based on unreasonable seizures. Id. at 658 (“‘malicious prosecution’ is a troublesome label for claims
based on unreasonable pretrial detention.”) (Thapar, J., concurring); 660 n.1 (6th Cir. 2020) (“While we're
at it, we might want to stop using the ‘false arrest’ and ‘false imprisonment’ labels too. The elements of
common-law false arrest or false imprisonment are not a perfect match for a Fourth Amendment
unreasonable-seizure claim (for instance, the required interference with liberty in false imprisonment is a
‘confinement,’ not a ‘seizure’). For maximum clarity, we should simply call every unreasonable-seizure
claim what it is: an unreasonable-seizure claim.”) (Thapar, J., concurring) (citations omitted). But for now,
the Court follows the parties’ invitation to use these labels and conduct its analysis according to the two
categories suggested by such labeling. This being the case, the Court notes that it is a matter of perspective
whether one views Count I as presenting one claim or two claims; below, the Court generally refers to
Count I as if it presented multiple claims.
without probable cause (constituting “false arrest” within the current terminology for this kind of
§ 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment). (See Complaint ¶¶ 55—56).
In response to this claim, Deffendoll has raised a qualified immunity defense. Qualified
immunity serves to protect “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Barker v. Goodrich, 649
F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). As discussed, when raising a qualified immunity
defense at the summary judgment stage a defendant must initially “com[e] forward with facts to
suggest that he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority during the incident in
question.” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 311 (6th Cir. 2000).
To that end, Deffendoll has provided purported factual information in a sworn declaration.
(Doc. No. 27-7). Therein, Deffendoll avers, “During the course of the traffic stop . . . I spotted a
hypodermic needle containing a clear liquid, which had been previously hidden under the
dashboard cover and was revealed when either Alford or Cass moved the dashboard cover”. (Id. ¶
6). Deffendoll also made an averment regarding his subjective belief14 as to probable cause, stating

that “because of the hypodermic needles’ [sic] placement and the apparent attempt to keep the
hypodermic needle hidden, I believed I had probable cause to conduct a search of the entire vehicle
for evidence of illegal drugs and drug use.” (Id. ¶ 7). During the subsequent search of the truck,
Deffendoll stated that he found “scales, small clear baggies, a black container filled with more
syringes/needles, and a bag containing a powder substance.” (Id. ¶ 9). He also stated that he
“discovered a prescription pill bottle containing six oblong, white pills,” that belonged to someone

14 The Court notes that the subjective state of mind of Officer Deffendoll does not bear on the legal standard
in this instance, which focuses on the objective reasonableness of an officer’s determination pertaining to
probable cause. However, the Court includes this for context.
not in the vehicle at the time. (Id. ¶ 8). Deffendoll averred that he “believed the clear substance
contained in the hypodermic needle to be heroin” and that “[t]his belief… was formed by my
experience, training, and curriculum,” and stated that based on courses he took at Walter State
Police Academy he “learned that drug users will often dissolve illicit substances in their powder
form into water to be injected.” (Id. ¶ 11). Based on this search, Deffendoll declared that he thought

he “had probable cause to arrest Alford for Possession of Prescription Unlawful, Simple
Possession of a Schedule I drug, and Possession of Drug Paraphern[a]lia.” (Id. ¶ 14).15
Based on these sworn statements from Deffendoll’s declaration, the Court finds that
Deffendoll has met his initial burden under the qualified immunity standard. He has raised ample
evidence suggesting that he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority, i.e., acted
reasonably as an officer in finding probable cause to arrest Alford in light of the knowledge this
evidence suggests he had: knowledge that syringes, a powdery substance (that turned out to be
methamphetamine), baggies, scales, and prescription pills were in Alford’s truck.
The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to show that there exists a genuine issue as to

whether Deffendoll's conduct violated a right so clearly established that any official in his position
would have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such conduct.
See Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 311. Plaintiff has not successfully done so. In his Response, Plaintiff
claims that the “most serious” charges concerned the heroin and paraphernalia. (Doc. No. 33 at 6).
Plaintiff argues that Deffendoll did not have a basis to think that Alford was in possession of heroin
based on his search of the truck. Alford specifically points to Deffendoll’s deposition (which was

15 The Court again notes that the applicable legal standard here is whether a reasonable officer in these
circumstances could have determined that there was probable cause to arrest Alford. The Court includes
the above quoted language because it indicates not only subjectively that there was probable cause but also
would indicate to a reasonable officer that there was probable cause.
taken prior to the submission of his declaration) in which Deffendoll stated that he could not recall
why or even whether—at the time of Alford’s arrest—he believed that the syringe contained
heroin. (Doc. No. 31-1).16 Plaintiff uses this statement to argue that Deffendoll did not believe that
the syringe contained heroin. Even accepting this argument, Plaintiff still fails to meet his burden.
As previously stated, the key analysis here is what a reasonable officer could have believed at the

time, not what Officer Deffendoll subjectively believed himself. The Court finds that a reasonable
officer could have found probable cause under these circumstances. Therefore Plaintiff does not
meet his burden when arguing that Deffendoll violated a clearly established constitutional right.
When viewed in its totality, the evidence that Plaintiff has put forth does not suffice to
show a triable issue as to whether “[Deffendoll’s] conduct violated a right so clearly established
that any official in his position would have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative
duty to refrain from such conduct.” Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 311. More specifically, (i) Plaintiff
has failed to show a genuine dispute as to any underlying facts that bear on this issue (i.e., whether
a reasonable officer could have found probable cause to arrest Alford), and (ii) based on the facts

not materially in dispute, Plaintiff fails to show that a reasonable officer in Deffendoll’s position
would have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to refrain from arresting
Plaintiff because (supposedly but not actually) there was no probable cause to do so and thus such

16 The exchange Plaintiff cites is as follows:

Q: All right. And then on the syringe for the simple possession charge, you said the needle
on the dash was full of a substance you believed to be heroin, and it will be sent to the TBI
for testing. What about that made you believe it to be heroin?

A: I don’t recall, sir.

Q: Did you believe it to be heroin?

A: I don’t recall sir.

Doc. No. 34-1 at 20.
arrest was in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. With respect to the second of these
propositions, an officer “is entitled to qualified immunity if he or she could reasonably (even if
erroneously) have believed that the arrest was lawful.” Eversion v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 499 (6th
Cir. 2009).
As Eversion makes clear, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer

reasonably could have believed that an arrest was lawful. Applied to the present facts in this case
the Court finds that Deffendoll was acting reasonably when he arrested Alford. Given the
information he had at the time—namely that a baggie of powder, scales, baggies, syringes and
prescription pills had been found in the truck (by him personally, no less)17—a reasonable officer
in his circumstances could have concluded that there was probable cause to arrest Alford. The
Court therefore concludes that an objectively reasonable officer could have believed that probable
cause existed for the arrest.18
Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue to refute that at the time of his arrest, an officer aware
of the information that was then available to Deffendoll could reasonably have believed there was
probable cause for the arrest.19 Deffendoll therefore is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

17 Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that genuinely places in dispute that Defendoll had this
information when he made the arrest.

18 “Probable cause ‘requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity.’” United States v. Christian, 925 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting
United States v. Tagg, 886 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2018)). In Christian, the Sixth Circuit instructed that
probable cause should be determined “[v]iewing the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ Florida v. Harris, 568
U.S. 237, 244 (2013), through the ‘lens of common sense,’ as the Supreme Court has instructed, id. at
248[.]” Id. at 309. The Court finds that under the totality of the circumstances, an officer in Deffendoll’s
position reasonably could have found that there was probable cause to arrest Alford given what Deffendoll
uncovered during his search of the truck: syringes, a powdery substance, scales, baggies, and prescription
pills.

19 Nor has Plaintiff done what Moore, 2025 WL 274631, at *2, instructs claimants to do: cite a precedential
case where, based on facts similar to the ones here, the court found that the officer made an unreasonable
seizure (due to a lack of probable cause). And, as discussed, the Court cannot otherwise find that a
reasonable officer could not have found that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
§ 1983 claim against him. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 (noting that an officer “is entitled to summary
judgment [if], in light of the clearly established principles governing warrantless searches, he
could, as a matter of law, reasonably have believed that [the action allegedly in violation of the
Fourth Amendment] was lawful”).
2. Malicious Prosecution20

Plaintiff also asserts a claim of malicious prosecution against Deffendoll. The Supreme
Court has clarified that:
American courts describe[] the elements of the malicious prosecution tort as
follows: (i) the suit or proceeding was “instituted without any probable cause”; (ii)
the “motive in instituting” the suit “was malicious,” which was often defined in this
context as without probable cause and for a purpose other than bringing the
defendant to justice; and (iii) the prosecution “terminated in the acquittal or
discharge of the accused.”

20 As stated above the Court has broken down Alford’s § 1983 claim under Count I into “false arrest” and
“malicious prosecution” claims following the parties’ lead. The Court notes that the Supreme Court has
continued to recognize a § 1983 claim for “malicious prosecution” as one based on a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and the Court will analyze the claim under the accepted Constitutional framework. See
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36. As stated above, the Court is also aware that the term “malicious
prosecution” implies that the actionable conduct is that of prosecution, not of mere arrest. Despite this
implication, a malicious-prosecution claim does in fact focus on seizure because an essential element of a
malicious-prosecution claim is that the suit or proceeding was instituted without any probable cause as
Thompson v. Clark makes clear. Therefore, while there are other elements in the claim of malicious
prosecution (such as a favorable termination of the underlying criminal prosecution) the Court needs only
to focus on this essential element in the instant analysis. That is because, as described above, the Court
finds that Deffendoll has put forth enough evidence to demonstrate that a reasonable officer in his
circumstances could have found probable cause to arrest Alford, and he is therefore entitled to qualified
immunity.

A quick note on claims of malicious prosecution. This confusing term was criticized with strong
language by Justice Alito in his dissent in Thompson calling this kind of claim “a chimera of a constitutional
tort” and finding that “the Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution have almost nothing in common.”
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49-50 (Alito, J., dissenting). The Court agrees with this criticism and finds
that this claim mixes a classic Fourth Amendment violation with a state-law tort of wrongful prosecution
(which typically is based on a legal proceeding beyond the point of arrest). The Court also notes that this
kind of claim is distinct from the state law malicious-prosecution claim of the kind that Alford asserts in
Count III of the Complaint.
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1338, 212 L. Ed. 2d 382 (2022). An essential
element of a claim for malicious prosecution is that “the defendant’s actions cause the plaintiff to
be ‘seized’ without probable cause.” Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494, 510-511 (D.C.
Cir. 2007). Further:
th[e] distinction between a seizure and a prosecution does not matter . . . [w]hether
it should be called a ‘malicious prosecution claim’ or simply an ‘unreasonable-
seizure claim,’ the claim has two universally applicable ground rules. As a matter
of substance, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only those pretrial seizures (or
prosecutions) that lack probable cause, and § 1983 grants qualified immunity to
defendants who mistakenly but reasonably conclude that probable cause exists.

Lester v. Roberts, 986 F.3d 599, 607 (6th Cir. 2021).
Deffendoll has raised a qualified immunity defense. Because the availability of qualified
immunity as to this claim (as with the claim of false arrest) turns at least in part on whether a
reasonable officer could have found probable cause to effectuate an arrest, the above-described
rationale for bestowing qualified immunity on Deffendoll applies here as well. Mirroring its false-
arrest analysis, the Court finds that Deffendoll has produced enough evidence to demonstrate that
a reasonable officer could have determined that there was probable cause to arrest Alford based
on the information that was available to Deffendoll at the time of the arrest.21
The burden therefore is on Plaintiff to show a genuine dispute of fact over whether the
officer committed a constitutional violation. Plaintiff has attempted to meet that burden mainly by
stating that Deffendoll did not actually believe that the syringe he found in Alford’s truck contained
heroin. According to Plaintiff, this constitutes a genuine issue of material fact pertaining to

21 Given this indispensable element of the claim, the Court does not need to analyze any “later stages” of
the malicious-prosecution claim, such as the bringing of charges, the issuance of an indictment or any other
proceeding traditionally associated with a post-arrest prosecution (which ultimately did not take place in
this instance).
Deffendoll’s probable cause determination because it supposedly demonstrates that Deffendoll did
think Alford possessed an illegal drug (despite Deffendoll also finding a powdery substance).
Ultimately, however, this attempt fails. Despite Plaintiff’s characterization of Deffendoll’s actions,
there is not enough in the record to raise an issue of triable fact that Deffendoll could not have
found probable cause to arrest Alford. Instead, Deffendoll reasonably thought that he had probable

cause based on what his search of Alford’s truck revealed, as a reasonable officer in his
circumstances could have determined. Alford’s characterization simply does not comport with the
factual record in this case and a reasonable officer in those circumstances could have easily made
the same probable cause determination.
Therefore, with respect to his claim of malicious prosecution, Plaintiff has not met his
burden of raising a triable issue of fact at this stage and it accordingly fails.
B. Officer Smith22
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not articulated any specific, independent allegations
against Smith, and that therefore Defendants have met their burden showing there is no genuine

issue of material fact as to any claim made against Smith. The Court agrees. Smith did not search
Alford’s vehicle and did not make the decision to arrest or charge Alford with any crime. (RSUMF
¶¶ 6-11, 21). He also did not draft or swear to the Affidavits of Complaint that Deffendoll filled
out. (RSUMF ¶ 21). Smith neither initiated the Parole Board hearing nor made the decision to
revoke Alford’s parolee status. (RSUMF ¶ 29). Smith was also not a party to the purported
arrangement whereby Alford’s charges would be dropped if he acted as a criminal informant.
(RSUMF ¶ 31). Plaintiff has not pointed to anything in the record that genuinely places these facts

22 As noted above, the Court does not find it necessary to analyze the multiple claims against Smith. This
analysis focuses solely on the 1983 cause of action against Smith and not the state law claims (Counts II
and IV) that were brought against him.
in dispute. Therefore, the Court finds the absence of a genuine dispute that Smith did not act in
any way that could have caused a violation of Alford’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unlawful seizures. The claims against him accordingly fail.
C. Cannon County
1. Failure To Supervise

Alford claims that Cannon County as a municipality should be held liable for the alleged
Fourth Amendment violations of its officers under a so-called Monell theory of liability. Monell
liability requires that “the municipality itself cause the constitutional violation at issue.” City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Svcs,
436 U.S. 658 (1978)) (citation omitted). It also requires “a direct causal link between a municipal
policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 385. Plaintiff claims that
Cannon County “has a widespread custom with the force of law of failing to supervise its officers,
and of letting its officers make false accusations with impunity.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 56).
To support this claim, Plaintiff has referred to the deposition testimony of Sheriff Darrell

Young (“Sheriff Young”) who was the sheriff of Cannon County during the time of Alford’s arrest.
Sherriff Young stated that due to staffing shortages at that time the sheriff’s office was unable to
supervise some of its lower-level officers. (Doc. 34-3 at 6). He also stated that usually officers are
required to fill out a “narrative” section of their police report, which generally includes their
reasons for finding probable cause. (Id. at 14). He also stated that officers’ bodycam footage shows
the kinds of things that officers typically write in the narrative section. (Id. at 14). Deffendoll’s
narrative section was apparently left blank on his police report. (Id. at 6).
Failure-to-supervise claims require a plaintiff to show that a municipality acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk of the [constitutional violation] and that its deliberate
indifference was the ‘moving force’ behind the assault.” Amerson v. Waterford Twp., 562 Fed.
Appx. 484, 491—92 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Even assuming arguendo that Cannon
County acted with deliberate indifference to the risk of Fourth Amendment violations, Plaintiff’s
claim still fails. This is because Defendant has put forth enough evidence to demonstrate that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation at all. As stated above, a reasonable officer in Deffendoll’s

position could have made the determination that there was probable cause to arrest Alford under
these circumstances. Plaintiff has not pointed to any triable issues of fact demonstrating that it
would have been clear to a reasonable officer that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
Therefore this supposed deliberate indifference cannot have been the “moving force” behind any
Fourth Amendment violation.23 “[I]f a plaintiff does not suffer a constitutional violation, there can
be no unconstitutional custom or policy that is ‘the moving force’ behind an act upon which
municipal liability can attach.” Gohl v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1090 (E.D. Mich.
2015) (citations omitted), aff'd sub nom. Gohl v. Livonia Pub. Sch. Sch. Dist., 836 F.3d 672 (6th
Cir. 2016).

Alternatively, even assuming arguendo that there was no probable cause, Defendant has
demonstrated that there is not a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Cannon County
acted with “deliberate indifference.” Defendants successfully note that Plaintiff has not provided
any meaningful evidence pertaining to a pattern of constitutional violations on behalf of Cannon
County. This suffices for them to meet their burden under the summary judgment standard by
demonstrating that, contrary to Plaintiff’s claims and representations in his briefing, the materials
cited by Plaintiff do not actually establish the presence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Sheriff

23 As previously noted, based on facts not in genuine dispute, a reasonable officer could have found probable
cause to arrest Alford given the information available to Deffendoll at the time of the arrest.
Young admitted to staffing shortages due to competition with other counties in retaining officers,
but this does not automatically mean that Cannon County was “deliberately indifferent” to
constitutional violations on behalf of the officers it employed. Staffing shortages do not necessarily
equate to a policy or custom of not training officers to avoid inflicting constitutional violations
such as the one Plaintiff has alleged. True, Sheriff Young admitted that Deffendoll’s narrative

section on the report was not filled out and that usually supervising officers ensure that these
reports are completed. But Deffendoll was wearing a bodycam that captured the entirety of the
events that took place, and thus, as Sheriff Young described, captured what an officer would
normally write down in the narrative section of a police report.24 Further, Deffendoll’s failure to
fill out the report represents a single case of a general policy not being followed. This is not enough
to establish Monell liability even if Cannon County was negligent in this instance, because
“[w]here a city does create reasonable policies, but negligently administers them, there is no
deliberate indifference and, therefore no § 1983 liability.” Shadd v. White, No. 1:06-cv-2478, 2007
WL 2751897, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416

(6th Cir. 2006). Defendoll’s failure to fill out the report is a single act that cannot be imputed to
Cannon County as having a custom or policy that resulted in it being “deliberately indifferent” to
constitutional violations.
Therefore, Defendants have shown—without subsequent presentation of contrary evidence
by Plaintiff—that there is not a genuine issue of fact pertaining to Cannon County’s deliberate

24 The bodycam footage was manually filed with the Court (Doc. No. 35) and the Court has reviewed the
footage. Nothing in the footage indicates that Officer Deffendoll was not acting reasonably when he made
his probable cause determination and arrested Alford. There is no mystery as to what the circumstances
were when Officer Deffendoll made this decision. This is similar to the circumstances in Moore v. Oakland
County, Mich., No. 24-1563, 2025 WL 274631, in which the Sixth Circuit reviewed bodycam footage and
ultimately found that an officer was reasonable in using force to arrest a suspect in an uncertain and tense
environment.
indifference to any Fourth Amendment violations on behalf of its officers. Accordingly, the failure
to supervise claim against Cannon County fails.
2. Widespread Custom of False Drug Accusations
Plaintiff also alleges that Cannon County is “liable because it has a widespread custom
with the force of law of letting its officers make drug arrests in the absence of any chemical testing

for drugs, thereby promoting false accusations.” (Doc. No. 1 at 10). The quoted language indicates
to the Court that Plaintiff here has identified, as the custom underlying Cannon County’s alleged
Monell liability, a custom of not conducting pre-arrest drug testing25—a policy that allegedly
“promote[s] false accusations”26—rather than a custom of promoting false accusations.
Defendants take aim at the allegation that they have such a custom. With a focus on the
availability of drug field-testing kits and drug testing policies, Defendants have met their burden
to show a lack of a genuine issue of fact regarding Cannon County’s alleged widespread custom
of forgoing pre-arrest drug testing. (Doc. No. 34-3 at 13). Sheriff Young testified that the sheriff’s
office had drug field-testing kits available for officers at the office. (Doc. No. 34-3 at 13). He also

stated that there have never been complaints made to the county commission about a lack of field
tests. (Doc. No. 34-3 at 11). He also stated that the chief had knowledge about the availability of
field tests on a day-to-day basis and that the office regularly conducted inventory to determine

25 As thus identified, the alleged custom is not a custom (which would be a strikingly counterproductive
and foolish policy for any police agency that wants the charges from its arrests to be dismissed rather than
supported by evidence sufficient to take the charges to trial if needed) to avoid having purported drugs
tested post-arrest.

26 The Court does not know what exactly Plaintiff means by “thereby promot[ing] false accusations.” In
particular, it is unclear whether this means that false accusations are the intentional goal (as opposed to the
unintentional by-product) of that custom, and, relatedly whether “false accusations” refers specifically to
knowingly false accusations. It is in part (though only in part) because of Plaintiff’s lack of clarity and
specification in this regard that the Court does not view Plaintiff as alleging that there is a custom of false
drug accusations; again, the alleged custom is a custom of forgoing pre-arrest drug-testing.
whether they had enough tests available or instead needed to order more. (Doc. No. 34-3 at 11).
Further, the lack of drug field testing in Alford’s case in particular is of very minimal (if any)
probative value as to whether Cannon County has such a custom; the fact that an officer did not
do something in one case is simply not indicative of whether the officer’s employer had a policy
of having officers not do that thing generally. Accordingly, Defendants have satisfied their burden

to show that there is not a triable issue of fact regarding Cannon County’s alleged custom of
avoiding pre-arrest (field) testing of purported drugs.
Plaintiff relies on the fact that the syringe taken from the scene of the arrest was not tested
thereafter. But this reliance is misplaced, for two reasons. First, again, non-testing in Alford’s case
is, at most, only very minimally probative of whether there was a (very foolish) custom of avoiding
post-arrest testing of suspected drugs; it would provide, at most, a mere scintilla of evidence of
such a custom. Second, the alleged custom is not a custom to avoid having purported drugs tested
post-arrest.
Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate an issue of triable fact by pointing to Sheriff Young’s lack

of knowledge of the number of drug testing kits he had in the office and pointing out that the
syringe was not ultimately tested for illegal drugs. While Sheriff Young in his deposition could
not remember exactly how many field drug-testing kits the sheriff’s office had available on hand,
this does not mean that the police force was underequipped or that Cannon County had a custom
of not having enough field drug-testing kits; still less does it mean that Cannon County had a
custom of simply not doing field testing.
In short, Defendants have met their initial burden, and in response, Plaintiff has failed to
meet his burden of identifying a genuine issue of material fact regarding his Monell claim.
Accordingly, the claim fails.
Counts II-IV: State Law Claims
Alford has alleged state law claims against both Officers Smith and Deffendoll for false
arrest and abuse of process and specifically has alleged a claim of malicious prosecution against
Deffendoll. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) states that: “The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if – the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Sixth Circuit has held
that “Generally, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, … the state claims should be
dismissed as well.” Taylor v. First of Am. Bank-Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted); see also Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 1997) (“the district court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if ‘the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction’”).
In the instant case, this Court had original jurisdiction over the federal § 1983 claims filed
by Alford and it exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining alleged state law claims.
All of the federal claims, which constituted the basis of original jurisdiction in this suit, have been

dismissed. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims. Therefore the claims will be dismissed without prejudice for potential disposition in an
appropriate state court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion (Doc. No. 27) will be GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Motion will be granted as to Count I, containing
Plaintiff’s federal claims (which are brought against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and
summary judgment is granted Defendants as to those claims. However, the Motion will be denied
as to Counts II, III and IV, containing Plaintiff’s state-law claims. The state-claim claims are
dismissed without prejudice, leaving Plaintiff free to file them in an appropriate state court, subject
to all applicable temporal and procedural requirements.
An appropriate accompanying order will be entered.

ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10788050. Public record. Not legal advice.