# Asset Group Inc v. Corrugated Erectors Inc

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · January 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10787852

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** January 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ASSET GROUP, INC., )
)
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-14-435-SLP
)
CORRUGATED ERECTORS, INC., )
)
Defendant/Counterclaimant, )
)
and )
)
TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND )
SURETY COMPANY, )
)
Defendant. )

CORRUGATED ERECTORS, INC., )
)
Third-Party Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
GRAVITY-RATTERMAN, LLC, )
NATIONAL TRUST INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY )
INSURANCE COMPANY, and )
GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Third-Party Defendants. )

O R D E R
Before the Court are two cross-motions for summary judgment. First, Third-Party
Defendant Gravity-Ratterman, LLC filed Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 560],
to which Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Corrugated Erectors, Inc. filed a Response [Doc.
No. 569]. Gravity did not file a reply. Second, Corrugated filed its Amended Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 566], to which Gravity responded, see [Doc. No.
571], and Corrugated replied, see [Doc. No. 574].1

I. Background
The latest round of summary judgment briefing follows significant developments in
the makeup of this action. After the Court denied two separate motions for the entry of a
consent judgment, Plaintiff Asset Group, Inc. and Corrugated entered into a settlement
agreement (“the Settlement”) that resolved those parties’ claims against one another. The

Settlement also resulted in the dismissal of Corrugated’s claims against Third-Party
Defendants Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company and Great American Insurance
Company, see [Docs. No. 523, 545], and Asset’s claims against Defendant Travelers
Casualty and Surety Company, see [Doc. No. 543].
As a result, the only parties remaining in this action are Corrugated, Gravity, and

National Trust. The only pending claims are (1) Corrugated’s claims against Gravity for
negligence and breach of contract and/or breach of warranty, and (2) Corrugated’s claim
against National Trust for breach of contract. See [Doc. No. 84] at 8–12. The Court granted

1 Third-Party Defendant National Trust Insurance Company also filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. No. 563]. The Court will resolve that motion by separate order.
leave to allow the parties to file additional summary judgment motions addressing these
significant case developments.

II. Governing Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment if there is “no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A fact is only material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary

judgment “shoulder[s] the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case.” GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Behunin, 38 F.4th 1183,
1200 (10th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must
then “identify specific facts that show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Id. (quoting Clinger v. New Mexico Highlands Univ., Bd. of Regents, 215 F.3d 1162, 1165

(10th Cir. 2000).
When a district court is “presented with cross-motions for summary judgment,” it
“‘must view each motion separately,’ in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” United States v. Supreme Ct. of
New Mexico, 839 F.3d 888, 906–07 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Manganella v. Evanston Ins.
Co., 702 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2012)).

III. Undisputed Material Facts2
As detailed in the Court’s previous orders, this lawsuit stems from the construction
of the School Age Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana. The United States Army Corps of
Engineers entered into a contract with Asset to construct the Center. Asset then entered
into subcontracts with River City Drywall (for, inter alia, the installation of metal studs on
exterior walls and “permanent and temporary bracing of walls as necessary,” [Doc. No.

234-3] at 17), and Corrugated (for, inter alia, completion of the standing seam metal roof
system and installation of light gauge trusses), see [Doc. No. 234-4] at 17.
Corrugated, in turn, entered into a sub-subcontract with Gravity, which was
responsible for completing work related to the light gauge trusses and decking. See [Doc.
No. 84-2] at 1. The Corrugated-Gravity sub-subcontract contains the following

indemnification provision:
To the fullest extent permitted by the law, [Gravity] shall indemnify and hold
harmless [Corrugated and others] from all damages, losses, or expenses,
including attorneys fees, from any claims or damages for bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death, or from claims for damage to tangible property,
other than the Work itself. This indemnification shall extend to claims
resulting from the performance of this Subcontract and shall apply only to
the extent that the claim or loss is caused in whole or in part by any negligent
act or omission of [Gravity] or any of its agents, employees, or
Subcontractors. This indemnity shall be effective regardless of whether the
claim or loss is caused in some part by a party to be indemnified. . . .

2 The Court includes facts that are material, supported by the summary judgment record, and not
genuinely disputed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Id. at 3.
The trusses were installed at the center between April and August 2013. In October

2013, deficiencies in the trusses were discovered. The parties disagree about the cause of
these deficiencies. In November 2013, Asset sent a cure notice to Corrugated stating:
ASSET Group has discovered that certain of the deficiencies noted on the
walls were caused by Gravity Ratterman. Specifically, during a review of
photographs taken during construction it is evident that the lateral bracing on
the high walls was installed prior to the truss installation. ASSET has
attached several representative photographs that depict this condition and
sequence of the installation. The photographs show that both the cold rolled
steel and the strap bracing was installed on the high walls. Further
investigation shows that some of the straps are still partially attached. One
photograph shows studs where the straps appeared to have been installed and
vacant holes from the screws that were used to attach the straps or clips
(depending on the type of bracing and/or blocking required). In one
photograph you can see where the cold roll steel was cut and Gravity
Ratterman is installing the truss.
ASSET Group interviewed the prior QC who stated that River City and
Gravity Ratterman openly argued over the point that Gravity Ratterman had
removed certain bracing. ASSET is told that Gravity Ratterman acceded to
the QC officer’s demands to not cut any additional bracing and agreed to
repair/restore what was already cut and removed. According to further
project records and the as-installed condition today, Gravity Ratterman never
repaired/restored he cut bracing. In fact, the record shows that Gravity
Ratterman continued removing bracing after River City left the project. The
bracing that was removed was not at eye level and, thus, was apparently
missed by follow-on QC inspectors.
[Doc. No. 123-5] at 2 (footnote omitted). The cure notice also included a photo, which
Asset claimed “shows the cold roll steel and steel strap lateral bracing was in place in the
clerestory but as shown in this picture it has been cut to install the trusses.” Id. at 6.
In April 2014, Asset filed suit, alleging Corrugated breached its contract with Asset
and acted negligently by, inter alia, “[a]llowing or failing to identify and prevent the
removal of lateral bracing from Clerestory walls.” [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 16(j). On May 20, 2014,
Corrugated sought defense and indemnity from Gravity and National Trust. See [Doc. No.

123-12]; see also [Doc. No. 123-14] (“Corrugated has tendered its defense and
indemnification of the lawsuit to our [insured] Gravity-Ratterman LLC [] and National
Trust.”). Both Gravity and National Trust declined to tender a defense.
Asset filed its Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 41] on October 7, 2014,
asserting claims against Corrugated for breach of contract, breach of implied warranties,
and negligence. The Fourth Amended Complaint alleged: “As a direct and legal result of

Corrugated’s negligence (whether alone, together with or by or through its own
subcontractors and engineers, including but not limited to Gravity), ASSET has been
damaged . . . in an amount to be proven at trial estimated in excess of $982,626.94.” Id.
¶ 44. Corrugated filed a counterclaim against Asset for breach of contract, see [Doc. No.
84] at 6–7, and asserted third-party claims against Gravity (for negligence and breach of

contract and/or breach of warranties) and National Trust (for breach of contract),3 id. at
10–11.
On or around December 29, 2023, Asset and Corrugated entered into a settlement
agreement to resolve their claims against each other. See [Doc. No. 566-2]. As part of this

3 Corrugated initially named FCCI as a third-party defendant. In August 2017, the Court granted
leave to substitute National Trust for FCCI. See [Docs. No. 154, 155]. The Court refers to
“National Trust” when referencing actions taken prior to the substitution.
settlement, Corrugated agreed to pay $364,455 to resolve Asset’s negligence claim against
it.4

IV. Analysis
Both Corrugated and Gravity’s motions implicate the indemnification agreement
contained in the Corrugated-Gravity sub-subcontract. Corrugated contends it “is entitled
to summary judgment on its contractual indemnification claim” against Gravity “because
there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the application of the
Indemnification Agreement to Asset’s negligence claim against Corrugated in this matter”

now that Corrugated and Asset have reached a settlement. [Doc. No. 566] at 11–12. On
the other hand, Gravity claims (1) the Settlement sets an upper limit on the amounts that
Corrugated can recover from Gravity, (2) Corrugated cannot execute a judgment against
Gravity, and (3) Corrugated is derivatively responsible for Asset’s mismanagement.
A. The Legal Effect of the Settlement

Corrugated seeks partial summary judgment against Gravity, arguing the Settlement
triggers the indemnification provision because Gravity failed to tender a defense.
Corrugated relies primarily on Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 427 and Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Dobry Flour Mills, 211 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1954).5

4 Corrugated also agreed to pay Asset $125,000 to resolve Asset’s breach of contract claim, but it
is not seeking indemnification from Gravity as to that part of the Settlement. See [Doc. No. 574]
at 2–3.

5 Both parties rely on Oklahoma law, and neither argues that any other state’s law applies to the
interpretation of the contract.
“The general rules of contract interpretation apply to the interpretation of an
indemnity contract.” Otis Elevator Co. v. Midland Red Oak Realty, Inc., 483 F.3d 1095,

1101 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court must interpret contracts “to give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties, as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is
ascertainable and lawful.” Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 152. Section 427 provides additional rules
for courts to apply in interpreting indemnity contracts “unless a contrary intention appears.”
Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 427. Those rules, as set forth in the statute, are:

1. Upon an indemnity against liability, expressly, or in other equivalent terms,
the person indemnified is entitled to recover upon becoming liable.
2. Upon an indemnity against claims or demands, or damages or costs,
expressly, or in other equivalent terms, the person indemnified is not entitled
to recover without payment thereof.
3. An indemnity against claims or demands, or liability, expressly or in other
equivalent terms, embraces the costs of defense against such claims,
demands or liability incurred in good faith, and in the exercise of reasonable
discretion.
4. The person indemnifying is bound, on request of the person indemnified,
to defend actions or proceedings brought against the latter in respect to the
matters embraced by the indemnity; but the person indemnified has the right
to conduct such defense, if he chooses to do so.
5. If, after request, the person indemnifying neglects to defend the person
indemnified, a recovery against the latter, suffered by him in good faith, is
conclusive in his favor against the former.
6. If the person indemnifying, whether he is a principal or a surety in the
agreement, has not reasonable notice of the action of proceedings against the
person indemnified, or is not allowed to control its defense, judgment against
the latter is only presumptive evidence against the former.
7. A stipulation that a judgment against the person indemnified shall be
conclusive upon the person indemnifying, is applicable if he had a good
defense upon the merits, which, by want of ordinary care, he failed to
establish in the action.
Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 427.
In Dobry, a “railroad company constructed a spur track from its main line to serve
a flour mill.” 211 F.2d at 786. The contract between the railroad and the flour mill included
an indemnification provision in which the flour mill

“agree[d] to indemnify and hold harmless the [railroad] for loss, damage or
injury from any act or omission of the [flour mill], its employees or agents,
to the person or property of the parties hereto and their employees and to the
person or property of any other person or corporation, while on or about said
track, and if any claim or liability other than from fire shall arise from the
joint or concurring negligence of both parties hereto, it shall be borne by
them equally.”
Id.
A railroad employee sued his employer for negligence after he was injured working
on the track, claiming it “was covered with an accumulation of flour dust from the Dobry
mill.” Id. The railroad asked the flour mill to defend the negligence claim and advised it
would settle the case and seek indemnification if the flour mill declined. The flour mill
disclaimed liability and declined to tender a defense. As promised, the railroad settled the
negligence action with the employee and sued the flour mill for indemnification under the
contract.
The flour mill admitted the indemnification provision existed but continued to deny
liability for the accident. The Tenth Circuit, relying on § 427, concluded that because the
flour mill had declined to tender a defense to the railroad, it could no longer assert defenses
to the employee’s negligence claim:
[I]n Oklahoma and elsewhere in indemnity cases, where the indemnitor
denies liability under the indemnity contract and refuses to assume the
defense of the claim, then the indemnitee is in full charge of the matter and
may make a good faith settlement without assuming the risk of being able to
prove absolute legal liability or the actual amount of the damage. A contrary
rule would make the right to settle meaningless in cases where the indemnitor
has denied liability
Id. at 788 (citations omitted). Because the flour mill’s liability “[wa]s not to be determined
from its primary liability to [the employee] but from its obligations as created by the
contract,” the jury should have been tasked only with determining “whether the Railroad
made a reasonable, prudent and good faith compromise and settlement.” Id.
Corrugated cites two other cases in which courts citing Dobry have reached the same
result under similar facts. See Callaway v. Wiltel Commc’ns, LLC, No. 06-CV-0579-CVE-
PJC, 2007 WL 2902878, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 2, 2007) (“It is sufficient that Callaway
alleged Batten’s performance of the work caused his injury. Batten breached the
indemnification agreement when it refused to comply with its contractual obligation to
defend and indemnify WilTel, and Batten is liable to WilTel under the indemnification
agreement.”); Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 551 P.2d 671, 673–74 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1976) (“At no place in the indemnity agreement do we find that Kelly must be
proven guilty of negligence, but instead it says that Kelly will save Mobil and DeYong
harmless from every claim or injury, including attorneys’ fees, which may arise or be

asserted, based upon a claim of injury, claimed to have been caused by or attributable to
defective workmanship or material.”). Notably, the indemnitors in those two cases agreed
to hold harmless and indemnify for claims arising from their own negligence.
Gravity’s Response [Doc. No. 571], which includes just three pages of analysis,
reiterates its argument that disputes of fact about the trusses preclude summary judgment.6

Gravity does not attempt to distinguish Dobry or present any legal argument as to why it is
inapplicable to this case following the Settlement. Perplexingly, Gravity does not even
mention Dobry in its Response, nor did it file a reply in support of its own Motion to
address the case’s applicability.7 Instead, Gravity reiterates the argument that its
negligence is disputed, precluding summary judgment. But it does not explain why that

6 Gravity’s briefing also makes no distinction between the factual basis for Corrugated’s breach of
contract claim and its negligence claim.

7 At a previous hearing, the Court suggested the parties’ arguments were akin to a silent disco;
rather than providing law or facts rebutting the opposing party’s position, each party steadfastly
stuck to the argument it wanted to make. Gravity has not strayed from this approach in its briefing.
Rather than addressing Corrugated’s arguments under the Dobry line of cases, Gravity continues
beating the drum that such a result violates Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 221(B). To the extent there is some
argument as to why Dobry is inapplicable here, Gravity has not even attempted to make it. The
Court notes that Corrugated’s reliance on Dobry and its progeny can come as no surprise to
Gravity. Corrugated has promulgated this theory since at least September 5, 2023, when it made
similar arguments in support of its motion for a consent judgment. See [Doc. No. 475] at 9. While
the Court ultimately determined that “Asset and Corrugated’s attempt to create a legal obligation
through the entry of a consent decree is improper,” it cautioned that “nothing in [its] Order should
be construed as an opinion about Gravity’s duty to indemnify Corrugated outside of the context of
the proposed consent judgment.” [Doc. No. 536] at 9 & n.5 (emphasis added). This action has a
long procedural history, throughout which the parties have presented and briefed myriad issues. It
is not the Court’s function to sort through the factual record, previous briefing, or prior rulings to
construct legal arguments rebutting Corrugated’s position. See State v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency,
989 F.3d 874, 885 (10th Cir. 2021) (“[C]ourts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and
research.” (quoting Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147 n.10 (2011)));
C.P.C. v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. Re-2, No. 122CV00564RMRSBP, 2023 WL 8831330, at *3 (D.
Colo. Dec. 21, 2023) (“The Court is not obligated to perform legal research on behalf of [a party]
. . . nor will the Court make arguments for [a party] that he himself has not raised.”); Lovato v.
Mahler, No. 121CV01986RMRMDB, 2023 WL 2613821, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 23, 2023) (“The
Court will not make arguments for the parties, nor should the parties expect that the Court will
consider arguments that the parties could have made but did not.”). Instead, the Court confines its
ruling to the positions advanced by counsel.
dispute is material where, as here, the party it agreed to indemnify reached a settlement on
the underlying negligence claim after Gravity declined to tender a defense. Upon review—

and without the benefit of any argument from counsel on this point—Dobry appears to
control the result in this case.
In its own Motion, Gravity claims Corrugated is improperly “rely[ing] on its
settlement with Asset to establish a right to indemnity from [Gravity].”8 [Doc. No. 560] at
8. But this framing does not accurately articulate Corrugated’s position. Corrugated relies
on the indemnification provision contained in the Corrugated-Gravity sub-subcontract as

the source of its right to indemnification, not the Settlement. Corrugated claims that the
Settlement, coupled with Gravity’s declination of a defense under § 427, means that it no
longer has to prove Gravity’s negligence in order to recover under the contract provision,
as set forth in Dobry and its progeny.
Gravity’s Motion focuses nearly exclusively on § 221(B),9 claiming that Corrugated

cannot seek to recover more than Gravity’s negligence under the indemnification provision.

8 Gravity cites one case in support of this argument. There, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated
that “it is the recovery which is conclusive, if the person is in fact indemnified and the recovery
does not in itself conclusively establish that the person claiming to be indemnified is in fact
indemnified.” U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Dawson Produce Co., 68 P.2d 105, 106 (Okla. 1937).
Gravity then claims that Corrugated “must still establish fault on the part of [Gravity], and the
extent of any such fault, to obtain any recovery from [Gravity] on a theory of indemnity.” [Doc.
No. 560] at 8. But as Corrugated points out, Dawson addressed the preclusive effect of an earlier
judgment on an insurer who failed to provide a defense. See 68 P.2d at 106. Here, the question is
whether Corrugated can seek contractual indemnification from Gravity to reimburse it for the
amounts paid to settle Asset’s negligence claim—an issue more directly addressed by both Dobry
and § 427.

9 That subsection reads: “Except as provided in subsection C or D of this section, any provision in
a construction agreement that requires an entity or that entity’s surety or insurer to indemnify,
insure, defend or hold harmless another entity against liability for damage arising out of death or
In Gravity’s view, § 221(B) requires a jury to determine whether and to what extent Gravity
was negligent before any indemnification obligation is triggered under the contract—

although it cites no legal authority supporting that result when an indemnitor settles a claim
after the would-be indemnitee refuses to tender a defense.
Further, Gravity’s § 221(B) argument ignores the plain language of the
indemnification provision, § 427, and Dobry. Gravity does not dispute that it agreed to
defend and indemnify and hold Corrugated harmless “from claims for damage to tangible
property, other than the Work itself,” as long as “the claim or loss is caused in whole or in

part by any negligent act or omission of [Gravity].”10 [Doc. No. 84-2] at 3. It does not
dispute that it declined to tender a defense to Corrugated. It does not dispute that Asset
and Corrugated have settled the claims. Nor does it dispute that the factual basis for the
$364,455 payment is Gravity’s cutting of certain bracing, and not the actions of Corrugated
or any other contractors.11 Finally, Gravity provides scant legal authority to support its

interpretation of how §§ 221 and 427 apply after the indemnitee has settled the underlying
claim.

bodily injury to persons, or damage to property, which arises out of the negligence or fault of the
indemnitee, its agents, representatives, subcontractors, or suppliers, is void and unenforceable as
against public policy.”

10 While Gravity references the allegations in Asset’s pleadings, it does so only to support its
arguments under § 221(B). It does not argue the allegations are insufficient to trigger the
indemnification provision outside of that context.

11 As set forth in ¶ 2.06 of the settlement agreement [Doc. No. 566-2], Asset and Corrugated
“incorporate by reference the[ir] Amended Stipulation and Consent to Entry of Judgment [Doc.
506-1] as a material part of this Agreement but only for purposes of supporting the Parties’ reasons,
rationale and basis for reaching this Settlement.”
The Court agrees with Corrugated that the Settlement (coupled with Gravity’s
declination of Corrugated’s tender) shifts the focus of this case from a question of

negligence to one of contract, as it did in Dobry. See 211 F.2d at 788 (“On this subject, the
only question which should have been submitted to the jury was whether the Railroad made
a reasonable, prudent and good faith compromise and settlement.”). The sole issue
remaining, therefore, is whether the Settlement was made in good faith. At this juncture,
genuine issues of fact preclude summary judgment in Corrugated’s favor on the question
of good faith. As Gravity points out, the agreement attached to the briefing is heavily

redacted, and there is conflicting information about whether and to what extent Gravity
participated in the negotiations. See, e.g., [Doc. No. 560-5]. Thus, it is appropriate for a
factfinder to resolve the question of whether Corrugated settled Asset’s negligence claim
in good faith.
B. Remaining Issues in Gravity’s Motion

Gravity argues that the $364,455 Corrugated paid to settle Asset’s negligence claim
sets an upper limit for Corrugated’s recovery against Gravity. While Corrugated does not
seem to dispute that the actual damages available under the indemnification can’t exceed
the settlement amount, it fleetingly argues the contract permits recovery of attorney’s fees.
See [Doc. No. 569] at 9 n.1. Gravity did not file a Reply brief, so it did not address the

argument. Without the benefit of briefing from counsel on this issue, Gravity has not
shown as a matter of law that Corrugated’s absolute recovery (i.e., actual damages and
fees) under the indemnification cannot exceed $364,455. Accordingly, this portion of
Gravity’s Motion is DENIED.
Gravity also seeks summary judgment on the basis that Corrugated “[can]not
execute any judgment against [Gravity]” in light of the October 27, 2014 order filed by the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky. [Doc. No. 560] at 14 (citing
[Doc. No. 560-9]. Gravity also makes an equitable argument that Corrugated should be
estopped from enforcing any judgment against Gravity. But these issues are not ripe for
determination unless and until Corrugated obtains a judgment against Gravity.
Accordingly, Gravity’s Motion is DENIED as premature.
Finally, Gravity argues that Corrugated is derivatively liable for Asset’s
mismanagement of the project. But for the same reasons set forth, the Court finds this issue
is no longer material in light of the Settlement.
V. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Gravity-Ratterman, LLC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 560] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Corrugated Erectors, Inc.’s Amended Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 566] is GRANTED, as set forth herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24" day of January, 2025.

SCOTT L. PALK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10787852. Public record. Not legal advice.