# Brown v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

> District Court, M.D. Florida · January 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10786925

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

BYRON JAMAAL BROWN,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 8:17-cv-465-TPB-SPF

SECRETARY, Department of Corrections,

Respondent.
/

O R D E R

Brown applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus
(Doc. 1) and challenges his conviction for robbery with a firearm, for which
conviction Brown is imprisoned for twenty-five years. Both the conviction
and the sentence accord with the plea agreement. Numerous exhibits support
the response. (Doc. 26) The Respondent admits the petition’s timeliness
(Response at 2, Doc. 26)1 and correctly argues (1) that each ground for relief
either fails to assert a ground reviewable under § 2254 or lacks merit and
(2) that the petition asserts no ground based on the ineffective assistance of
counsel.

1 This case was previously closed. After Brown did not oppose the Respondent’s earlier
response, an order (Doc. 13) determined that the Respondent correctly argued that this action
was untimely, which determination was reversed because the circuit court ruled that Brown’s
first of several post-conviction motions was “properly filed” and tolled the limitation. (Doc. 22)
I. BACKGROUND2
In 2005 Brown pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and was sentenced
to probation. Four months later in 2006 (1) Brown pleaded guilty to uttering a

forged instrument and was sentenced to imprisonment for three years,
(2) Brown’s probation for the 2005 conviction was revoked, and (3) he was
sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the 2005 conviction to run
concurrent with the 2006 conviction. Brown was released from imprisonment

in August, 2008.
Less than a year later, specifically, June 5, 2009, Brown and a
co-defendant entered a Metro P.C.S. store, Brown brandished a firearm at the
store clerk and demanded money from the cash register, and Brown reached

across the counter and grabbed nearly $600 from the cash register. The store
security cameras captured both the armed robbery and the robbers flight in a
van. Later the store clerk identified the abandoned van a few blocks away, and
she subsequently identified the co-defendant from a “photo-pak.” Upon being

advised that an arrest warrant was issued, the co-defendant surrendered to
police, provided a full confession, and implicated Brown as his accomplice.
Later Brown was arrested and asserted as an alibi that he was at his
grandmother’s house, but she denied that he was at her house on that date.

2 This summary of the facts derives from Brown’s Anders brief and Brown’s pro se
briefs on direct appeal. (Respondent’s Exhibits 12 and 13)
Brown was charged with robbery with a firearm and the prosecutor filed a
notice that Brown faced a sentence as both a prison releasee re-offender (“PRR”)
and a habitual felony offender (“HFO”). (Respondent’s Exhibit 4) Because the

robbery occurred within one year of his release from prison, Brown qualified for
a sentence as a PRR, and he qualified for a sentence as an HFO because he had
the two predicate prior felony convictions. If sentenced as a PRR, Brown’s
sentence was a mandatory term of life imprisonment. The plea agreement

avoided a PRR sentence and, although life imprisonment was still the
maximum possible sentence as an HFO, under the terms of the plea agreement
the prosecutor agreed to limit Brown’s sentence to only twenty-five years
imprisonment with a ten-year minimum mandatory followed by fifteen years’

probation. At sentencing Brown stated “that he was tak[ing] the plea deal
rather than take a risk at catching life.” (Respondent’s Exhibit 6 at 22)
On appeal Brown’s counsel filed an initial brief under Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Brown pro se filed both an initial and a

supplemental initial brief, and Brown filed a pro se reply brief. (Respondent’s
Exhibits 12, 13, 15, and 16) The state court record shows that Brown filed
several motions under Rule 3.800, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
correct an illegal sentence but no timely motion for post-conviction relief under

Rule 3.850. The six grounds for relief in this action challenge Brown’s sentence;
the petition alleges no ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210

(11th Cir. 1998). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard
for federal court review of a state court adjudication, as Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000), explains:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal
habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two
conditions is satisfied — the state court adjudication resulted in a
decision that (1) “was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “involved
an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under the
“contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state
court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a
question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this
Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the
“unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the
writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from
this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts
of the prisoner’s case.

“The focus . . . is on whether the state court’s application of clearly
established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable
application is different from an incorrect one.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693
(2002). “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 427 (2014) (“The critical point is that relief is
available under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable-application clause if, and only if, it

is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that
there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question . . . .”) (citing
Richter); Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It is the
objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision

that we are to decide.”). The phrase “clearly established Federal law”
encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court “as of the
time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412.
A federal court must afford due deference to a state court’s decision.

“AEDPA prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using federal
habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of
state courts.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010); see also Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (“This is a ‘difficult to meet,’ . . . and ‘highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt’ . . . .”) (citations omitted).
When the last state court to decide a federal claim issues a reasoned and
explanatory opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons as

stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable. Wilson
v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). When the relevant state-court decision is
not accompanied with reasons for the decision, the federal court “should ‘look
through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that
does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision

adopted the same reasoning.” Id.
In a per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate
court on direct appeal affirmed Brown’s convictions and sentence. (Respondent’s
Exhibit 17) Similarly, in other per curiam decisions without a written opinion

the state appellate court affirmed the denial of Brown’s subsequent Rule 3.000
motions to vacate. (Respondent’s Exhibit 28, 34, and 40) The state appellate
court’s per curiam affirmances warrant deference under Section 2254(d)(1)
because “the summary nature of a state court’s decision does not lessen the

deference that it is due.” Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002).
The state post-conviction court’s rejection of Brown’s claims warrants deference
in this case. (Orders Denying Motions to Correct Illegal Sentence, Respondent’s
Exhibits 23, 31, and 37)

III. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
Brown alleges six grounds for relief; one ground challenges his plea and
the other grounds challenge his sentence. Brown is not entitled to relief under
any of the alleged grounds.
A. Challenge to the Guilty Plea
In Ground One Brown questions the validity of his guilty plea. Brown
must overcome the “well settled [premise] that a voluntary and intelligent plea

of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent
counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508
(1984). And, as Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), explains, a
guilty plea waives a non-jurisdictional defect:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has
preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has
solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense
with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to
the entry of the guilty plea.

This waiver of rights precludes most challenges to the conviction. E.g., United
States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1217, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, a voluntary,
unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the
proceedings.”); Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A
defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to
the constitutionality of the conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and
knowing nature of the plea can be sustained.”).
In his petition (Doc. 1 at 3) Brown recognizes that, “to be valid, a guilty
plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Brown, as the petitioner,
must identify a basis for challenging the constitutionality of his guilty plea.
Brown fails to identify a basis for challenging his guilty plea. In his reply
Brown argues that the state should have been required (1) to determine if he
was competent and (2) to afford him a “hearing to determine whether or not
his guilty plea was voluntary even though he had declared in open court that

his plea was voluntarily and knowingly.” (Doc. 29 at 4) Brown identifies no
basis for contesting either the voluntariness of his plea or his competency. On
the contrary, “the representations of the defendant . . . [at the plea proceeding]
as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a

formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn
declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977). Ground One has no merit.
B. Challenges to the Sentence

Grounds Two through Six challenge the validity of Brown’s sentence
under state law, specifically, that the trial court’s factual findings are
insufficient to impose a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence (Ground Two);
that the trial court failed to find both that an HFO sentence was needed to

protect the public and that Brown had the requisite two predicate prior
convictions (Grounds Three and Four); that the trial court failed to require a
pre-sentence investigation report (Ground Five); and that the ten-year
minimum mandatory sentence is illegal because it was not part of the plea

agreement (Ground Six).
A sentence within legislatively mandated guidelines is presumptively
valid. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). If a sentence is within the
statutory limits, state courts have wide discretion in determining “the type

and extent of punishment for convicted defendants.” Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949). Consequently, federal habeas corpus review of an
asserted violation of state sentencing law is limited, as McCullough v.
Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535–36 (11th Cir. 1992), explains:

A federal habeas petition may be entertained only on the ground that a
petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A state’s interpretation of its
own laws or rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since
no question of a constitutional nature is involved. Bronstein v.
Wainwright, 646 F.2d 1048, 1050 (5th Cir. 1981). State courts are the
ultimate expositors of their own state’s laws, and federal courts
entertaining petitions for writs of habeas corpus are bound by the
construction placed on a state’s criminal statutes by the courts of the
state except in extreme cases. Mendiola v. Estelle, 635 F.2d 487, 489 (5th
Cir. 1981).[3]

See also Branton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 796 F. App’x 635, 638 (11th Cir.
2019)4 (“Branton has articulated no cognizable claim for federal habeas corpus
relief because the federal courts are limited to correcting errors of federal law,
and Branton never brought a federal claim, either in state court or in federal

3 Unless later superseded by Eleventh Circuit precedent, a Fifth Circuit decision issued
before October 1, 1981, binds this court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).
4 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited
as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.
court.”); Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) “[F]ederal
courts cannot review a state’s alleged failure to adhere to its own sentencing
procedures.”) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, each claim in Grounds Two through Six is refuted by the
record and, to the extent that he raised the claims in state court, each claim
was rejected by the post-conviction court. “Defendant waived his right to a
presentence investigation pursuant to his plea agreement, and the Court made

the necessary findings to qualify Defendant as an HFO [and] the Court then
sentenced Defendant according to the terms of his negotiated plea agreement,
including the 10 year minimum mandatory provision.” (Respondent’s Exhibit
37 at 2–3) Brown is not entitled to relief based on Grounds Two through Six.

CONCLUSION
Brown fails to meet his burden to show that the state court’s decision was
either an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court precedent or
an unreasonable determination of fact. As Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19–20

(2013), recognizes, a petitioner’s burden under § 2254 is very difficult to meet:
Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to
adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable
barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been
adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show
that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court
was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
[86, 103] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet” — and it is — “that
is because it was meant to be.” Id., at [102]. We will not lightly conclude
that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme
malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at [103]
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Brown’s motion “to hear and rule” (Doc. 33) is GRANTED. Brown’s
petition for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The clerk must
enter a judgment against Brown and CLOSE this case.

DENIAL OF BOTH
A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Brown is not entitled to a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Under
§ 2253(c)(1), a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute
entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition. Rather, a district
court must first issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA “only if
the petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” To merit a COA, Brown must show that reasonable jurists would find
debatable both the merits of the underlying claims and the procedural issues he
seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478
(2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir 2001). Because he fails to
show that reasonable jurists would debate either the merits of the claims or the

procedural issues, Brown is entitled to neither a COA nor leave to appeal in
forma pauperis.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Leave to appeal in forma
pauperis is DENIED. Brown must obtain permission from the circuit court to
appeal in forma pauperis.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 23rd day of
January, 2025.

TOM BARBER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-12-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10786925. Public record. Not legal advice.