# LONG v. FRENCH

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · January 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10785653

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** January 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10785653

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the Warden was personally responsible for the alleged cell conditions, and distinguishing Vance, because the Warden "not only knew about the problems but was personally responsible for changing prison policies so that they would be addressed"

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

COURTNEY LONG, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:22-cv-01712-JPH-TAB
)
JENNIFER FRENCH et al., et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Courtney Long is a prisoner who alleges that Defendants wrongfully
confined him in segregated housing—essentially solitary confinement—for
extended periods of time between 2011 and 2022. He brings claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
and his right to be free from retaliation for engaging in constitutionally-protected
activity. Defendants, who work for the Indiana Department of Correction
("IDOC") or IDOC contractors, have filed motions for summary judgment. Dkts.
[62], [65]. For the reasons below, those motions are GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART.
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is
unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,
instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,
572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-
finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to
consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need
not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind.
Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the
basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986).
Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed,
the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the
record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion
can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in
the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
II.
Factual Background
Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a),
the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Long
and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 572–73.
A. The Parties
Mr. Long is a prisoner who has been in the custody of the IDOC for nearly
15 years. During that time, he has been housed at multiple prisons, including

Pendleton Correctional Facility, Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, New Castle
Correctional Facility (which is operated by GEO Group, Inc.), Westville
Correctional Facility, and Indiana State Prison. Mr. Long's current earliest
expected release date is in 2036. Dkt. 77-1.
Defendants are employees of the IDOC and GEO Group, who worked at
IDOC's Central Office and the prisons where Mr. Long has been housed. During
the relevant timeframe of the events alleged in Mr. Long's complaint, Defendants
Hendrix and Basinger worked at the IDOC Central Office; Defendants French,

Fitch, Joseph, Sanford, Dickerson, and Sevier worked at New Castle; Defendant
Marshal worked at Wabash Valley; and Defendant Peterson worked at Pendleton.
Their respective positions and job duties relevant to this case are summarized
below:
Name Position Duty station
Jack Hendrix Executive Director of IDOC Central Office
Classification, 2011-
present

Mr. Hendrix's role, with respect to overseeing classification, "includes receiving
recommendations from facilities for offender admittance to and release from
department-wide administrative restrictive housing status." Dkt. 63-1 at 1
(Hendrix affidavit).

James Basinger Deputy Commissioner of IDOC Central Office
Operations, 2013-
present
Mr. Basinger's role, in part, is to oversee the IDOC classification division. Dkt.
63-5 at 1 (Basinger affidavit).

Robert Marshall Lead investigator, Office Wabash Valley
of Investigations and
Intelligence, 2014-
October 2016

Mr. Marshall's job included making recommendations regarding inmates'
restrictive housing status at Wabash Valley. Dkt. 63-6 at 1 (Marshall affidavit).

Walter Peterson Internal investigator, Pendleton
1980-2020
Tina Dickerson Caseworker, March New Castle
2021-April 2023

Ms. Dickerson was assigned to New Castle's restrictive housing unit between
October and December 2021. Part of her duties were to participate in and
document periodic reviews of inmates who were in restrictive status housing,
including Mr. Long's reviews between October and December 2021. Dkt. 63-8
at 1 (Dickerson affidavit).

Christopher Sanford IDOC Investigator and New Castle
correctional police
officer, August 2018-
present

Mr. Sanford sometimes provides recommendations on whether an inmate
should be in restrictive housing. Dkt. 63-9 at 1 (Sanford affidavit).

Sammy Joseph GEO Group Investigator, New Castle
present

Mr. Joseph was personally involved with Mr. Long's restrictive housing
placement reviews at New Castle. Dkt. 67-5 at 1 (Joseph affidavit).

Scott Fitch Assistant Warden, 2006- New Castle
present
Jennifer French GEO Group Assistant New Castle
Facility Administrator

Ms. French was personally involved with Mr. Long's restrictive housing
placement reviews at New Castle. Dkt. 67-7 at 1 (French affidavit).
Mark Sevier Warden, present New Castle

B. IDOC Segregation Policies and Procedures

IDOC prisoners are ordinarily housed in what is referred to as "general
population" but may be assigned to segregated or restricted housing in the form
of administrative segregation, also referred to as restrictive housing, and
disciplinary segregation. Although New Castle is operated by GEO Group, it still
is subject to IDOC rules and regulations and oversight of inmates' restrictive
housing classifications. See dkt. 67-5 at ¶ 6.
Administrative segregation, or restrictive status housing, may be imposed
at the facility level or department-wide level: "(1) facility administrative restrictive

status housing ("ARSH"); and (2) department-wide administrative restrictive
status housing ("DW-ARSH")." Dkt. 63-1 at 1. Placement in either type of
administrative segregation "shall be based on the" (1) threat to life, self, staff,
other offenders, or property; (2) threat to the orderly operation and security of a
facility; and (3) regulation of an inmate's behavior that has not been within
acceptable limits. Id. at 4-5 (copy of IDOC Policy 02-01-111). Final decisions
regarding ARSH placement are made at the facility level. Dkt. 63-1 at 1-2. Final
decisions whether to place an inmate on DW-ARSH are made by regional

directors at IDOC central office, with input from facility staff and central office
classification staff, including Mr. Hendrix. Id. at 2.
Disciplinary restrictive housing or segregation, like administrative
segregation, may be facility-based ("DRSH") or department-wide ("DWRH-D").
Dkt. 77-1 at 36-37 (copy of IDOC Policy 02-04-102). A prisoner is placed in
disciplinary restrictive housing or segregation as a sanction imposed by the
Disciplinary Hearing Board. Under the Disciplinary Restrictive Housing

Regulations, "[a]dmission of an offender to a disciplinary restrictive status
housing unit shall be documented in the unit log," along with completion of State
Form 39588. Id. at 40. The policy also does not allow an offender to "remain on
disciplinary restrictive status housing longer than the given disciplinary sanction
imposed by the Disciplinary Hearing Board." Id. at 44.
C. Mr. Long's Time at Pendleton: 2011 – January 2015
While at Pendleton, Mr. Long was found guilty of disciplinary violations
related to trafficking cell phones. Dkt. 73 at 1-2 (Long Affidavit). As a sanction,

he was ordered to serve time in disciplinary segregation; according to IDOC
records, the last period of disciplinary segregation during Mr. Long's time at
Pendleton would have ended in April 2013. Dkt. 63-4 at 1 (Long's IDOC
Disciplinary Records). While serving disciplinary sanctions at Pendleton, Mr.
Peterson approached Mr. Long and told him he could make Mr. Long's "situation
go away" if he cooperated with further investigation into cellphone trafficking. Id.
at 2-3. After Mr. Long refused to cooperate, Mr. Peterson said "he would have me
moved further away from my family to the SHU at Wabash for a couple of years,

'to see if you change your mind.'" Mr. Long still refused to cooperate. Id. at 3.
D. Mr. Long's Time at Wabash Valley: January 2015 – June 2018
In January 2015, Mr. Long was transferred to Wabash Valley. See Dkt. 63-
1 at 3. Mr. Long was immediately assigned to a segregated or restrictive housing
unit where he remained until his June 2018 transfer to New Castle. Id. Upon
arriving at Wabash Valley, Mr. Marshall came to Mr. Long and said "that I should
debrief and give a statement involving trafficking" at Pendleton. Dkt. 73 at 3. Mr.

Long declined, and Mr. Marshall then said, "he would never recommend me to
be placed back into general population unless I played ball with their
investigation." Id. at 3.
Mr. Long started at Wabash Valley with a department-wide disciplinary
restrictive housing designation, but that designation was changed to
department-wide administrative restrictive housing in September 2016. Id. At
that time he entered the ACT program with the goal of transferring back to
general population.1 Id. But he was later approached by unidentified OII officers

and told he needed to cooperate with Mr. Peterson about the cellphone trafficking
investigation or he would be removed from the ACT program. Id. In November
2016, after Mr. Long said he would not cooperate, he was removed from the ACT
program and continued in segregation. Id. Mr. Long returned to the ACT program
in March 2017 but was again removed from it in August 2017. Id. at 4.
In his affidavit, Mr. Long states that he was not in DWRH-D at Wabash
Valley but instead was in DW-ARSH, at least from September 2016 onwards.
Dkt. 73 at 3.2 He has also designated emails between IDOC staff, including Mr.

1 "ACT" apparently refers to the IDOC's Actions, Consequences, and Treatment Program.
See Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2017).

2 According to Mr. Hendrix's affidavits, Mr. Long was in DWRH-D for the entirety of his
stay at Wabash Valley. Dkt. 63-1 at 3; dkt. 75-1 ("As a technical matter, Long may have
been classified as in administrative restrictive housing, but this was not the purpose for
his being in restrictive housing.").
Hendrix and Mr. Basinger and then-IDOC Commissioner and non-defendant
Robert Carter, about having "the RH (DS, AS, PC) time verified for the offenders
on the attached list [including Mr. Long]. I think there may be some

discrepancies." Dkt. 73-1, at 36. A response indicates that Mr. Long was "listed
as DS under RH Type and should be AS." Id. at 35.
On August 18, 2017, Commissioner Carter emailed Mr. Hendrix, stating
about Mr. Long that "16 months is quite awhile. I would consider giving him a
chance." Id. at 37. Mr. Hendrix responded, cc'ing Mr. Basinger, "Sure is. His
conduct has cleaned up quite a bit and if he has finished Phase 4 he should be
ready to return to their GP. I have call into the facility for their report and status
on where he is in the review process." Id. Mr. Basinger forwarded this email to

Janna Anderson, who is not a defendant and worked as administrative secretary
at Wabash Valley. Ms. Anderson responded, "Interesting. . . . I believe OII
believes him to be a security concern, however I'm sure Jack will find out for
sure." Id.
On August 21, 2017, Mr. Hendrix wrote Commissioner Carter, cc'ing Mr.
Basinger, "After checking further and discussing his status with Wabash staff,
he is not an AS offender, but rather is serving disciplinary segregation sanctions.
Although his conduct record has shown marked improvement, his current

disciplinary sanction release date is May 18, 2018 [] due to a lengthy period of
conduct issues involving cell phones and possession of controlled substances."
Id. at 38. The email also referred to an ongoing OII investigation into suspected
trafficking between Mr. Long and his non-incarcerated brother, noting that there
was insufficient evidence to file any charges related to those suspicions. Id.
The designated evidence contains documentation of periodic reviews for

potential removal from restrictive housing at Wabash Valley, but only beginning
in September 2016. From September 2016 through August 2017, the monthly
reviews were named "Department Administrative Restrictive Status Housing
Review." Dkt. 73-1 at 19-21, 25, 27-29, 31-33. Those reviews said, "Your status
has been reviewed and there are no changes recommended to the Executive
Director of Operations at this time. Your current Department Administrative
Restrictive Housing Status shall remain in effect unless otherwise rescinded by
the Executive Director of Operations." Id.

In September 2017, after Mr. Hendrix discussed Mr. Long's segregation
status with Wabash Valley staff, the monthly reviews were renamed,
"Department Disciplinary Restrictive Status Housing Review." Dkt. 75-2. Every
one of these reviews said, "Offender is appropriately placed at this time." Id.
Mr. Hendrix testified in an affidavit that Mr. Long "was found guilty of
several conduct violations and the Disciplinary Hearing Board sanctioned him
to serve time in disciplinary restrictive housing" for the following date ranges
while at Wabash Valley:

• November 2014 to May 2015 – 6 months
• May 2015 to November 2015 – 6 months
• November 2015 to February 2016 – 3 months
• February 2016 to August 2016 – 6 months
• August 2016 to November 2016 – 6 months
• November 2016 to February 2017 – 6 months
• February 2017 to August 2017 – 6 months

• August 2017 to February 2018 – 3 months
• February 2018 to May 2018 – 3 months
Dkt. 75-1 at 3.
Defendants have also submitted in support of summary judgment a record
of Mr. Long's conduct violations. Dkt. 63-4. The report lists several IDOC guilty
disciplinary findings from 2010 to 2014. Id. at 2-4. Then, there are three guilty
findings from early 2016—for unauthorized possession of property, disruptive

behavior, and abuse of mail/telephone/visits. Id. at 1. There are no more guilty
findings until May 2019. Id. This document also lists four occasions on which
Mr. Long was penalized with placement in disciplinary segregation for his
conduct violations, for 3 months each time, with the last being recorded in
January 2013. Id.
E. Mr. Long's Time at New Castle: June 2018 – December 2021
Mr. Long was transferred to New Castle in June 2018 and spent most of
the next two-and-a-half years in a "transition unit." Dkt. 73-1 at 15 (April 26,

2021 letter from French to IDOC central office). Although he had three brief stints
in facility-based administrative and disciplinary segregation, none was for longer
than two to three weeks. Dkt. 63-1 at 3. Mr. Long's time in the "transition unit"
is not recorded as time in segregation by either the IDOC or New Castle.3
Mr. Long graduated from the ACT program in December 2018 and the

STAND program (another general population reintegration program offered at
New Castle) in December 2020. Dkt. 73 at 4. Mr. Long expected to be transferred
to general population after completing these programs, but he was not. Id. Mr.
Long learned in February 2021 from a New Castle caseworker that his
completion of these programs was not reflected in the prison's computer system.
Id. at 5-6. The caseworker said it was "odd" that the completions did not show
up in the computer system and that the "administration had something against
[him]." Id.; see also dkt. 73-1 at 12 (copy of STAND review document dated

December 17, 2020, stating Mr. Long had successfully completed the program).
In November 2020, Defendants Sanford and Joseph approached Mr. Long
about cooperating in the Pendleton trafficking investigation. Dkt. 73 at 4. After
Mr. Long again refused to cooperate, Defendants Sanford and Joseph told him
he "would never get out of lockup if [he] didn't cooperate." Id.
On December 20, 2020, three days after Mr. Long graduated from the
STAND program, Mr. Sanford filed a conduct report against him for attempted
trafficking of a controlled substance. Id. at 4-5. Mr. Long denied the accusations.

Before the disciplinary hearing held on February 3, 2021, Defendants Sanford

3 The New Castle "transition unit" has been described as "a step-down program for
offenders who have been in restrictive-status housing for several years or longer" but
with additional programming available for general population reintegration. Isby, 856
F.3d at 516-17.
and Joseph confronted Mr. Long with a camera and said, "if I just debrief this
could all go away." Id. at 5. Mr. Long refused, id., and he was found guilty after
the disciplinary hearing. See Long v. Warden, 1:21-cv-01806-TAB-SEB (S.D.

Ind.), dkt. 9-9. Mr. Long was sanctioned with 45 days commissary suspension,
90 days lost credit time, and a demotion in credit class, but he was not ordered
to be placed in disciplinary segregation. Id. Mr. Long pursued habeas corpus
relief, which this Court denied. Id. at dkt. 14.
Also in February 2021, Defendants Sanford and Joseph searched Mr.
Long's cell and found a controlled substance, which Mr. Long denies he
possessed. Dkt. 73 at 5.4 On February 13, 2021, Mr. Long was assigned to ARSH,
and he would remain in segregation for his remaining time at New Castle, until

December 30, 2021. Mr. Long also had disciplinary findings at New Castle in
May 2019 for disorderly conduct, in November 2019 (twice) for being in an
unauthorized area and having an intoxicating substance, in February 2020 for
being in an unauthorized area, in June 2020 for possession or use of a controlled
substance, in February 2021 for fighting, in March 2021 for having an
intoxicating substance, and in June 2021 for unauthorized possession of
property. Dkt. 63-4 at 1.
In March 2021, Mr. Long asked Ms. French when he could expect to be

moved back to general population. Defendant French responded, "you have to
help yourself Mr. Long, they're not going to release you back to population unless

4 It appears that Mr. Long sought habeas relief for this disciplinary finding, which this
Court denied. See Long v. Warden, No. 1:21-cv-02056-JRS-DML (S.D. Ind.), dkt. 14.
you sit down with them and tell them what you know." Id. at 6. Mr. Long again
refused to cooperate. Id.
In April 2021, Ms. French wrote a letter to IDOC central office requesting

permission for Mr. Long to participate in the STAND program. Dkt. 73-1 at 15.
The letter refers to a previous request by New Castle for Mr. Long to be
transferred to a different facility, which IDOC had denied.5 Id. The letter states
that Mr. Long had previously been unsuccessful in the STAND program. Id. It
also refers to Mr. Long having accumulated "five major conduct reports and three
minor conduct reports" since arriving at New Castle. Id. In September 2021,
Warden Sevier wrote a similarly-worded letter to IDOC central office, requesting
that Mr. Long be assigned to department-wide administrative restrictive housing

status. Id. at 17. At some point thereafter, Mr. Long was assigned DW-ARSH.6
After Mr. Long was transferred to ARSH at New Castle, he received weekly
status reviews, beginning February 24, 2021. See dkt. 67-2 at 7. Unlike the
reviews at Wabash Valley, these reviews are reflected on State Form 56670,
"Facility Restrictive Housing, Protective Custody, and Department Wide
Restrictive Housing (DWRH) Review." Id. The form includes multiple boxes to
check if an inmate is to be continued in segregation: "Threat to facility security";
"Escape risk"; "Additional observation needed"; "Overall negative adjustment";

5 No details or communications regarding that request are in the designated evidence.

6 Mr. Hendrix's affidavits in support of summary judgment state that Mr. Long was in
ARSH until he was transferred to Westville, when the designation was changed to DW-
ARSH. Dkts 63-1 at 3; 75-1 at 2.
"Recent negative adjustment"; "Protective custody (PC)/safekeeping"; "Failure to
adjust"; and "Other (Explain in comments)". Id.
On the vast majority of the reviews after February 24, 2021, only the boxes

"Additional observation needed" and "Other" are checked. Id. The "Comments"
section for checking the "Other" box contains minimal information, usually
"Admin Hold." Id. at 7, 10-16, 18, 20-27, 30-33, 35, 37-38, 41-44, 46-49. Some
of the reviews refer to awaiting directives "from Central Office," apparently
referring to a decision either to transfer Mr. Long to another facility or to be
placed in department-wide administrative segregation. See, e.g., id. at 37. On
May 5, 2021, the boxes "Overall negative adjustment" and "Failure to adjust"
also are checked. Id. at 20.

F. Mr. Long's Time at Westville: December 2021 – May 2022
At the end of December 2021, Mr. Long was transferred to Westville on
DW-ARSH status. Dkt. 63-1 at 3. On May 13, 2022, he was released from
segregation altogether and transferred to Indiana State Prison in general
population. Mr. Long's periodic reviews at Westville are similar to those he
received at New Castle while in ARSH—forms filled out by hand at first on a
weekly basis by a caseworker, then after February 2022 every thirty days. Dkt.
67-2 at 62-75.7

7 Mr. Long's complaint originally named, in addition to the current defendants, three
caseworkers at Westville: Thomas Krause, D. Malfese, and C. Carroll. Id. at 8. Mr. Long
later stipulated to a dismissal of these caseworkers as defendants in this action. Dkt.
44.
G. Conditions of Segregation
Mr. Long testified in his affidavit that there was little practical difference
between the conditions in long-term administrative segregation and those in

disciplinary segregation. He testifies that, unlike inmates in general population,
he was locked in his cell 23 hours a day, with one hour per day of solitary
recreation time. Dkt. 73 at 1-2. He was always shackled and cuffed when taken
out of his cell. Showers were limited to three times a week, and sometimes less.
Id. Sometimes the hot water turned was turned off in the showers to discourage
showering. Id. Mr. Long ate all his meals alone. Id. A security light was left on in
his cell 24 hours a day. Id. He had limited visitation, and no physical contact
allowed with any visitors. Id. He was routinely strip searched and frequently had

reading materials confiscated. Id. He was surrounded by screaming and/or
suicidal inmates. Id. Guards sometimes turned the air conditioning up in the
cells very high and then sealed the cells off to make it extremely cold in the cells.
Id.
Mr. Long also testified that his conditions of confinement were similar
during his time in the New Castle "transition unit." See id. at 1 (describing these
conditions as applying to all years while in segregation from 2011 to 2022); dkt.
72 at 3 (Long's brief in response to summary judgment alleging "over six years

in administrative segregation after serving at least five years on disciplinary
segregation"); dkt. 77 at 2-3 (Long's summary judgment sur-reply brief).
Defendants do not dispute Mr. Long's description of the conditions of
confinement in the "transition unit."
H. Procedural History
Mr. Long brought this case in August 2022, dkt. 1, and is proceeding on
claims that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights

and that they retaliated against him because of his refusal to cooperate in an
internal affairs investigation, dkt. 10 (screening order). He alleges that he was
designated to and remained in segregated housing because he would not
cooperate with IDOC officials' investigation of cell phone trafficking. He further
alleges that he was not given meaningful periodic reviews to determine whether
there were legitimate reasons to keep him in segregated housing.
Two groups of Defendants have separately moved for summary judgment.
Dkt. 62 (Defendants Hendrix, Basinger, Peterson, Marshall, Sanford, and

Dickerson ("Group 1 Defendants")); dkt. 65 (Defendants French, Joseph, Sevier,
and Fitch ("Group 2 Defendants")).
III.
Discussion

Before turning to the merits, the Court addresses Mr. Sanford's argument
that he was no longer a defendant in this action after the Court issued its
screening order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Dkt. 62 at ¶ 5. While the
screening order did not list Mr. Sanford as a defendant against whom the due
process and retaliation claims were proceeding, dkt. 10 at 3, that did not result
in Mr. Sanford's dismissal from this case. On the contrary, other aspects of the
screening order and Mr. Sanford's own actions made clear that he remained in
the case as a defendant. First, his name was not included on the list of
defendants whom the Court directed to be terminated from the docket. Id. at 5.
Second, Mr. Sanford was issued process along with the other defendants. Id. at
7. Third, Mr. Sanford waived service and answered the complaint on the merits,
dkts. 14 and 18. Fourth, he did not move to dismiss the complaint against him

(as expressly allowed by the screening order) based on lack of notice or for failure
to state a claim, or raise this issue prior to summary judgment. Finally, he does
not cite any authority for the proposition that the screening order's failure to
expressly include him as a defendant in the body of the order now precludes
further consideration of any claims against him. Instead, his brief addresses Mr.
Long's claims against him on the merits. The Court will do likewise.
A. Retaliation
Defendants Peterson, Marshall, Sanford, and Joseph argue they are

entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Long's retaliation claims because Mr. Long
has not shown a link between his exercise of the right not to incriminate himself
and a decision to place and keep him in segregated housing. Mr. Long responds
that there are disputed material issues of fact in that regard.
The Court's screening order did not specify whether Mr. Long's retaliation
claims would fall under the First or Fifth Amendments. See dkt. 10 at pp. 3, 5.
Regardless, all Defendants "acknowledge that Long 'engaged in protected activity
when he refused to provide information to [OII] . . . .'" Dkt. 64 at 11 (Group 1

Defendants' summary judgment brief) (quoting Vermillion v. Levenhagen, 2018
WL 2321112 (S.D. Ind. 2018)); see also dkt. 66 at 11 (agreeing "that refusal to
cooperate in an investigation is a Constitutionally protected activity.") (Group 2
Defendants' summary judgment brief). The Group 1 Defendants' brief, as well as
the Vermillion opinion it cites, refers to both the First and Fifth Amendments as
the source of the right not to cooperate in an internal prison investigation.
Mr. Long asserts that he repeatedly invoked his right not to answer

questions or cooperate at all. "Plaintiff disputes any and all allegations that he
was not retaliated against for asserting his right to remain silent in order to deter
him from asserting his right to remain silent in the future." Dkt. 71 ¶ 4. This
arguably implicates the Fifth, rather than the First Amendment, though the
issue is not firmly settled in the Seventh Circuit. See Thomas v. Gomez, 2024 WL
2248273 at n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2024). "The weight of authority suggests that an
inmate's refusal to cooperate with a prison investigation is not protected speech
unless the inmate invokes his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination."

Id. See also McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 731 F. App'x 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2018)
(holding inmate had First Amendment right to truthfully answer investigators'
questions by expressly denying knowledge of gang activity).
In Caffey v. Maue, 679 F. App'x 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2017), the Seventh
Circuit stated, "prisoners may be compelled to disclose information during
internal investigations provided they are not punished for refusing to make self-
incriminating statements," that is, by offering the prisoner immunity from
prosecution for answers he or she may give. (citing Riggins v. Walter, 279 F.3d

422, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)). Put another way, the Fifth Amendment gives a person
the right "not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding,
civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him
in future criminal proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). This
right applies in the prison disciplinary context, and prison officials may violate a
prisoner’s right against self-incrimination if a prisoner’s silence alone results in
punishment of the kind capable of compelling waiver of the right. See Minnesota

v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317
(1976); LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 1995).
In Caffey, the Court held that the prisoner had failed to state a Fifth
Amendment retaliation claim because he had not alleged that his statements to
investigators might incriminate him. Caffey, 679 F. App'x at 490. Here, by
contrast, a reasonable jury could infer from the context that by steadfastly
refusing to be interviewed, Mr. Long was invoking his right against self-
incrimination—he had previously been disciplined for his involvement with cell

phone trafficking and prison officials' statements show that they wanted to know
more about his involvement. Defendants therefore do not dispute that Mr. Long's
answers to investigators' questions about cellphone trafficking might have
incriminated him in a future criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 35-44.1-
3-5(b) (Level 5 felony trafficking with an inmate if the contraband is a cellphone);
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-8 (Class A misdemeanor possession of a cellphone while
incarcerated). And there is no designated evidence that Mr. Long was offered
immunity from criminal prosecution in exchange for cooperating with

investigators.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because
there is no evidence that Mr. Long's refusal to cooperate was a motivating factor
in his placement or retention in segregation. Defendants agree that the elements
of a Fifth Amendment retaliation claim are parallel to a First Amendment
retaliation claim. Such claims therefore require a plaintiff "to show that the
speech or activity was constitutionally protected, a deprivation occurred to deter

the protected speech or activity, and the speech or activity was at least a
motivating factor in the decision to take retaliatory action." Manuel v. Nalley, 966
F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020). "The motivating factor [element] amounts to a
causal link between the activity and the unlawful retaliation." Manuel, 966 F.3d
at 680. This element may be proven by circumstantial evidence, which may
include suspicious timing; ambiguous statements, behavior, or comments
directed at others in the protected group; evidence that similarly situated people
were treated differently; and evidence that the decisionmaker offered a pretextual

reason for an allegedly retaliatory action. Id.; Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731
F.3d 635, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2013). "Suspicious timing alone will rarely be
sufficient to create a triable issue because suspicious timing may be just that—
suspicious—and a suspicion is not enough to get past a motion for summary
judgment." Manuel, 966 F.3d at 680 (cleaned up) (standing alone, fact that
inmate's cell was shaken down nine minutes after he engaged in First
Amendment protected activity could not create triable issue of fact as to
retaliation claim because another, non-retaliatory motive existed).

In McKinley, an inmate asserted that prison investigators retaliated
against him for denying any knowledge regarding gang activity, which was
characterized as a First Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of several of the prison
officials. First, it held that the inmate's placement in segregation for three years
was adequate evidence of "adverse action likely to deter future First Amendment
activity." McKinley, 731 F. App'x at 514. Second, the inmate provided evidence

that several prison officials made comments such as that they could be the
inmate's "'best friend or wors[t] nightmare' and that he 'better give them
something to go off of.' The timing of McKinley's placement in segregation
coupled with these comments could allow a reasonable jury to infer that
McKinley's protected speech was a motivating factor for his placement in
segregation." Id. Additionally, while defendants there designated evidence that
the inmate was placed in segregation for "safety and security" reasons, there was
also contrary evidence, "tending to show that the defendants’ rationale was a

pretext and that the real reason he was placed in segregation was retaliatory
animus." Id. at 515. The Court pointed to evidence showing a 4-year gap between
the inmate's last disciplinary guilty finding and his initial placement in
segregation, the lack of evidence that the inmate actually was a security threat,
the length of time the inmate was held in segregation, "and the number of times
officers interviewed him, as though they expected his answers to the same
questions to change to ones they liked." Id.
Accepting the veracity of Mr. Long's affidavit for summary judgment, his

retaliation claims are based on the following:
• At Pendleton, Mr. Peterson told Mr. Long, after he was disciplined for
cellphone trafficking, that Mr. Long's "situation [could] go away" if he
cooperated with further investigation into cellphone trafficking. Dkt. 73 at
2-3. After Mr. Long refused to cooperate, Mr. Peterson said "he would have
me moved further away from my family to the SHU at Wabash for a couple
of years, 'to see if you change your mind' . . . ." Id. at 3. Mr. Long refused

to cooperate with Mr. Peterson and was transferred to Wabash Valley a
short time thereafter for reasons that are not clear in the record.
• At Wabash Valley, Mr. Marshall told Mr. Long that he would never
recommend his return to general population unless he "played ball with
their investigation." Id. Mr. Long refused to cooperate, and he never was
returned to general population during the three-and-a-half years he was
at Wabash Valley, despite not incurring any new disciplinary charges
during that time. (As noted, Mr. Marshall left his employment at Wabash

Valley in October 2016).
• At New Castle, Defendants Sanford and Joseph told Mr. Long in November
2020 that he "would never get out of lockup if [he] didn't cooperate" with
the Pendleton trafficking investigation. Id. at 4. By that time, Mr. Long had
graduated from the ACT program and was about to graduate from the
STAND program, expecting to be reintegrated into the general population.
However, these graduations were not recorded in New Castle's computer
system. Mr. Long learned in February 2021 from a New Castle caseworker

that these completions for some unknown reason were not reflected in the
prison's computer system. Id. at 5-6. Also, shortly after Mr. Long's
December 2020 STAND graduation, Defendants Sanford and Joseph
initiated disciplinary proceedings against him. Shortly before the
disciplinary hearing on this matter, Defendants Sanford and Joseph
confronted Mr. Long and said, "if I just debrief this could all go away." Id.
at 5. Mr. Long refused, id., and he was found guilty after the disciplinary

hearing. Also in February 2021, Defendants Sanford and Joseph searched
Mr. Long's cell and found a controlled substance, which Mr. Long denies
he possessed.
Construing the above evidence in a light most favorable to Mr. Long, there
are material questions of fact as to whether Defendants Peterson, Marshall,
Sanford, and Joseph retaliated against him because of his refusal to cooperate
into ongoing investigations of cellphone trafficking. Mr. Long's sworn statements
support an inference that Mr. Peterson had a say in Mr. Long's transfer from

Pendleton to Wabash Valley and his remaining in segregation at that time, and
that Mr. Peterson was motivated to do so at least in part because of Mr. Long's
refusal to cooperate. Mr. Long's sworn statements also support an inference that
Mr. Marshall had a say in Mr. Long's remaining in segregation at Wabash Valley,
at least through October 2016, and Mr. Marshall was motivated to do so at least
in part because of Mr. Long's refusal to cooperate.
Finally, Mr. Long's sworn statements support an inference that
Defendants Sanford and Joseph would not have pursued disciplinary action

against him, but for his invoking his right not to cooperate in a prison
investigation. There is more than just "suspicious timing" here—there is the
timing of Mr. Long's refusal to cooperate plus evidence of statements by Sanford
and Joseph to Mr. Long, as well as the "misplacing" of his ACT and STAND
graduations while at New Castle. Just as in McKinley, there is sufficient evidence
to survive summary judgment on Mr. Long's claims that Defendants Peterson,
Marshall, Sanford, and Joseph retaliated against him. Even assuming that there

were other factors for Mr. Long's placement and retention in segregation and for
his disciplinary findings at New Castle, there still is evidence in the record from
which a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Long's refusal to cooperate "was at
least a motivating factor" in those actions. See Manuel, 966 F.3d at 681. These
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are therefore denied with respect to
these claims.
Mr. Long has not designated evidence that any of the remaining
Defendants were personally involved in any alleged retaliation. "'To recover

damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was
personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.'" Whitfield v.
Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d
555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)). For this purpose, each defendant is considered
independently. Id.
Ms. French is alleged to have told Mr. Long in March 2021 that "they're
not going to release you back to population unless you sit down with them and
tell them what you know." Dkt. 73 at 6. While this statement may reflect that

Ms. French knew that others were retaliating against Mr. Long, it does not show
that she had any role or participated.8 And there is no evidence of any kind that

8 Such evidence, however, could be relevant to alleged retaliation by Defendants Joseph
and Sanford.
any other defendant did so. So, the remaining Defendants—French, Sevier,
Hendrix, Basinger, Dickerson, and Fitch—are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on Mr. Long's retaliation claims against them. See McKinley, 731 F. App'x

at 514-15 (affirming summary judgment on retaliation claim as to defendant
against whom there was no evidence of retaliatory motive in placing inmate in
segregation).
C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
1. Due Process Standard
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution does not create a due
process liberty interest in avoiding transfer within a correctional facility or
remaining in the general prison population. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.

209, 222 (2005); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Instead, an inmate
will be entitled to due process protections only when the more restrictive
conditions pose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Inmates
therefore have no liberty interest in avoiding short-term transfer to segregation
for administrative, protective, or investigative purposes, even when they are
subjected to harsher conditions as a result. See, e.g., Townsend v. Fuchs, 522
F.3d 765, 766 (7th Cir. 2008); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608-09 (7th Cir.

2005). However, placement in long-term segregation approaching a year or more
can implicate a liberty interest, requiring further inquiry into whether the
conditions of confinement impose an atypical, significant hardship. See Marion
v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698-99 (7th Cir. 2009) (determination of
whether 240 days in segregation imposed an atypical, significant hardship could
not be made at the pleading stage).
If placement in "administrative" segregation meets the "atypical and

significant hardship" standard, "the Due Process Clause mandates that prison
officials periodically review whether an inmate placed in administrative
segregation continues to pose a threat." Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th
Cir. 2017) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983)). Although such
periodic reviews need not be formal and adversarial, they must be sufficient to
ensure that administrative segregation does not become a pretext for indefinite
confinement. Id. The sufficiency of periodic reviews are evaluated by considering
"(1) the private interest (that is, [the inmate's] interest) affected by a governmental

decision, (2) the governmental interests at stake, and (3) 'the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of [the private] interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.'" Id.
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
If an inmate is subjected to discipline that results in a lengthening of state
custody, the inmate must challenge the discipline in a habeas corpus proceeding
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 before resorting to a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2001). If such

discipline is not successfully challenged, any civil lawsuit based upon it is barred
by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Morgan v. Schott, 914 F.3d 1115,
1120 (7th Cir. 2019). And, if an inmate receives a mixed disciplinary sanction of
placement in segregation and deprivation of credit time or other sanction
resulting in a lengthening of custody, he or she cannot avoid the Heck bar by
purporting to waive any challenge to the length of custody sanction. Id. On the
other hand, if an inmate's discipline results only in changes in the conditions of

confinement and does not affect the length of custody, the Heck bar does not
apply to a § 1983 action challenging a placement in segregation. "Heck . . . limit[s]
only challenges to the fact or duration of a prisoner's sentence, not the conditions
of his confinement." Hall-Bey v. Hanks, 93 F. App'x 977, 980 (7th Cir. 2004).
2. Mr. Long's Time at Wabash Valley: January 2015 – June 2018
In their opening summary judgment brief, the Group 1 Defendants'
primary argument regarding Mr. Long's due process claim about his time in
segregation in Wabash Valley is that he was in "disciplinary" segregation, and

therefore his § 1983 claims are barred by Heck unless he first obtains reversal
of his disciplinary sanctions. The Group 1 Defendants cite no authority for this
proposition and, as discussed above, Heck bars a due process claim only when
disciplinary sanctions included loss of credit time or other lengthening of a
prisoner's sentence. See Hall-Bey, 93 F. App'x at 980; Fleming, 2021 WL
5919712 at *2. Here, Defendants have not designated evidence, such as unit
logbooks, State Forms 39588, or orders from the Disciplinary Hearing Board,
showing that Mr. Long was so disciplined in connection with his time in

segregation at Wabash Valley.
Moreover, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to which type of
segregation Mr. Long was in—disciplinary or administrative—during that time.
The IDOC's designated records appear to indicate that Mr. Long was at first
classified as being in disciplinary segregation, then it was noted that he should
be in administrative segregation, then that determination was reversed after Mr.
Hendrix spoke with Wabash Valley staff. Mr. Long's periodic reviews were

conducted as department-wide administrative segregation reviews from
September 2016 to September 2017, when they were switched to department-
wide disciplinary segregation periodic reviews. And before September 2016, there
is no designated evidence of what kind of periodic reviews Mr. Long had, if any.
From there, the Group 1 Defendants did not argue in their opening brief
that the periodic reviews Mr. Long received at Wabash Valley were
constitutionally adequate. They did briefly attempt to do so in their reply brief,
but without citation to any authority. Even if the Court were to overlook the

Defendants' failure to raise the issue initially and later failure to develop the
argument, it is difficult to distinguish this case from Isby with respect to the
"boilerplate" language and cursory nature of the reviews. See Isby, 856 F.3d at
515, 526-29. The Court further is troubled by the shifting and often
unsupported explanations, both contemporaneous and in litigation, of whether
and when Mr. Long was in "administrative" versus "disciplinary" segregation,
from which a jury could infer pretext.
It is undisputed that Mr. Long spent sufficient time in segregated housing

to qualify as an "atypical and significant" hardship for due process purposes.
Mr. Long had a long stretch of time while in segregation where he was not found
guilty of any conduct violations and received the same "boilerplate" reviews of
his status. Also, Mr. Long did not receive clear written communication of what
he might do differently to change his status. There also is evidence that Mr. Long
tried to avail himself of the ACT Program while at Wabash Valley to try to move
out of segregation, but was unable to do so for reasons that are unclear. There

is evidence from which a jury could infer that the real reason Mr. Long was kept
in segregation was because of suspicions he was engaged in ongoing trafficking,
but that explanation does not appear in the periodic reviews. Therefore, there is
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Long's periodic reviews at
Wabash Valley were sufficient to meet due process requirements.
Finally, the Group 1 Defendants argue there is no designated evidence
from which a jury could find that any of them were personally involved with a
deprivation of Mr. Long's due process rights while at Wabash Valley. See

Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 706. They suggest that because they were not the "final
decisionmaker" with respect to Mr. Long's segregation status, they cannot be
held liable for due process violations associated with it. But they cite no
authority that only a "final decisionmaker" can be held responsible for such
violations, likely because that's not the law. To the contrary,
Any official who 'causes' a citizen to be deprived of [his]
constitutional rights can also be held liable [under §
1983]. The requisite causal connection is satisfied if the
defendant set in motion a series of events that the
defendant knew or should reasonably have known
would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of [his]
constitutional rights.

Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396–97 (7th Cir. 1988).
The designated evidence allows a reasonable jury to find direct and
personal involvement by Mr. Hendrix in Mr. Long's segregation status at Wabash
Valley and the nature of his periodic reviews there. First, his position at IDOC
central office gave him overall administrative oversight over classification and
restrictive housing issues at all IDOC facilities. Dkt. 63-1 at 1. Second, there is

evidence that Mr. Hendrix was directly involved with Mr. Long's classification
status at Wabash Valley. He made sure that Mr. Long should be deemed to be
on DWRH-D instead of DW-ARSH. Dkt. 73-1 at 38.
There is also designated evidence that Mr. Marshall was involved in
periodic reviews of Mr. Long's segregation status, at least to the extent of making
recommendations about inmates' restrictive housing status, up through October
2016, when he left Wabash Valley. Dkt. 63-5. At least for the time frame from
January 2015 to October 2016, there is sufficient designated evidence of Mr.

Marshall's involvement in a deprivation of Mr. Long's due process rights.
As to Mr. Basinger, he was in a supervisory role at IDOC central office with
the classification division being one of his responsibilities. Dkt. 63-5. He also
had some personal involvement regarding Mr. Long's restrictive housing status
at Wabash Valley. See dkt. 73-1 at 36-38. "Liability under § 1983 is direct rather
than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those
of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks
correctly." Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018). Something

more than generalized knowledge and inaction is required for personal
responsibility. Although what additional allegations are required are case-
specific, two scenarios are illustrative. First, a supervisor could be actually
engaged with the underlying issue such that personal responsibility is present.
See, e.g., Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the Warden could be held personally responsible for the harm
caused by cold prison conditions because the evidence showed he "had actual

knowledge of the unusually harsh weather conditions, that he had been apprised
of the specific problem with the physical condition of [the plaintiff's] cell (i.e., the
windows would not shut), and that, during the time period of [the plaintiff's]
complaint, the warden toured the segregation unit himself"). Or second, personal
responsibility can be present when the underlying issue is the direct
responsibility of the individual in question, rather than one for his or her
subordinates. See Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding
that the Warden was personally responsible for the alleged cell conditions, and

distinguishing Vance, because the Warden "not only knew about the problems
but was personally responsible for changing prison policies so that they would
be addressed").
Here, there is a question of fact regarding Mr. Basinger's level of personal
responsibility and involvement for generally ensuring that classification
decisions and restrictive housing statuses and reviews were conducted as
required by due process, and that Mr. Long specifically was being afforded due
process. Mr. Basinger therefore is not entitled to summary judgment.

There is no evidence of any other named defendant having been personally
involved in a potential deprivation of Mr. Long's due process rights at Wabash
Valley. Group 1 Defendants Dickerson, Peterson, and Sanford are therefore
entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Mr. Long does not argue that any
of the Group 2 Defendants are responsible for deprivation of his due process
rights during his time at Wabash Valley, and they likewise are entitled to
summary judgment on this claim.

3. Mr. Long's Time at New Castle: June 2018 – December 2021
a. "Transition Unit"
When Mr. Long first arrived at New Castle in June 2018, he was placed in
a "transition unit," where he remained until February 2021. He has consistently
alleged that regardless of what it was called, it functionally was placement in
segregation because the conditions he experienced were similar to those in
administrative or disciplinary segregation. None of the defendants have
responded to this assertion, except to suggest Mr. Long technically was in neither

administrative nor disciplinary segregation during this time.
Moreover, Mr. Long has testified that during that time he was "housed in
some form of segregation" the conditions of confinement that he experienced
were the same as the other times in segregation. Dkt. 73 at 1–2. And the
defendants have not designated evidence that Mr. Long received any kind of
meaningful periodic review during this 2.5-year time frame, except for those
times when he was briefly and "officially" placed in segregation. There is therefore
a material question of fact as to whether Mr. Long's due process rights were

violated during his time in the transition unit.
The record also reflects that Warden Sevier and Ms. French were
personally and directly involved with Mr. Long's housing placements within New
Castle. See dkt. 67-5 at 2 (Joseph affidavit) (noting that IDOC classification
system applies to New Castle). So, Defendants Sevier and French are not entitled
to summary judgment. There is no designated evidence, however, that Mr.
Hendrix and Mr. Basinger personally made specific classification decisions for

Mr. Long at New Castle. While they oversaw IDOC classification decisions
broadly, see dkt. 63-1 at 1; dkt. 63-5 at 1, under § 1983 "supervisors are
responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to
ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly." Horshaw, 910 F.3d at
1029. Mr. Hendrix and Mr. Basinger are therefore granted summary judgment
regarding Mr. Long's time at New Castle.
The other remaining defendants from New Castle are also entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, because there is no designated evidence that they

were personally involved in the decision or implementation of a policy and
procedure at New Castle that provided for no periodic reviews at all for inmates
placed in the New Castle "transition unit."9
b. ARSH
Mr. Long was transferred to ARSH at New Castle in February 2021.
Thereafter, he received weekly periodic reviews, in which a caseworker would
make handwritten notations and comments on a form regarding the reasons for
Mr. Long remaining in ARSH. See generally dkt. 62-7. These reviews were

adequate for due process purposes under the circumstances. First, Mr. Long was
only in ARSH at New Castle for approximately 10 months. This length of time

9 The Court notes that Mr. Long misidentifies Mr. Fitch as former Wabash Valley warden,
whereas he clearly states in his affidavit that he has been New Castle assistant warden
since 2006. Dkt. 67-6. There is no reason to doubt this assertion.
could be long enough to trigger the requirement of periodic reviews of the
placement, but it's at the low end of the continuum. Second, although Mr. Long
went for long stretches of time at Wabash Valley and during the first part of his

time in the "transition unit" without any misconduct findings, that had changed
by February 2021, by which time he had accrued several new misconduct
findings and would accrue two more after his placement in ARSH. Dkt. 63-4 at
1. Third, although the weekly periodic review forms often do not contain detailed
information, they reflect that a caseworker filled them out manually rather than
merely printing out repeated "boilerplate" form notices like those Mr. Long
received at Wabash Valley. Under Isby, lack of detailed explanation in
segregation periodic reviews alone does not amount to a violation of due process.

Instead, the Court must consider and balance the Mathews v. Eldridge factors
as applied to a particular situation and inmate. After doing so here with respect
to Mr. Long's ARSH placement at New Castle, the Court concludes no reasonable
jury could find that his due process rights were violated by any defendant.10
4. Mr. Long's Time at Westville: December 2021 – May 2022
With his dismissal of the Westville caseworkers earlier in the litigation, Mr.
Long has not now named any defendants who allegedly improperly denied him
due process or retaliated against him with respect to his placement in DW-ARSH

10 The Court notes that whether Defendants Joseph and Sanford retaliated against Mr.
Long, which led to his placement in ARSH at New Castle, is a separate and distinct
question from whether Mr. Long's due process rights were violated with respect to his
continued placement in ARSH. See Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005)
("due process and retaliation claims are analyzed differently. Conduct that does not
independently violate the Constitution can form the basis for a retaliation claim, if that
conduct is done with an improper, retaliatory motive.").
while at Westville for six months. This also was a relatively brief continuation of
his segregation placement that had begun at New Castle after Mr. Long had
accrued numerous conduct violations there. Mr. Long received seven-day

periodic reviews. They were admittedly perfunctory, even more so than what he
received at New Castle, and they sometimes refer to Mr. Hendrix by name, i.e.
that Mr. Long was to remain in DW-ARSH "until further notice per Mr. Hendrix."
Dkt. 67-2 at 69. But again, these reviews are tied to a placement in segregation
following repeated misconduct at New Castle. Additionally, Mr. Long has not
provided any testimony or evidence regarding the conditions of confinement at
Westville in particular. The Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find
a violation of Mr. Long's due process rights by any defendant during this time

frame.
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants French, Sevier, Hendrix, Basinger, Dickerson, and Fitch are
entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Long's retaliation claims, so their
summary judgment motions on those claims are granted. As to Defendants
Peterson, Marshall, Sanford, and Joseph, there are triable issues of fact
regarding whether they retaliated against Mr. Long, and their summary
judgment motions on those claims are denied.
For Mr. Long's due process claims, there are triable issues of fact on those
claims against Defendants Basinger, Hendrix, and Marshall related to his time
in segregation at Wabash Valley, and against Defendants Sevier and French
related to his time in the "transition unit" at New Castle. Defendants are
otherwise entitled to summary judgment on the due process claims—that is,
related to Mr. Long's time in ARSH at New Castle and his time at Westville. Dkts.
[62] and [65] are granted in part and denied in part in accordance with this
order.
The clerk is directed to terminate defendants Dickerson and Fitch as
defendants on the docket as they are entitled to summary judgment on all claims
against them. No final judgment will issue at this time.
The Court prefers that Mr. Long be represented by counsel for the
remainder of this action. The clerk is directed to send Mr. Long a motion for
assistance recruiting counsel with his copy of this Order. Mr. Long has thirty
days from the date of this Order to file a motion for counsel using this form
motion or to inform the Court that he wishes to proceed pro se. Once the motion
has been ruled on and counsel has been recruited, the magistrate judge is asked
to schedule a telephonic status conference to discuss further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 1/21/2025 omnis tanbove
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
COURTNEY LONG
108201
INDIANA STATE PRISON
INDIANA STATE PRISON
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36

Magistrate Judge Baker's Chambers

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10785653. Public record. Not legal advice.