# Sattley v. The City of Beverly Hills CA2/2

> California Court of Appeal · January 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10785110

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** January 22, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 1/22/25 Sattley v. The City of Beverly Hills CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JOSH SATTLEY, B334048

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV45066)
v.

THE CITY OF BEVERLY
HILLS,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Barbara M. Scheper, Judge. Affirmed.

JW Howard/Attorneys, John W. Howard and Scott J. Street
for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Richards, Watson & Gershon, Rebecca T. Green, Jennifer
Petrusis and Garen N. Bostanian for Defendant and Respondent.
Appellant Josh Sattley, formerly employed as a firefighter
for respondent City of Beverly Hills (city), appeals from a final
judgment entered in favor of the city. Sattley sued the city after
he was terminated from employment, asserting causes of action
for violations of his civil rights and violations of the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, §§ 12900
et seq.). In this appeal, he challenges two trial court orders: the
order sustaining the city’s demurrer to his cause of action for
failure to accommodate religious beliefs and the order granting
summary judgment on his FEHA retaliation claim. We find no
error and affirm the judgment in full.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Sattley worked for the Beverly Hills Fire Department for
11 years. During that time, he received excellent performance
reviews.
On August 12, 2021, the Health Officer of the County of Los
Angeles issued the Health Care Worker Vaccination Requirement
(health order). The health order required certain healthcare
workers, including emergency medical technicians (EMT’s) and
EMT-paramedics, to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by
September 30, 2021. City firefighters, as certified EMT’s or
EMT-paramedics, were required to comply with the health order
and get vaccinated. The city’s fire chief, Gregory Barton, notified
all city firefighters they had to comply with the health order by
September 30, 2021.
The health order allowed an individual to “be exempt from
the vaccination requirements . . . only upon providing . . . a
declination form, signed by the individual stating either of the
following: (1) the worker is declining vaccination based on

2
Religious Beliefs, or (2) the worker is excused from receiving any
COVID-19 vaccine due to Qualifying Medical Reasons.” An
organization or agency subject to the order could permit an
unvaccinated employee to work under certain conditions,
provided the agency “deem[ed] [the] worker to have met the
requirements of an exemption.”1
Many firefighters, including Sattley, submitted signed
forms declining to get the COVID-19 vaccine for religious
reasons. On September 28, 29, and 30, 2021, the city’s human
resources director, Shelley Ovrom, met individually with each of
the firefighters, including appellant, to determine which of the
firefighters were eligible for a religious accommodation.
Fourteen firefighters were granted an accommodation, four
withdrew their requests, and six firefighters’ requests were
denied. Of the six firefighters whose requests were denied, all
except Sattley later submitted proof of vaccination. Because
Sattley did not have an approved accommodation or exemption,
he was placed on administrative leave on October 1, 2021.
Ovrom and Chief Barton decided to place Sattley on leave
because he was no longer qualified to perform his job under the
health order.

1 The form does not require an employer to grant an
exemption upon the filing of the declination form. The
permissive language of this section of the health order, stating a
worker “may” be exempt upon providing the required form, along
with the language permitting the employer to “deem[] [the]
worker to have met the requirements of an exemption,” allow
some discretion on the part of the employer to review and
approve each individual request for exemption.

3
By e-mail on October 8, 2021, Ovrom inquired whether
appellant intended to get vaccinated so he could return to duty.
She stated, “It is the City’s hope that you will decide to get the
vaccine so you can continue to serve the community as a
firefighter under the County Order.” Ovrom offered to have
another meeting if Sattley needed any further information or
wanted to discuss the city’s decision. Sattley did not respond.
Ovrom and Chief Barton spoke regularly about Sattley’s
employment status between October 1, 2021, and December 14,
2021. They ultimately concluded Sattley could not remain an
employee of the city when the city could not allow him to perform
his job under the health order.
After being placed on administrative leave, Sattley
criticized the city’s COVID policies and its refusal to grant him
an accommodation. Part of this criticism involved Beverly Hills
City Councilmember John Mirisch, who spoke out against any
firefighters disingenuously seeking religious exemptions. Sattley
criticized Mirisch and the city on Instagram.
On December 14, 2021, Chief Barton issued a notice of
intent to discipline, informing appellant that without a COVID-
19 vaccine or exemption, appellant could not serve as an EMT or
EMT-paramedic under the health order, and therefore did not
meet the minimum qualifications for his position.
Sattley received a due process (Skelly) hearing, and the
hearing officer recommended Chief Barton proceed with
termination of Sattley’s employment. On March 9, 2022, Chief
Barton terminated Sattley, effective March 11, 2022. The
termination notice informed appellant: “[b]y failing to comply
with the County’s Order, you are no longer qualified to work as a
Firefighter within L.A. County.” (Underscoring omitted.) Sattley

4
was given his back pay for the time period he was on unpaid
leave.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sattley and another firefighter filed a lawsuit against the
city, Councilmember Mirisch, the County of Los Angeles, and
County Health Officer Muntu Davis on December 10, 2021.
Sattley was on unpaid leave at the time and had obtained right-
to-sue letters from the California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing (DFEH) and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in response to his
discrimination charge.2 The second amended complaint (SAC),
filed August 9, 2022, is the operative complaint. It contained 11
causes of action. In December 2022, the trial court sustained the
city’s demurrer to all causes of action except the 11th cause of
action for retaliation in violation of FEHA.
As to Sattley’s cause of action for failure to accommodate
religious beliefs, the trial court wrote Sattley “failed to allege
requisite facts regarding the belief held by Sattley that conflicted
with the mandatory COVID vaccination.” The court found
Sattley’s allegation he “had a sincerely held religious belief or
practices that conflicted with a stated job requirement” to be
“wholly conclusory.”
The city filed a motion for summary judgment on the
retaliation cause of action on July 6, 2023. The city argued
Sattley’s retaliation claim should be summarily disposed of for

2 In his DFEH charge filed in November 2021, Sattley
asserted: “I believe I was discriminated against due [sic] my
religion (Mormon/Christian), in violation of Title VII Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended.”

5
three reasons: first, Sattley did not exhaust his administrative
remedies with the California Department of Civil Rights (CRD).3
Second, Sattley could not identify any specific protected activity
in which he had engaged, and had no evidence of a causal
relationship between any protected activity and his termination.
Finally, the city argued it had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason
for firing Sattley—he was not in compliance with the health order
and thus did not meet the minimum requirements of his job.
The trial court granted the city’s motion. The court
reasoned, “Given [Sattley’s] undisputed failure to obtain a right-
to-sue letter for his retaliation claim, the claim fails as a matter
of law.” The court further noted, “Even if [Sattley] had exhausted
his administrative remedy, the Court would still grant the
motion.” The court explained Sattley “presented no evidence of
any specific social media post he made, nor of any statement he
made in those posts.” Because he had not identified any specific
posts he made, he “failed to show that any post was sufficiently
close in time to his termination to support a prima facie showing
of causation.” Sattley also offered “no evidence that Chief
Barton, who made the decision to terminate [Sattley], even saw
any particular social media post or considered it in making his
decision.” Finally, Sattley “presented no evidence [the city’s]
purported legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating
[Sattley] was pretextual.”
Prior to filing the motion for summary judgment, the city
filed an application for an order continuing trial due to the
necessity of obtaining additional discovery. Sattley’s attorneys

3 The CRD was known as the DFEH until July 2022. It is
referred to as the DFEH in most current case law.

6
initially opposed the request, but later changed their position,
indicating the case was still in the early stages of discovery and
critical evidence was needed. The motion for summary judgment
proceeded as scheduled. Sattley argued the motion should be
denied pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (h) (section 437c(h)), which permits denial of a
summary judgment motion if it appears “facts essential to justify
opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be
presented.” The court found Sattley failed to meet the
requirements of section 437c(h) to obtain a continuance.
Final judgment in favor of the city was entered on
October 12, 2023. Sattley filed his notice of appeal on October 19,
2023.

DISCUSSION
I. Demurrer to failure to accommodate cause of action
Sattley first challenges the trial court’s decision sustaining
the city’s demurrer as to his seventh cause of action for failure to
accommodate his religious beliefs.
A. Demurrer standard of review
The order sustaining the city’s demurrer is reviewed de
novo. (SI 59 LLC v. Variel Warner Ventures, LLC (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 146, 152.) We must exercise our independent
judgment as to whether, as a matter of law, the complaint states
a cause of action under any legal theory. (Ortega v. Contra Costa
Community College Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1080.)
When evaluating the complaint, we construe it liberally and take
all properly pleaded facts as true. (Bank of New York Mellon v.
Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 943.) “[A]ll material
facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable

7
implication, but not conclusions of fact or law, are deemed
admitted by the demurring party.” (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) We do not consider “opinions, speculation
or allegations which are contrary either to law or to judicially
noticed facts.” (Long Beach Equities, Inc. v. County of Ventura
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1024–1025.)
An order denying a request for leave to amend is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. (Jo Redland Trust, U.A.D. 4-6-05 v. CIT
Bank, N.A. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 142, 161.) “To show an abuse
of discretion, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that
‘there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect
with an amendment.’” (Id. at p. 162.)
B. Applicable law
Government Code section 12940, subdivision (l) establishes
that it is unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . to discharge a person
from employment . . . or to discriminate against a person . . .
because of a conflict between the person’s religious belief or
observance and any employment requirement, unless the
employer . . . demonstrates that it has explored any available
reasonable alternative means of accommodating the religious
belief or observance . . . .”
In establishing a claim for failure to accommodate religious
beliefs, “the employee must establish a prima facie case that he
or she had a bona fide religious belief, of which the employer was
aware, that conflicts with an employment requirement.”
(Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 345,
370.) If the employee establishes the existence of such a bona
fide religious belief, “the employer must establish it initiated
good faith efforts to accommodate or no accommodation was
possible without producing undue hardship.” (Ibid.)

8
C. Sattley’s allegations of bona fide religious belief
Sattley’s allegations of his alleged bona fide religious belief
consisted of one sentence: “He had a sincerely held religious belief
or practices that conflicted with a stated job requirement
(mandatory Covid vaccination).”
The city argued on demurrer these allegations were
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of failure to
accommodate, taking the position Sattley could not “plead
entitlement to an accommodation process without pleading facts
about his religious beliefs.” In short, Sattley’s “conclusory
allegation that he had a ‘sincerely held religious belief’” was a
conclusion of law. The trial court agreed.
D. Analysis
The California Supreme Court has held a religious belief
must be more than “a philosophy or a way of life.” (Smith v. Fair
Employment & Housing Comm. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1166.)
Employers are not required to “‘accommodate what amounts to a
“purely personal preference.”’” (Friedman v. Southern Cal.
Permanente Medical Group (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 39, 57
(Friedman).) In order to satisfy this element of his claim, Sattley
was required to make a prima facie showing “both that the belief
or practice is religious and that it is sincerely held.” (Ibid.) Thus,
Sattley was required to allege facts allowing the court to
determine “‘whether [his] particular belief-system should be
considered a religion’” (id. at pp. 59–60) and whether “the ‘belief’
for which protection is sought . . . is . . . ‘sincerely held’”
(Redmond v. GAF Corp. (7th Cir. 1978) 574 F.2d 897, 901,

9
fn. 12).4 We do not assume the truth of Sattley’s conclusory
allegation. (Rodas v. Spiegel, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 517.)
Sattley cites several cases in support of his argument he
sufficiently alleged a sincerely held religious belief. Ludgate Ins.
Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592 involved
a motion for judgment on the pleadings on a claim for declaratory
relief on an insurance policy. The complainant sought a judicial
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with
respect to defense and indemnity. (Id. at p. 604.) The insurance
company argued Lockheed was required to plead facts
establishing exhaustion of primary policies before any conflict
arose between the parties. (Id. at p. 608.) Under those
circumstances, the Ludgate court noted “‘a plaintiff is required
only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable
precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a
defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of
action.’” (Ibid.) Sattley has not done so here. He has failed to set
forth the essential facts of his case, in that he has failed to
explain his religious beliefs and how they interfere with the
vaccination requirement. Sattley points to a statement in
Ludgate asserting “‘less particularity is required where the
defendant may be assumed to have knowledge of the facts equal
to that possessed by the plaintiff.’” (Ibid.) Here, Sattley has
more information about his religious beliefs, and how they
conflict with the vaccine mandate, than the city. This

4 In considering the concept of religion, California courts
consistently look to federal authority. (Friedman, supra, 102
Cal.App.4th at p. 49.) We thus refer to federal case law
throughout this discussion.

10
information is essential to his claim and necessary to acquaint
the city with the nature of his cause of action.
California Fair Employment & Housing Com. v. Gemini
Aluminum Corp. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1004 involved a
Jehovah’s Witness who provided evidence that he attended
religious conventions nearly every year for over 25 years. (Id. at
p. 1009.) He sought and was denied a request for time off to
attend the convention. (Id. at p. 1010.) When he missed work
and attended the convention despite the denial of his request, he
was suspended, and subsequently fired. (Ibid.) In Gemini, the
former employee provided significantly more detail than Sattley
asserts here. The Gemini plaintiff described his religious
tradition and provided details regarding the way in which this
religious obligation conflicted with his work obligations. In
contrast Sattley has provided no details of his alleged religious
belief nor how such beliefs conflict with the vaccine requirement
in the health order. While the former employee in Gemini was
not required to “explain[] his religious beliefs to his employer and
provide[] enough information about his religious needs for
Gemini to understand the significance of the convention and how
his attendance was tied to his religious beliefs”, he was required
to “cite a religious connection,” which he did. (Id. at p. 1015.)
Sattley made no such connection, except in conclusory form.
Sattley also cites Ohno v. Yasuma (9th Cir. 2013) 723 F.3d
984, which noted “[c]ourts typically give credence to assertions of
sincerely held religious beliefs in absence of any challenge to
their sincerity or religious motives, and so long as they are not ‘so
bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled
to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.’” (Id. at p. 1011.)
Here, the city challenges Sattley’s sincerity and religious motives.

11
His request for religious exemption was denied, and his
allegations are conclusory. The court had no way of knowing
whether his religious beliefs were bizarre and nonreligious in
motivation, because he provided insufficient, conclusory
allegations.
Similarly, in Together Employees v. Mass General Brigham
Inc. (D.Mass. 2021) 573 F.Supp.3d 412, 339–440, the court was
“presented with a series of affidavits, each alleging that the
employee holds a sincere religious belief that precludes COVID-
19 vaccination.” The case does not suggest that one sentence,
completely devoid of any description of the asserted religious
beliefs or the connection to the COVID-19 vaccine, is sufficient to
survive demurrer. The Mass General court declined to delve into
the various affidavits, but “assume[d], for the sake of argument,
that plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case that a bona fide
religious belief prevents them from taking the COVID-19
vaccine.” (Id. at p. 441.) Having made this assumption, the Mass
General court concluded Mass General showed a likelihood of
success on the merits of its claim of undue hardship in
accommodating the employees. (Id. at p. 442.)5

5 Sattley cites several cases for the first time in his reply
brief, which he argues show it is inappropriate to dismiss
COVID-related religious accommodation claims at the pleading
stage. All are distinguishable because the pleadings contained
far more detail than Sattley provided as to the appealing parties’
religious beliefs and how those beliefs conflicted with the COVID-
19 vaccine. In Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc. (1st Cir.
2024) 113 F.4th 9, the appellant explained, “‘COVID-19 vaccines
currently available developed and confirmed their vaccines using
fetal cell lines, which originated from aborted fetuses.’” (Id. at

12
Sattley argues to survive demurrer he was required to
plead only ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. He asserts his
religious beliefs are evidentiary facts, thus he was not required to

p. 13.) Based on those specific allegations, the plaintiff indicated
partaking in the vaccine would make her complicit in that action
and was an aberration to her faith. The plaintiffs in Passarella v.
Aspirus, Inc. (7th Cir. 2024) 108 F.4th 1005, 1008, and Bube v.
Aspirus Hospital, Inc. (7th Cir. 2024) 108 F.4th 1017, 1019,
similarly expressed detailed concerns related directly to their
religious beliefs. While there were multiple plaintiffs in
Passarella, their allegations included statements explaining their
beliefs that a “body ‘is [the Lord’s] dwelling place’ and that ‘[a]fter
prayerful consideration, I don’t feel at peace about receiving the
COVID vaccine,’” and “‘I must follow the message that God has
given me not to receive the vaccine.’” (Passarella, supra, at
p. 1007) In Bube, the plaintiffs included statements such as “‘I
trust in God completely and cannot accept this vaccine in my
body’” and receiving the vaccine would be “‘going against what
God has intended for me.’” (Bube, supra, at p. 1019.) The
plaintiff in Lucky v. Landmark Medical of Michigan, P.C. (6th
Cir. 2024) 103 F.4th 1241, 1243, also pled sufficient facts,
including that her beliefs included the belief that “she ‘should not
have any vaccination enter her body such that her body would be
defiled,’” that she sought to make all decisions through prayer,
and specifically that “‘God spoke to [her] in her prayers and
directed her that it would be wrong to receive the COVID-19
vaccine.’” In Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance (8th Cir. 2024)
102 F.4th 894, 901, the various plaintiffs alleged varying beliefs,
pled with sufficient detail—i.e., that their bodies were temples,
and thus they should not inject them with foreign substances, or
that their anti-abortion beliefs, rooted in their religion, prevented
them from using a product developed with fetal cell lines.
Sattley’s single, conclusory allegation does not suffice under these
authorities.

13
plead them. In support of this argument, Sattley cites Logan v.
Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 116,
126. In Logan, the court concluded the plaintiff could not state a
cause of action supporting his claim of a taking without due
process. The court stated, “Logan argues the legal conclusion
that he was not accorded due process, but has not presented
ultimate facts as to how his due process rights were violated at
the hearing.” (Ibid.) Logan supports the conclusion that Sattley
has pleaded insufficient, conclusory allegations here.6
Federal district courts grant motions to dismiss when
plaintiffs do not adequately allege their religious beliefs or how
those beliefs conflict with a job requirement. For example, in
Bartholomew v. Washington (W.D.Wash. 2023) 693 F.Supp.3d
1107, 1113, the district court found the plaintiff had failed to
state a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an
employment policy. The court noted, “[n]owhere in Plaintiff’s
complaint does he specifically state what religious beliefs he
holds or why his religious beliefs conflict with [the defendant’s]
vaccine requirement. At most, Plaintiff alleges that he completed
a religious accommodation request . . . .” Similarly, in Craven v.
Shriners Hospitals for Children (D.Or. 2024) 2024 WL 21557, *3,
the district court determined the plaintiff had not properly
pleaded employment discrimination on the basis of religion where
the plaintiff pleaded he was a “‘devoutly religious individual who

6 Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14
Cal.App.5th 841, 848, also cited by Sattley, involved a complaint
that was “not particularly reader-friendly,” but the court found
“the Mahans’ core allegations” to be set forth in a “reasonably
coherent fashion.” Since coherence is not an issue in this case,
the Mahan case is unhelpful to Sattley.

14
adheres to principles of a Christian faith,’” and his “‘sincerely
held religious beliefs conflicted with the Defendant’s COVID-19
vaccine mandate.’” The court held the single conclusory
allegation was insufficient under Federal Rules of Court, rule
12(b)(6). (Craven, at p. *3.) The court noted its conclusion
“comports with those of other courts.” (Ibid.; see Gamon v.
Shriners Hospitals for Children (D.Or. 2023) 2023 WL 7019980,
*3.)
Because Sattley failed to adequately plead a bona fide
religious belief that conflicted with the health order, the trial
court properly sustained the city’s demurrer to this cause of
action. (Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, 51
Cal.App.4th at p. 370.)
E. Leave to amend
On appeal, we must determine whether there is a
reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an
amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1074, 1081.) The party seeking leave to amend carries the
burden of showing “in what manner he can amend his complaint
and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his
pleading.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)
In support of his argument that he should be granted leave
to amend, Sattley argues he “can allege facts in an amended
complaint that explain, in detail, what his religious beliefs are,
where they come from, and how they affect his objection to
vaccination.” Without providing citation to the record, Sattley
argues he has described these things in discovery responses and
during deposition.
Sattley’s showing is insufficient. Sattley was required to
provide “factual allegations that sufficiently state all required

15
elements” of his cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California
Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Such
allegations must be “factual and specific, not vague or
conclusionary.” (Id. at p. 44.) Sattley has not described with
specificity additional facts that he would plead in an amendment
either in his briefs or at oral argument. He has not offered
specifics about his religious beliefs nor how such beliefs conflict
with the health order.7 Sattley did not provide any such detail in
his opposition to the city’s demurrer, nor does he provide any

7 In his reply brief, Sattley claims his proposed third
amended complaint contained further information about his
religious beliefs. The new allegations stated only “Sattley is a
Christian. He has a sincerely held religious belief that prevents
him from taking the Covid-19 vaccine.” Sattley’s addition of the
denomination of “Christian” does not clarify his religious
objection, as he had already described his religion as
“Mormon/Christian” in his November 2021 DFEH charge.
Sattley argues in his reply brief that he has “similar religious
beliefs to those expressed in the circuit court decisions discussed
above. He can allege those beliefs in detail.” (See fn. 5, above.)
He provides no citation to the record, nor does he provide any
further detail than to assert he will mimic the claims of plaintiffs
in other cases (although he does not specify which case). Sattley’s
suggestion insufficient. The allegations in the federal cases are
specific to each individual plaintiff’s subjective belief. The
individual plaintiffs expressed various reasons their individual
beliefs interfered with a vaccine mandate, depending on the
individual plaintiff’s personal belief. Sattley has failed meet his
burden of adequately stating his own beliefs and how those
beliefs conflict with the health order.

16
such detail on appeal.8 Because a bona fide religious belief and a
conflict between that religious belief and the employment
requirement are essential to his failure to accommodate cause of
action, the trial court did not err in declining to permit Sattley to
amend his complaint.
II. Summary judgment on retaliation cause of action
Sattley’s second challenge is to the trial court’s order
granting the city’s summary judgment motion as to Sattley’s 11th
cause of action for retaliation in violation of FEHA.

8 Sattley argues the city’s own witnesses testified they
listened to Sattley describe his religious beliefs, understood his
religious beliefs, and did not have any reason to doubt his
sincerity. In support of this contention, Sattley cites the
deposition testimony of Ovrom, who conducted an interview with
Sattley concerning his request for accommodation. Sattley
exaggerates Ovrom’s comments. Specifically, Ovrom commented,
“The information shared during the interview we conducted with
Mr. Sattley upon evaluation did not, in our opinion, meet the
standard for what would qualify for a religious exemption.”
Ovrom later specified: “upon reviewing the information he
shared, it did not, in our opinion, qualify as being a sincerely-held
religious belief that would qualify for not being vaccinated. I’m
not saying he doesn’t have sincere religious beliefs, just that it
didn’t necessarily preclude him from being able to receive the
vaccination.” Ovrom could not recall what specific religion
Sattley identified with, but did not believe Sattley was lying
when he expressed his religious beliefs. The cited information
does not support Sattley’s argument that he should be permitted
leave to amend.

17
A. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies
1. Applicable law
“FEHA creates an administrative agency . . . whose task it
is to receive, investigate and conciliate complaints of unlawful
employment discrimination.” (Okoli v. Lockheed Technical
Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613 (Okoli).) “If,
following receipt of a complaint, the [CRD] fails to resolve the
case or to file an accusation against the employer within 150
days, it must notify the employee in writing of his or her right to
file a civil action under the FEHA.” (Ibid.) “This notification is
commonly referred to as a ‘right to sue’ letter.” (Ibid.)
Before filing a FEHA lawsuit, a plaintiff is required to
exhaust administrative remedies with the CRD. (Kim v. Konad
USA Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1345.)
“Exhaustion includes the timely filing of administrative
complaints addressing the claims and parties at issue, as well as
the procurement of right-to-sue letters.” (Ibid.) “Courts have
referred to this requirement as a ‘“jurisdictional prerequisite.”’”
(Ibid.) “To exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to a
particular act made unlawful by the [FEHA], the claimant must
specify that act in the administrative complaint, even if the
complaint does specify other cognizable wrongful acts.” (Martin
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718,
1724.) Sattley bears the burden of proving the exhaustion
requirement was met. (Kim, supra, at p. 1345.)
2. Relevant facts
Sattley filed a charge with the EEOC, which was
automatically dual-filed with the CRD (formerly DFEH), on
November 12, 2021. The charge alleged religious discrimination
only, not retaliation for a protected activity. Sattley’s charge

18
asserted he provided a religious accommodation request that
explained the reasons the COVID-19 vaccine was against his
religious beliefs. Sattley wrote, “To date, I have not been
accommodated to continue working without receiving the COVID-
19 vaccine. I believe I was discriminated against due [sic] my
religion (Mormon/Christian), in violation of Title VII Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended.” Sattley filed no further claims with
the EEOC or DFEH prior to filing his first amended complaint or
the SAC.
Sattley’s original complaint, filed in December 2021, did
not contain a FEHA retaliation claim. On March 9, 2022, Chief
Barton terminated Sattley, effective March 11, 2022. Sattley’s
first amended complaint, filed March 25, 2022, added the cause of
action for retaliation in violation of FEHA. The SAC, filed
August 9, 2022, also contained the cause of action for retaliation
in violation of FEHA.
On November 9, 2022, three months after the filing of the
SAC, Sattley filed another charge with the EEOC (dual-filed with
the CRD), alleging the city retaliated against him for engaging in
protected activity. At the time the city’s summary judgment was
heard, Sattley had not received a right-to-sue letter from the
CRD.9

9 Sattley has filed a request for judicial notice, asking we
take judicial notice of his filing of a new charge with the CRD on
April 22, 2024, and the right-to-sue notice he received on the
same date. We granted Sattley’s request. Sattley’s new charge
was filed over four months after his notice of appeal in this
matter. Therefore, it is not relevant to the question of whether
Sattley exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his
cause of action for retaliation. As the new charge is not relevant

19
3. Sattley has failed to show he exhausted his
administrative remedies prior to filing the FEHA
retaliation claim
Filing an administrative charge and obtaining a right-to-
sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a civil claim
under FEHA. (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 83.) “Thus,
instead of abating an action as premature, a trial court must
grant summary judgment and dismiss the suit upon a finding
that a party has not exhausted his or her administrative
remedies.” (Miller v. United Airlines, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d
878, 890.)
A trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a retaliation cause
of action if the plaintiff has never filed a charge with the CRD
encompassing the purported retaliation. (Okoli, supra, 36
Cal.App.4th at p. 1612.) This is true even if the plaintiff has filed
a charge with the CRD alleging other illegal acts such as
discrimination. (Id. at p. 1613.) In Okoli, the plaintiff filed a
charge with the CRD (formerly DFEH) of discrimination based on
race and national origin in May 1988. Following its
investigation, in December 1988, the CRD notified the plaintiff of
his right to pursue civil litigation. In June 1989, the plaintiff
filed suit against Lockheed, alleging causes of action for racial
discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation. (Id. at
p. 1610.) On appeal, the court explained, “it is undisputed that
Okoli filed a charge of discrimination with the DFEH in which he
alleged specific instances of discrimination based on his race and
national origin. It is also undisputed that he did not file a

to our decision on the summary judgment, we decline to consider
it in connection with this appeal.

20
subsequent charge based on acts of retaliation by his employer.
The question on this appeal is whether he can maintain his
retaliation claim in spite of his failure to enumerate that claim in
his charge before the DFEH.” (Id. at p. 1613.) The Okoli court
concluded “the unlawful retaliation, which occurred after the
filing of the DFEH charge, would not reasonably have been
uncovered in an investigation of the charges that were made.”
(Id. at p. 1617.) In sum, “Since Okoli’s complaint added claims
that were neither like nor reasonably related to his DFEH claim
and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH
investigation, his retaliation claim is barred by the exhaustion of
remedies doctrine.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, in Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th
143, 153, the Court of Appeal considered the question of
“‘whether [Wills] can maintain the instant action for alleged
incidents of discrimination [retaliation, harassment, and failure
to accommodate] which were not specifically enumerated in [her]
complaint before the DFEH.’” Wills’s DFEH complaint asserted
she was discriminated against because her employer refused to
reinstate her following her medical leave of absence. It did not
mention disability discrimination, retaliation, harassment, or
failure to accommodate. Nor did it mention her termination. The
court thus concluded she failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies as to her second through sixth causes of action. (Id. at
p. 159.)10

10 Federal decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) are in accord. (See, e.g.,
Fundukian v. United Blood Services (9th Cir. 2001) 18 Fed.Appx.
572, 575 [EEOC charge alleging retaliation for opposing racially

21
Sattley alleged in his November 2021 charge that he was
subjected to religious discrimination by being denied a religious
accommodation. At that time, he was still employed with the
city. After his termination, Sattley added a cause of action for
retaliation to his lawsuit. Sattley’s November 2021 charge
alleging religious discrimination, prior to his termination, was
not sufficient to exhaust administrative remedies as to his
retaliation cause of action based on his termination from
employment four months later. Therefore, the retaliation cause
of action is properly summarily adjudicated in favor of the city.
(Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 890.)11
Sattley cites Corkill v. Preferred Employers Group, LLC
(S.D.Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 5975678, *8, for the proposition that

discriminatory practices was not sufficiently related to plaintiff’s
claims of discrimination based on her race, sex and age]; Ware v.
NBC Nevada Merchants, Inc. (D.Nev. 2016) 219 F.Supp.3d 1040,
1044–1045 [EEOC charge alleging plaintiff was subjected to
harassment through a racially insensitive birthday card and
subject to disparate treatment when her employer hired a
security guard to monitor her not sufficiently related to her
claims of discriminatory practices in hiring and allocating
overtime].)
11 Sattley’s November 2022 charge did not satisfy the
exhaustion requirement because it was filed after the retaliation
claim was added to the complaint and because Sattley never
received a right-to-sue letter stemming from this charge. As set
forth above, the April 2024 charge, filed after Sattley initiated
this appeal, is also insufficient to satisfy exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which must take place before the
plaintiff files a civil suit. (Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., supra,
174 Cal.App.3d at p. 890 [“an individual must exhaust his or her
administrative remedies before filing a civil action”].)

22
“the FEHA administrative exhaustion requirement like the Title
VII requirement is subject to equitable exceptions, such as
waiver, estoppel, and tolling.” However, Sattley fails to make a
factual argument as to how such doctrines are applicable here.
Sattley further argues the claims presentation requirement
is not as narrow as the city argues. Sattley contends he need not
identify every unlawful act, citing Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 266 (Nazir) for the proposition that a
subsequent lawsuit may include “claims that are “‘“like and
reasonably related to” the allegations of the DFEH charge.’” In
making this determination, “what is submitted to the DFEH
must not only be construed liberally in favor of plaintiff, it must
be construed in light of what might be uncovered by a reasonable
investigation.” (Id. at p. 268.)
Nazir is distinguishable. In Nazir, the employee was
subjected to harassment beginning in the early 1990’s and, after
he complained numerous times over the years, was terminated
from employment in May 2005. (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 258–262.) The plaintiff’s first precomplaint questionnaire
was submitted to DFEH in July 2005. He checked boxes
indicating he had been discriminated against due to race, color,
age, religion, disability, national origin and ancestry. There was
no box for harassment. However, he wrote that he had been
discriminated against and harassed “‘nonstop since 1991.’” (Id.
at p. 265.) In a second precomplaint questionnaire, the plaintiff
indicated he had endured relentless unfair and prejudicial
treatment by his colleagues and had informed human resources
on numerous occasions. (Ibid.) His first complaint for
discrimination, which was prepared by someone at DFEH, was
filed on October 3, 2005. (Ibid.) In May 2006 the plaintiff filed

23
two more complaints with the DFEH, which indicated he was
“‘harassed and fired in retaliation for taking medical leave and in
retaliation for opposing harassment against me on the basis of
my religion (Muslim), my color (dark), and my national origin
(parents from Pakistan, born in Kuwait).’” (Id. at p. 266.) On
May 23, 2006, the DFEH sent plaintiff a notice of case closure
because “‘an immediate right to sue letter was requested.’” (Ibid.)
The operative complaint, which asserted causes of action for
harassment as well as discrimination, was filed July 7, 2006. (Id.
at p. 250.)
The trial court determined all the alleged acts of
harassment were barred for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things,
that the factual statement in the October 2005 DFEH charge
made no reference to being harassed, and harassment is not like
or related to discrimination. (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at
p. 266.) The appellate court rejected this argument, stating:
“‘Administrative charges are to be construed liberally because
they are often drafted by claimants without the assistance of
counsel.’” (Id. at pp. 266–267.) Applying those principles, the
court determined the trial court’s summary judgment was in
error. The court concluded, “The materials [plaintiff] submitted
to the DFEH are certainly adequate to specify the nature of his
problems at the workplace. In both of his questionnaires, he
expressly claimed to be the victim of constant harassment.” (Id.
at p. 268.)
In contrast to the present matter, the plaintiff in Nazir
mentioned harassment numerous times. Sattley failed to
mention retaliation at all, failed to mention his criticism of the
city on social media, and failed to supplement his CRD charge

24
following his termination. Even construed liberally, Sattley’s
CRD charge does not satisfy his obligation to exhaust
administrative remedies.12
Because Sattley failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies as to his retaliation cause of action, it was properly
summarily adjudicated in favor of the city.
B. Merits of retaliation claim
The trial court noted in its order that even if Sattley had
exhausted his administrative remedy, the court would still grant
the city’s motion for summary judgment. Both parties address
the trial court’s alternative rationale. Although it is unnecessary,
we briefly address the merits of Sattley’s claim.

12 Sattley cites Sosa v. Hiraoka (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 1451,
1456–1457, for the proposition that the inquiry into the
jurisdictional scope of any action can include “allegations
occurring not only before, but also after the filing of” an EEOC
charge. Sosa is distinguishable because the Sosa court concluded
“all of Sosa’s allegations are sufficiently ‘like or reasonably
related to’ the allegations contained in Sosa’s EEOC charge.” (Id.
at p. 1457.) In addition to his claims of denial of promotion, Sosa
asserted in his EEOC charge that the department and its
administrators had engaged in a pattern and practice of
retaliating against him because he had previously filed
discrimination charges and complaints against them. (Ibid.) The
Sosa court thus concluded, “Because all of the acts Sosa alleged
in his First Amended Complaint are on their face like or
reasonably related to the allegations in his EEOC charge,
including the allegation of a continuing violation, the district
court should not have dismissed Sosa’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 1458.) We reach a different conclusion
based on the facts before us.

25
To prevail on a claim for retaliation under FEHA, a
plaintiff must show (1) the employee engaged in a protected
activity; (2) the employer took adverse employment action
against the employee; and (3) the cause of the adverse
employment action was the employee’s engagement in the
protected activity. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36
Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.
(Batarse v. Service Employees Internat. Union, Local 1000 (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 820, 831.) “A defendant moving for summary
judgment, however, may skip to the second step of the analysis
and demonstrate that it had a legitimate business reason . . . for
taking its employment action.” (Ibid.)
1. Protected activity
Sattley argues he engaged in protected activity during the
fall of 2021 when he criticized the city’s COVID personnel policies
on social media and filed this lawsuit. He argues this qualifies as
a protected activity because it involved “‘some degree of
opposition to or protest of the employer’s conduct or practices
based on the employee’s reasonable belief that the employer’s
action or practice is unlawful.’” (Dinslage v. City and County of
San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 382 (Dinslage).)
Generally, employees are protected from retaliation for
conduct opposing what the employee reasonably believes to be
unlawful discrimination. (Dinslage, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
p. 383.) That an employee perceives his employer’s actions as
“unwise or even improper” is “not enough to make his opposition
a protected activity.” (Id. at p. 382.) Sattley had the burden of

26
showing that his criticisms of the city’s COVID policy qualified as
a protected activity. (Id. at p. 384.)
Sattley fails to point to a specific social media post that he
believed was the basis for his termination. Sattley’s general
objections or disagreement with the city’s policy is insufficient, in
the absence of a showing that Sattley was protesting unlawful
behavior. Sattley argues the court should not focus on any
specific social media post, but instead look to whether Sattley can
“demonstrate some degree of opposition to or protest of the
employer’s conduct or practices based on the employee’s
reasonable belief that the employer’s action or practice is
unlawful.” (Rope v. Auto-Chlor System of Washington, Inc. (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 635, 652–653, overturned on other grounds by
legislative action.) The Rope case is unhelpful to Sattley, as the
court concluded the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing
of a protected activity sufficient to support a claim for retaliation
in violation of FEHA. (Rope, at pp. 652–653.) Similarly, here,
Sattley’s vague allegations that he criticized the city’s COVID
policy do not show a reasonable belief that the city’s actions were
unlawful. Under the circumstances, Sattley failed to set forth a
prima facie case of retaliation.
2. Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
Even if Sattley could establish a prima facie case, the city
had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his
employment. An employee’s inability to perform the essential
tasks of his or her job is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to
terminate the employee. (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 830, 861 [examples of legitimate reasons are a
failure to meet performance standards or a loss of confidence in
an employee]; Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th

27
327, 352 [loss of confidence in an employee to perform his
essential job tasks is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
discharge].)
Here, the undisputed facts show the city terminated
Sattley’s employment because Sattley refused to comply with the
health order after his request for accommodation was denied. On
October 1, 2021, he was placed on administrative leave because,
under the terms of the health order, he could no longer perform
his job obligations. This administrative leave occurred prior to
the time Sattley allegedly began criticizing the city on social
media. The health order required that all EMT’s and paramedics
in the county be vaccinated by September 30, 2021. The health
order applied to Sattley. His request for accommodation was
denied, and he failed to submit proof of vaccination. Chief Barton
could not see any way that Sattley could perform his job when he
was not in compliance with the health order, therefore Sattley’s
employment was terminated.
Sattley argues a jury should determine whether his
criticism of the city in the fall of 2021 was the reason for his
termination from employment. He argues the timing of his
termination matches with his social media criticisms in the late
fall of 2021, and that the city notified Sattley of its intent to fire
him just a few days after it learned of this lawsuit. Further,
Sattley argues, he was otherwise in good standing with the
department and was an excellent employee.
Temporal proximity does not support a finding of pretext
here. “[T]emporal proximity alone is not sufficient to raise a
triable issue as to pretext once the employer has offered evidence
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.”
(Arteaga, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.) “This is especially so

28
where the employer raised questions about the employee’s
performance before [the protected acts], and the subsequent
termination was based on those performance issues.” (Ibid.)
Here, the city placed Sattley on administrative leave before his
alleged protected activity, and his subsequent termination was
for the same reason as his initial leave.
The city’s termination of Sattley for his failure to comply
with the health order was a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for
Sattley’s termination.
III. Motion to continue
Sattley argues the trial court should have denied the
summary judgment motion pursuant to section 437c(h) because
he had not been able to conduct the necessary discovery to find
facts and evidence to oppose the motion.13 In the absence of an
affidavit that requires a continuance, we review a trial court’s
denial of a continuance under section 437c(h) for abuse of
discretion. (Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 253.)
Preliminarily, we note the summary judgment motion
involved only Sattley’s retaliation claim. Additional discovery
would not have changed the outcome of the motion because
Sattley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this
claim. Thus, Sattley cannot show prejudice stemming from any
asserted error in failing to continue the matter, and any such

13 Section 437c(h) provides, in part: “If it appears from the
affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential
to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be
presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make
any other order as may be just.”

29
error is not reversible. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8
Cal.4th 548, 574 [error “generally does not warrant reversal
unless there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the
error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have
been reached”].) We need not address the parties’ arguments on
this issue further. However, as set forth below, we conclude no
abuse of discretion occurred.
“An opposing party’s declaration in support of a motion to
continue the summary judgment hearing should show the
following: (1) ‘Facts establishing a likelihood that controverting
evidence may exist and why the information sought is essential to
opposing the motion’; (2) ‘The specific reasons why such evidence
cannot be presented at the present time’; (3) ‘An estimate of the
time necessary to obtain such evidence’; and (4) ‘The specific steps
or procedures the opposing party intends to utilize to obtain such
evidence.’” (Johnson v. Alameda County Medical Center (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 521, 532.) In exercising its discretion as to
whether to grant a continuance under section 437c(h), a trial
court may consider “the extent to which the requesting party’s
failure to secure the contemplated evidence more seasonably
results from a lack of diligence on his part.” (Rodriguez v. Oto
(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1038.)
The trial court found Sattley did not meet the requirements
of section 437c(h). The court explained: “After [Sattley] was
terminated on March 9, 2022, [Sattley] filed a First Amended
Complaint on March 25, 2022. The operative Second Amended
Complaint was filed on August 9, 2022. The trial date of
October 23, 2023 was set on December 5, 2022. [Sattley’s]
counsel . . . states in conclusory fashion that the City and Sattley
did not commence discovery until the Spring of 2023 and

30
describes the action as in the early stages of discovery. This is
utterly insufficient. [Sattley’s] counsel offers no explanation as to
why he failed to initiate any discovery regarding [Sattley’s] claim
for over eighteen months. Moreover, none of the proposed
discovery could rebut [Sattley’s] failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies.” Thus, the trial court denied Sattley’s
motion for continuance under section 437c(h).
Sattley argues he met the standard under section 437c(h).
In support of his request for a continuance, Sattley filed the
declaration of Scott J. Street, his counsel, on August 27, 2023.
Street acknowledged that the case was filed in December 2021,
but claimed that after early motion practice the parties “focused
on litigating the claims against the City and Councilman
Mirisch.” Street then claimed, “Discovery between the City and
Sattley did not start until the spring of 2023. The City did not
produce a witness for deposition until July 28, and the witnesses
it produced that day refused to (or couldn’t) answer many key
questions, including questions about how Sattley violated the
County Health Order and why he had to be terminated when the
City accommodated every other firefighter who insisted on it.”14
As the city points out, the declaration does not explain why such
evidence could not have been sought earlier, nor does it suggest
Sattley sought to depose any witnesses prior to July 28, 2023.
Street stated he was seeking to depose Jennifer Petrusis, a
lawyer listed as counsel of record for the city in this case, who
participated in Sattley’s accommodation process and thus may
have been able to answer questions other city witnesses could not

14 The city challenges this statement, stating the record
shows the city in fact denied accommodations to six firefighters.

31
answer. Street was aware the city intended to seek a protective
order. The city argues it would have prevailed on such an order,
as there are legal hurdles to deposing a party’s counsel, and
Sattley could not have prevailed on these hurdles.
Sattley argues the parties first focused on litigating the
constitutional claims involving the health order, as those claims
would have ended the case early on. Sattley claims this is why
discovery was still in the early stages at the time the summary
judgment deadlines were approaching. However, the trial court
was more involved with the proceedings below, and we defer to
its assessment of the parties’ diligence. Sattley failed to explain
what efforts were made to take the depositions earlier or why,
despite the focus on the constitutional issues, the depositions
could not have commenced at an earlier date. Under the
circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the continuance. (Cooksey v. Alexakis, supra, 123
Cal.App.4th at p. 256; see A & B Painting & Drywall, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 349, 356–357 [continuance
not warranted where declaration fails to explain what efforts
were made to take necessary depositions or why they could not
have been taken earlier].)
Sattley cites Hamilton v. Orange County Sheriff’s Dept.
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 759 as an example of a case where the trial
court abused its discretion in denying a requested continuance
under section 437c(h) solely based on its view of counsel’s alleged
delay in conducting discovery. The facts of Hamilton are
different. In Hamilton, the parties had stipulated to continue the
summary judgment hearing and trial for 60 days. While the
plaintiff had timely noticed the relevant depositions, they could
not go forward because defendant’s counsel was engaged in trial.

32
Under the circumstances, the Hamilton court concluded the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to accommodate counsels’
joint request for the continuance. (Id. at pp. 761–762.) While the
plaintiff had not met the showing required under section 437c(h),
she did make a showing of good cause. (Hamilton, at p. 765.)
The “relatively minor lack of diligence” on the part of plaintiff’s
attorney did not justify “the substantial injustice the court’s order
created.” (Id. at p. 766.)
Sattley complains the trial court failed to consider
additional factors set forth in Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA,
Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 632, 644, including: “(1) how long the
case has been pending; (2) how long the requesting party had to
oppose the motion; (3) whether the continuance motion could
have been made earlier; (4) the proximity of the trial date or the
30-day discovery cutoff before trial; (5) any prior continuances for
the same reason; and (6) the question whether the evidence
sought is truly essential to the motion.” Sattley asserts, without
explanation, that most of these factors favored a continuance. He
fails to make a citation to the record showing he sought a
continuance based on these factors or argued the trial court
should consider them.
The standard of review in this matter is abuse of discretion.
Under this standard, we do not reverse a trial court ruling if it
was based on reasoned judgment and complied with legal
principles and policies relevant to the matter. (City of San Diego
v. Rancho Penasquitos Partnership (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1013,
1027.) Sattley has failed to show that he could not have obtained
the requested discovery earlier, has failed to explain why
discovery had not commenced earlier, has failed to show the
information he sought from Attorney Petrusis was not available

33
from other witnesses, and has failed to show he was entitled to
depose her. Under the circumstances, he has failed to show an
abuse of discretion.
IV. Evidentiary ruling
Sattley argues the trial court erroneously excluded
evidence of a proposal Sattley claimed he received from the city
about accommodating him if he agreed to stop criticizing the city
on social media. Sattley learned about the proposal from union
Attorney Stuart Adams. On August 18, 2023, the trial court
granted a protective order filed by nonparty Beverly Hills
Firefighters Association (BHFA) to prevent the disclosure of
attorney-client privileged communications between BHFA
counsel Adams and Sattley, a BHFA member. The BHFA argued
the attorney-client privilege exists between the attorney and the
union, not the individual member for whom the union is
providing representation.
Sattley argues the proposal was not confidential, as Adams
never told him it was confidential, and Sattley testified that
“numerous people were aware of the proposal, including the
association’s leadership and the City’s labor negotiator, Peter
Brown.” Sattley argues any privilege was waived by disclosure of
the substance of the communication.
The city argues Sattley forfeited this argument when he
chose not to oppose the BHFA’s motion for protective order or
state his objections during the hearing. Under the forfeiture
doctrine, with few exceptions, “‘an appellate court will not
consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—
raised in the trial court.’” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1107, 1114.) Sattley’s argument fails for this reason.

34
Further, Sattley has failed to show prejudice from the
exclusion of evidence. Sattley argues that while the
consideration of this evidence is not necessary to reverse the
summary judgment on his retaliation claim, it provides
compelling direct evidence of retaliation. Because Sattley’s
retaliation claim was properly summarily adjudicated on the
ground that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the
resolution of the evidentiary issue in his favor would be of no
consequence.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs
of appeal.

________________________
CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
RICHARDSON, J.

35

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10785110. Public record. Not legal advice.