# Morris v. Evans

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · January 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10780372

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT MORRIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-cv-3302-NJR

ERIC EVANS, CALEB ZANG,
BRADLEY SADLER, MAYNARD
AGNE, ANDREW STORY, LEVI
GAETZ, MICHAEL LAMINACK,
JASON MORRIS, and
PHILIP ROYSTER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Robert Morris, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action
for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically,
Morris alleges Eighth Amendment excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment
claims against correctional officers who allegedly sprayed him with mace, beat him, and
placed him in a cell contaminated with chemical agents.
This matter is currently before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed
by Defendants Maynard Agne, Eric Evans, Levi Gaetz, Michael Laminack, Jason Morris,
Philip Royster, Bradley Sadler, Andrew Story, and Caleb Zang (Doc. 25). With their
motion, Defendants filed a notice advising Morris that his failure to respond to the motion
could result in a judgment in their favor (Doc. 26). Morris initially requested additional
time to file a response, as well as the assignment of counsel due to his limited access to
the law library (Doc. 27). But the Court found Morris capable of responding to the motion

on his own by indicating his attempts to exhaust his claims through the grievance process
(Doc. 28). He was granted additional time to file a response.
One month after the extended deadline, Morris again asked for counsel and
additional time to respond to the motion (Doc. 31).1 Morris alleged that he was placed on
crisis watch without access to his property, lacked access to the law library, and was
denied access to legal documents because of a drug epidemic at the prison (Id.). The Court

again found Morris capable of responding on his own, noting that he was only required
to explain the steps he took to exhaust his claims (Doc. 32). Because of issues with
lockdowns and access to his materials, he was granted additional time, until October 21,
2024, to respond to the pending motion (Id.). He was later granted another extension,
until to December 2, 2024, to file a response (Doc. 45). As of this date, Morris has failed to

file a response.

1 Morris also filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking a transfer because he argued that
Defendants continued to harass him and deny him access to his legal materials in retaliation for
his lawsuit (Doc. 29). His motion was ultimately denied because his allegations involved
individuals who were not defendants in the case and events that were unrelated to the claims in
this case (Doc. 48).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Morris’s claims in this case were severed from his original claims in Morris v.
Jeffreys, et al., Case No. 23-cv-1162-DWD (Doc. 1). After review of the severed claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, Morris was allowed to proceed on the following counts:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force or cruel and unusual
punishment claim against Defendants Philip Royster, Eric
Evans, Caleb Zang, Bradley Sadler, Maynard Agne, Andrew
Story, Levi Gaetz, Michael Laminack, and Jason Morris for
releasing pepper spray on April 4, 2022.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim or cruel and
unusual punishment claim against Defendants Sadler, Story,
Gaetz, Laminack, Morris, and Agne for allegedly beating
Morris on April 4, 2022, after removing him from the
healthcare unit, and for then placing him in a cell
contaminated with chemical agents.

(Doc. 17, p. 3).
Morris alleges that Defendants took turns spraying pepper spray on inmates,
including Morris, who took part in a hunger and water strike (Doc. 17, p. 2). During the
assault, Morris suffered a panic attack and was transported to the healthcare unit (Id.).
After his release back to the unit, Defendants Sadler, Story, Gaetz, Laminack, Morris, and
Agne took Morris to a secluded area and beat him (Id.). They then returned him to his
cell, which had not been decontaminated from the pepper spray (Id.). He was forced to
remain in the cell for several days.
Morris filed one grievance regarding his claims. The grievance, dated April 24,
2022, described the events in his Complaint.
April 24, 2022 Grievance (#253-4-22):
On April 24, 2022, Morris submitted an emergency grievance about the
April 4, 2022 incident. The grievance indicated that on April 4, while on a
hunger strike in crisis watch, two officers came to Morris’s door and asked
if he wanted to see mental health or medical staff (Doc. 25-1, p. 121). Morris
informed the officers that he could not feel his legs and he had pains in his
heart for several days (Id.). The sergeant on duty directed him to leave the
cell and threatened to spray Morris (Id.). Morris informed the sergeant that
his actions would amount to cruel and unusual punishment. The sergeant
then maced Morris for 11 seconds, causing Morris to hyperventilate and
experience pain in his chest (Id. at pp. 121-122).

Morris noted in his grievance that he passed out. He later learned that while
unconscious, two lieutenants tried to wake him, but he remained
unresponsive. The major was notified, and a tactical team was brought in.
Those officers then ordered Morris to get up, but he remained unconscious.
He was then sprayed again by the officers (Id.). An officer then jumped on
him, and he was dragged out of his cell and placed in a wheelchair (Id.).

Morris’s grievance alleged that he was taken to the healthcare unit where
he received an EKG (Id. at p. 122). After being released from the healthcare
unit, Morris alleged that he was wheeled back to his unit and beaten by
officers. He was then placed back in his mace contaminated cell (Id.). Morris
requested a transfer to another prison, additional medical care including an
MRI, medication for muscle spasms, and monetary compensation (Id. at
p. 121).

On April 24, 2022, Morris submitted his grievance as an emergency
(Doc. 25-1, p. 121). On April 26, 2022, the warden marked it as an emergency
and forwarded the grievance to the grievance officer. On April 27, 2022, the
grievance officer reviewed Morris’s grievance (Id. at p. 119). The grievance
officer noted that Internal Affairs opened an investigation regarding the
incident. On May 12, 2022, the grievance officer contacted the major in
North 2 where Morris was housed and inquired about his living conditions.
The major asked Morris about the status of his cell and Morris noted there
was nothing currently wrong with his cell or his living conditions (Id. at
p. 120). The grievance officer ultimately denied Morris’s grievance as moot
(Id. at p. 119). On May 13, 2022, the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”)
received the grievance and on May 18, 2022 he concurred with the decision
(Id.). On May 18, 2022, the grievance was returned to Morris through the
institutional mail (Doc. 25-2, p. 13).
On either May 18 or 19, 2022, Morris marked his grievance as being
appealed to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) (Doc. 25-1, p. 119).
The date is not entirely clear (Id.). 2 The ARB received the grievance on June
30, 2022. On July 8, 2022, ARB officer Margaret Madole submitted an email
to Menard’s Internal Affairs Coordinator inquiring about the status of the
investigation into Morris’s claims (Id. at p. 118). Menard’s Internal Affairs
Coordinator responded that the investigation was closed, and Morris’s
claims were unsubstantiated (Id.). The coordinator noted that force, in the
form of chemical spray, was used to gain compliance and extraction from
the cell after Morris claimed he could not use his legs when he previously
had been able to walk (Id.). Although the ARB investigated the grievance,
Madole ultimately determined that the grievance would not be addressed
because it was received 30 days after the CAO signed off on the grievance
(Id. at p. 117). Madole noted, however, that due to the nature of the
grievance she went ahead and verified that the Internal Affairs
investigation was completed and the claims unsubstantiated.

LEGAL STANDARDS
“Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures,
and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [the defendant] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467
(7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent part,
that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
Id. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.

2 Morris signed the grievance and noted the date, but only the “1” is legible (Doc. 25-1, p. 119).
Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]his circuit has taken a
strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed.

Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot file suit and then
exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id. Moreover, “[t]o exhaust
remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the
prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.
2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to properly utilize a prison’s grievance process,
“the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim

can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
Under Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-41(7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held
that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge.
Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative

defense, the Seventh Circuit set forth the following recommendations:
The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is
therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion
and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems
appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust
his administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the
plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must
go back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative
remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials
prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given
another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will
be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being
given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in
which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the
prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will
proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if
there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without
being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the
district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his
administrative remedies.

Id. at 742.
A. Illinois Exhaustion Requirements

As an IDOC inmate, Morris was required to follow the regulations contained in
IDOC’s Grievance Procedures for Offenders (“grievance procedures”) to properly
exhaust his claim. 20 Ill. Administrative Code §504.800 et seq. The grievance procedures
first require inmates to file their grievance with the counselor within 60 days of the
discovery of an incident. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(a). The grievance form must:
contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,
including what happened, when, where and the name of each person who
is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This
provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the
names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much
descriptive information about the individual as possible.

20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through
routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.820(a).
The Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written response to the
inmate. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer shall consider the
grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to the Chief
Administrative Officer [“CAO”] within two months after receipt of the grievance, when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(e). “The
[CAO] shall review the findings and recommendation and advise the offender of his or
her decision in writing.” Id.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he or she can file an appeal
with the Director through the ARB. The grievance procedures specifically state, “[i]f, after

receiving the response of the Chief Administrative Officer, the offender still believes that
the problem, complaint or grievance has not been resolved to his or her satisfaction, he
or she may appeal in writing to the Director. The appeal must be received by the
Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the date of the decision.” 20 Ill. Admin.
Code §504.850(a). The inmate shall attach copies of the Grievance Officer’s report and the
CAO’s decision to his appeal. Id. “The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the

Director a written report of its findings and recommendations.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code
§504.850(d). “The Director shall review the findings and recommendations of the Board
and make a final determination of the grievance within six months after receipt of the
appealed grievance, when reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender
shall be sent a copy of the Director’s decision.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(e).

The grievance procedures allow for an inmate to file an emergency grievance. In
order to file an emergency grievance, the inmate must forward the grievance directly to
the CAO who may “[determine] that there is a substantial risk of imminent personal
injury or other serious or irreparable harm to the offender” and thus the grievance should
be handled on an emergency basis. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(a). If the CAO

determines the grievance should be handled on an emergency basis, then the CAO “shall
expedite processing of the grievance and respond to the offender” indicating to him what
action shall be taken. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(b). If the CAO determines the
grievances “should not be handled on an emergency basis, the offender shall be notified
in writing that he or she may resubmit the grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with
the standard grievance process.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(c). When an inmate

appeals a grievance deemed by the CAO to be an emergency, “the Administrative Review
Board shall expedite processing of the grievance.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(f).
ANALYSIS
Morris was provided with notice of the summary judgment motion and informed
of the consequences of failing to respond to it (Doc. 26). Morris also was advised that his
failure to respond could amount to an admission of the facts asserted in Defendants’

motion (Id.). Although Morris sought several extensions of time to file a response to the
summary judgment motion, Morris ultimately failed to do so.
Pursuant to SDIL Local Rule 56.1(g) “all material facts…shall be deemed admitted
for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.” Because Morris failed
to respond to Defendants’ statement of facts, the Court accepts the statement of facts as

true. Parra v. Neal, 614 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Cracco v. Vitran Exp. Inc.,
559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003)).
The admission of the material facts, however, does not mean that the Court can
automatically grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; they must still
demonstrate that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carroll v. Lynch, 698

F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). And here, Defendants have failed to do so.
Defendants do not dispute that Morris filed a timely grievance. They only dispute
that Morris fully exhausted that grievance with the ARB because the grievance was
received by the ARB more than 30 days after the CAO’s final ruling on the grievance.
IDOC’s inmate grievance procedures require that “the appeal must be received by the
[ARB] within 30 days after the date” of the CAO’s decision. 20 Ill. Admin. Code

§504.850(a). The CAO signed his concurrence on May 18, 2022, and the counseling records
indicate that the grievance was placed in the institutional mail for return to Morris on the
same date (Doc. 25-1, p. 119; Doc. 25-2, p. 13). Morris received the grievance either the
same date or the following date and immediately marked the grievance for appeal to the
ARB (Doc. 25-1, p. 119). The ARB received the grievance on June 30, 2022. Thus,
Defendants argue that the grievance was procedurally deficient because it was not timely

received and returned as unexhausted.
Although the grievance was not “received” by the ARB until June 30, 2022,
Defendants fail to point to anything in the record suggesting that Morris failed to submit
his grievance to the ARB in a timely fashion. Morris marked the grievance for appeal on
either May 18 or 19, less than a day after he received the grievance back from the CAO.

There is simply nothing in the record indicating that Morris waited to send the grievance
to the ARB after marking it for appeal. Based on the markings on Morris’s grievance, he
submitted the grievance in the prison mail either on May 18 or 19, or shortly thereafter.
Conley v. Anglin, 513 F. App’x 598, 601 (7th Cir. 2013) (“And though the defendants would
like us to presume that [Section] 504.850 and the ARB's own procedures do not recognize

the ‘mailbox rule,’ they offered no support (and still don't) for the proposition.”); Dole v.
Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner had filed a timely appeal to
the ARB by placing it in the prison mail system even though it was never received by the
ARB). Morris submitted the grievance in a timely fashion, allowing enough time for it to
be received within the 30 days required by the administrative code. He had no control
over the mail system and did all that he could to submit the grievance in a timely fashion.

Defendants fail to demonstrate otherwise. Thus, the grievance was timely submitted and
should not have been rejected by the ARB as untimely.
Further, it appears that the ARB did review Morris’s grievance on the merits.
Despite returning the grievance to Morris on a “return of grievance” form, ARB officer
Margaret Madole also reviewed and responded to the merits of Morris’s grievance. In
fact, she emailed Menard Internal Affairs to inquire as to the status of the investigation

into Morris’s claims against the officers. Based on that inquiry, Madole noted on the
return of grievance form that the investigation was completed and the claims were
deemed unsubstantiated (Doc. 25-1, p. 117). Thus, Madole provided Morris with a ruling
on the merits of his claims and there was nothing further for Morris to do to exhaust his
claims. The Court finds that under these circumstances, Morris’s grievance was fully

exhausted.
In addition to arguing that Morris failed to adequately exhaust his April 2022
grievance, Defendants also argue that the grievance failed to properly identify Lieutenant
Zang and failed to identify any of the defendants as to the claim in Count 3. Defendants
acknowledge that Morris’s grievance refers to two security officials, a sergeant, and

tactical team members who could arguably be identified as Evans, Royster, Agne, Gaetz,
Laminack, Morris, Sadler, and Story (Doc. 25, p. 7). Defendants argue, however, that the
grievance lacks any allegations that would suggest the involvement of Caleb Zang.
But Defendants acknowledge that Zang was a lieutenant at the time, was present
at Morris’s cell during the incident, attempted to obtain compliance from Morris, and

called the de-escalation response team (Doc. 25, p. 4).3 Further, Morris’s grievance refers
to numerous officers who were present during his cell extraction, including two
lieutenants (Doc. 25-1, p. 122). He also noted that there was video footage of the incident
(Id.). Although Morris may not have referred specifically to Lieutenant Zang, exhaustion
is not intended to provide individual notice to each prison official who might later be
sued; it is designed to provide the prison with notice of the problem and give them an

opportunity to fix it. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). As such, an
inmate must provide enough information to serve the grievance’s function of giving
“prison officials a fair opportunity to address [an inmate’s] complaints.” Maddox, 655 F.3d
at 722. Morris’s grievance clearly gave officials notice of his claims against all officials

involved, including lieutenants that were present, and directed officials to video footage
of the incident. There was enough information in the grievance to put officials on notice
that Morris was complaining about the actions of Lieutenant Zang during the incident.
Further, the prison clearly investigated the incident and obtained a statement regarding
Zang’s involvement (although Defendants failed to attach that portion of the

3 Defendants point to Exhibit B, Bates 000011, to support their argument (See Doc. 25, p. 4), but
Exhibit B is the Cumulative Counseling Summary and does not include a Bates 000011 (Doc. 25-
2). Exhibit C includes all of the incident reports, but the reports at Bates 000010 and 000011 are
missing from the record (Doc. 25-3).
investigation). Thus, the grievance served its purpose in notifying officials of Morris’s
issues with all of the involved officers, including Zang.
Finally, Defendants argue that Morris failed to properly exhaust his claims in
Count 3 regarding the assault that allegedly occurred upon Morris’s return to his cell.
Defendants argue that Morris’s grievance failed to specifically identify any officer who
participated in the assault either by name or description. But again, the grievance officials
were able to investigate Morris’s claims, including the alleged assault based on the
allegations in Morris’s grievance. “A procedural shortcoming...amount[s] to a failure to
exhaust only if prison administrators explicitly relied on the shortcoming.” See Maddox,
655 F.3d at 722. At no time did grievance officials reject Morris’s grievance because he
failed to properly identify the officers involved in the alleged assault. Thus, the grievance
exhausted Morris’s claims in Count 3.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 25)
is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 14, 2025 Tl
neff onsen
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10780372. Public record. Not legal advice.