# Laird v. Spencer

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · January 13, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10779270

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** January 13, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Civil Rights
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10779270

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “defenses such as absolute quasi-judicial immunity, that only protect defendants in their individual capacities, are unavailable in official-capacity [§ 1983] suits”
- concluding that absolute judicial immunity did not shield judges sued in their official capacities under the ADA and section 504

## Opinion text

Case: 20-30237 Document: 63-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/13/2025

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
January 13, 2025
No. 20-30237 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

Donna Laird,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Larry Spencer,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:19-CV-299

Before King, Richman, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Donna Laird appeals the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal,
arguing that absolute judicial immunity does not bar her claims, brought
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act (section 504), against Justice of the Peace Larry
Spencer. Because Laird’s claim for monetary damages is barred by judicial

*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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immunity, Laird lacks standing to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief,
and Laird is not entitled to attorney’s fees, we affirm.
I
Laird is a hard-of-hearing individual who often requires auxiliary aids
and services to ensure effective communication. In 2018, Laird received
from her landlord a citation for an eviction proceeding to be held in Justice of
the Peace Larry Spencer’s court. Soon thereafter, Laird filed a written
answer with Spencer. In her answer, Laird requested the provision of
auxiliary aids to facilitate communication during the upcoming proceeding,
asking Spencer to furnish either an oral interpreter or Communication
Access Real-time Translation (CART) captioning services. In response,
Spencer drafted and sent, via U.S. Mail, a reply letter denying Laird’s
request.
Later that month, the eviction proceeding took place in the Justice of
the Peace Court. When the hearing began, Laird verbally objected to the fact
that the requested aids had not been provided, and Spencer replied that he
would write notes on a legal pad for Laird’s benefit. During the hearing,
Spencer wrote some notes, but much of the verbal communication was not
transcribed. Moreover, Laird’s landlord sat to her right, where her hearing
is weakest. Laird avers that, as a result, she failed to understand much of the
proceeding and was unable to participate fully and effectively. Ultimately,
Spencer rendered judgment for Laird’s landlord, resulting in her eviction.
Laird appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Spencer “violated [her] rights
under the [ADA,] causing [her] not to be able to participate fully in the
eviction hearing.” Laird’s appeal suspended the order of eviction, 1 and she

1
See La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 4735.

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received a de novo trial in the 19th Judicial District Court. 2 That court also
rendered a judgment of eviction.
Laird subsequently filed this suit against Spencer in his official
capacity, as well as the state of Louisiana, in the Middle District of Louisiana.
She alleged violations of the ADA, section 504, and the Louisiana
Interpreter’s Law. Laird sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Roughly one year
later, Laird voluntarily dismissed her claims against Louisiana. Spencer filed
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that absolute judicial
immunity barred Laird’s claims against him. The district court granted the
motion and entered judgment for Spencer. Laird timely appealed.
II
To survive Spencer’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Laird “must
plead enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 3 We
review de novo the district court’s dismissal, accepting the complaint’s well-
pleaded facts as true and viewing all facts in the light most favorable to Laird. 4
Laird does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that absolute judicial
immunity bars her Louisiana Interpreter’s Law claim. 5 We therefore address
only her claims under the ADA and section 504. 6

2
See id. art. 4924(A)-(B).
3
Warren v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 759 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
4
See Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other
grounds by Hamilton v. Dallas County, 79 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc).
5
See generally La. Stat. Ann. §§ 46:2361-72.
6
See Monteon-Camargo v. Barr, 918 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Generally
speaking, a [party] waives an issue if he fails to adequately brief it.” (quoting United States
v. Martinez, 263 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2001))); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5),

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First, we address Laird’s threshold argument that absolute judicial
immunity is a personal defense inapplicable to official-capacity claims. As
Laird correctly notes, in Kentucky v. Graham, 7 the Supreme Court observed
a distinction between personal-capacity suits—in which defendants may
assert personal immunity defenses—and official-capacity suits—in which
personal defenses are unavailable, and the only potential immunities are
forms of sovereign immunity. 8 Accordingly, this court has held that absolute
immunities are personal defenses inapplicable to official-capacity actions. 9
But these decisions interpreted liability under the distinct statutory scheme
of § 1983. Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has extended the
principle that absolute judicial immunity applies only in personal-capacity
actions to suits brought under the ADA or section 504. We decline to do so
here.
Notably, § 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very person”
who deprives another of rights or privileges secured by federal law. 10 Because
“a State is not a person” amenable to suit under § 1983, 11 plaintiffs use the
workaround of official-capacity suits against state officials, which are “in all

(a)(8)(A) (explaining that an appellant’s brief must contain “a statement of the issues
presented for review” and, within the argument, the “appellant’s contentions and the
reasons for them”).
7
473 U.S. 159 (1985).
8
See id. at 165-67.
9
See Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civ. Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir.
2000) (explaining that “defenses such as absolute quasi-judicial immunity, that only
protect defendants in their individual capacities, are unavailable in official-capacity
[§ 1983] suits”); Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 998 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[Absolute
i]mmunity does not bar suits against defendants in their official capacities.”).
10
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
11
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).

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respects other than name . . . treated as . . . suit[s] against the [state or state]
entity.” 12 Section 1983 plaintiffs may also elect to sue officials in their
personal capacity, “seek[ing] to impose personal liability upon . . . official[s]
for actions . . . take[n] under color of state law.” 13 Thus, Kentucky v.
Graham’s distinction between personal-capacity and official-capacity suits is
tethered to § 1983’s language and unique statutory framework, which
permits plaintiffs to sue “persons” in multiple capacities. 14
Suits brought under the ADA and section 504 require no such
distinction. Title II of the ADA provides that qualified disabled individuals
may not be excluded from “the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity” because of their disability. 15 Likewise, section
504 declares that no qualified disabled individual may “be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 16
These statutes regulate public entities, programs, and activities—not
“persons.” Thus, unlike § 1983, the ADA and section 504 do not permit
personal-capacity suits against government officials.17 Put differently,

12
Graham, 473 U.S. at 166.
13
Id. at 165.
14
Cf. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 122 (1988) (“Aware that
governmental bodies can act only through natural persons, the Court [in Monell v.
Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)] concluded that [local]
governments should be held responsible when, and only when, their official policies cause
their employees to violate another person’s constitutional rights.”).
15
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
16
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
17
See 42 U.S.C. § 12133; 29 U.S.C. § 794a. Compare Smith v. Hood, 900 F.3d 180,
184 n.6 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that “the ADA cannot be assessed against an individual”),
Hay v. Thaler, 470 F. App’x 411, 417-18 & n.19 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished)
(affirming dismissal of ADA and section 504 claims against defendants in their individual

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plaintiffs suing government officials under the ADA and section 504 must
necessarily pursue official-capacity claims, whereas § 1983 plaintiffs may elect
to sue officials in either their individual or official capacities (or, often, both).
Given this significant difference, it makes little sense to import the
conclusion that personal immunity defenses do not apply in official-capacity
actions from our § 1983 jurisprudence to the present claims. Indeed, several
other circuits have upheld judicial immunity in official-capacity actions
outside the context of § 1983. 18

capacities), and Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that
government officials may not be sued in their individual capacities under section 504), with
Goodman v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Claims under § 1983 may
be brought against persons in their individual or official capacity . . . .”).
18
See, e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying absolute judicial immunity in an official capacity action under the ADA and
section 504); Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (extending absolute judicial immunity to a judge sued in her official and
individual capacities under the ADA and section 504); Lloyd v. Doherty, No. 18-3552, 2018
WL 6584288, at *1, *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 2018) (unpublished) (concluding that absolute
judicial immunity barred claims against judges sued in their individual and official
capacities for money damages under the ADA and section 504); see also Kaul v. Christie,
372 F. Supp. 3d 206, 246 (D.N.J. 2019) (stating that “[a]bsolute judicial immunity applies
to all claims, whether official-capacity or personal-capacity, that are based on judicial
acts”); Livingston v. Guice, 68 F.3d 460, No. 94-1915, 1995 WL 610355, at *3-4 (4th Cir.
1995) (unpublished table decision) (holding that a judge sued in his official capacity under
the ADA was not entitled to absolute immunity in a suit pursuing only declaratory and
injunctive relief, but implying that such immunity would apply were the suit to seek
damages). But see Marks v. Tennessee, 562 F. App’x 341, 344 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014)
(unpublished) (stating in dicta that “[t]he judicial immunity doctrine does not appear to
apply, because that doctrine typically only forbids damages suits against judges . . . who are
sued in their individual capacity”); Prakel v. Indiana, 100 F. Supp. 3d 661, 677-78 (S.D. Ind.
2015) (concluding that absolute judicial immunity did not shield judges sued in their official
capacities under the ADA and section 504).

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We conclude, therefore, that Spencer may assert absolute judicial
immunity as a defense to Laird’s official-capacity suit brought under the
ADA and section 504.
III
Having determined that absolute judicial immunity applies generally
to official-capacity suits alleging violations of the ADA and section 504, we
now examine whether such immunity applies to Spencer’s conduct here. We
conclude that it does.
Absolute judicial immunity is broad but not unlimited. 19 As Laird
recognizes, for purposes of immunity, there is “an intelligible distinction
between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive
functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.” 20
Accordingly, the application of judicial immunity turns on whether the
challenged conduct is a judicial action, and whether the judge acted within
the bounds of jurisdiction. 21 In other words, “[a]bsolute judicial immunity
extends to all judicial acts that are not performed in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.” 22 The parties do not dispute that Spencer possessed
jurisdiction over Laird’s eviction proceeding; therefore, the relevant inquiry
is whether Spencer’s denial of the auxiliary aids requested by Laird during
that proceeding is a judicial act.

19
See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam) (noting that “the
immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances”).
20
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).
21
See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
22
Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993).

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When determining whether an act is “judicial in nature,” this court
considers four factors:
(1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial
function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or
appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge’s chambers;
(3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending
before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of
a visit to the judge in his official capacity. 23
We “broadly construe[]” these criteria “in favor of immunity,” and we
may extend immunity “even though one or more of the . . . factors is not
met.” 24
A
Regarding the first factor, Laird asserts that Spencer’s denial of
auxiliary aids was an administrative task, not a normal judicial function.
While there is little Fifth Circuit precedent on point, our sister circuits have
addressed similar scenarios, and we find their analysis persuasive.
In Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 25 the most analogous decision, the Ninth
Circuit examined a claim that a judge had failed to accommodate a litigant’s
hearing impairment during court proceedings, thereby violating the ADA
and section 504. 26 In that case, a partially deaf plaintiff contacted the
county’s ADA coordinator prior to trial and requested that videotext display
be utilized. 27 The ADA coordinator explained that the trial courtroom

23
Id. (citing McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972)).
24
Id.
25
260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
26
Id. at 1129.
27
Id. at 1130-31.

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would be equipped for the hearing impaired, and that the plaintiff could file
a motion with the court requesting a specific accommodation. 28 When the
plaintiff appeared at trial, however, he learned that the courtroom lacked
videotext display capability and subsequently brought a motion seeking the
technology’s implementation, which the judge denied. 29 At a post-trial
hearing, the plaintiff moved for a mistrial, which the judge denied as well. 30
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the judge was entitled to judicial
immunity for his refusal to accommodate the plaintiff.31 The court reasoned
that “[r]uling on a motion is a normal judicial function, as is exercising
control over the courtroom while court is in session.” 32
The Ninth Circuit is not the only court of appeals to apply absolute
judicial immunity to a judge’s refusal to provide auxiliary aids and services.
In Badillo v. Thorpe, 33 an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that
such immunity shielded a judge who, during a court proceeding, rejected a
hearing-impaired plaintiff’s request for specific assistive technology. 34
There, as in Duvall, the plaintiff first contacted a court administrator seeking
accommodations, then repeated the request to the judge at his hearing. 35
In the present case, whether Spencer engaged in a normal judicial
function when denying Laird’s request for auxiliary aids requires the analysis

28
Id. at 1131.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 1132.
31
Id. at 1133.
32
Id.
33
158 F. App’x 208 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished).
34
Id. at 210-11.
35
Id. at 210.

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of two separate acts: (1) his written reply to Laird’s answer, and (2) his in-
court verbal refusal to provide Laird’s desired accommodation. The latter,
which entails “exercising control over the courtroom while court is in
session,” is plainly an ordinary judicial activity. 36 The former, however, is
less clear. Unlike Duvall and Badillo, in which the plaintiffs first contacted
court administrators to request accommodations, and both judges were
unaware of the plaintiffs’ requests before trial, 37 Spencer was Laird’s sole
contact with the court. Further, Spencer’s written reply to Laird’s initial
request for auxiliary aids was not an in-court ruling, 38 but a letter sent via U.S.
Mail. Ultimately, though, this court construes “broadly . . . in favor of
immunity” the four factors governing whether an act is judicial in nature. 39
As a written response to a formal court filing, Spencer’s letter is akin to
“[r]uling on a motion,” a routine judicial task. 40
Accordingly, we conclude that Spencer’s denial of auxiliary aids, both
in writing and during the eviction proceeding, constitutes a normal judicial
function, thus favoring the extension of judicial immunity.
B
The remaining factors also point toward the extension of judicial
immunity. As to factor two, Spencer’s denial of auxiliary aids “occurred in
the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge’s
chambers.” 41 Spencer’s verbal denial of auxiliary aids took place in open

36
Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1133; see also Badillo, 158 F. App’x at 210-11.
37
See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1130-31; Badillo, 158 F. App’x at 210.
38
See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1131-32; Badillo, 158 F. App’x at 210.
39
Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993).
40
Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1133.
41
Malina, 994 F.2d at 1124.

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court. Laird contends that Spencer’s written denial did not occur in an
appropriate space but alleges no facts to support this conclusory assertion.
Indeed, Laird appeared to concede this point before the district court by
arguing that “leniency should be extended” regarding this factor.
Regarding factor three, Spencer refused to provide Laird
accommodations during eviction proceedings, so the resulting “controversy
centered around a case pending before [Spencer’s] court.” 42 Finally,
concerning factor four, “the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in
his official capacity.” 43 Spencer’s verbal denial took place in the courtroom.
While the written denial did not follow Laird’s physical appearance in
Spencer’s court or chambers, it did respond directly to Laird’s answer, a
court filing made in anticipation of the upcoming eviction proceeding.
Broadly construed, 44 Laird’s answer is akin to a judicial visit.
In sum, our four-factor test indicates that Spencer’s conduct was
judicial in nature and is thus protected by absolute judicial immunity.
C
In so holding, we emphasize the alternative forms of redress that Laird
could, and did, take advantage of. The cases that established absolute judicial
immunity “recognized that the immunity was designed to further the public
interest in an independent judiciary, sometimes at the expense of legitimate
individual grievances,” but “accepted those costs to aggrieved individuals

42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See id.

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because the judicial system itself provided other means for protecting
individual rights.” 45
Louisiana provides several such “alternative forums and methods for
vindicating those rights.” 46 Louisiana law provides that upon an “[a]ppeal
from a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace court,” the “case is tried
de novo on appeal” in the parish court or “the district court of the parish in
which the justice of the peace court is situated.” 47 Appeals brought within
twenty-four hours and accompanied by an appeal bond will “suspend
execution of a judgment of eviction.” 48 Moreover, “[s]upervisory
jurisdiction of the proceedings in the parish or district court may be exercised
by the court of appeal which otherwise would have had appellate
jurisdiction.” 49 Louisiana also maintains a Judiciary Commission charged
with receiving complaints and conducting investigations of judicial
misconduct, 50 including violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
requires judges to “perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice” and
“make reasonable efforts, consistent with the law . . . to facilitate the abilities
of all litigants . . . to be fairly heard.” 51
Despite the application of judicial immunity to her present claim,
Laird was not bereft of options for challenging her eviction proceeding and

45
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 369 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (first
citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349, 354 (1871); and then citing Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
46
Id. at 370.
47
La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 4924(A)-(B).
48
Id. art. 4735.
49
Id. art. 4924(D).
50
See La. Const. Ann. art. 5, § 25; La. Sup. Ct. R. XXIII, § 3(a)(1).
51
La. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(A)(4).

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vindicating her rights. The remedy of appeal was available not just in theory,
but also in practice. Here, Laird appealed Spencer’s order of eviction to the
19th Judicial District Court. She specifically raised the argument that
Spencer violated her rights under the ADA by refusing to accommodate her
such that she was unable to participate effectively in the eviction hearing, and
she received a de novo trial.
D
Next, we briefly address Laird’s arguments that our judicial immunity
jurisprudence “does not mesh well” with Supreme Court precedent. Laird
contends that this court’s case law, which favors the extension of immunity
by construing broadly the relevant analytical framework, clashes with
Forrester v. White. 52 Under that decision, Laird asserts, “judges who seek
absolute immunity for a non-judicial function have the burden of showing that
the exemption [from] liability is justified by overriding considerations of
public policy.” 53 But the portion of Forrester that Laird cites discusses the
evolution of official immunity generally, not judicial immunity specifically, 54
and the opinion goes on to acknowledge that “we cannot pretend that we are
writing on a clean slate or that we should ignore compelling reasons that may
well justify broader protections for judges than for some other officials.” 55

52
484 U.S. 219 (1988).
53
See id. at 224 (describing the Supreme Court’s “‘functional’ approach to
immunity questions,” which “examine[s] the nature of the functions with which a
particular official . . . has been lawfully entrusted,” “evaluate[s] the effect that exposure to
particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those
functions,” and counsels that “[o]fficials who seek exemption from personal liability have
the burden of showing that such an exemption is justified by overriding considerations of
public policy”).
54
See id.
55
Id. at 226.

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Ultimately, Forrester recognizes a dichotomy between judicial acts, which
immunity shields, and administrative, legislative, or executive acts, to which
immunity does not apply. 56 The Fifth Circuit’s approach to judicial
immunity is consistent with Forrester. The point of our four-factor analysis
is to determine whether the challenged conduct is “judicial in nature,” and
the first factor explicitly considers whether the judge was performing “a
normal judicial function.” 57
Further, Forrester is not the final word on absolute judicial immunity;
subsequent cases have further developed and refined the doctrine. In Mireles
v. Waco, 58 for example, the Supreme Court observed that
our cases make clear that [judicial] immunity is overcome in
only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune
from liability for nonjudicial actions . . . . Second, a judge is not
immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction. 59
This court’s framework for assessing judicial immunity directly follows
Mireles. 60
IV
Finally, we address the application of absolute judicial immunity to
the various types of relief sought. Laird contends that even if Spencer’s
denial of auxiliary aids and services was a judicial act shielded by absolute

56
Id. at 227.
57
Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993).
58
502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam).
59
Id. at 11-12 (first citing Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-29; and then citing Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)).
60
See Malina, 994 F.2d at 1124 (“Absolute judicial immunity extends to all judicial
acts that are not performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”).

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immunity, such immunity applies only to the claim for monetary damages
and does not bar the claims seeking prospective relief and attorney’s fees.
We conclude, however, that Laird lacks standing to pursue declaratory and
injunctive relief, and she is not entitled to attorney’s fees.
A
First, regarding her request for an injunction and a declaratory
judgment, Laird submits that Bauer v. Texas 61 permits such relief. In Bauer,
this court observed that “[a]bsolute judicial immunity . . . does not bar
prospective relief against a judicial officer.” 62 A number of our recent § 1983
cases, albeit unpublished, have reaffirmed this statement, 63 and several other
courts of appeals have extended the principle to ADA and section 504
actions. 64
But our analysis does not end here. Even assuming arguendo that
absolute judicial immunity does not bar Laird’s claims for injunctive and

61
341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003).
62
Id. at 357 (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984)).
63
See, e.g., Norman v. Tex. Ct. of Crim. Appeals, 582 F. App’x 430, 431 (5th Cir.
2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[J]udicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive
or declaratory relief in § 1983 actions.”); LaBranche v. Becnel, 559 F. App’x 290, 290 (5th
Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[J]udicial immunity does not bar claims for
injunctive or declaratory relief in civil rights actions . . . .”); Severin v. Parish of Jefferson,
357 F. App’x 601, 605 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[J]udicial immunity
does not bar declaratory relief . . . .”).
64
See, e.g., Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (observing that the plaintiff’s “claim for money damages against [the judge]
based upon the ADA and [Rehabilitation Act] is barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial
immunity,” but that “judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against
a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity” (quoting Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 541-42));
Livingston v. Guice, 68 F.3d 460, No. 94-1915, 1995 WL 610355, at *4 (4th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision) (concluding that “[w]ith [the plaintiff] only seeking injunctive

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declaratory relief, Laird must nonetheless have standing to pursue these
claims, as Spencer correctly notes. 65 While Spencer did not raise the issue of
standing before the district court, Article III standing is an “essential
component[] of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.” 66 This court has “a
continuing obligation to examine the basis for [its] jurisdiction” such that
standing concerns “may be raised by parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any
time.” 67
To demonstrate Article III standing,
a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that
is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision. 68
When “seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts”
evincing “a substantial and continuing controversy between two adverse
parties . . . [that is] real and immediate, and create[s] a definite, rather than
speculative threat of future injury.” 69 “Past exposure to illegal conduct does
not in itself show a present case or controversy . . . if unaccompanied by any

and declaratory relief against [the judge], there is no basis for affording the judge absolute
immunity”).
65
See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff must
demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.” (quoting Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000))).
66
Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
67
MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).
68
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-81 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)).
69
Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2003).

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No. 20-30237

continuing, present adverse effects.” 70 Rather, “[t]o obtain [declaratory or
injunctive] relief for past wrongs, a plaintiff must demonstrate either
continuing harm or a real and immediate threat of repeated injury in the
future.” 71
Laird seeks equitable relief to remedy Spencer’s past violation of the
ADA and section 504. She asserts no continuing harm from the alleged
violation. Nor does she demonstrate a non-speculative threat of future
injury. The complaint states that
as a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish, [Laird] may
foreseeably have to appear before . . . Spencer in the future[,]
and this possibility generates significant fear and distress for
[her] due to the discrimination she faced and expects to face in
the future if she has to return to . . . Spencer’s court.
The complaint goes on to state that “absent injunctive relief, there is a clear
risk that [Spencer’s] actions will recur with [Laird] and/or additional deaf
patients or companions [sic].” Such conjecture does not establish the
requisite threat of future harm. 72
We conclude, therefore, that even if absolute judicial immunity does
not bar Laird’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, Laird lacks
standing to pursue these remedies. “[T]he danger that excessive
superintending of state judicial functions ‘would constitute a form of

70
Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
71
Id.
72
See id. (“This court has often held that plaintiffs lack standing to seek
prospective relief against judges where the likelihood of future encounters is speculative.”).

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No. 20-30237

monitoring of the operation of state court functions that is antipathetic to
established principles of comity’” bolsters our conclusion. 73
B
All that is left is Laird’s claim for attorney’s fees. Laird contends that
absolute judicial immunity does not bar a grant of attorney’s fees under the
ADA and section 504. But because Laird’s underlying claims were properly
dismissed, she is not a “prevailing party” to whom attorney’s fees may be
awarded. 74 This form of relief is equally unavailable to Laird.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal.

73
Id. (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501 (1974)).
74
See Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 576 (5th Cir.
2018) (noting that to be considered a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under the
ADA, a party must, among other things, “achieve judicially-sanctioned relief” (quoting
Davis v. Abbott, 781 F.3d 207, 214 (5th Cir 2015)); Teresa Diane P. v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist.,
744 F.2d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1984) (“A party ‘prevails’ within the meaning of [the
Rehabilitation Act] if his or her lawsuit is a substantial factor or significant catalyst in
achieving the primary relief sought.”).

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10779270. Public record. Not legal advice.