# Michael Crist v. State of Florida

> District Court of Appeal of Florida · January 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10778311

## Case

- **Court:** District Court of Appeal of Florida
- **Decided:** January 10, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10778311

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the registration and notification requirements under the Sex Offender Act do not infringe on sex offenders’ substantive due process rights because it is “rationally related to a legitimate government interest”
- stating that content-based restrictions “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests”

## Opinion text

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________

Case No. 5D2022-2966
LT Case No. 2019-CF-001352
_____________________________

MICHAEL CRIST,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.
_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumter County.
Mary P. Hatcher, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Jane Almy, Assistant
Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard A.
Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

January 10, 2025

MAKAR, J.

At issue are governmentally compelled designations on the
front of Florida driver licenses and ID cards of people convicted of
sexual crimes. Here is an exemplar from the website of the
Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles:

The Department explains that the “Florida driver license and ID
card allows for the identification of sexual predators and sexual
offenders with a blue identifier on the bottom right of the front of
the card. Sexual predators will have ‘Sexual Predator’ spelled
out on the card, while sexual offenders have ‘943.0435,
F.S.’ listed in this area.” See Florida’s NEW Driver License and
ID Card, Florida Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,
https://www.flhsmv.gov/driver-licenses-id-cards/newdl/ (last
visited June 7, 2024). This case involves the “SEXUAL
1

PREDATOR” designation, not the sexual offender designation;
the latter—as indicated—uses only the number of the sexual
offender statute, “section 943.0435,” rather than a phrase such as
“SEXUAL OFFENDER,” or the like. In general, sexual predators
are sexual offenders who have committed two or more sexual

1 Because this case involves a Florida driver license, rather

than a Florida ID card, references to the former will generally
include the latter for convenience. In addition, references will be
to a “driver license,” the phrase used in Florida Statutes, rather
than the colloquial “driver’s license.” See § 322.01(18), Fla. Stat.
(2024).
2
offenses, who used physical violence in such offenses, or who
preyed on children. § 775.21(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2024).

In 2001, at the age of 26, Michael Crist, attempted to engage
in unlawful conduct with a minor under the age of 12. In 2002, he
pled no contest to violations of section 794.011(3), Florida
Statutes, (attempted sexual battery on a child under the age of
12), and section 800.04(5)(a) & (b), Florida Statutes, (lewd and
lascivious molestation), resulting in eight years in prison and
seventeen years of supervision. He was released from custody in
May 2008 and thereafter resided in Sumter County.

Over a decade later, a probation officer went to Crist’s home
to conduct a sexual predator registration check; Crist had no
prior supervisory violations at that time. The officer asked for
Crist’s driver license but snatched it away when Crist appeared
to be scratching off a sticker (a Happy Face emoji) placed over the
SEXUAL PREDATOR designation. Crist was charged with
possession of a driver license without the required designation
and for tampering with evidence (by attempting to scratch off the
sticker).

Crist moved to have the statutes requiring the SEXUAL
PREDATOR designation (sections 322.212(5)(c) and 322.141
(3)(a), Florida Statutes) declared unconstitutional as applied to
him. He relied on recent cases from the Louisiana Supreme Court
and a federal district court in Alabama, each holding that similar
designations amounted to compelled speech in violation of the
license holder’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment.
The trial court, however, held that (a) Crist failed to provide any
Florida caselaw that the sexual predator designation on Crist’s
license was compelled speech and (b) the designation “is less
intrusive and less restrictive than any alternative that would still
meet the compelling interest of public notification.” Crist appeals
the denial of his motion.

I.

Florida has a compelling governmental interest in protecting
the public from persons who have been convicted of offenses
deemed sexual predation. That’s because the legislature has

3
declared that sexual predators “present an extreme threat to the
public safety” and “are extremely likely to use physical violence
and to repeat their offenses.” § 775.21(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Indeed, the
legislature has said that Florida “has a compelling interest in
protecting the public from sexual predators and in protecting
children from predatory sexual activity, and there is sufficient
justification for requiring sexual predators to register and for
requiring community and public notification of the presence of
sexual predators.” Id. § 775.21(3)(c).

Because of the “high level of threat that a sexual predator
presents to the public safety, and the long-term effects suffered
by victims of sex offenses,” the State has sufficient “justification
to implement a strategy that includes”:

3. Requiring the registration of sexual predators, with a
requirement that complete and accurate information be
maintained and accessible for use by law enforcement
authorities, communities, and the public.

4. Providing for community and public notification
concerning the presence of sexual predators.

Id. § 775.21(3)(b)3. & 4. Pursuant to legislative directive, Florida
has online registration and notification systems. Sexual offenders
and sexual predators are required to register and provide
detailed information on a real-time basis such as address, phone
number, internet identifiers, autos, and in-state travel. Their
photos and personal information (race, sex, hair color, eye color,
height, weight) are posted for identification. A link on the site
produces printable flyers with a registrant’s photo, background,
offenses and even a QR code (specific to each registrant) for
posting. Florida provides online search engines for locating
sexual offenders and sexual predators that generate maps so the
public can see if such individuals live in their neighborhoods. The
system also has a notification/tracking feature that allows
members of the public to receive an email whenever a sexual
offender or sexual predator moves close to an address in Florida,
which could be a home, workplace, school, daycare, and so on.

4
This case does not directly involve the registration and
notification systems or the search engines that are available for
law enforcement and the public to identify, locate, and receive
notifications about sexual offenders and predators. As a general
matter, these systems are deemed constitutional with minimal
judicial scrutiny because they have a rational basis. See, e.g., Doe
v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1344−48 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that
the registration and notification requirements under the Sex
Offender Act do not infringe on sex offenders’ substantive due
process rights because it is “rationally related to a legitimate
government interest”); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202,
1209−10 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding Moore’s substantive due process
analysis applicable where “[t]he same putative ‘right’ of a sexual
offender to refuse to register and to prevent publication is at
issue in this case under a similar national registration statute,
and the restrictions contained in the federal statute, similarly,
are rationally related to Congress’ legitimate goal in protecting
the public from recidivist sex offenders”); see also Butler v. State,
923 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (analyzing Moore).
Though these systems are generally valid and not under scrutiny
in this case, they are relevant in analyzing the legal issue
presented: whether the designation of “SEXUAL PREDATOR” on
a Florida driver license violates constitutional principles as a
form of compelled speech by the license holder that is not
narrowly tailored under the applicable strict scrutiny test, given
the registration and notification systems just described.

A. Florida Driver Licenses and Compelled Speech.

The first step is determining the nature of a Florida driver
license. Is it a governmentally controlled forum containing
government speech, private speech, or a hybrid of the two? The
State candidly and justifiably concedes that it has not argued
that the SEXUAL PREDATOR designation on a Florida driver
license is purely government speech subject to little or no judicial
scrutiny. Nor could it.

On its face, a Florida driver license is a conglomeration of
governmental and personal speech, some of it compelled by law to
be on the front of the license (such as the “Sexual Predator”
designation) and some of it voluntarily placed there (such as the

5
“Organ Donor,” “Veteran,” “Deaf” and “Developmentally
Disabled” designations). The back of the card has additional
voluntary designations for holders of Lifetime Florida Wildlife
Commission freshwater fishing, hunting, saltwater fishing, and
sportsman licenses, among others; symbols such as a bass, deer,
sailfish, and rifle/rod are used. Florida driver licenses are
essentially speech hybrids.

With its mixture of information, images, and symbols, a
Florida driver license cannot be seen as simply a plastic card
containing only governmental speech. That’s because several of
its features are private or personal information that license
holders want to convey to others. Plus, most of the
governmentally required information, such as address, date of
birth, sex, height, and sexual crimes, is not purely governmental;
it is factual information about the license holder that is personal
only to him individually. Some people don’t like certain facts
about themselves to be known, such as their confidential home
addresses (e.g., police officers, public officials, etc.) or their age
(for vanity or other reasons), their sex presented in a binary mode
(a contemporary matter of controversy), or that they are a certain
height. In short, a Florida driver license is not purely a
governmentally controlled forum with only governmentally
approved viewpoints or speech; it is a hybrid of government and
private speech.

Even if it were purely government speech it would still be
subject to constitutional analysis under the compelled speech
doctrine when the governmental message is placed on a license
tag, a driver license, or any other item that is readily associated
with an individual. The Supreme Court directly addressed this
point, stating the “Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the
government’s speech if, for example, the government seeks to
compel private persons to convey the government’s speech.”
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Vets., Inc., 576 U.S. 200,
208 (2015); see Doe 1 v. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1325
(M.D. Ala. 2019) (“But the fact that a license is government
speech does not mean it is immune from the compelled speech
analysis.”); see also State v. Hill, 341 So. 3d 539, 552 (La. 2020)
(“Thus, even though an identification card is government speech,
a compelled speech analysis may still be required.”). Here, the
6
governmental message is “I, as the holder of this license, am a
sexual predator.”

Next is the question of whether the sexual predator
designation is “compelled speech.” As just mentioned, a Florida
driver license is not immunized from the compelled speech
doctrine simply because it is governmentally controlled and
contains some governmentally approved information. The State
concedes that even if a Florida driver license was considered
governmental speech, it would still be subject to judicial review
as compelled speech.

Indeed, the license plate in Wooley v. Maynard, was
governmentally controlled and contained an ideological
expression (“Live Free or Die”) that the government supported,
but that didn’t stop the United States Supreme Court from
concluding that Wooley, who disagreed with the slogan, had a
constitutional right not to display it. 430 U.S. 705, 716−17 (1977).
Government speech is a different animal from compelled speech.
The former focuses on the government’s interest in expressing its
own views without compelling a private person to communicate
information or a message he does not wish to convey; the latter
involves the government compelling a person to do so.

The test for compelled speech, applied here, is whether the
SEXUAL PREDATOR designation communicates information
compelled by the government that is readily linked or associated
with the plaintiff. See Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 949–
51 (10th Cir. 2015); see generally Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714−17.
This test is easily met. The designation is compelled by the
government over Crist’s objection, and the designation is directly
associated with Crist: it is a designation on a driver license that
is personal to him alone. See Doe 1, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1326
(“Identification cards, by contrast, are personalized. They are
meant to convey substantive personal information about their
holders. They are meant to be displayed, never to be given
away.”).

By compelling that the designation be on Crist’s license, the
State is directly conveying that information through Crist, who
must have his driver license in his possession 24/7. He is required

7
to present it upon demand at any time or place. It is universally
understood to be his driver license, one that he must present in
myriads of daily transactions with businesses, government
offices, and others that require personal identification. He paid
for it, he must possess it, and he has a due process right in
retaining the privilege of using it. The question is not who owns
or has a property interest in a driver license, but whether it is
readily linked or associated with its holder; here, that is clearly
Crist. His driver license is not a duly issued official state
document in a government filing cabinet (or computer file) or
posted on a governmental website. It is governmentally
regulated, but that does not diminish the fact that the license is
personal and readily identifiable as Crist’s personal license with
information related directly to him. See Doe 1, 367 F. Supp. 3d at
1326; Mariach v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 57 (2013) (“To obtain a
driver’s license . . . state DMVs, as a general rule, require an
individual to disclose detailed personal information, including
name, home address, telephone number, Social Security number,
and medical information.”). In short, it is Crist’s identity on the
card, not that of the government; no reasonable observer would
conclude it is the government’s identity that is featured on Crist’s
driver license.

Plus, the State’s ability to take away a driver license under
certain circumstances does not give the government the
unreviewable right to place any message or information it wants
on it and force persons to convey that message or information to
others. Just like a driver license, a Florida license plate is subject
to forfeiture, but as in Wooley the government cannot compel a
message on it. Government regulation of driver licenses likewise
does not give the government the right to compel whatever
message the government desires. Just because the government
regulates—or even owns—lapel buttons or t-shirts emblazoned
with SEXUAL PREDATOR doesn’t mean it can force individuals
such as Crist to wear them at all times and all places; nor could it
force the expression of political viewpoints (“Vote Democratic!”) or
causes (“Build the Wall!”). As the Supreme Court has reminded
us, the “Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the
government’s speech if, for example, the government seeks to
compel private persons to convey the government’s speech.”
Walker, 576 U.S. at 208.

8
Furthermore, a driver license is readily viewable to a broad
swath of members of the public who require it for transacting
business and other essential activities. It is not like a road-side
billboard or a car’s license plate, both of which are in public
spaces and visible to members of the public generally. But both
do not directly or necessarily convey information about a specific
person or who even owns them. The license tag in Wooley, for
example, was on Wooley’s car, but observers would not
necessarily know who owned the car. In sharp contrast, a Florida
driver license is a privately possessed card that displays
compulsory information that is directly personal to the license-
holder and thereby readily associated with the individual person
whose face and name are on it. As the court in Hill stated, “[e]ven
more so than a license plate on a car, an identification card is
personalized to such an extent that it is readily associated with
the bearer.” Hill, 341 So. 3d at 549.

A Florida driver license is a forum in which a license holder,
who has been convicted of a sexual offense, is compelled to
disclose the fact of his criminal history against his wishes. That a
fact is compelled rather than a political opinion or policy doesn’t
matter. The Supreme Court has made clear that the compelled
speech doctrine applies whether the government compels political
speech or facts. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487
U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988) (stating that its precedents “cannot be
distinguished simply because they involved compelled statements
of opinion while here we deal with compelled statements of ‘fact’:
either form of compulsion burdens protected speech”).

As both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Alabama
federal district courts have concluded, a compelled disclosure
emblazoned on a driver license is a form of compelled speech
subject to constitutional limitations. Indeed, the Alabama federal
court recently concluded that an identification card with a sexual
offender designation is compelled speech.

This is so for the same reasons that the court previously
found the “CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER” ID label
compelled speech. See Doe 1, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1323–27
(explaining why an ID label requirement attached to a
9
certain group of people constitutes compelled speech).
Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the challenged
provision does not simply require sex offenders to
“maintain and possess an ID;” it requires the ID to bear
a specific, expressive message. Indeed, the explicit
purpose of the provision is to express a class-based
message. Like a license plate that says, “Live Free or
Die,” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, or a yard
sign that warns away citizens from a sex offender’s
home, McClendon v. Long, 22 F.4th 1330, 1333 (11th
Cir. 2022), a required message classifying someone as a
sex offender on their personal ID constitutes compelled
speech.

McGuire v. Marshall, No. 2:19-CV-174-WKW, 2024 WL 2401833,
at *60 (M.D. Ala. May 23, 2024) (citation and footnote omitted).
Similarly, requiring a message declaring a person is a SEXUAL
PREDATOR on his personal driver license constitutes compelled
speech, which may be constitutional if it meets the applicable
judicial test.

B. The Judicial Test

The final step is applying the proper judicial test to assess
whether the means used to advance the government’s compelling
interest in protecting the public from recidivism by sexual
predators is permissible under free speech precedent. The few
cases that discuss the proper test in the context of sexual
offenders/driver licenses apply the most difficult test, that of
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Hill, 341 So. 3d at 545; Doe 1, 367 F.
Supp. 3d at 1326.2

2 An anomaly identified in Hill is that polar opposite tests

apply depending on how a “branded-identification card” is
characterized, i.e., whether it “amounts to government speech or
compelled speech.” Hill, 341 So. 3d at 545. “If compelled speech,
the branded identification card faces strict scrutiny. If
government speech, the branded identification card faces little to
no scrutiny.” Id. (emphases added). We note that the Supreme
Court in recent years has softened the judicial test for content-
based regulations in limited situations, but not yet in the
10
They do so in part based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wooley, which held that New Hampshire could not punish Mr.
Wooley for covering up the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” on his
state-issued license plate. The rationale in Wooley was that even
when a state’s purpose in compelling a message on a vehicle’s
license plate is “legitimate and substantial,” that “purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” 430 U.S.
at 716 (citation omitted) (emphases added). The highlighted
language emphasizes the narrowness of the state’s choices when
it chooses to compel a person to convey information that they do
not wish to express or associate with.

The Alabama and Louisiana cases also point to the
multitude of Supreme Court precedents holding that a content-
based restriction on speech must pass strict scrutiny, meaning
that the state “must have a compelling interest, and it must have
adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.”
Doe 1, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1326 (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (stating that content-based restrictions
“are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if
the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests”)); see also Hill, 341 So. 3d at 553 (“The
branded identification card is compelled speech, and it is a

compelled speech context. See, e.g., Vidal v. Elster, 602 U.S. 286,
300 (2024) (“Because of the uniquely content-based nature of
trademark regulation and the longstanding coexistence of
trademark regulation with the First Amendment, we need not
evaluate a solely content-based restriction on trademark
registration under heightened scrutiny.”); Davenport v. Wash.
Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 190 (2007) (noting that content-based
regulations of speech are presumptively unconstitutional, but
that in the “unique context of public-sector agency-shop
arrangements, the content-based nature of [the statute at issue]
does not violate the First Amendment”). Whether it or our
supreme court decides to do so is their prerogative alone.
11
content-based regulation of speech that consequently must pass
strict scrutiny.”).

Both courts concluded that requiring the display of “sexual
offender” or the like on an individual’s state-issued identification
card is not the least restrictive way of advancing the state’s
interest. In Hill, the court concluded as follows:

The branded identification card is compelled
speech, and it is a content-based regulation of speech
that consequently must pass strict scrutiny. While the
state certainly has a compelling interest in protecting
the public and enabling law enforcement to identify a
person as a sex offender, Louisiana has not adopted the
least restrictive means of doing so. A symbol, code, or a
letter designation would inform law enforcement that
they are dealing with a sex offender and thereby reduce
the unnecessary disclosure to others during everyday
tasks. The sex offender registry and notification is
available to those who have a need to seek out that
information, while also not unnecessarily requiring
disclosing that information to others via a branded
identification. As Louisiana has not used the least
restrictive means of advancing its otherwise compelling
interest, the branded identification requirement is
unconstitutional.

Hill, 341 So. 3d at 553. Likewise, in Doe 1, the court concluded
that:

The State has a compelling interest in enabling law
enforcement to identify a person as a sex offender. But
Alabama has not adopted the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest. By using “CRIMINAL SEX
OFFENDER” instead of a single letter, the State goes
beyond what is necessary to achieve its asserted
interest.

Doe 1, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1326 (internal citation omitted). The
court noted that Alabama conceded that it “could use a single
letter to designate sex offenders” and that “law enforcement
12
officers would know what that single letter meant.” Id. at
1326−27. As such, “using one letter would keep officers informed
while reducing the unnecessary disclosure of information to
others.” Id. at 1327 (footnote omitted). Notably, Alabama’s
legislature responded to Doe 1 by dispensing with the CRIMINAL
SEX OFFENDER designation on identification cards in favor of
the “code ‘CV606’ in small black font,” which was upheld as
constitutional. McGuire, 2024 WL 2401833, at *60.

Both courts focused on the law enforcement’s need to identify
sexual offenders via a symbol, code, or letter on the identification
card. The court in Hill also highlighted that a state-compelled sex
offender registry and notification system was publicly available
“to those who have a need to seek out that information, while also
not unnecessarily requiring disclosing that information to others
via a branded identification.” Hill, 341 So. 3d at 553.

The reasoning of both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the
Alabama federal court are persuasive and support the conclusion
that the SEXUAL PREDATOR designation is not narrowly
tailored or the least restrictive means, thereby failing strict
scrutiny. As a content-based restriction, the designation is
presumptively unconstitutional, requiring that the “government
proves that [the restriction is] narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 163. Unlike
legislation generally, which is presumed constitutional, the
restriction at issue is presumed to be unconstitutional because it
forces an individual to convey governmentally compelled
information over his objection. It does not mean the government
automatically loses, only that it must prove that its restriction is
narrowly tailored and no broader than necessary.

Here, the State relies on the statutory language of the
legislature’s purpose for a registration and notification system of
sexual offenders and sexual predators. The legislature identified
two goals: registration and notification, both of which are
substantially advanced by Florida’s comprehensive registration
and notification systems, by which the public can freely obtain
information and emails about sexual offenders and predators who
live in or move into their neighborhoods. The State clearly
advances its compelling interest through these systems, which
13
meet constitutional standards by disseminating information
broadly without compelling speech by individual registrants.

The question, however, is whether—given the robust
registration and notification systems in place for use by the
general public and law enforcement—the State has proven it has
no less intrusive means and must necessarily use the SEXUAL
PREDATOR designation on driver licenses rather than use a code
or statute number as it does for sexual offenders. Existing
precedent, though limited, holds that the use of a code or number
is constitutional under compelled speech analysis because they
provide information to persons with a need to know it; it is
narrowly tailored in that sense. Persons needing to screen for
sexual predators can ask to see a driver license and determine if
it has the code/number. The court in Doe 1 pointed out that the
“general public most likely would not know what that single
letter meant” thereby reducing the potential for overbroad
disclosures of compelled speech. Doe 1, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1327.
In other words, compelled use of the SEXUAL PREDATOR
designation to the world at large is overbroad if a more narrow
and functional means of communication is available.

The point of strict scrutiny is that the government must
carefully tailor a compelled speech policy that is no broader than
necessary to advance its interest in protecting the public. In this
regard, not every situation calls for the compelled public
disclosure that an individual has previously committed a sex
crime. A requirement that a registrant publicly wear a
governmentally compelled tee shirt or badge saying SEXUAL
PREDATOR would be highly effective in notifying the public
about the person’s past sexual criminality; but it is doubtful such
a requirement would be narrowly tailored to pass constitutional
analysis. The same would be true of tee shirts or badges saying
FELON, STALKER, MURDERER, and so on for those released
into society but who may have committed crimes with elevated
risks of recidivism. In a similar way, the SEXUAL PREDATOR
designation on driver licenses is not a narrowly tailored means to
inform only those persons who have the greater need to know
about an individual’s past sexual criminality.

14
The conclusion that the “SEXUAL PREDATOR” designation
on Crist’s driver license is impermissibly compelled speech under
the prevailing judicial test in no way involves the use of judicial
power to compel a specific change to the statutory law. It merely
holds that this specific designation is off-limits under the Bill of
Rights enacted by and for the People; no judicially compelled
change of law is made. Whether the government chooses to use a
particular number, symbol, color, or font size in place of the
current designation is not something a court directs or involves
itself in. The State might choose to use statute numbers but use
red for sexual predators and blue for sexual offenders; it might
use symbols that the public readily understands; it might choose
to issue separate free-standing sexual offender identification
cards that sexual offenders and sexual predators must present
when asked. These are decisions for the legislative and executive
branches, not the judicial branch.

II.

Florida laudably has rigorous registration and notification
systems designed to closely monitor sexual offenders and sexual
predators. The systems inform the public and law enforcement
about the location and backgrounds of sexual offenders and
sexual predators, which includes notifications to the public and
institutions such as schools and churches when sexual offenders
and predators reside in their neighborhoods. The designation of
SEXUAL PREDATOR on a personal driver license, however, is
the type of compelled speech that is a step too far as the
Louisiana Supreme Court and an Alabama federal court have
held. The availability of numbers, symbols, or codes in various
colors and fonts, as an example, shows a lack of narrow tailoring
and that the government’s compelling interest in protecting the
public can be achieved without compelling speech impermissibly.
We emphasize that our decision is based on the existing United
States Supreme Court and lower court precedent on compelled
speech analysis and not out of sympathy for those who have
committed the underlying crimes for which they have served
their punishment. Because this issue is one of great public
importance, the following question is certified for the Florida
Supreme Court’s consideration:

15
Does the requirement that a Florida driver license
contain the designation SEXUAL PREDATOR for those
persons within that category constitute compelled
speech that is unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny
test?

Because of the importance and unsettled nature of the issue, we
withhold issuance of the mandate and stay our decision, holding
it in abeyance to allow for Florida Supreme Court review.

WALLIS, J., concurs.
SOUD, J., dissents with opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

16
Case No. 5D2022-2966
LT Case No. 2019-CF-001352

SOUD, J., dissenting.

Is it constitutional for the People of Florida to require a
convicted sexual predator such as Michael Crist—as a
consequence of his conviction—to have his state-issued Florida
driver license marked with the words “SEXUAL PREDATOR” as
one means of protecting vulnerable children from those who may
desire to sexually abuse them? Of course it is.

Yet, remarkably, the majority in its ill-conceived opinion
concludes otherwise and declares unconstitutional sections
322.212(5)(c) and 322.141(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2021).
Undeterred by the long-standing and strong presumption that
duly enacted Florida statutes are constitutional, the majority
races into a dangerously wayward opinion that ends in a
repugnant result with deleterious effect.

First, the majority unjustifiably strips from law enforcement
and the public generally the ability to readily identify through a
government-issued certificate (a driver license) one who is a
convicted sexual predator, thereby threatening the public safety,
even if unintentionally, by heightening the risk sexual predators
pose to Florida’s children and families. Second, some may argue
(wrongly) that the analysis employed by the majority extends
beyond this case and opens the door to others who seek editorial
control over information on a driver license that more fits the
whim of the licensee. This Court should immediately return that
door to its closed and locked position.

The majority’s decision simply strains reason and
understanding. And it is founded upon the softest and loosest of
constitutional soil.

Therefore, I dissent.

17
I.

In 2001, Michael Crist was charged in Sumter County,
Florida with three counts of capital sexual battery and two
counts of first-degree lewd or lascivious molestation. More
specifically, Crist was charged with the penile-anal rape of a boy
less than 12 years of age. He was further charged with engaging
in oral sex and other lewd touching with the young boy during a
five-month period.

Ultimately, Crist was allowed to enter a plea agreement by
which he pleaded guilty to lesser included offenses: three counts
of attempted sexual battery upon a person less than 12 years of
age and two counts of second-degree lewd or lascivious
molestation. By his plea, Crist admitted his guilt and
acknowledged that the child victim was “truthful” concerning the
allegations and that, subsequent to the charged conduct, Crist
invited the child-victim to his home “intend[ing] to again engage
in sexual acts with that child.” Crist also acknowledged that
another minor child “who first brought [his] criminal actions to
light concerning the [young male] child victim in the pending case
has been truthful concerning [Crist’s] sexual overtures toward
her.” By the terms of the plea, Crist was designated a sexual
predator and sentenced to 8 years in prison followed by 17 years
of sex-offender probation.

Upon release from prison, Crist began serving the sex-
offender probation portion of his sentence. By operation of section
322.141(3)(a), Florida Statutes, Crist’s Florida driver license was
to bear the marking “SEXUAL PREDATOR.” While Crist was on
probation, a law enforcement officer went to Crist’s residence to
conduct a registration check and verify his current address.
When Crist was asked for his identification, the law enforcement
officer observed Crist “picking” at the license while he delayed
giving it to the officer. Based on the officer’s experience, he
believed Crist was trying to remove a sticker from his license that
concealed the “SEXUAL PREDATOR” marking. When the officer
was able to obtain Crist’s license, he observed a smiley face

18
sticker covering the statutorily required marking. Crist was
arrested.

Crist was charged with violation of section 322.212(5)(c),
Florida Statutes, and attempted tampering with evidence. As a
result of these charges, he also was alleged to have violated his
probation. Crist filed his motion asking the trial court to declare
sections 322.212(5)(c) and 322.141(3)(a) unconstitutional. Crist
argued that the required “SEXUAL PREDATOR” marking on his
driver license compels his speech, in violation of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, Crist entered
an admission of violation of probation and related plea agreement
to the new charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his
motion. Crist was sentenced to 295 months in prison for violation
of his probation (just more than 24.5 years). He also was
sentenced to concurrent terms of five years in prison on each of
his two new crimes. This appeal followed.

II.

Florida statutes are cloaked with a “strong presumption” in
Florida law that they are constitutional. Montgomery v. State, 69
So. 3d 1023, 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing first DuFresne v.
State, 826 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. 2002), and then Adhin v. First
Horizon Home Loans, 44 So. 3d 1245, 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)).
“It is a fundamental principle of our constitutional jurisprudence
that all doubts as to the validity of a statute are to be resolved in
favor of constitutionality where reasonably possible.” Westerheide
v. State, 767 So. 2d 637, 647 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), approved, 831
So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
presumed constitutionality endures until the contrary is shown.
Id. Thus, one who challenges a statute’s constitutionality
shoulders “a heavy burden of establishing its invalidity.”
Montgomery, 69 So. 3d at 1026 (citing Wright v. State, 739 So. 2d
1230, 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)).

A.

19
The Florida Sexual Predators Act, found in section 775.21,
Florida Statutes, governs those who have been convicted of
qualifying sexual offenses set forth therein. See § 775.21(4)(a),
Fla. Stat. To serve the State of Florida’s “compelling interest in
protecting the public from sexual predators and in protecting
children from predatory sexual activity,” see § 775.21(3)(c), Fla.
Stat., the Act requires that all individuals convicted of qualifying
offenses shall, at the time of sentencing, be designated a “sexual
predator.” See § 775.21(5), Fla. Stat. The convicted sexual
predator also is subjected to, inter alia, registration
requirements, see § 775.21(6), Fla. Stat., and public-notification
procedures. See § 775.21(7), Fla. Stat.

Further, a Florida driver license or identification card issued
to a designated sexual predator “shall have on the front of the
license or identification card . . . the marking ‘SEXUAL
PREDATOR.’” § 322.141(3)(a), Fla. Stat. If the designated sexual
predator fails to display or otherwise alters this required
marking on the driver license issued to him, he commits a third-
degree felony. See § 322.212(5)(c) and (6), Fla. Stat.

B.

Crist argues that the “SEXUAL PREDATOR” marking on
the driver license issued to him by the Florida Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is unconstitutional because
it compels his speech in violation of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. I disagree.

To determine the constitutionality of sections 322.141(3)(a)
and 322.212(5)(c), we must resolve two issues. First, does the
statutorily required “SEXUAL PREDATOR” marking now placed
upon the Florida driver license issued to Crist compel his speech?
Finally, if so, does such compelled speech violate the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution?

In my view, the answer to the first question is no—the
required marking does not compel Crist’s speech. Further,
assuming arguendo such marking did compel Crist’s speech, the
answer to the second question also is no—the required marking
does not violate the First Amendment.

20
1.

The statutorily required “SEXUAL PREDATOR” marking on
Crist’s driver license does not compel speech by Crist. Rather, it
is the government of the State of Florida that speaks.

Government speech has been described as speech by the
government in furtherance of its purposes or programs. See
Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S.
200, 232 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). And when the government
chooses to speak, it does not trigger First Amendment
safeguards.1 “The Free Speech Clause restricts government
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467
(2009) (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553
(2005) (“[T]he Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny.”) (other citations omitted)); see also Walker,
500 U.S. at 207 (“When government speaks, it is not barred by
the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it
says.”). Generally, a government entity has the right to “speak for
itself.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 229 (2000). When the government chooses to speak, “it
is entitled to say what it wishes.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).2 And when government
does so, “it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the

1 The majority suggests that even if it were to determine the

driver license was purely government speech, “it would still be
subject to constitutional analysis under the compelled speech
doctrine.” As this statement makes clear, the majority’s position
in this regard is entirely dependent upon its determination that
the marking compels Crist’s speech. With this, I disagree.

2 As Justice Alito, writing for the Court, further explained in

Pleasant Grove City, “This does not mean that there are no
restraints on government speech. For example, government
speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.” 555 U.S.
at 468; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–98 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause).

21
political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly
elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary
position.” Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.

While it is true that the government has the right to speak,
it does not have the right to compel Crist to disseminate its
message. Here, however, the State has not spoken through Crist.
Rather, it speaks through its own, duly issued document—a
Florida driver license.

Pertinent here, the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech . . . .” Amend. I, U.S. Const. The United
States Supreme Court, in interpreting the First Amendment, has
determined that “the right of freedom of thought protected by the
First Amendment against state action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citations omitted). “The
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual
freedom of mind.’” Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has
further concluded that the “compelled speech doctrine applies to
ideological speech and purely factual, non-commercial speech.”
McClendon v. Long, 22 F.4th 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988);
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755
(2018)).

As urged by Crist, the majority essentially relies primarily
on two cases in support of his position that the challenged
statutes are unconstitutional: Doe 1 v. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d
1310 (M.D. Ala. 2019), and State v. Hill, 341 So. 3d 539 (La.
2020). Those cases conclude that each state’s similar laws
requiring markings on the driver licenses held by those who have
committed sexual crimes impermissibly compelled the offender’s
speech in violation of the First Amendment. In my view, both
cases are devoid of any persuasive force or effect.

Nearly fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in
Wooley declared unconstitutional New Hampshire’s punishment
of a citizen for covering the State motto “Live Free or Die” on his

22
license plate affixed to his personal automobile. Wooley, 430 U.S.
at 717. The Court held it was violative of the First Amendment to
“require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a
manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read
by the public.” Id. at 713 (emphasis added). To allow the state to
do so would “in effect require[] that appellees use their private
property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message
or suffer a penalty[.]” Id. at 715; see also McClendon, 22 F.4th at
1336 (citing Wooley). Such action “invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control.” Wooley, 430 U.S.
at 715 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).

The “SEXUAL PREDATOR” marking on Crist’s license
materially differs from Wooley in two important ways. First, the
marking is not displayed on Crist’s private, personal property.
Second, the required marking is not placed on the driver license
“for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the
public” at large. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (emphasis added).

a.

Simply stated, much like a U.S. passport, a Florida driver
license remains government property and, when issued by the
State and placed in Crist’s possession, does not constitute Crist’s
personally owned private property. See Doe v. Kerry, No. 16-cv-
0654-PJH, 2016 WL 5339804, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016) (a
U.S. passport “remain[s] government property even when held by
individuals” and may constitutionally bear an identifier notifying
those who view the passport that the holder is a convicted sex
offender). A Florida driver license is “a certificate that, subject to
all other requirements of law, authorizes an individual to drive a
motor vehicle.” § 322.01(17), Fla. Stat. The driver license is
issued only by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles. See § 322.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat. And Florida law
grants to the department the right to require the surrender of the
driver license upon certain occurrences. See, e.g., § 322.059, Fla.
Stat. (surrender of license required for delinquent support
obligation); § 322.22, Fla. Stat. (authorizing cancelation or

23
withholding of issuance or renewal of license and requiring
surrender of canceled license).

The holder of a Florida driver license, such as Crist,
possesses no “editorial control” over what information is
contained on the license. No Floridian can add a statement to an
officially issued license that may express the holder’s personal
view or opinion.3 Indeed, the State of Florida alone determines
what information is displayed on a driver license. Florida law
dictates—in considerable detail—what information is set forth on
the license, including, inter alia: a color photograph or digital
image of the licensee; the name of the State; a unique number
assigned to the licensee; the licensee’s full name, date of birth,
and residential address; a description of the licensee, to include
his sex and height; and the dates of issuance and expiration of
the license. A license is also required to be signed by the licensee
and identify the class of vehicle he may operate. See § 322.14(1),
Fla. Stat.; see also § 322.141, Fla. Stat. The holder of the license
has no prerogative to request or require the removal of this
information beyond that contemplated by Florida law.4

3 To permit the holder of a Florida driver license to add to or

alter its contents based on the whim or preference of the holder
would diminish the license as a means of government-issued
identification.

4 The majority’s novel determination that a government-
issued Florida driver license is a “speech hybrid” containing both
governmental and personal voluntary speech, such as for an
organ donor or lifetime fishing or hunting licensee, misses the
point. Such information is only permitted on a license for those
who qualify for inclusion because the State of Florida directs such
information be placed there. The reason for this requirement
seems clear: the identification of the licensee as an organ donor,
for example, must be able to be officially communicated to proper
authorities when needed or required. While one may voluntarily
choose to be an organ donor or not, and the state does not make
that choice, the inclusion of the information on the license of the
organ donor is not personal because it is provided for by the
Department, not simply the individual.

24
Further, the State of Florida exerts considerable control over
the physical license itself. Specifically, Florida law provides:

Every licensee shall have his or her driver license, which
must be fully legible with no portion of such license
faded, altered, mutilated, or defaced, in his or her
immediate possession at all times when operating a
motor vehicle and shall present or submit the same
upon the demand of a law enforcement officer or an
authorized representative of the department.

§ 322.15(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). As such, when the driver
license was tendered by the State into Crist’s possession, the
license retains its character as a government “certificate,” see
§ 322.01, Fla. Stat., over which the government maintains
ownership and statutory control.

It is that certificate—that license issued by the Florida
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles—that conveys
the State’s message identifying Crist’s legal status as a “SEXUAL
PREDATOR.” Such legal status is born from the designation
Florida law placed upon him as a result of his conviction for his
admitted and horrendous sexual offenses perpetrated against his
minor child victim. He did not choose the classification, and one
can rightly conclude he would discard the status if allowed.
Nonetheless, Florida law requires Crist be designated a sexual
predator and that the Department identify Crist as a convicted
sexual predator on his state-issued driver license.

As a result, both the substance of the communication—
Crist’s legal status as a sexual predator, which is pertinent to his
legal identity—and the means of communication—the driver
license issued by the State of Florida to Crist that contains all
information required by law—is quintessential government
speech. Far different than the forced straw-like hypotheticals
presented by the majority involving overtly political commentary
(which push to the brink of absurdity), the State’s communication
of Crist’s legal status as a dangerous sexual predator is purely
governmental speech spoken through a purely governmental
medium. And the State is permitted to communicate Crist’s legal

25
status in furtherance of its purpose to protect the community and
children in Florida.

That Crist has possession of the driver license, and exercises
a degree of concurrent physical control over it, does not render
the license “his property.” See Kerry, 2016 WL 5339804, at *17
(“Passports remain government property even when held by
individuals . . . .”). And because the State’s message
communicating Crist’s status as a sexual predator is not
communicated through use of Crist’s private property—as was
the case in Wooley and McClendon—the State has not
impermissibly compelled Crist’s speech.

b.

Additionally, the driver license here is distinguishable from
the license plate in Wooley because the required marking is not
placed on the driver license “for the express purpose that it be
observed and read by the public.” See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713
(emphasis added). The compelled distribution of the government
speech at issue in Wooley (a license plate attached to one’s
vehicle) and McClendon (a yard sign placed by a local sheriff’s
office at the residences of registered sex offenders warning
passersby not to trick or treat at the home) involved distribution
by displaying the message on one’s private property that would
be observed and read by all passersby. See McClendon, 22 F.4th
1336–38.

Far different than Wooley and McClendon, the “SEXUAL
PREDATOR” marking is not placed on Crist’s driver license as a
“billboard,” see Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715, designed to be a message
communicated to the public at large and consumed by them. By
its very nature, a driver license customarily is held in one’s wallet
(or the like) along with other items needed for business or
personal purposes. Unlike a license plate or sign, it is not
displayed to all who pass by or encounter its holder. Rather, it is
a means of official identification (and certificate of authority to
operate a motor vehicle on public roadways) that is shown when
required or requested. Those who may request to view the license
may be law enforcement or other governmental agents, as well as
private individuals in business settings. Such request is born of

26
situational need. And it is not difficult to envision such need
extending beyond Crist encountering law enforcement officers
and into business settings, including those environments where
children regularly congregate (e.g., playground-type
establishments, cruises, places where adults may volunteer to
work with children, etc.). Thus, the purpose of the marking is to
notify such persons who have reason to view the driver license in
seeking to identify an individual and receive other information
contained on the license (perhaps including his designation as a
sexual predator).

2.

Even if, arguendo, the statutorily required “SEXUAL
PREDATOR” marking constitutes a form of compelled speech by
Crist, as the majority suggests, the statutes requiring the
marking and forbidding its alteration or concealment are
constitutional.

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “[w]hen the
government ‘compel[s] speakers to utter or distribute speech
bearing a particular message,’. . . such a policy imposes a content-
based burden on speech and is subject to strict-scrutiny review.”
McClendon, 22 F.4th at 1337–38 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994)) (other citations
omitted). Thus, to be constitutionally permissible, the challenged
speech “must be a narrowly tailored means of serving a
compelling state interest.” Id. at 1338 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec.
v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986)). The
SEXUAL PREDATOR marking before us passes constitutional
muster.

The inherently compelling state interest in protecting the
public and minor children from sexual offenses, see § 775.21(3)(c),
Fla. Stat., is self-evident and in need of no commentary. This
interest is universally—and rightly—regarded as sufficiently
compelling for constitutional purposes, including by the courts
relied upon by Crist. See Doe 1, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1329; Hill, 341
So. 3d at 553; see also McClendon, 22 F.4th at 1338.

27
Additionally, the challenged statutes are sufficiently
narrowly tailored to serve this compelling state interest.5 The
statutorily required marking on Crist’s license does not seek to
communicate to the public at large or to disinterested passersby.
Rather, the marking is viewed only by those who need or desire
to view his license for a given purpose. Those who seek to review
Crist’s driver license—be they law enforcement authorities or
individuals engaged in business or social enterprise—may well
need or want to know of Crist’s status as a sexual predator. The
marking on his license to provide such awareness is narrowly
tailored to accommodate this compelling state interest. Any
humiliation Crist claims he suffers when required to produce his
driver license neither lessens the State’s interest nor renders the
State’s means in this regard insufficiently narrowly tailored.

As a result of his arguments, Crist asks this Court to “at
least change the requirement of the sexual predator designation
on ID cards and driver licenses to those required in the case of
sexual offender.” The majority seemingly puts its seal of approval
on such a change. However, Crist’s argument, and the majority’s
approval thereof, fails for two reasons.

First, the majority’s “one-size-fits-all” approach of the use of
a statute section number as a means of identifying his status as a
sexual predator fails to appreciate the unique and heightened
risks posed by such predators. True, sexual offenders are
themselves serious threats to the public safety. Sexual predators,
however, present an even greater threat to the community given
the nature of their offenses and the targeting of vulnerable
children. Perhaps the requirements of Florida statutes—that a
sexual offender be identified on his driver license by statute
section number, see § 322.141(3)(b), Fla. Stat., while a sexual
predator is to be identified by express wording—were enacted
into Florida law to appreciate and address that heightened risk

5 As noted by the Eleventh Circuit in McClendon, “‘narrowly

tailored’ does not mean ‘perfectly tailored.’” McClendon, 22 F.4th
at 1338 (citing Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 454
(2015)). The statutory marking objected to here is constitutional,
and the State of Florida has no burden to further tailor the
marking to meet Crist’s preference.

28
and give notification consistent therewith (along with the
substantial registration and monitoring requirements also
applicable).

Further still, the majority presents no colorable basis for its
conclusion that its recommended statute numbers (replete with
color-coding) pass constitutional muster while the words
“SEXUAL PREDATOR” do not. In its effort to assuage the shame
purportedly felt by Crist,6 the effect of the majority’s
recommendation is to lessen the ability of the public to know of
the threat presented by predators in their presence.

Finally, and more importantly, however, Crist’s request and
the majority’s recommendations—on a most fundamental level—
misunderstand the prerogative and purpose of the judicial branch
of government. This Court simply should refuse to go along, even
in the form of left-handed recommendations.

Courts may not, even in a rare instance when a statute is
declared unconstitutional, rewrite the law. Such is the sole
prerogative of the political branches of government, administered
by individuals duly elected by the People. To even entertain a
contrary notion is violative of the most foundational aspects of
government in our Republic and inconsistent with the text,
structure, and history of our governing constitution. See Art. II, §
3, Fla. Const. (“The powers of the state government shall be
divided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. No
person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly
provided herein.”); see also generally Arts. I–III, U.S. Const.

III.

As sections 322.215(5)(c) and 322.141, Florida Statutes, are
plainly constitutional and do not violate Crist’s right to speech

6 Public sunlight may well cause Crist a sense of shame for

the repeated and abhorrent acts of abuse he perpetrated on his
victim in the darkness of isolation. So be it. Such a proper feeling
in no way renders the statutorily required marking on his license
unconstitutional.

29
secured by the First Amendment, the trial court correctly denied
his motion. Therefore, I would affirm.

30

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10778311. Public record. Not legal advice.