# Ross v. Gossett

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · January 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10777253

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reversing the district court for applying the officer suit exception to a case involving damages claims against a state agent in his personal capacity

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DEMETRIUS ROSS, et al., on behalf of )
themselves and all others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) Case No. 15-cv-309-SMY
vs. )
)
GREG GOSSETT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiffs Demetrius Ross, Kevin L. Hamilton, Ronald Smith, Jonathan Tolliver, and
Glenn Verser, current and former inmates of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”),
bring this class action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated for violations of
their constitutional rights as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs’ claims
concern the constitutionality of facility-wide shakedowns that occurred at Illinois River, Big
Muddy River, Lawrence, and Menard correctional centers during the period April 2014 through
July 2014.
Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint:
Count I: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Defendants designed and
implemented a plan to conduct abusive and humiliating
shakedowns that did not further any legitimate penological
purpose;

Count II: Eighth Amendment conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging Defendants reached an agreement to violate class
members’ constitutional rights;

Count III: Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983;
Count IV: Prison Rape Elimination Act under 42 U.S.C. § 19831.; and

Count V: State law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The Court previously certified a class of approximately 10,000 prisoners housed at the four
prisons on three claims against 22 supervisory Defendants.2 The class was not certified as to the
400+ non-supervisory Defendants named in the Second Amendment Complaint.
This matter is now before the Court for consideration of Defendants’ motion seeking
summary judgment on Counts I, II, III and V (Doc. 642), which Plaintiffs oppose (Doc. 671).
For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED and part.
Factual Background
Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the evidence and reasonable inferences
establish the following facts relevant to the pending summary judgment motion:
IDOC’s Search Policies
The Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC” or “Department”) prison staff search
inmates’ cells at IDOC facilities regularly to ensure that inmates cannot hide contraband.
Contraband includes any unlawful substance in an inmate’s cell, including drugs, weapons,
metal, any item that belongs to another inmate, and any item that has been altered from its
original state (Doc. 642-6, p. 97). These searches are commonly referred to as “shakedowns”
(Doc. 481-8, pp. 51-52; Doc. 642-2). Facility-wide searches go beyond these routine searches,

1 The Court dismissed this Count with prejudice on January 28, 2016 (Doc. 76).
2 The supervisory defendants are Salvador Godinez (Director); Joseph Yurkovich (Chief of Operations); Michael
Atchison (Deputy Chief of Operations); David White (Statewide Tact Commander); Anthony McAllister (Southern
Regional Tact Commander); Jerry Witthoft (Menard Tact Commander); Frank Eovaldi (Menard Assistant Tact
Commander); Robert Arnett (Illinois River Tact Commander); Brian Piper (Illinois River Assistant Tact
Commander); David Hermetz (Big Muddy Tact Commander); Chris White (Big Muddy Assistant Tact
Commander); Ken Finney (Big Muddy Assistant Tact Commander); Michael Gilreath (Lawrence Tact
Commander); Timothy McAllister (Lawrence Assistant Tact Commander); Kim Butler (Menard Warden); Alex
Jones (Menard Assistant Warden); Greg Gossett (Illinois River Warden); Stephanie Dorethy (Illinois River Assistant
Warden); Zachary Roeckeman (Big Muddy Warden); Robert Craig (Big Muddy Assistant Warden); Stephen
Duncan (Lawrence Warden); and Richard Moore (Lawrence Assistant Warden).
as they are “statewide” operations that require the use of tact team members from multiple
prisons to execute them. Facility-wide searches require approval from and supervision by senior
members of the IDOC administration (Doc. 481-6, pp. 33, 46). Facility-wide searches are
achieved primarily by detaining inmates in a holding area while Department staff search the
facilities on a cell-by-cell basis (Doc. 642-8, p. 272; Doc. 642-9, p. 231).

Facility-wide searches are generally handled by an IDOC unit known as the “tact team”
(or tactical team) (Doc. 642-6, pp. 38, 45-48; Doc. 642-5, pp. 35-36; Doc. 642-2, p. 44). Tact
team members are responsible for handling particularly complex situations within the
Department, including riots, escapes, and forcible cell extractions (Doc. 642-6, p. 38; Doc. 642-
11, pp. 35-36; Doc. 642-2, pp. 43-45).
IDOC has developed and communicated policies and procedures to guide searches at
IDOC facilities, including facility-wide searches (Doc. 642-12, pp. 18-19; 27-30). The
Department’s policy regarding cell searches includes a visual sweep, followed by a close
inspection of the cell fixtures, including plumbing, walls, ceiling, floor, windows, shelving,

desks, drawers, and hot air registers, ventilation grills, and radiators (Doc. 642-7, pp. 92-94).
The policy regarding cell searches also requires an in-depth search of all inmate property within
the cell, including all clothing, toiletries, mattresses and bedding, books, and electronics. Id.
Department policy requires each tactical team member to complete a “shakedown slip” for any
cell he or she searches (Doc. 642-22, p. 89; Doc. 642-9, p. 169). The manual for tact teams
requires tact teams to conduct strip searches from inmates’ head to their legs. It also requires
moving inmates in pairs and handcuffed behind the back (Doc. 642-10).
The Administrative Defendants
Defendant Salvador Godinez was the IDOC Director in 2014 (Doc. 642-44, pp. 17-24).
Defendant Joseph Yurkovich was IDOC’s chief of operations in 2014, with operational
responsibilities over the entire prison system (Doc. 642-2, pp. 34-35, 58-59). Defendant Michael
Atchison was IDOC’s Deputy Chief of Operations in 2014 (Doc. 642-22, p. 45). Atchison

supervised deputy directors of the three Department regions, each of which contained eight to ten
facilities; he also supervised ancillary Department units that were operational in nature. Id.
38:17-22. The facility-wide searches at issue were under Atchison’s supervision “at a high
level.” Id. 49:9-23. Defendant David White was IDOC’s statewide tact commander (Doc. 642-5,
p. 24). White assisted in overseeing IDOC’s training academy and oversaw the statewide
firearms and tactical operations. Id. 29:11-17. White supervised at least 50 facility-wide searches
as the statewide tactical commander. Id. 35:20-36:1. Defendant Anthony McAllister was IDOC’s
tactical commander for the southern region in 2014, responsible for planning statewide tactical
operations (Doc. 642-9, pp. 7, 37, 54).

2014 Facility-Wide Searches
Sometime in 2014, Yurkovich and Atchison decided to perform facility-wide searches at
IDOC facilities as part of a “spring cleaning” initiative to remove trash, contraband, and to
gather intelligence from facilities (Doc. 481-16, pp. 93-95; Doc. 481-69, p. 2). Yurkovich and
Atchison had several conversations regarding conducting facility-wide searches (Doc. 481-6, pp.
42-47). Yurkovich could not recall if the operation was in response to increased staff assaults,
increased contraband, gang activity, or any risks to the safety and security of the facilities (Doc.
481-16, pp. 103-104; Doc. 671-1, p. 14). Yurkovich and Atchison initiated the searches because
the prisons “hadn’t been searched on a facility-wide scale in a long time” (Doc. 481-6, p. 46;
Doc. 481-16, pp. 103-104).
In March 2014, Yurkovich emailed Eddie Caumiant, the state union president for the
majority of IDOC correctional staff, informing him that multiple facilities statewide would be
locked down (Doc. 671-3). Caumiant replied positively, as staff union members “want to see a

facility wide lock and shakedown. They are getting very worried that the place is losing control,
and are starting to whisper ‘no confidence’ among other things.” Id.
Yurkovich and Atchison decided to use IDOC tactical teams to execute the shakedowns
(Doc. 481-6, pp. 47-49; Doc. 481-71, pp. 2-3). Tact team members are supervised by a facility
tact commander and one or more assistant commanders at the prison where they work, followed
by the Regional Tact Commander (McAllister) and the Statewide Tact Commander (White)
(Doc. 481-8, p. 18; Doc. 481-16, pp. 67-69; Doc. 481-17, pp. 83-84). All tact command staff
answered to the IDOC Deputy Chief of Operations (Atchison) and the Chief of Operations
(Yurkovich), who in turn answer to the IDOC Director (Godinez) (Doc. 481-17, p. 83; Doc. 481-

16, p. 136). White drafted operations orders working with regional tactical commanders (Doc.
642-5, pp. 74-75, 82, 120). IDOC statewide and regional tactical commanders worked with
facility wardens to draft operations orders for the searches (Doc. 642-2, pp. 106-107). Draft
orders for each of the four facilities were reviewed by the IDOC’s operations deputy director and
deputy chief, then approved by Yurkovich. Id.
After their initial conversations about the searches, Yurkovich and Atchison had a series
of “very in-depth conversations” between them, White, and the wardens of the facilities they
planned to search (Doc. 481-6, pp. 47-49; Doc. 481-69, p. 2). White attended a meeting in
Springfield with either Yurkovich or Atchison, where he learned about the plan to conduct the
searches (Doc. 481-7, pp. 71-72). McAllister testified that he was not involved in the decision to
conduct facility-wide searches, but he was involved in planning their execution once the decision
was made to conduct the shakedowns (Doc. 481-17, pp. 114-115).
McAllister and White were responsible for creating written operations orders (Doc. 481-
17, pp. 85-86; Doc. 481-7, p. 70; Doc. 481-6, pp. 54-55; Doc. 481-17, pp. 123-124). The orders

outlined the schedule and staffing needs for the shakedowns (Doc. 481-64, p. 2). The statewide
operations require approval and supervision by senior members of the IDOC administration,
including Yurkovich, Atchison, and Godinez (Doc. 481-6, p. 33, 46; Doc. 481-16, p. 100; Doc.
481-72, p. 2). The written orders were not distributed to the facility tactical team commanders,
assistant commanders, or any tact team members (Doc. 481-17, pp. 132-136; Doc. 481-8, p. 75;
Doc. 481-20, p. 66; Doc. 671-1, p. 21). Only the warden and assistant warden of each facility
received a copy of the written orders (Doc. 481-17, pp. 132-136).
The written orders omitted several key details about the plan, including how the
shakedowns would be performed (Doc. 481-66, pp. 2-5). The orders listed high-level,

generalized “objectives” for the searches that stated what the searches would include. Id. at 1, 2.
Instead, the details about how the shakedowns would be performed were communicated orally
(Doc. 481-7, pp. 36-37; Doc. 481-8, pp. 70-71; Doc. 481-10, pp. 71-74, 101; Doc. 481-11, pp.
65-67; Doc. 481-14, pp. 40-41). In briefings, McAllister or White discussed the shakedown plan
with facility tact commanders, including the specifics of how the shakedown operation was to be
conducted (Doc. 481-10, pp. 71-73, 75; Doc. 481-7, p. 37). McAllister or White laid out “how
you would perform your duties of the day,” “what [prisoners] could wear out of the cell,” “[h]ow
you [were] to cuff,” and “[h]ow they were to . . . conduct their self, how to handle the inmates,”
among others (Doc. 481-1, pp. 71-73). The facility’s Warden and Assistant Warden of
Operations also attended these briefings (Doc. 481-17, pp. 139-140; Doc. 481-7, pp. 36-37; Doc.
481-18, pp. 56-57; Doc. 481-19, pp. 131-132).
Facility tact commanders and assistant commanders then met with the rest of their teams,
where they would discuss the shakedown plan with each member of the tact team, relaying the
instructions they had been given by White and/or McAllister (Doc. 481-11, pp. 65-67; Doc. 481-

10, pp. 73-74; Doc. 481-15, p. 73; Doc. 481-14, pp. 40-41). Immediately before they began
marching toward the cellhouse to begin the shakedown, the entire group would convene for a
mass group briefing, delivered by the prison’s Warden and McAllister or White, reiterating the
shakedown plan and its objectives (Doc. 481-10, pp. 75-76; Doc. 481-14, pp. 40-41; Doc. 481-7,
pp. 36-37). Nothing was distributed in writing during or after the oral briefings. Id. The oral
instructions contained instructions on how to conduct the shakedowns that were absent from the
written operations orders (Doc. 481-66; Doc. 481-7, pp. 84-86; Doc. 481-23, pp. 127-131.
McAllister and/or White were present during the shakedowns and were responsible for
supervising the tact team members during the shakedown (Doc. 481-6, p. 50; Doc. 481-17, p.

188). White was the primary supervisor of the shakedowns at Menard and Illinois River (Doc.
481-17, p. 222). McAllister was the primary supervisor at Big Muddy and Lawrence. Id.; Doc.
481-17, pp. 187, 258-265. Facility tact commanders and assistant commanders reported to
McAllister and/or White, who would then ensure that the uniform plan was being carried out
across the facilities (Doc. 481-14, p. 62; Doc. 481-11, pp. 123-124; Doc. 481-10, pp. 107-109;
Doc. 481-8, pp. 80-81, 86-89; Doc. 481-75 at ¶ 4; Doc. 481-7, p. 79; Doc. 481-11, pp. 116-122).
Each facility Warden attended the shakedowns because they understood that they were
responsible for the conduct of staff at the prison (Doc. 481-18, p. 105; Doc. 481-19, pp. 179-180;
Doc. 481-20, p. 17).
Tact team members wore an orange jumpsuit, a vest, a helmet with a face shield, gloves,
a 3-foot baton, pepper mace, a flashlight, and a radio (Doc. 481-7, pp. 38-39; Doc. 486-1, p. 51).
The uniforms concealed team members’ identities – the helmet covered their face, the gloves
prevented a prisoner from being able to identify even the race of the officer, and the jumpsuits
had no identifying names or numbers (Doc. 481-7, p. 39; Doc. 486-1, p. 51). IDOC staff and

prisoners referred to the tact team as “Orange Crush” (Doc. 481-6, pp. 162-163).
Officers generally began the searches by entering the inmates’ living area quickly and
noisily, including yelling and banging batons on railings, to alert the inmates and put them on
notice that a search was going to occur (Doc. 642-5, p.141; Doc. 642-22, p. 123; Doc. 642-8, pp.
239-240). Tact team members were instructed to march in lockstep or stomp into the cellhouse
and begin banging and crashing their batons on the cells (Doc. 481-23, p. 206). According to the
current IDOC Statewide Tact Commander Zach Sarver, the IDOC now prohibits tact team
members from entering cellhouses in this way while conducting facility-wide searches (Doc.
642-11, pp. 82-83).

After entering the cellhouse, tact team members strip searched inmates individually in
their cells. Defendants testified that strip searches proceeded from head to toe according to
IDOC policy (Doc. 642-14, pp. 36-38; Doc. 642-11, pp. 122-123; Doc. 642-7, pp. 54-61; Doc.
642-16, pp. 86-87; Doc. 642-39, pp. 54-56). Class members testified that they were ordered to
strip and then manipulate their genitals and spread their buttocks before putting their hands in
their mouths to widen it and moving their tongue (Doc. 481-31, pp. 56-57; Doc. 481-33, pp. 73-
74; Doc. 481-32, p. 58; Doc. 481-29, pp. 45-46, 51-54; Doc. 481-30, p. 42; Doc. 481-34, p. 71;
Doc. 481-36, pp. 30, 54, 74-75; Doc. 481-37, pp. 47-48; Doc. 481-38, p. 26; Doc. 481-39, pp.
13-14, 22-23; Doc. 481-40, pp. 93-96, 110; Doc. 481-41, pp. 30-31; Doc. 481-42, pp. 37-46;
Doc. 481-43, pp. 29-30; Doc. 481-44, pp. 36-37; Doc. 481-45 pp. 49-50; Doc. 481-46, pp. 40-41,
84; Doc. 481-47, pp. 63-64).
While the strip searches were occurring, tact team members ordered prisoners to hand
them their clothing (including their underwear) for a close, manual inspection and search (Doc.
642-11, pp. 121-122). After the search, prisoners were told that they must wear their “prison

blues” but could not wear underwear (Doc. 481-31, pp. 56-57; Doc. 481-30, pp. 44-45; Doc.
481-36, pp. 72-73; Doc. 481-37, pp. 47-48; Doc. 481-38, p. 27; Doc. 481-39, pp. 14-15, 25; Doc.
481-40, p. 111; Doc. 481-41, p. 37; Doc. 481-42, pp. 37-46; Doc. 481-43, p. 61; Doc. 481-44,
pp. 36-37; Doc. 481-45, p. 52; Doc. 481-46, pp. 42, 83; Doc. 481-47, p. 133).
Officers then escorted inmates to waiting areas in pairs, walking in close formation, with
their heads down, and handcuffed in the back with their palms facing out and thumbs up (Doc.
642-5, pp. 82-83). Class members were marched so close with prisoners in front and behind that
their genitals made physical contact with the prisoner in front of them and the genitals of the
prisoner behind them (Doc. 481-31, pp. 74, 147; Doc. 481-33, pp. 62-67, 92-97; Doc. 481-29,

pp. 68-79; Doc. 481-30, pp. 50-51, 55-56; Doc. 481-36, 44-45; 88-89, 93-94; Doc. 481-37, pp.
61-70; Doc. 481-38, pp. 33, 62-63; Doc. 481-40, pp.130-144; Doc. 481-41, pp. 42-49, 62-77;
Doc. 481-42, pp. 63-71; Doc. 481-43, pp. 35-40; Doc. 481-44, pp. 46-50, 77-78; Doc. 481-45,
pp. 67-71; Doc. 481-46, pp. 56-59; Doc. 481-47, pp. 115-120; Doc. 481 at 12 n.9). Class
members described the close formation mass movement as “nuts to butts” or “nuts to hands”
(Doc. 481-19, pp. 222-225; Doc. 481-27, p. 37). Prisoners were marched single file outside in
two columns with tact team members in full gear flanking them on all sides. Id. Several class
members testified that during line movement, tact team members pushed and shoved them so
they were in contact with other prisoners. Numerous class members reported being pushed,
punched, kneed, poked with batons, and subjected to verbal abuse by tact team members (Doc.
481-31, pp. 74, 86-94, 110-112; Doc. 481-33, pp. 92-97, 104-112; Doc. 481-29, p.69; Doc. 481-30,
pp. 51-56; Doc. 481-34, 83-85; Doc. 481-35, pp. 21-26; Doc. 481-36, pp. 85-86; Doc. 481-37, p. 34,
68-69; Doc. 481-38, pp. 33-48; Doc. 481-40, pp. 113-120, 157-158; Doc. 481-41, pp. 39-40, 46-77;
Doc. 481-42, pp. 51-61, 71-82; Doc. 481-43, pp. 35-42; Doc. 481-44, pp. 46-56; Doc. 481-45, pp.
65-70; Doc. 481-46, pp. 55-56; Doc. 481-47, pp. 73-83). Other class members could hear and/or

see this abuse taking place. Id.
Inmates then remained in the waiting area while the tact teams searched every cell before
being returned to their cells (Doc. 642-5, pp. 90-92). Defendants offered differing accounts of
the conditions under which prisoners were held, but those accounts were consistent in that they
reported that prisoners remained cuffed, standing for hours at a time, facing walls, and unable to
speak (Doc. 481-7, pp. 82-83, 92; Doc. 481-17, p. 241; Doc. 481-6, p. 75; Doc. 481-9, pp. 86-
90).
The wardens of the respective facilities sent Yurkovich summaries of the searches after
they were completed (Doc. 642-42; Doc. 642-43; Doc. 642-2, pp. 128-129). As the shakedowns
were occurring, prisoners submitted grievances complaining about the abuses they suffered and

about their missing property. Atchison received status updates at the end of the day with
highlights of what was found or use of force, segregation, transfer, or assault incidents (Doc.
481-6, p. 79). Yurkovich received these daily reports as well (Doc. 481-16, pp. 100, 107-109).
Neither White nor McAllister investigated allegations of abuse or misconduct reported in the
facilities they supervised (Doc. 481-7, p. 150). Multiple emails were exchanged among tact team
officers and commanders as early as April 2014 that highlighted prisoners’ experiences with
abusive and unprofessional staff during the shakedowns (Doc. 671-10). In these exchanges, they
discussed the “overwhelming amount of allegations of staff misconduct” from prisoners in
different facilities, including accounts of tact team members eating their food and leaving empty
candy wrappers, missing property not documented on shakedown slips, broken damaged
property, property receipts missing, urine on bed sheets and in property boxes, allegations of
physical abuse such as slapping the backs of their heads, forcefully placing their heads against
walls ….” (Doc. 671-2, pp. 41-42).

The Supervisory Defendants
The 2014 facility tact commanders, assistant tact commanders, wardens, and assistant
wardens at each facility included:
Menard Illinois River Big Muddy Lawrence

- Jerry Witthoft - Robert Arnett - David Hermetz - Michael Gilreath
- Frank Eovaldi - Brian Piper - Chris White - Timothy McAllister
- Kim Butler - Greg Gossett - Ken Finney - Stephen Duncan
- Alex Jones - Stephanie Dorethy - Zachary Roeckeman - Richard Moore
- Robert Craig

Defendant Kimberly Butler was transitioning from the Menard assistant warden of
programs to facility warden in April 2014, in which capacity she was responsible for the entire
operation of the facility (Doc. 642-18, pp. 26-29). Butler attended the pre-operation tactical
briefings for the purpose of “welcoming all of the tact team members to the facility, giving them
an idea of what they were searching for in regards to weapons.” Id. at p. 56. Butler also
participated in drafting and reviewing operations orders for the shakedowns. Id. at pp. 38-42,
48-54. During the searches, Butler and her senior staff “would just walk around the galleries and
talk to staff and talk to the offenders…Just to make ourselves available, you know, be seen, and
if anyone had any issues, they could talk to us about them.” Id. at p. 32.
Defendant Alex Jones was temporarily assigned as Menard’s assistant warden of
operations during the 2014 facility-wide searches (Doc. 642-21, pp. 36-37). Jones could not
recall the search operations at Menard. Id. at pp. 37, 45, 50. He also had no memory of playing a
role in either planning, drafting, or receiving the operations orders. Id. at pp. 43-44.
Defendant Jerry Witthoft was the Menard tactical team commander in 2014, responsible
for overseeing tactical team training, recruitment, and operations (Doc. 642-54, pp. 35-38, 52).
Witthoft could not recall details of the 2014 searches at Menard. Id. at p. 57. During such

operations, however, Witthoft testified that he would have been responsible as the “institutional
commander” for assigning facility tactical team members to the holding areas where inmates
wait while the cellhouse searches occurred, and for assigning team members to cellhouse
searches. Id. at pp. 72-74. When participating in a facility-wide search as the tactical team
commander, Witthoft supervised the team’s search operations, including “assist[ing] them to do
their job,” and ensuring that they “adher[ed] to policy.” Id. at 78.
Defendant Frank Eovaldi was the Menard assistant tactical team commander in 2014,
responsible for tracking team members’ hours, rostering team members for operations, and
generally overseeing the facility tactical team (Doc. 642-39, p. 23). While he has no memory of

specific operation days, Eovaldi believes he participated in the 2014 facility-wide searches at
Menard, Big Muddy, and Lawrence. Id. at pp. 39-44.
Defendant Gregory Gossett was the Illinois River warden in 2014, responsible for daily
operations (Doc. 642-6, pp. 22-26). Gossett took part in drafting the operations order for the
Illinois River facility-wide search. Id. at pp. 103-105. On the first day of the search, Gossett
addressed the tactical team with a “[w]elcome, and thank you,” telling the team where they could
get assistance should they have any questions about the facility or its operations. Id. at pp. 149-
150. Once the operation began, Gossett toured the facility each day of the search, observing “all
stages” of the operation. Id. at 144, 175.
Defendant Stephanie Dorethy was the Illinois River assistant warden of operations in
2014, overseeing “the operations of the facility, various departments like security, dietary,
maintenance” (Doc. 642-25, pp. 10, 26). Dorethy was present for some of the tactical team
meetings. Id. at pp. 48-49. She testified that for the facility-wide search, the tactical teams
reported to the tactical commander, who then addressed any issues or concerns to the warden or

assistant warden or central regional commander. Id. at p. 51. During the operations, Dorethy
would have initially gone to the location the tactical team was searching and then she would tour
other units and attend to her assistant warden duties. Id. at p. 53. She did not stay with the
tactical team, but was instead “intermingling throughout the facility,” “basically kind of
check[ing] things out, mak[ing] sure there’s no issues,” and then attending to her regular duties
as assistant warden. Id. at pp. 52-54.
Defendant Robert Arnett was the Illinois River tactical commander in 2014 (Doc. 642-19,
pp. 16, 26). Arnett participated in the Illinois River facility-wide search, but not those at the
other three facilities. Id. at pp. 27-31. Arnett’s primary role for the Illinois River search was to

help instruct tactical team members during the operation. Id. at pp. 34, 57. Arnett, as “the host
commander” at Illinois River, did anything that was needed to be done for the logistics of the
search – getting more gloves, obtaining water for team members, making sure inmates were
restrained, strip searched, lined up, and directed to the holding area, and ensuring the Illinois
River tactical team was “carrying out the operation according to the procedures… discussed
during the [pre-operations] commanders briefing.” Id. at pp. 34, 62, 68-70).
Defendant Brian Piper was the Illinois River assistant tactical commander in 2014 (Doc.
342-47, pp. 16-17). Piper’s role included ensuring that the required number of facility tactical
team members were assigned to the search; he arrived at the facility early to gather supplies
needed for the tactical teams. Id. at p. 82. Piper participated in each day of the Illinois River
search, assigned to overseeing the gymnasium or segregation yard holding areas where inmates
waited while their cells were searched; he did not take part in searching housing unit cells. Id. at
pp. 88-90, 109. After the morning briefings for the tactical teams, but prior to the inmates’
arrival at the day’s holding area, Piper’s team swept the holding area for contraband, and did so

again after the inmates left the holding area. Id. at pp. 93-94, 110. Piper was responsible for
ensuring that operations in the holding area were conducted consistent with the morning briefing.
Id. at pp. 108-109.
Defendant Zack Roeckeman was the Big Muddy warden in 2014, responsible for the
“overall supervision of the facility, including all safety and security” and the “supervision of
staff” (Doc. 642-45, pp. 12, 25). Roeckeman was not involved in deciding to conduct a facility-
wide search at Big Muddy but did help draft the operations order for the search. Id. at 30, 35.
Roeckeman was present for the first day of the operation to welcome the tactical team, thanking
them in their effort to “help us make the facility safer.” Id. at pp. 32-33. During the search

week, Roeckeman “stopped by just to check how things were going from time to time.” Id. at p.
47.
Defendant Robert Craig was the Big Muddy assistant warden of operations in 2014,
responsible for the day-to-day operations and the staff of the facility (Doc. 642-46, pp. 22-23).
Although Craig was second in command after tact team commander McAllister, he testified that
he had no role in deciding to conduct a facility-wide search at Big Muddy and no role in deciding
the logistics of the search. Id. at pp. 22-23, 28. Craig was present and spoke with McAllister
during the morning briefings and was present and available during the shakedowns to assist. Id.
at p. 32. During the searches, Craig went along with his regular daily responsibilities. Id. at pp.
29-32.
Defendant David Hermetz was the Big Muddy tactical commander in 2014 and was
present for the Big Muddy and Menard facility-wide searches (Doc. 642-24, pp. 26, 35).
Hermetz attended the pre-operation briefings held for tactical commanders for both the Big

Muddy and Menard searches, which he described as “very similar.” Id. at p. 60. Hernetz’s role
was to maintain the security of the operation while it was occurring. Id. at p. 88. After the pre-
operation briefings, Hermetz’s responsibilities included orally communicating to tactical team
members the operations order details from those briefings and ensuring team members carried
out the searches consistent with those instructions. Id. at pp. 47, 50, 67.
Defendant Chris White was the Big Muddy assistant tactical commander in the spring of
2014, and was then appointed tactical commander later that summer (Doc. 642-16, pp. 170-171).
He was not present during the Big Muddy facility-wide searches in 2014 because he was
teaching in Springfield. Id. at p. 53. White did participate in the shakedowns at Menard and

Lawrence that year. Id. at p.78-83. White testified that, generally, tactical team leadership
obtained operational information regarding facility-wide searches at a commander’s briefing
conducted each day of facility-wide multiday searches. Id.
Defendant Kenneth Finney became the Big Muddy assistant tactical commander
sometime during the summer of 2014 (Doc. 642-17, pp. 23, 142-143). He recalled participating
in the shakedowns at Lawrence, Menard, and Big Muddy but could not recall details about how
the shakedowns occurred. Id. at pp. 121-124. Finney never saw an operations order for an
IDOC facility-wide search. Id. at pp. 144-145.
Defendant Stephan Duncan was the Lawrence warden in 2014, overseeing operations for
the entire facility and responsible for the safety of inmates and staff (Doc. 642-20, pp. 6, 17).
Duncan provided input on the drafting of the operations order for the Lawrence search and
attended the operations, as well as several pre-operations tactical team briefings. Id. at pp. 40-
42, 51-53. During those briefings, Duncan would address the team, focusing on the types of

contraband being searched for, advising the non-Lawrence team members about the types of
personal property allowed at the facility, and stressing that the team be professional and follow
the chain of command. Id. at pp. 51, 66. Once the operations began, Duncan undertook his
normal duties and “ran the facility,” but would “periodically . . . check, see how things were
going, watch some of the movement . . . go to the cell houses while they were conducting the
strip searches.” Id. at pp. 68-69, 72-73. Duncan “witnessed that whole operation at least two or
three times that week.” Id.
Defendant Richard Moore was the Lawrence assistant warden of operations in 2014,
responsible for security-related issues and inmate movements throughout the facility (Doc. 642-

38, pp. 21-22). Moore had no role in planning the facility-wide search at Lawrence or in drafting
the operations order for the search. Id. at pp. 62-64. Moore was present at operational plan
briefings with tact team members and conveyed prisoners’ personal property concerns to
McAllister. Id. at pp. 66-68. Moore was tasked with ensuring tact team compliance with the
uniform plan in his facility and provided support to McAllister. Id. at pp.78-82.
Defendant Michael Gilreath was Lawrence’s tact commander who was transitioning to
active military duty in 2014 (Doc. 642-15, pp. 65-70). Gilreath could not recall his role in the
Lawrence shakedown and had no memory of the pre-operation briefings, the strip searches, the
cell searches, or the movement of inmates. Id. at pp. 129-130.
Defendant Tim McAllister was transitioning from his role as the Lawrence assistant
tactical commander to the role of tactical commander in 2014, overseeing tactical members good
standing, training, assignments, and communications (Doc. 642-40, at pp. 45, 69-72). McAllister
had no role in preparing the search operations order and learned about the Lawrence searches the
day before the operation, being told he was to arrange for 25 tactical team members for the

searches. Id. at pp. 99, 119-120. On operation day, McAllister arrived before other team
members and obtained any needed supplies for the day’s work. Id. at p. 105. McAllister
attended the pre-operations tactical commanders’ briefings, in which the operations were
outlined, after which commanders met with their individual teams to convey the day’s operation
detail; the entire tactical group then met, and the day’s operation would begin. Id. at pp. 117-
119. Through the course of the Lawrence facility operation, McAllister participated in some
strip searches and searched some cells, going “back and forth” from the cellhouses to the inmate
holding area. Id. at pp. 148-149, 164-168.
Discussion

Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to Counts I, II, and III, asserting
that Plaintiffs have not identified evidence of a uniform plan to violate their Eighth Amendment
rights and that there is also no evidence that each individual supervisory defendant was
personally involved in developing or executing such a plan. Defendants also move for summary
judgment on behalf of all but nine of the non-supervisory defendants on the same claims,
asserting that there is no evidence connecting those individuals to any violation of Plaintiffs’
rights.
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment where the non-moving
party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to
which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Lawrence v. Kenosha County,
391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004).
Supervisory Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment
Count I
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment bars prison
authorities from unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on inmates. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 737 (2002). This prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment of inmates includes
both physical and psychological harm. See Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 357–58 (7th Cir. 2015).
In the context of searches of prisoners, a prisoner states a claim under the Eighth Amendment

when he plausibly alleges that the strip-search in question was motivated by a desire to harass or
humiliate rather than by a legitimate justification, such as the need for order and security in
prisons. Rivera v. Drake, 497 F. App'x 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). The infliction of pain on
prisoners without any legitimate penological justification “always violates contemporary
standards of decency and need not produce serious injury in order to violate the Eighth
Amendment.” Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)); Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“infliction of pain that is totally without penological justification is per se malicious”).
In affirming class certification, the Seventh Circuit noted Defendants’ concession that the
shakedowns were conducted according to a uniform plan created and implemented by the
Defendants, and that the plan was executed in a uniform manner under their supervision. The
only dispute was the content of that uniform policy – specifically, whether that uniform policy
reflected the version alleged by the Plaintiffs or the one alleged by the Defendants. Defendants

argue the record establishes that their version of events surrounding the planning and
implementation of the shakedowns should be believed – that the shakedowns were conducted
pursuant to IDOC policies, and that those policies were designed not to “cause pain or
humiliation” but rather to further IDOC’s penological objectives. Citing the testimony of the
supervisory Defendants and the opinions of defense expert Larry Reid, Defendants maintain that
no reasonable jury could conclude that the searches were unconstitutional.
Defendants’ arguments are belied by the evidence in the record. Plaintiffs have adduced
evidence that the written orders differed from verbal orders. The details about how the
shakedowns would be performed were only communicated orally – nothing was distributed in

writing during or after the oral briefings. Class members across the four facilities detailed the
same complaints about the shakedowns across their grievances and throughout depositions in this
case. The parties present conflicting evidence regarding many aspects of the shakedowns,
including the use of batons, reverse strip searches, handcuffing, line formation, and the way cells
were searched. Plaintiffs’ experts Dan Pacholke and Pat Hurley opine that multiple aspects of
the shakedowns were contrary to widely accepted correctional standards and had no legitimate
penological purpose. Defense expert Reid comes to the opposite conclusion. The conflicting
evidence and dueling expert opinions must be left to a jury to weigh and decide which version to
believe.
Defendants further argue that even if there was evidence of a uniform policy to violate
Plaintiffs’ rights, Plaintiffs must show that each supervisory defendant personally participated in
the deprivation. The personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 is satisfied if the
conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at the official's direction or with his or her
knowledge and consent. Williams v. Shah, 927 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 2019). Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that there is sufficient
evidence in the record to deny summary judgment to most of the supervisory Defendants:
Statewide supervisors: Godinez approved the statewide shakedowns and received notice
of abuses during the shakedowns. Yurkovich and Atchison were responsible for
developing the initial shakedown plans and had daily conversations with on-the-ground
staff during the shakedown. White and McAllister were responsible for helping to draft
operations and supervised and/or observed various stages of the searches.

Menard: Butler attended the pre-operation tactical briefings and was aware of the plans.
Butler also participated in drafting and reviewing operations orders for the shakedowns.
Witthoft supervised the tact team’s search operations and ensured that they were
conducting the search according to the uniform plan. Eovaldi participated in the searches
at Menard, Big Muddy, and Lawrence.

Illinois River: Gossett took part in the drafting of the operations orders for the Illinois
River search and was involved in observing all stages of the operation. Dorethy was
present for some of the tactical team meetings. During the operations, Dorethy would
have initially gone to the location the tactical team was searching and then she would tour
other units and attend to her assistant warden duties. She periodically checked on the
progress throughout the day. Arnett participated in the search at Illinois River and his
primary role was to help instruct tactical team members during the operation. Piper
participated in the searches and was present for morning briefings, and gave instructions
to tact team members.

Lawrence: Duncan provided input on drafting the operations orders for the Lawrence
searches and attend the operations and pre-operations tactical team briefings. Moore was
present at operational briefings with tact team members and conveyed personal property
concerns to McAllister. Tim McAllister attended pre-operations tactical team briefings
and participated in some strip searches and cell searches.
Big Muddy: Roeckeman assisted in drafting operations for the Big Muddy search and
checked on the progress of the searches throughout the week. Craig spoke with
McAllister during the morning briefings and was present and available to assist during
the shakedowns. Hermetz was responsible for managing the security of the operation
while it was occurring at Big Muddy and Menard. he attended pre-operational tactical
team meetings. Chris White attended tactical team commander briefings. Finney
participated in the shakedowns at Big Muddy, Lawrence, and Menard.

However, summary judgment will be granted as Defendants Jones and Gilreath. Even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Jones and Gilreath had no
memory of playing a role in the operations at their facilities, did not stay with the tact team or
participate in briefings, and performed their regular job duties during searches.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part as to Count I. 3
Counts II and III
In a footnote, Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ claims that
Defendants conspired to violate their Eighth Amendment rights and failed to intervene to protect
those rights. They argue that because Counts II and III are premised on the same underlying
Eighth Amendment theory, if Plaintiffs’ core Eighth Amendment claim fails, their conspiracy
and failure-to-intervene claims likewise fail. It is rarely proper to present substantive arguments
in footnotes. See Mahaffey v. Ramos, 588 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Perfunctory,
undeveloped arguments ... are waived.”). That said, the Court finds the evidence sufficient to
withstand summary judgment.
To establish a prima facie case of a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show (1) an express
or implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights and

3 In the alternative, Defendants suggest that the Court grant partial summary judgment as to aspects of Plaintiffs’
Eighth Amendment claims. For example, finding that Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs’ rights by their loud
entrance or by preventing them from wearing underwear. The Court declines the invitation. The conflicting
evidence regarding multiple aspects of the searches considered together create genuine issues of material facts
preventing the granting of summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III.
(2) actual deprivations of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.
Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1988). Here, there is evidence in the record
about the planning, implementation, and communication between the Defendants regarding the
shakedowns and evidence of abuses that occurred during the shakedowns. There is also
evidence that the defendants were aware of but ignored prisoner complaints about the

shakedowns and how they were conducted. This evidence sufficiently supports the failure-to-
intervene claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is denied on Counts II and III as to the
remaining supervisory Defendants.
Qualified Immunity
Determining whether a defendant state officer is entitled to qualified immunity involves
two inquiries: “(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a
violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.” Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 758
(7th Cir.2013). If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant official is entitled to

summary judgment.
Defendants assert that qualified immunity is warranted because “the policies pursuant to
which these searches occurred – inmates strip searched, handcuffed, moved to secure areas, and
returned to their cells after searched – are grounded in penological purposes and consistent with
common practices across the United States.” This argument presumes that Defendants’ factual
narrative regarding the searches is believed.
Prisoner searches intended to inflict unnecessary pain and humiliation without any
legitimate penological justification violate the Eighth Amendment. The manner in which the
strip search is conducted must pass constitutional muster. See Mays, 575 F.3d at 649, 650
(collecting cases). Here, factual disputes regarding the underlying motivation and the method in
which these searches occurred prevents the granting of qualified immunity to the Defendants.
Official Capacity Claims
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs request injunctive relief as to Counts I and
II. Defendants move for summary judgment on official capacity claims against the Director of

the Department4. Plaintiffs did not respond to this portion of Defendants’ motion, and the Court
finds Defendants’ arguments to be well-taken.
The Director is amenable to suit only to remedy “an ongoing violation of federal law.”
Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Valcq, 16 F.4th 508, 521 (7th Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs have not
identified an ongoing violation of federal law, nor have Plaintiffs articulated that there is any real
and immediate threat that they will experience due to the conduct alleged in this case.
Accordingly, Defendants motion is granted as to the official capacity claims against the Director
of IDOC.
Count V

Citing T.S. v. Cook Cnty, 67 F.4th 884, 890 (7th Cir. 2023), Defendants move for
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on
the basis these claims are barred by Illinois state-law sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs did not
respond to this portion of Defendants’ motion.
In T.S., the Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction over all claims against the state founded on any law of the state. The Court also
clarified that the officer suit exception does not apply in a damages suit. T.S., 67 F.4th at 894
(reversing the district court for applying the officer suit exception to a case involving damages
claims against a state agent in his personal capacity). Thus, because Plaintiffs only seek

4 Latoya Hughes is the current Acting Director of the Department.
compensatory damages against Defendants, their claims are barred. Accordingly, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Count V of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.
Non-Supervisory Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims against 432 non-
supervisory defendants – individual tact team officers who Plaintiffs allege personally violated

their Eighth Amendment rights by participating in the 2014 facility-wide searches.5 Instead of
responding to the merits of Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs assert that there is no trial pending
against the non-supervisory Defendants and therefore, no need to resolve any claims against
those defendants at this time.
Under Rule 56(b), “a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30
days after the close of all discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). Although Plaintiffs sought class
certification as to the 22 supervisory Defendants, this case has never been bifurcated between the
two groups of defendants. The numerous amendments to the Scheduling Order applied to all
defendants and did not distinguish between supervisory and non-supervisory defendants. And

pursuant to the most recent Scheduling Order, fact discovery as to all defendants closed on
December 15, 2020.
That said, the Court takes this portion of the motion UNDER ADVISEMENT. Plaintiffs
shall file a response within 30 days of the entry of this Order. Defendants may seek leave to file
a reply pursuant to the undersigned’s Case Management Procedures.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 642) is GRANTED in part and

5 Defendants do not move for summary judgment as to the following nine non-supervisory Defendants: Bradley
Clark, Steven Conrad, Justin Eckelberry, Jason Furlow, James Gray, Marcus Jenkins, Brian Livingston, John
Maragni, and Carson Winters. According to Defendants, these nine individuals are the only non-supervisory
Defendants who were ever named by any named or consolidated Plaintiff as having personally engaged in any
specific conduct that Plaintiffs assert is unconstitutional.
DENIED in part. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Defendants Alex Jones and Michael
Gilreath on Plaintiffs’ claims in the Second Amended Complaint; GRANTED as to Count V of
the Second Amended Complaint as to all Defendants; and GRANTED as to any official capacity
claims against the Director of the IDOC. Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to the remaining
supervisory Defendants as to Count I, II, and III. Defendants’ motion is TAKEN UNDER
ADVISEMENT as to the non-supervisory Defendants. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
enter judgment in favor of Defendants Jones and Gilreath and against Plaintiff at the close of this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 8, 2025 Now i

STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10777253. Public record. Not legal advice.