# Williams v. The Bank of Fayette County

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · January 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10774606

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** January 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10774606

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that courts must balance the petitioner’s interest against “the competing interests of protecting the finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

)
TERRY WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:24-cv-02216-SHM-cgc
)
THE BANK OF FAYETTE COUNTY, )
)
Defendant. )
)
)

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT; DENYING MOTION
FOR REHEARING; DENYING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT; DENYING
MOTION TO INITIATE DISCOVERY; AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO
STRIKE REPLY

This is a pro se action by Plaintiff Terry Williams against
Defendant Bank of Fayette County, alleging a violation of the
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), and related
state law claims. (ECF No. 1). On October 18, 2024, the Court
ordered the dismissal of Plaintiff’s action with prejudice (ECF
No. 19) and entered a judgment closing the case. (ECF No. 20).
Before the Court are several post-judgment motions:
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed on
November 12, 2024 (ECF No 21); Plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing,
filed on the same day (ECF No. 22); Plaintiff’s Second Motion to
Amend Pro Se Complaint, filed on December 3, 2024 (ECF No. 24);
Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Reply, filed on December
17, 2024 (ECF No. 27); and Plaintiff’s Motions to Initiate
Discovery (ECF No. 28), filed on the same day (collectively, the
“Motions”). For the reasons below, the Motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant,
alleging violations of TILA and fraudulent concealment and
seeking declaratory relief and to quiet title, based on a real
property transaction that originated on November 21, 2008. (ECF
No. 1). On May 10, 2024, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 10). On October
18, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion, dismissing
Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice (ECF No. 19) and entered
judgment closing the case. (ECF No. 20).

In its October 18, 2024 order, the Court explained that
Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed because, even if Plaintiff’s
factual allegations were accepted as true, they failed to state
a plausible claim for relief. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff’s claims
were based on his argument that the securitization of the
mortgage rendered the note and mortgage unenforceable. (ECF No.
1). The Court found this argument inconsistent with established
Sixth Circuit case law. See Williams v. Bank of Fayette County,

No. 2:24-cv-02216, 2024 WL 4529584, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 18,
2024) (citing Dauenhauer v. Bank of New York Mellon, 562
Fed.Appx. 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2014); Thompson v. Bank of America,
N.A., 773 F.3d 741, 749 (6th Cir. 2014)).

After judgment, Plaintiff filed multiple post-judgment
motions. On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave
to amend his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a). (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff attached an amended complaint
that raises three new claims: breach of contract, fraud in the
inducement, and declaratory relief challenging Defendant’s
standing to enforce the mortgage. (ECF No. 21). On the same day,
Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, which the Court construes

as a motion for reconsideration given that no hearing was held.
(ECF No. 22).
On November 26, 2024, Defendant filed a response arguing
that Plaintiff’s post-judgment motions were procedurally
defective. (ECF No. 23). On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
second motion to amend the complaint (ECF No. 24) and a reply to
Defendant’s response. (ECF No. 25). On December 17, 2024,

Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s second motion to amend as frivolous
(ECF No. 26) and filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s December
3, 2024 reply for failure to seek leave under the Court’s Local
Rule. (ECF No. 27). In response, Plaintiff filed a motion to
initiate discovery. (ECF No. 28).
II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 15(a), courts shall “freely grant leave to amend
when justice so requires.” Oleson v. United States, 27 Fed.Appx.
566, 569 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). However,
“the right granted by Rule 15(a) […] to amend the complaint […]
end[s] with the entry of the judgment dismissing the action.”
Feddersen Motors v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 523 (10th Cir. 1950).
After a final judgment has been entered, “a party may not seek
to amend their complaint without first moving to alter, set

aside, or vacate judgment pursuant to either Rule 59 or Rule
60[.]” Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 2002)
(citing Lindauer v. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1996)).
“[U]nless post-judgment relief is granted, the district court
lacks the power to grant a motion to amend the complaint under
Rule 15(a).” In re Ferro Corp. Derivative Litigation, 511 F.3d
611, 624 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez,
22 F.3d 384, 389 (1st Cir. 1994)).

A plaintiff who fails to “amend his complaint prior to the
entry of judgment, but instead waits until after the judgment of
dismissal […] must make the more difficult showing that the case
should be reopened under Rule 59 or Rule 60.” Washington v. Ohio,
No. 5:21-cv-2003, 2024 WL 4664709, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 4,2024)
(citing Pond v. Haas, 674 Fed.Appx. 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2016))
see also Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616
F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2010)). In addition to the standard Rule 15(a)
factors – such as “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue

prejudice, and futility” – courts consider “the competing
interests of protecting the finality of judgments and the
expeditious termination of litigation.” Washington, 2024 WL
4664709, at *2 (citing Pond, 674 Fed.Appx. at 473) (internal
quotation marks omitted). That “includes asking whether the
claimant has made a ‘compelling explanation’ for failing to seek
leave to amend prior to the entry of judgment.” Id. (citations
omitted).

Whether to grant or deny a post-judgment motion for leave
to amend complaint “is committed to the district court’s sound
discretion.” Ruschel v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 89 Fed.Appx. 518,
521 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Russel v. GTE Government Systems
Corp., 141 Fed.Appx. 429, 437 (6th Cir. 2005); Northwestern Nat.
Ins. Co. v. Joslyn, Nos. 93-4266, 93-4295, 93-4332, 1995 WL
270995, at *5 (6th Cir. May 8, 1995) (noting that the standard
of review for a district court’s denial of motions under Rule
15(a) and Rule 59(e) is abuse of discretion).

III. ANALYSIS
Because Plaintiff filed his post-judgment motions within 28

days of the Court’s dismissal, the Court applies the Rule 59(e)
standard.1 Under Rule 59(e), a court may alter or vacate judgment
for: “(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence;
(3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to

prevent manifest injustice.” Hearing v. Perry, No. 2:18-cv-94,
2022 WL 22738217, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2022) (citing GM,
LLC v. FCA US, LLC, 44 F.4th 548, 563 (6th Cir. 2022)); see also
Betts v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 558 F.3d 461, 474 (6th Cir.
2009) (citing Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d
479, 496 (6th Cir. 2006)). Rule 59(e) motions “are generally
disfavored because they consume scarce judicial resources on
matters already decided.” Oden v. Warden, North Central
Correctional Complex, No. 1:18-cv-420, 2020 WL 419749, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2020). Courts grant them sparingly in the
interest of finality. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v.
Limited, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 541, 547 (S.D. Ohio 1998).

1 If a motion is filed within 28 days after the entry of a
final judgment, it is treated as a motion to alter or amend
judgment under Rule 59. See Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 520
n. 9 (2020); accord Dayton Veterans Residences Limited
Partnership v. Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority, No. 3:16-
cv-466, 2019 WL 5956543, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2019). If
filed after 28 days, the motion is treated as a motion for relief
from a judgment or order under Rule 60. See Goyer v. United
States, No. 1:15-cv-01185, 2020 WL 5995505, at *2 (W.D. Tenn.
Oct. 9, 2020).
A. Plaintiff Fails to Satisfy the Requirements for
Reopening the Case Under Rule 59(e)
Plaintiff has not met his burden under Rule 59(e). Nowhere
in his post-judgment motions does Plaintiff demonstrate any clear
error of law, newly discovered evidence, or an intervening change
in controlling law. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to prevent
manifest injustice, his only relevant assertion is that “denying
leave to amend […] for a pro se litigant [ ] conflicts with

established procedural principles favoring amendments[.]” (ECF
No. 22). Plaintiff relies on Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962),
and Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608 (6th Cir. 2011), for
the proposition that courts should be lenient in allowing pro se
litigants to amend their complaints. (ECF No. 22). However, those
cases are inapplicable. Although courts often grant pro se
litigants some latitude to amend their pleadings, neither Foman
nor Brown supports the granting of post-judgment amendments. The
right to amend under Rule 15(a) ends once a final judgment has
been entered. See Ward, 180 F.2d at 523; see also Morse, 290
F.3d at 799.

No legal authority supports Plaintiff’s argument that
courts should liberally grant leave to amend pro se complaints
after judgment. Plaintiff cites only one case, Doe v. Oberlin
College, 963 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2020), for his proposition that
“post-judgment amendments are permissible where they address
deficiencies or prevent procedural injustice.” (ECF Nos. 24,
25). That sentence does not appear in Doe. In fact, Doe addresses
a different issue altogether: whether the district court erred

in dismissing a Title IX sex discrimination claim for lack of
factual support. See Doe, 963 F.3d at 586-87. The Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision based on the factual
sufficiency of the pleading, not the permissibility of post-
judgment amendments. Plaintiff’s reliance on Doe is misplaced.
B. The Court’s Interest in Protecting the Finality of the
October 18, 2024 Judgment Outweighs Plaintiff’s
Interest in Reopening the Case
The Court’s interest in finality weighs against granting
the post-judgment motions. “A motion under Rule 59(e) is not an
opportunity to re-argue a case.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998).
It may not be used to “revisit arguments already made and
rejected.” Meekison v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehabilitation & Correction,
181 F.R.D. 571, 572 (S.D. Ohio 1998). All of Plaintiff’s claims,
whether old or new, recycle the argument the Court considered
and rejected in its October 18, 2024 order: that the

securitization of the mortgage voids Defendant’s rights to
enforce it. (ECF Nos. 19, 21, 22). As the Court explained,
securitization does not alter the parties’ rights under the
mortgage because it “creates a separate contract, distinct from
the original note.” Williams, 2024 WL 4529584, at *3. Plaintiff
could not state a plausible claim for relief because his rights
under the mortgage were unaffected by securitization. See id.

(citing Thompson, 773 F.3d at 749). Plaintiff offers no basis
for the Court to revisit Plaintiff’s securitization argument.
Plaintiff also fails to meet his burden to justify reopening
the case under Rule 59(e). See Washington, 2024 WL 4664709, at
*2; see also Pond, 674 Fed.Appx. at 473 (holding that courts
must balance the petitioner’s interest against “the competing
interests of protecting the finality of judgments and the

expeditious termination of litigation.”). Plaintiff offers no
reason, let alone a compelling reason, for failing to seek leave
to amend before the Court entered judgment on October 18, 2024.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s post-judgment motions
fail. Plaintiff has not met the requirements to reopen the case
under Rule 59(e). He has not provided a compelling reason for
failing to seek leave to amend his complaint before the Court
entered its judgment.

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint (ECF No. 21), Motion for Rehearing (ECF No. 22), Second
Motion to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 24), and Motion to Initiate
Discovery (ECF No. 28).

The Court also DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s Motion to Strike
Plaintiff’s Reply. (ECF No. 27).
SO ORDERED this 6th day of January, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10774606. Public record. Not legal advice.