# (PC) Kendrid v. Umana

> District Court, E.D. California · January 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10773632

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** January 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 FORREST KENDRID, No. 2:24-cv-01005-EFB (PC)
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 I. UMANA, et al.,
15 Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42
18 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to filing a complaint (ECF No. 1), he also filed an application to
19 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). The court will grant his application and screen the
20 complaint.
21 Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
22 Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), that
23 plaintiff is unable to prepay fees and costs or give security therefor. Accordingly, plaintiff’s
24 motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
25 Screening Standards
26 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek
27 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
28 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
1 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
2 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
3 Id. § 1915A(b).
4 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)
5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and
6 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the
7 defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
8 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
9 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plain statement” requirements of Rule 8, its
10 allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
11 662, 679 (2009).
12 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked
13 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
14 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
15 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
16 678.
17 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility.
18 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
19 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
20 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a
21 claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v.
22 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
23 plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
24 Screening Order
25 Plaintiff sues defendants identified as I. Umana and Biclar. Both defendants are alleged to
26 be supervising Registered Nurses (RNs) at the California Medical Facility. Plaintiff alleges that
27 defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical or mental health care needs
28 on March 27, 2024. Plaintiff alleges an unspecified “conflict” between himself and a staff person
1 identified as “CNA Bravo.” Bravo appears to have been assigned to maintain a suicide watch
2 over plaintiff. Plaintiff objected to having Bravo as his “suicide observatory.” ECF No. 1 at 3.
3 Plaintiff informed Umana that Bravo triggered plaintiff’s PTSD because of a previous,
4 unspecified “altercation” with Bravo. Plaintiff told Umana that plaintiff would try to kill himself
5 if Bravo remained at her suicide watch post. Umana allegedly stated that “he did not care if
6 plaintiff tried to kill himself he would be dealt with, then smiled and walked away.” Id. Plaintiff
7 cut his wrist, Bravo activated an alarm, and officers arrived to escort plaintiff to the exam room
8 where two unidentified nurses cleaned and dressed plaintiff’s cut. Id. Umana instructed Bravo to
9 remain at her post, and Biclar refused to intervene with Umana who was her “supervisory
10 counterpart.” Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff alleges Biclar acted with “total disregard” for plaintiff’s safety
11 by refusing to intervene with Umana. Id. at 4. Plaintiff was returned to his cell, and Bravo
12 remained at the suicide watch post. Id.
13 Plaintiff cut his wrist a second time, in the presence of both Umana and Biclar. Two
14 unidentified nurses cleaned and dressed the second cut. Plaintiff was once again returned to his
15 cell. Plaintiff alleges Umana, in the presence of Biclar, instructed Bravo “to not activate her
16 alarm unless it’s longer and deeper.” Id. Bravo responded to Umana that Bravo did not want to
17 risk losing her job by violating the policy requiring alarm activation whenever an inmate harms
18 himself. Id. at 4, 7. Bravo informed plaintiff that Bravo had received instructions from Umana
19 and Biclar to not activate the alarm “unless the cut were longer and thicker.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff
20 claims to have overheard Umana instruct nursing staff that “the next time he cuts himself don’t
21 bring him to the exam room” but instead “clean him in the hallway in front of his door so
22 everyone can see and Bravo will continue to be his suicide observatory I don’t care what happens
23 to [plaintiff’s] well being.” Id. at 5.
24 Plaintiff cut himself a third time “deeper and thicker.” Id. Bravo activated the alarm and
25 reported the third cut was bigger and thicker. Two unidentified nurses instructed the responding
26 officers to hold plaintiff in front of his cell door and they treated plaintiff there. Id.
27 ////
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1 The complaint alleges that Umana and Biclar1 acted with deliberate indifference to
2 plaintiff’s serious mental health needs, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.2
3 Id. Plaintiff claims defendants could have assigned other mental health staff to replace Bravo at
4 the suicide watch post so as to de-escalate plaintiff’s “mental state of mind” and that defendants’
5 failure to do so “disregarded plaintiff’s safety and caused pain and suffering.” Id. at 7.
6 Eighth Amendment Claims
7 Plaintiff’s allegations imply Eighth Amendment claims based on either or both failure to
8 protect and/or deliberate indifference to serious medical or mental health care needs. The
9 potential claims are somewhat intertwined.
10 Failure To Protect
11 Regarding failure to protect, “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
12 conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment,”
13 which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993).
14 A violation of the Eighth Amendment requires a showing of both an “objective component” – the
15 objective seriousness of the challenged condition, and a “subjective component” – the responsible
16 official’s subjective state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v.
17 Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to
18 “provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive
19 adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to
20 guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. Where a prisoner alleges injuries
21 stemming from an objectively unsafe condition of confinement, prison officials may be held

22 1 It is somewhat unclear the extent to which the claims against Biclar are based on
Biclar’s own supervisory status and authority, or merely on a presumed ability to confer or
23 intervene with Umana. For purposes of this screening, the complaint is construed as alleging that
Biclar’s authority was essentially equal to Umana’s, since they are both alleged to be supervisory
24 registered nurses.

25 2 Plaintiff’s claims arise, if at all, under the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment because he is a convicted inmate in state custody. Redman v. City of San Diego, 942
26 F.2d 1435, 1440 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825 (1994) (“while the Eighth Aamendment proscribes cruel and unusual punishment for
27 convicted inmates, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes any
punishment of pretrial detainees”); see also Perez v. Cox, 788 F. App’x 438, 442 (9th Cir. 2019)
28 (recognizing abrogation on other grounds).
1 liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost
2 v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). A condition is
3 sufficiently serious if it poses “a substantial risk of serious harm” to the inmate. Farmer, 511
4 U.S. at 832. Because the sufficiency of a conditions-of-confinement claim depends upon the
5 particular facts of each situation, the “circumstances, nature, and duration” of the challenged
6 conditions must be carefully considered. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000).
7 “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact
8 subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, …
9 and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact
10 that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Thus, a showing of deliberate indifference
11 rests on facts clearly evincing “obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good
12 faith.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “Liability may follow only if a prison
13 official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by
14 failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Labatad v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155,
15 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). The Eighth Amendment does not give
16 rise to a federal cause of action whenever prisoners are inconvenienced or suffer de minimis
17 injuries. Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds
18 sub nom. Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728 (1992).
19 To the extent the complaint’s allegations against Umana and Biclar might be construed as
20 a failure to protect claim based on keeping Bravo at the suicide watch post, the claim fails for
21 multiple reasons. The complaint alleges a previous “altercation” between plaintiff and Bravo
22 without describing the nature of the altercation or why it might trigger plaintiff’s PTSD. Nothing
23 in the complaint suggests that Bravo was unwilling or unable to competently perform her role as
24 “suicide observatory.” Bravo called for medical attention each time plaintiff cut himself. Bravo
25 articulated her intention to follow policy, and asked for and obtained clarification from Umana
26 and Biclar when they instructed Bravo on the threshold injury for activating the alarm. Bravo
27 also communicated with plaintiff and explained to him the threshold for activating the alarm. The
28 complaint shows no objective reason why Bravo posed a substantial risk of serious harm to
1 plaintiff and no objective reason for defendants to remove Bravo from her post. For these
2 reasons, the complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim based on the
3 decision to keep Bravo at the suicide watch post.
4 Deliberate Indifference To Serious Medical Or Mental Health Needs
5 To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on deliberate indifference to
6 medical or mental health care need, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she had a serious medical
7 need; and (2) the defendant’s response to that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner,
8 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A
9 serious medical or mental health care need exists if the failure to treat the condition could result in
10 further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.
11 Deliberate indifference may be shown by the denial, delay, or intentional indifference with
12 treatment, or by the way in which care is provided. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390,
13 394 (9th Cir. 1988).
14 To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware of facts from
15 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
16 draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a defendant will be liable for violating the
17 Eighth Amendment if he knows that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk of serious harm and
18 disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. A physician
19 need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate that inmate’s Eighth Amendment
20 rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A failure to competently
21 treat a serious medical or mental health condition even if some treatment is prescribed, may
22 constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id.
23 However, “mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice,’” will not support
24 an Eighth Amendment claim. Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 4548, 460 (9th Cir.
25 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th
26 Cir. 2004). “Rather, to prevail on a claim involving choices of treatment, a prisoner must show
27 that the chosen course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the circumstances,’ and
28 was chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health.’” Id. (quoting
1 Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)). Further, a plaintiff must have suffered
2 some type of pain or harm that is more than de minimis in order to implicate the Eighth
3 Amendment. See, e.g., Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th
4 Cir. 1985) (“delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical
5 indifference … unless the denial was harmful”).
6 The complaint fails to adequately allege an objectively serious medical or mental health
7 care need to replace Bravo at her post. There is no allegation that any medical or mental health
8 care professional had issued any directive prohibiting Bravo from serving in the suicide watch
9 post so as to avoid triggering plaintiff’s PTSD. It was plaintiff’s own assessment that Bravo
10 should have been replaced. Defendants are supervisory registered nurses who assessed the
11 situation differently and made an affirmative decision to keep Bravo at her post. The complaint
12 fails to allege that plaintiff’s demand to replace Bravo was anything more than a disagreement
13 over the care needed to address plaintiff’s PTSD mental health condition. See Gonzalez v. Zika,
14 No. C 11-5561 CS (PR), 2013 WL 4557770, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2013) (although plaintiff
15 disagreed, mental health care professionals’ decision to discontinue single cell housing as
16 treatment for panic disorder was based on “considered evaluation of [the inmate’s] symptoms and
17 responses to treatment” and was neither medically unacceptable nor taken with sufficiently
18 culpable deliberate indifference); cf. Brown v. Newsome, 2:19-cv-1227-DB P, 2019 WL 3060063,
19 at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2019) (a prisoner’s hunger strike is not grounds for finding him in
20 imminent danger because “[w]ith rare exception, a plaintiff cannot ‘create the imminent danger so
21 as to escape the three strikes provision of the PLRA’” (citation omitted)). The complaint also
22 fails to show that defendants were subjectively deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s PTSD
23 condition. Umana’s comment that plaintiff would “just have to deal with” having Bravo in the
24 suicide watch post is insufficient to show deliberate indifference, especially in light of
25 defendants’ in-person monitoring and supervision and the attention given to plaintiff’s needs in
26 the ensuing hours.
27 The complaint equally fails to adequately allege a serious medical or mental health care
28 need regarding the apparently minor cuts plaintiff inflicted on himself. See Gonzalez v. Guzman,
1 No. 17-cv-241-GPC-BGS, 2017 WL 5446087, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2017) (“Because
2 Plaintiff’s injuries appear to consist of cuts/lacerations approximately ½ cm in length, they do not
3 rise to the level of a ‘serious medical need.’” (collecting cases)). Even if the cuts were a serious
4 medical need, the complaint fails to how defendants were deliberately indifferent to the need.
5 The complaint does not allege that defendants ignored or disregarded plaintiff’s cuts, nor does the
6 complaint allege inadequate treatment for the cuts. Two unidentified nurses (not defendants)
7 treated each of the cuts, and defendants also arrived on-scene. Plaintiff was immediately returned
8 to his cell after the first two cuts were dressed at the nursing station, which is another indication
9 that the cuts were minor. Defendants’ decision to have plaintiff’s third cut treated at his cell door
10 is another treatment decision with which plaintiff disagrees, but the complaint fails to show that
11 treating plaintiff’s third cut at the cell door posed a substantial risk of serious harm to him or was
12 otherwise deliberately indifferent to a serious medical or mental health care need.
13 Umana’s instruction to “clean” plaintiff in the hallway in front of his door the next time he
14 cuts himself “so everyone can see and Bravo will continue to be his suicide observatory I don’t
15 care what happens to [plaintiff’s] well being” is insufficient to show deliberate indifference to a
16 serious medical or mental health care need. This allegation instead shows that Umana gave
17 instructions how to provide care if plaintiff cut himself again. Nor does the complaint show any
18 substantial risk or any actual harm done by treating plaintiff’s cut at the cell door instead of in the
19 exam room. The complaint does not show, for example, why “everyone seeing” a cut being
20 treated at the cell door is materially more adverse to plaintiff’s well-being, than “everyone
21 seeing” plaintiff being escorted to the exam room to be treated there. For all these reasons, the
22 complaint fails to allege sufficient facts showing an objectively unsafe condition posing a
23 substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff, or that defendants had subjective knowledge of such a
24 substantial risk and obdurately and wantonly disregarded it, and thus the complaint fails to state
25 an Eighth Amendment claim against defendants for deliberate indifference to serious medical or
26 mental health care needs.
27 Leave to Amend
28 Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to file an
1 amended complaint, he should note that any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only
2 persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal
3 constitutional right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects
4 another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or
5 omits to perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). The
6 amended complaint must contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P.
7 10(a). The amended complaint should also describe, in sufficient detail, how each defendant
8 personally violated or participated in the violation of his rights. The court will not infer the
9 identify of defendants, nor the existence of allegations that have not been explicitly set forth in
10 the amended complaint.
11 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See
12 George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Nor may he bring multiple, unrelated claims
13 against more than one defendant. Id. The amended complaint should include only claims that are
14 related because they concern the same event (or series of related events) or the same defendant.
15 Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it is complete in itself without
16 reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended
17 complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the
18 earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114
19 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being
20 treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967)).
21 Finally, the court notes that any amended complaint should be as concise as possible in
22 fulfilling the above requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should avoid the inclusion of
23 procedural or factual background which has no bearing on his legal claims. The court cautions
24 plaintiff that failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court’s Local Rules,
25 or any court order may result in this action being dismissed. See Local Rule 110.
26 Conclusion
27 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
28 1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;
] 2. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF NO. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend within 30
2 days of services of this order; and
3 3. Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal of this action for the
4 reasons stated herein.
° oe
6 | Dated: December 31, 2024 Pitti “lige ChE □ tCH7
EDMUND F. BRENNAN
7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10773632. Public record. Not legal advice.