# SITTER v. ALLEGHENY HEALTH NETWORK

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · January 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10773476

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10773476

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “at least for purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss”
- applying the Darden factors in a Title VII case
- applying the Darden factors in a Title VII case
- affirming that plaintiff’s EEOC charge of discrimination did not constitute protected activity because “at no time did [plaintiff] complain of discrimination or retaliation on the basis of disability.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ARIEL SITTER,

2:24-CV-00815-CCW
Plaintiff,

vs.

ALLEGHENY HEALTH NETWORK,

Defendant.

OPINION
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Allegheny Health Network.
ECF No. 11. For the following reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the Motion.
I. Factual Background

This case arises from Plaintiff Ariel Sitter’s work as a nurse at Defendant Allegheny Health
Network (“AHN”). The relevant factual allegations, taken as true, are as follows.
Ms. Sitter is an African American woman who is associated with a disabled individual—
her grandmother—who had been diagnosed with terminal ovarian cancer. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10, 13.
Ms. Sitter began working for AHN as a Travel Registered Nurse on December 12, 2022. Id. ¶ 9.
Her employment contract was to run through March 10, 2023. Id. She obtained the employment
through AHN and Maxim, a staffing agency. Id. As part of this 13-week contract, Ms. Sitter was
assigned to work at AHN’s West Penn Hospital in the GI Lab Unit. Id. ¶ 12. During this contract
period, Ms. Sitter was allotted two call-off days. Id. ¶ 13. On February 13, 2023, Ms. Sitter
became ill with food poisoning and used the first of her two call-off days. Id. ¶ 20. On February
27, 2023, Ms. Sitter used her second call-off day to visit her grandmother in the hospital. Id. ¶ 21.
Ms. Sitter alleges that during her employment with AHN, her direct supervisor and GI Lab
Manager, Margaret Spiker,1 subjected her “to a higher level of scrutiny than her similarly situated
white counterparts who did not have an association with a disabled individual.” Id. ¶ 15. She
contends that Ms. Spiker consistently called her “dumb and incompetent . . . insinuat[ing] that

African American Registered Nurses were too incompetent to be Registered Nurses.” Id. ¶¶ 16,
18. She also asserts that Ms. Spiker “mock[ed] and laugh[ed] at” her while she was performing
her job—and that Ms. Spiker permitted other similarly situated white counterparts to do so as well.
Id. ¶ 17. She further alleges that Ms. Spiker treated her “with discriminatory animus by
questioning her requests to use her allocated time off.” Id. ¶ 19. Ms. Sitter points to an allegedly
similarly situated white counterpart, Ashley Foreman, who utilized her call-off days without issue
from Ms. Spiker. Id. ¶ 22. She also contends that other similarly situated white counterparts were
permitted to leave early, but Ms. Spiker did not allow Ms. Sitter to do so. Id. ¶ 23. For example,
on March 2, 2023, Ms. Sitter requested to leave early because the GI lab was done for the day and
she had completed her job duties; however, Ms. Spiker did not allow her to leave early. Id. ¶ 25.

Meanwhile, Ms. Spiker previously allowed a white employee, Ms. Perka, to leave early from the
GI Lab unit. Id. ¶ 30. Ms. Sitter confided in AHN nurse aid, Becca Jones, “about the
discrimination, harassment, and bullying” she faced from Ms. Spiker. Id. ¶ 23.
On March 6, 2023,2 Ms. Spiker held a meeting with all the GI Lab unit employees in which
she stated that Ms. Sitter “had been blacklisted because she was stupid, always asking to leave her
shift early, and was a problem.” Id. ¶ 26. Ms. Sitter maintains that she only requested to leave her

1 In her Complaint, Ms. Sitter sometimes refers to her direct supervisor as “Ms. Striker” instead of “Ms. Spiker.” For
consistency, the Court will use “Ms. Spiker” throughout.

2 In the Complaint, this date is March 6, 2024 not March 6, 2023. ECF No. 1 ¶ 26. The Court, however, believes this
to be a typographical error since Ms. Sitter’s employment ran from December 2022 to March 2023.
shift early twice because other employees did not relieve her for her lunch breaks. Id. ¶ 27. Despite
Ms. Spiker’s comments, on March 9, 2023, Maxim recruiter, Eden Fletcher, told Ms. Sitter that
AHN was going to extend Ms. Sitter’s contract. Id. ¶ 32. On March 10, 2023, Ms. Spiker had a
meeting with Ms. Sitter in which she “began to interrogate Ms. Sitter about her recent call offs.”

Id. ¶ 34. When Ms. Sitter explained the reasons for her call-offs, Ms. Spiker stated “You [Ms.
Sitter] call off more than the permeant [sic] staff in the last few months. It needs to stop, you
cannot call off again unless she [Ms. Sitter’s grandmother] dies.” Id. Ms. Spiker than proceeded
to raise allegations of Ms. Sitter’s past violations, including being on her cell phone and
continuously requesting to leave her shift early. Id. ¶ 35.
Ms. Sitter then immediately contacted Ms. Fletcher, the Maxim recruiter, to report Ms.
Spiker’s “harassment and bullying.” Id. ¶ 37. On March 13, 2023, Ms. Sitter told Ms. Fletcher
that she would not be extending her contract with AHN due to the “harassment, bullying, and
discrimination.” Id. ¶ 38. Ms. Fletcher told Ms. Sitter that there was nothing she could do, but
she said she would escalate it to her manager. Id. ¶ 42. But Ms. Fletcher did not escalate Ms.

Sitter’s complaint to Maxim and/or AHN’s Human Resource Department. Id. ¶ 43.
On June 5, 2024, Ms. Sitter filed her Complaint against AHN, alleging employment
discrimination and retaliation based on her race and her association with a disabled individual.
ECF No. 1. AHN now moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. ECF No. 11. The Motion
is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. ECF Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14.
II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a claim. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true a complaint’s
factual allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty.
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it cannot rest on mere labels and conclusions.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Accordingly, “[f]actual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and be “sufficient . . . to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established a three-step
process for district courts to follow in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations
that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for
relief.”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster
Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). That said, under Rule 8’s notice pleading standard, even
after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only “allege sufficient
facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connolly
v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788–89 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that “at least for purposes of
pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion
to dismiss”).
III. Legal Analysis

In her Complaint, Ms. Sitter alleges that AHN discriminated against her based on her race
(African American) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(Count 1) as well as based on her association with a disabled person (her terminally ill
grandmother) in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (Count
3). She also alleges that AHN retaliated against her when it constructively terminated her
employment in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (Count 4).3 Ms. Sitter further brings
claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 951, et seq. (Counts 5 and 6).
AHN responds that Ms. Sitter has failed to establish that AHN was her employer, that she
was subjected to an adverse employment action, or that any adverse employment action was taken
because of her race or her association with a disabled individual. ECF No. 12. Regarding her
retaliation claims specifically, AHN contends that Ms. Sitter does not adequately allege a protected

activity, and even if she did, AHN was unaware of the alleged protected activity. ECF Nos. 12,
14. The Court will address each argument below.4
A. Legal Framework

To prove a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must
show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) that she was qualified for the position she
sought to attain or retain, (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the action
occurred under circumstances that support an inference of intentional discrimination. Qin v.

3 In Count 2 of her Complaint, Ms. Sitter brings a retaliation claim under Title VII. ECF No. 1. In her Brief in
Opposition, however, Ms. Sitter agrees to dismiss this claim with prejudice, acknowledging that AHN was unaware
of any alleged protected activity. ECF No. 13 at 10.

4 The Court has jurisdiction over the Title VII and ADA claims, which raise federal questions, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 473 (3d Cir. 2024). Similarly, to establish a prima facie case of
associational discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she was subjected to
an adverse employment action; (2) she was qualified for her job at the time of the adverse
employment action; (3) her employer knew she had a relative or associate with a disability; and

(4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference
that the relative’s or associate’s disability was a determining factor in the employer’s decision.
Dodson v. Coatesville Hospital Corp., 773 F. App’x 78, 83 n.8 (3d Cir. 2019) (endorsing a four-
part test used by other circuit courts).
Additionally, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII or the ADA, a
plaintiff must show that (a) she engaged in a protected activity, (b) the employer took materially
adverse action against her, and (c) there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the employer’s action. Young v. City of Phila. Police Dept., 651 F. App’x 90, 95 (3d Cir.
2016) (citing Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340–42 (3d Cir. 2006)) (discussing Title VII
retaliation claims); Wilson v. Childs.’ Hosp. of Phila., No. 23-3223, 2024 WL 4490601, at *2 (3d

Cir. Oct. 15, 2024) (citing Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997))
(discussing ADA retaliation claims). Proving a prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, and at
the pleading stage, it is not a proper measure of whether a complaint fails to state a claim. Pedro
v. City Fitness, LLC, 803 F. App’x 647, 651 (3d Cir. 2020). Accordingly, at the motion-to-dismiss
stage, courts look only to whether there are “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of each element.” United States ex rel. Bookwalter v. UPMC, 946
F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
B. Ms. Sitter Has Sufficiently Alleged that AHN was her Employer.

In its Motion, AHN asserts that all of Ms. Sitter’s claims should be dismissed because she
has failed to adequately allege that AHN was her employer. ECF No. 12 at 4–6. It asserts Ms.
Sitter only makes “threadbare and conclusory allegations” that both AHN and Maxim employed
her which are insufficient to establish AHN as her employer. Id. at 4. In response, Ms. Sitter
contends that she has sufficiently alleged that AHN employed her because she has stated facts
showing “AHN’s authority, control and supervision of [her].” ECF No. 13 at 4. The Court agrees
with Ms. Sitter that she has sufficiently alleged that AHN was her employer.
Two distinct entities may both be liable for employment discrimination if they are joint
employers. Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1997). A joint employment relationship
exists where “two entities exercise significant control over the same employees.” Id. To determine
if an entity exercises significant control over an employee, courts consider the following non-
exhaustive factors:

[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of
the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring
party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment;
the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of
the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992); Faush v. Tuesday Morning,
Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying the Darden factors in a Title VII case).
Based on these factors, Ms. Sitter has sufficiently alleged that AHN was her employer.
First, Ms. Sitter alleges that she began her employment with AHN in December of 2022 and was
assigned to AHN’s GI Lab in the West Penn Hospital, indicating that she worked at an AHN
hospital and used their instrumentalities and tools. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 9, 12. Next, she states that her
contract ran through March 10, 2023 and that AHN determined whether or not to extend her
contract, showing the duration of her assignment and AHN’s authority to terminate her
employment. Id. ¶¶ 9, 32. Ms. Sitter further alleges that AHN controlled her day-to-day
employment through Ms. Spiker, Ms. Sitter’s direct supervisor and the AHN GI Lab Manager. Id.

¶ 15. For example, Ms. Spiker had the right to assign additional projects to Ms. Sitter and had
discretion over when and how long she worked. Id. ¶¶ 15, 16 (explaining that Ms. Spiker assigned
Ms. Sitter to care for certain patients); ¶¶ 23, 25, 28, 61 (explaining that Ms. Spiker controlled the
hours Ms. Sitter worked and whether she could leave early); ¶ 34 (explaining that Ms. Spiker
controlled whether Ms. Sitter could take off additional days). And while Ms. Sitter does not
directly allege that AHN was the entity that paid her or the method of that payment, she does
indicate that it was AHN, not Maxim, who paid her. Id. ¶ 24 (explaining that an AHN nurse told
Ms. Sitter that AHN is paying her to be there.).
Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Sitter has adequately alleged that AHN was her
employer because she pleaded that it had authority to fire her or extend her contract, it paid her

salary, and it controlled her daily tasks and work schedule. Cf. Rice v. KBR, No. 1:21-cv-1528,
2022 WL 3643649, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2022) (finding that plaintiff failed to allege a joint
employer relationship where he did not clearly allege who had the authority to hire or fire him;
who paid his salary; who was in charge of his daily tasks, provided tools, and had discretion over
his work schedule; or any other facts that may weigh in favor of a joint employer relationship).
Accordingly, to the extent AHN seeks dismissal of Ms. Sitter’s claims based on the failure
to plead that AHN was Ms. Sitter’s employer, the Motion will be denied.
C. Ms. Sitter Has Sufficiently Alleged an Adverse Employment Action.

In her Complaint, the adverse employment action that Ms. Sitter alleges for each claim is
that AHN constructively discharged her. ECF No. 1. AHN asserts that the Court should dismiss
all of Ms. Sitter’s claims because she has failed to adequately plead that she was constructively
discharged. ECF No. 12 at 6–9. AHN avers that Ms. Sitter has not sufficiently alleged constructive
discharge because she fails to plead “conditions so unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable person
would have felt compelled to resign.” Id. at 7. Ms. Sitter responds that whether she was
constructively discharged is a fact-intensive inquiry best resolved at the summary judgment stage,
and at this early stage of the case, she has pled sufficient facts to state such a claim. ECF No. 13
at 6–8. The Court agrees with Ms. Sitter that she has sufficiently alleged constructive discharge.
“Constructive discharge occurs when an employer knowingly permits conditions so
intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.” Boddie v. Cardone Indus., Inc.,
No. 20-3058, 2021 WL 4814770, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 15, 2021) (cleaned up). Such conditions

include threats of discharge or suggestions of resignation or retiring, demotions, pay or benefit
reductions, and alteration of job responsibilities. Brooks v. CBS Radio, Inc., 342 F. App’x 771,
777–78 (3d Cir. 2009). But “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious)” do not rise to the level of intolerable conditions of employment. Owens v.
Allegheny Valley School, 869 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (Mitchell, J.).
Here, Ms. Sitter alleges that she faced more than simple teasing or offhand comments;
instead, she asserts that she was consistently called dumb and incompetent, that she was mocked
and laughed at, and faced discrimination, harassment, and bullying throughout her employment.
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 16, 17, 18, 24, 26. Further, Ms. Sitter states that Ms. Spiker threatened to blacklist
her from future employment, id. ¶¶ 26, 41, and that Ms. Spiker altered Ms. Sitter’s job
responsibilities, id. ¶¶ 16, 30 (explaining that she was forced to care for patients who typically
required more than one nurse), ¶¶ 23, 25, 28, 29, 30 (explaining that she was not permitted to leave
early even if her job responsibilities were done, the GI Lab was closing, she was not the scheduled
“late” employee, and other employees were permitted to leave early). Therefore, at this stage in

the case, the Court finds that Ms. Sitter has pled “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence” of whether she was constructively discharged. Bookwalter,
946 F.3d at 168.
Accordingly, to the extent AHN seeks dismissal of Ms. Sitter’s claims based on the failure
to adequately allege an adverse employment action, the Motion will be denied.5
D. Ms. Sitter Has Sufficiently Alleged an Associational Discrimination Claim
Under the ADA.

AHN seeks to dismiss Ms. Sitter’s ADA discrimination claim (Count 3) because she has
not pled that her constructive discharge was because of her association with a disabled individual.6
ECF No. 12 at 9–12. Specifically, AHN asserts that Ms. Sitter has failed to allege that she made
AHN aware of her association with a disabled individual and that she failed to plead that her
constructive termination occurred under circumstances raising an inference of discrimination. Id.
Ms. Sitter responds that she has stated an ADA discrimination claim because her Complaint states
“specific allegations of her association with a disabled individual” and alleges facts showing that

5 Because AHN brings no other challenges to Ms. Sitter’s race discrimination claim (Count 1), the Court will not
dismiss it.

6 AHN also argues that Ms. Sitter has waived or abandoned her ADA discrimination claim because she failed to
respond to AHN’s arguments in her brief in opposition. ECF No. 14 at 4. The Court finds, however, that Ms. Sitter
appears to address AHN’s arguments in her brief, albeit inartfully. For example, Ms. Sitter discusses both her ADA
retaliation and discrimination claims together in one section, despite the heading only referring to her retaliation claim.
See ECF No. 13 at 9. In this section, she briefly responds to AHN’s two main arguments against her discrimination
claim: that she failed to plead AHN was aware of her association with a disabled individual and that she did not plead
an inference of intentional discrimination. Therefore, because Ms. Sitter’s brief does not entirely omit a response to
AHN’s arguments, the Court declines to dismiss her ADA discrimination claim on grounds of waiver or abandonment.
“the discriminatory action[s] on the part of the defendant were due to Plaintiff’ [sic] association
with a disabled individual.” ECF No. 13 at 9. The Court agrees that Ms. Sitter has sufficiently
alleged an associational discrimination claim under the ADA.
First, the Court finds that Ms. Sitter has adequately alleged facts showing that AHN was

aware of her association with a disabled individual. For example, she explicitly states that
“Defendants were fully aware of Ms. Sitter’s association with a disabled individual” at the time
she was working at AHN. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 14, 74. And although AHN asserts that this statement is
too conclusory to state a claim, Ms. Sitter includes other facts that allege AHN was aware of her
association. For instance, Ms. Sitter alleges that during a meeting on March 10, 2023, Ms. Spiker
told Ms. Sitter that she could not call off again unless her grandmother dies, ECF No. 1 ¶ 34, which
implies that Ms. Spiker, an AHN manager, was aware of Ms. Sitter’s association with a disabled
individual. Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Sitter has sufficiently alleged that AHN was aware
of her grandmother’s disability.
Second, the Court finds that Ms. Sitter has sufficiently alleged that she was discriminated

against on the basis of her association with a disabled individual “[A]t the pleading stage, . . . a
complaint is sufficient when it ‘pleads how, when, and where [the employer] allegedly
discriminated against [the employee]’ such that an employer is on notice of the basis of the claim
against it.” Ruggiero v. Mount Nittany Medical Center, 736 F. App’x 35, 41 (3d Cir. 2018). Here,
Ms. Sitter has alleged that AHN discriminated against her on the basis of disability when, on March
10, 2023, Ms. Spiker called Ms. Sitter into a meeting and “began to interrogate her” about her
recent call offs and told her that she could not call off again unless her grandmother dies. ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 33, 34. Ms. Sitter also alleges that Ms. Spiker sent an email saying that she was
blacklisted from employment at AHN, and that AHN constructively discharged her because she
used her second call-off day to care for her grandmother. Id. ¶¶ 76. Such allegations are “facially
plausible and give fair notice to [AHN] of the basis of [Ms. Sitter’s] claim.” Dreibelbis v. Cnty.
of Berks, 438 F. Supp. 3d 304, 313 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Therefore, the Court finds that, at this early
stage in the case, Ms. Sitter has met her “minimal burden as to the issue of causation.” Id. at 314–

15.
Accordingly, to the extent AHN seeks dismiss of Ms. Sitter’s ADA associational disability
discrimination claim in Count 3, the Motion will be denied.
E. Ms. Sitter Has Failed to Allege a Protected Activity Under the ADA.

AHN seeks to dismiss Ms. Sitter’s ADA retaliation claim (Count 4), asserting that she has
failed to allege a protected activity and, even if she had, she failed to allege that AHN was made
aware of such activity. ECF No. 12 at 12–13; 14 at 3–4. Ms. Sitter responds that she has
sufficiently stated an ADA retaliation claim because AHN knew about her grandmother’s
disability and constructively discharged her shortly after she took a day off to care for her
grandmother. ECF No. 13 at 9–10. The Court agrees with AHN that Ms. Sitter has failed to allege
a protected activity.
The ADA prohibits retaliation against any individual who “has opposed any act or practice
made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].” 42
U.S.C. § 12203(a). Thus, under the ADA, protected activity includes requests for a reasonable
accommodation for a disability, Hitch v. Frick Pittsburgh, No. 23-2065, 2024 WL 2237963, at *2
(3d Cir. May 17, 2024), and complaints of discrimination on the basis of disability, Kendall v.
Postmaster General of U.S., 543 F. App’x 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2013). But merely informing an
employer of one’s disability does not constitute protected activity. Lackey v. Heart of Lancaster
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 704 F. App’x 41, 49–50 (3d Cir. 2017).
In her Complaint, Ms. Sitter asserts that she “engaged in a protected activity when she
made Ms. Spiker and AHN fully aware of her association with a disabled individual.” ECF No. 1

¶ 81. But such an activity—informing an employer of one’s association with a disabled
individual—is not protected under the ADA. See Lackey, 704 F. App’x at 49–50. Additionally,
none of Ms. Sitter’s other allegations could be construed as protected activity. For example, while
Ms. Sitter alleges that she used one of her two call-off days to care for her grandmother, ECF No.
1 ¶ 21, she does not allege that she actually requested any accommodations. Further, Ms. Sitter
alleges that she complained to a Maxim recruiter and other AHN employees about the
“discrimination, harassment, and bullying she was being forced to endure.” Id. ¶¶ 23, 37, 38, 40.
But she does not allege that she complained specifically about discrimination based on disability—
as required to constitute protected activity under the ADA. See Kendall, 543 F. App’x at 144
(affirming that plaintiff’s EEOC charge of discrimination did not constitute protected activity

because “at no time did [plaintiff] complain of discrimination or retaliation on the basis of
disability.”).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Ms. Sitter’s ADA retaliation claim in Count 4 because
she has failed to allege a protected activity. The Court, however, will grant her leave to amend.
F. Ms. Sitter’s Discrimination and Retaliation Claims Under the PHRA.

Ms. Sitter also brings two state-law claims: one for discrimination (Count 5) and one for
retaliation (Count 6), both under the PHRA. ECF No. 1 at 13. The PHRA is “analyzed under the
same standards as its federal counterparts.” Niculcea v. Stone Ridge Towne Ctr., No. 22-1577,
2022 WL 17484280, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2022) (citing Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105
(3d Cir. 1996)) (analyzing claims under the ADA, Title VII, and the PHRA). Therefore, because
the Court will dismiss Ms. Sitter’s ADA and Title VII retaliation claims, it will also dismiss her
PHRA retaliation claim in Count 6. The Court, however, will grant Ms. Sitter leave to amend.

IV. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART AHN’s
Motion to Dismiss such that Ms. Sitter’s Title VII retaliation claim (Count 2) is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE and her ADA retaliation claim (Count 4) and PHRA retaliation claim (Count
6) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court will DENY AHN’s Motion to Dismiss
Ms. Sitter’s Title VII discrimination claim (Count 1), ADA discrimination claim (Count 3), and
PHRA discrimination claim (Count 5). Finally, Ms. Sitter will be granted leave to amend her ADA
and PHRA retaliation claims (Counts 4 and 6).

DATED this 2nd day of January, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Christy Criswell Wiegand
CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND
United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):
All Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10773476. Public record. Not legal advice.