# Kifer v. Burroughs

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · December 31, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10773131

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** December 31, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10773131

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CASE NO. 3:21-CV-039-DCK
RAY KIFER, JR., )
)
Plaintiff, ) ORDER
)
v. )
)
DAVID SCOTT BURROUGHS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on “Defendant Scott Howell’s Motion For
Summary Judgment” (Document No. 99). Defendant Howell “moves for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Monell claim.” Id. The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and this motion is ripe for disposition. Having carefully considered
the motion and the record, the undersigned will deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
The factual allegations underlying this lawsuit have been thoroughly addressed in previous
filings and are largely undisputed. See (Document No. 74, pp. 1-6); (Document No. 100, pp. 2-
6). As such, the undersigned will focus here on the procedural background most relevant to the
pending motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Ray Kifer, Jr. (“Plaintiff” or “Kifer”) initiated this action with the filing of a
“Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial” (Document No. 1) on January 26, 2021. The original
Complaint asserted claims based on the conduct of five (5) deputies of the Anson County Sheriff’s
Office – David Scott Burroughs (“Burroughs”), David Spencer (“Spencer”), Kyle Beam (“K.
Beam”), Josh Beam (“J. Beam”), and Jimmy Williams (“Williams”) (together, “ACSO deputies”).
(Document No. 1). The crux of the Complaint is that Defendant Burroughs, with the assistance of
other ACSO deputies, used his authority and position as a law enforcement officer to fabricate a
crime and frame Plaintiff Kifer for a felony drug offense that he did not commit. Id. The
Complaint contends that the ACSO deputies’ actions were within the scope of their official duties
and under color of law. (Document No. 1, pp. 2-3).

On March 19, 2021, the parties filed a “Joint Proposed Discovery Plan” (Document No.
14). This filing notes that “Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burroughs, while employed by the
Anson County Sheriff’s Department as a deputy, aided and abetted by Defendants Spencer, Beam,
Beam, Williams and [an] unknown federal agent, framed Plaintiff for possession of drugs, which
led to the violation of Plaintiff's civil rights.” (Document No. 14, p. 1). In pertinent part, the
parties’ proposed discovery plan also stated the following:
The parties determined 30 days after the close of fact discovery
to be the appropriate deadline for amending the pleadings based on
previous experience in similar 1983 matters. Often, during the
course of discovery and as facts become known, the parties
become aware of the need to add or remove named parties or
claims. This is particularly true in this case, as the specific roles
played by the various law enforcement officers involved in Mr.
Kifer’s arrest are currently unknown and will require document and
deposition discovery.

(Document No. 14, p. 3) (emphasis added).
On May 27, 2022, the parties filed a “Joint Motion to Amend Case Management Order”
that, inter alia, requested a “deadline to join additional parties and/or otherwise amend the
pleadings” by July 15, 2022. (Document No. 26, p. 2). The undersigned granted the parties’
motion. (Document No. 27).
On July 14, 2022, Plaintiff timely filed a “...Motion For Leave To File First Amended
Complaint” (Document No. 29). Plaintiff’s “proposed First Amended Complaint adds a Monell
claim against Sheriff Reid in his official capacity and Anson County.” Id. (citing Monell v. New
York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). The undersigned granted the motion to
amend on October 3, 2022, noting that “the instant motion was filed by the deadline the parties
had jointly proposed, and the Court approved, ‘to join additional parties and/or otherwise amend
the pleadings.’” (Document No. 35, pp. 2-3) (citing Document Nos. 26 and 27). The undersigned

further stated that the “amendment is without prejudice to Defendants re-raising any objection(s)
to Plaintiff’s claims in a future dispositive motion.” (Document No. 35, p. 3). Plaintiff’s “First
Amended Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial” (Document No. 36) was filed on October 4,
2022.
“Anson County, Estate Of Landric Reid, David Spencer, Kyle Beam, Josh Beam, And
Jimmy Williams’ Motion For Summary Judgment” (Document No. 51) was filed on January 10,
2023. Following full briefing, and a motions hearing held on August 3, 2023, the undersigned
granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ “...Motion For Summary Judgment” (Document
No. 51). (Document No. 74). Most pertinent to the pending motion, the undersigned granted the

motion in favor of Anson County on Plaintiff’s Monell claim, noting that “the proper defendant is
the Sheriff.” (Document No. 74, p. 22).
“Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint” (Document No. 78)
was filed on September 6, 2023. By amending, Plaintiff sought to delete claims dismissed by the
Court’s summary judgment decision and add “Sheriff Landric Reid as the Defendant in his official
capacity as the Anson County Sheriff in Count V.” (Document No. 78, p. 1). Ultimately, the
undersigned granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend and the “Second Amended Complaint And
Demand For Jury Trial” (Document No. 94) was filed on August 13, 2024.
Plaintiff contends that “at all times relevant to his Complaint, Defendant Landric Reid was
the Sheriff of Anson County, and as such was the final policymaker with regard to all personnel
issues within the Anson County Sheriff’s Department.” (Document No. 94, pp. 3-4). “Upon the
death of Defendant Landric Reid, Sheriff Scott Howell in his official capacity has been substituted
as a Defendant in place of Sheriff Reid in his official capacity,” and “Harry B. Crow was

substituted as a Defendant in place of Sheriff Reid in his individual capacity.” (Document No. 94,
p. 4); see also (Document Nos. 42, 45, and 90). “Harry B. Crow, Jr., an attorney duly licensed to
practice law in North Carolina and the Public Administrator for Anson County, North Carolina,
was appointed as the Administrator for the Estate of Landric Reid by Order of the Clerk of Superior
Court of Anson County” on or about December 19, 2022. (Document No. 45, pp. 1-2).
Now pending is “Defendant Scott Howell’s Motion For Summary Judgment” (Document
No. 99) filed on October 1, 2024. Anson County Sheriff Scott Howell seeks summary judgment
as to the Monell liability claim, Count V, brought against him in his official capacity on two
grounds: “1) the Monell claim is barred by the statute of limitations; and 2) the undisputed

evidence shows that ACSO was not deliberately indifferent in training its deputies.” (Document
No. 100, p. 2).
The pending motion is now ripe for review and disposition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review here is familiar. Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Only disputes between the parties
over material facts (determined by reference to the substantive law) that might affect the outcome
of the case properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence is such

that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
Once the movant’s initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. Webb
v. K.R. Drenth Trucking, Inc., 780 F.Supp.2d 409 (W.D.N.C. 2011). The nonmoving party
opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,
but ... must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, that is, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. At summary
judgment, it is inappropriate for a court to weigh evidence or make credibility determinations. Id.

DISCUSSION
In Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of City of New York, the Supreme Court established
that local governments could be held responsible under § 1983 for constitutional violations caused
by their own “policy or custom.” Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To successfully prove a
Monell claim, “four theories can be pursued to prove an unlawful custom, policy, or practice
violates section 1983”:
(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or
regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final
policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure
to properly train [employees], that “manifest[s] deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that
is so “persistent and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage
with the force of law.”

Bailey v. Campbell, 5:22-CV-052-KDB-DSC, 2022 WL 16849126, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 10,
2022) (internal citations omitted).
The “Second Amended Complaint...” alleges that
Although the Sheriff’s Department’s Policy and Procedure
Manual had an explicit section that required the reporting of official
misconduct (or even the suspicion of official misconduct) to
supervisors or directly to the Sheriff, employees of the Sheriff’s
Department were not required to read or review the Manual, and no
training was conducted regarding this critical policy. The Anson
County Sheriff’s Department instead adopted an “anything goes”
culture.

(Document No. 94, p. 2).
According to the “Second Amended Complaint...,” Sheriff Landric Reid became Sheriff of
Anson County in 2015, and “adopted the written policies and procedures governing the conduct
of Anson County Sheriff Department law enforcement officers performing law enforcement
functions on behalf of the county” that had been “adopted by his predecessor, Sheriff Tommy
Allen, [and] constituted the official policy of Anson County.” (Document No. 94, p. 38). Sheriff
Allen had “required all law enforcement officers to read the Anson County Policy and Procedure
Manual, then sign an affirmation that they had read and understood the policies and procedures”;
however, Sheriff Reid did not continue that requirement.” Id. Moreover, the Second Amended
Complaint alleges that “the Anson County Policy and Procedure Manual was only available in the
office of Sheriff Landric Reid” and that the other Defendants in this action were not even required
to know the location of the Anson County Policy and Procedure Manual. Id.
The Second Amended Complaint further alleges that Sheriff Reid failed to conduct training
on: the Anson County Policy and Procedure Manual; ethics; or “how to respond if an Anson
County Deputy Sheriff suspected wrongdoing by another Anson County officer.” (Document No.
94, p. 39). Plaintiff specifically alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that
340. In 2018, Section 105 of the Anson County Policy and
Procedure Manual provided as follows:

1.05 - Duty to Report Violations of laws, Ordinances,
Rules and Directives
Employees knowing of or suspecting other
employees of violating laws, ordinances, Sheriff’s
Office rules, directives, special orders, or standard
operating procedures shall report the same to their
supervisor. If an employee believes the information
is of such a nature or gravity, official channels may
be bypassed and the information may be reported
directly to the Sheriff.

341. The lack of training resulted in the failure of the
Defendants to intervene to protect Ray Kifer from Burroughs by
reporting their suspicions to their supervisors or to the Sheriff.

Id.
It is undisputed that Sheriff Scott Howell, in his official capacity, is the successor
Defendant to the late Sheriff Landric Reid. Regarding the pending Monell claim against Sheriff
Howell, Plaintiff concludes that “Sheriff Reid’s failure to require that Anson County Sheriff’s
Deputies be familiar with the Policy and Procedures Manual, and his failure to provide or require
training on the requirements of Section 105 of the Policy and Procedures Manual, led directly to
the illegal stop and arrest of Ray Kifer.” (Document No. 94, pp. 40-41).
By the instant motion, Sheriff Howell contends “that there is no genuine issue of material
fact” and that he is “entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law” as to the Second Amended
Complaint’s Monell claim. (Document No. 99, p. 1). Defendant Howell’s grounds for summary
judgment are: “1) the Monell claim is barred by the statute of limitations; and 2) the undisputed
evidence shows that ACSO was not deliberately indifferent in training its deputies.” (Document
No. 100, p. 2).
In support of summary judgment, Howell first argues that the statute of limitations in North
Carolina for section 1983 claims is three years, and since Plaintiff was arrested on March 7, 2018,
his Monell claim had to be filed by March 7, 2021. (Document No. 100, pp. 6-7). Defendant

Howell notes that the original Complaint was filed on January 26, 2021, without a Monell claim,
and that Plaintiff first brought a Monell claim against Anson County in his Amended Complaint
on October 4, 2022. (Document No. 100, p. 7). Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Sheriff Howell,
specifically, was included in his Second Amended Complaint filed on August 13, 2024. Id. Based
on the foregoing, Plaintiff contends that the “Monell claim is time-barred, unless the relation back
doctrine applies.” Id.
Defendant Howell argues, however, that Plaintiff cannot rely on the relation back doctrine
because he cannot “meet his burden to demonstrate that the Monell claim relates back to the
original Complaint.” (Document No. 100, pp. 7-8). Defendant asserts that:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (c) provides that an amendment
changing a party relates back to the original complaint when 1) it
arises out of the same transaction as that set forth in the original
complaint, and 2) within the time period set forth under Rule 4(m)-
90 days- the new party receives notice of the suit such that it will
not be prejudiced in defending the case, and the new party knew or
should have known that, but for a mistake as to the proper party’s
identity, it would have been sued.

Id. (citing Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 469-470 (4th Cir. 2007)).
Howell notes that Plaintiff “must show that there is a ‘factual nexus between the
amendment and the original complaint.’” (Document No. 100, p. 8) (quoting Grattan v. Burnett,
710 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1983)). Howell then suggests that there is not a sufficient factual nexus
because the Monell claim “involves different facts and allegations and theories than the underlying
constitutional claims set forth in the Complaint.”
Next Defendant Howell argues that even if “the ‘same transaction’ requirement is satisfied,
Plaintiff must still establish that, within 90 days, Scott Howell in his official capacity (ACSO)
‘knew or should have known the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake

concerning the proper party’s identity.’” (Document No. 100, pp. 9-10) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(c)(1)(C)(ii)).
Defendant acknowledges that Sheriff Reid and the ACSO received timely notice of the
First Amended Complaint, on or about October 13, 2022, but seems to argue that because he “did
not know or should have known that the Complaint would have been brought against him within
90 days of the service of the complaint,” on May 3, 2021, the relation back doctrine is not
applicable. (Document No. 100, p. 10).
Next, Defendant Howell argues that the “Monell claim fails on the merits because Plaintiff
cannot show that the ACSO was deliberately indifferent in training.” (Document No. 100, p. 12).

Howell further asserts that the
ACSO may only be held liable for the failure to train its employees
where such failure “reflects ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of
its citizens.” Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000)
(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct.
1197, 1204 (1989)). Deliberate indifference may be found where
“‘in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees,
the need for more or different training is ... obvious, and the [failure
to train is] likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights.’”
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. at 1205. Deliberate
indifference “is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action.” Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117
S.Ct. 1382, 1391 (1997). In this case, the evidence is clear that all
deputies were trained on how to report suspected wrongdoing by
employees.
(Document No. 100, pp. 13-14).
In opposition to “Defendant Scott Howell’s Motion For Summary Judgment,” Plaintiff
Kifer notes that he filed his “First Amended Complaint...” on October 4, 2022, naming Landric
Reid in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Anson County, and that Sean Perrin filed an answer
to the First Amended Complaint on behalf of Landric Reid “in his official capacity only” on

October 18, 2022. (Document No. 101, p. 1). Plaintiff notes that Sheriff Reid died shortly
thereafter, but argues that “this had no legal effect on the Monell claim that was pending.” Id.
“Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, his successor was automatically
substituted as a matter of law” and then “[o]n July 10, 2024, eighteen months after Sheriff Reid’s
death, the ACSO consented to the formal substitution of Scott Howell, in his official capacity as
the Sheriff of Anson County, for Landric Reid, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Anson
County.” (Document No. 101, pp. 1-2).
Plaintiff contends that the ACSO was timely served within 90 days of the filing of the First
Amended Complaint.” (Document No. 101, p. 2). Moreover, Plaintiff states that:

Practically speaking, the Anson County Sheriff’s Office has had
actual notice of this lawsuit since the day it was first filed. The local
media has publicized it, its employees have been deposed, a public
criminal trial based on the facts was held, and a guilty verdict was
rendered. To say that the ACSO did not have notice of the Monell
claim pending against it for the past two years is to deny reality.

(Document No. 101, p. 3).1
Plaintiff argues that according to “well-settled Fourth Circuit law,” Rule 15 and Rule 4(m)
were satisfied when service of the First Amended Complaint provided notice to the ACSO within
90 days. (Document No. 101, p. 2-4) (citing Wilson v. City of Jacksonville, North Carolina, 682

1 Defendant Howell’s counsel, Sean Perrin, filed an Answer to the original Complaint on behalf of ACSO
deputies Spencer, K. Beam, J. Beam, and Williams on February 11, 2021, and has been actively engaged
in this litigation ever since on behalf of ACSO Defendants.
F.Supp.3d 481, 486-488 (E.D.N.C. 2023)). Plaintiff notes that the Wilson court held that “so long
as the newly added individual defendants receive notice and should have had knowledge of the
action within the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) 90-day service period following filing of
amended complaint, they will have received required notice under Rule 15(c).” (Document No.
101, p. 4) (quoting Wilson, 682 F.Supp.3d at 491) (citing McGraw v. Gore, 31 F.4th 844, 849 (4th

Cir. 2022) and Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 608 (4th Cir. 2010)).
Next, Plaintiff argues “[t]he record in this case belies the claim that ‘the evidence is clear
that all deputies were trained on how to report suspected wrongdoing by employees.’” (Document
No. 101, p.7) (citing Document No. 100, p 14). Plaintiff further states:
As this Court recognized previously, it cannot “make credibility
determinations” in favor of Howell’s position. (D.E. 74, p 9, citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Like the
unlawful arrest and failure to intervene claims in this case, the
Monell claim requires a jury to resolve the “genuine dispute of
material fact” created by the above evidence. (D.E. 74, p 17). At
bottom, to the extent this Court entertains Defendant Howell’s
undisputed facts argument regarding training – and Plaintiff
maintains this issue is decided and now law of the case – the
discovery adduced in this case plainly reveals disputed material
facts regarding training.

(Document No. 101, p. 7).
In reply, Defendant Sheriff Howell first asserts that Plaintiff’s argument that timely service
was accomplished pursuant to Rule 15 and Rule 4(m) is incorrect because the Rules look to
“serving the original complaint, not any amended complaints.” (Document No. 102, pp. 1-2)
(citing Lee v. Airgas Mid South, Inc., 793 F.3d. 894, 897-898 (8th Cir. 2015); Barrow v.
Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 1995)). Howell argues that the Sheriff’s
Office must have received notice of a possible Monell claim within ninety (90) days of January
26, 2021 – the date of the filing of the original Complaint. (Document No. 102, p. 2). Howell
further argues that Plaintiff’s reliance on Wilson v. City of Jacksonville is misplaced. Id.
Next, Defendant Howell contends that Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing a
failure to train claim. (Document No. 102, pp. 4-7). According to Howell,
This Court would not need to make a “credibility determination”
on whether officers knew what to do when confronted with a fellow
officer’s misconduct. [Document 101, p. 7]. Everyone at the
Sheriff’s Office knew to report a co-worker if that co-worker was
involved in misconduct. There is no genuine issue on this fact
because no “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” CTB, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 954 F.3d 647, 658
(4th Cir. 2020).

(Document No. 102, p. 6)
Based on the foregoing, Howell concludes that he is entitled to summary judgment.
The undersigned will begin with Defendant Howell’s second argument, which does not
present a close call. In short, the undersigned is not persuaded that “the undisputed evidence shows
that ACSO was not deliberately indifferent in training its deputies.” (Document No. 100, p. 2).
Rather, the undersigned finds that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the ACSO’s
training practices, or lack thereof, that must be considered by a jury.
Defendant Howell’s first argument, regarding the statute of limitations, creates a slightly
closer call. Contrary to Plaintiff’s briefing, the Court has not previously decided this issue. See
(Document No. 101, pp. 4-5) (citing Document No. 93); see also (Document No. 74, pp. 18-22).
Although the undersigned did not expressly address Defendant Howell’s statute of limitations
argument in previous Orders, clearly the Court determined that Plaintiff’s assertion of a Monell
claim was not “futile.” See (Document Nos. 35, 78, 93).
In reviewing the record of the case, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s previous argument
regarding the applicable statute of limitations to be most persuasive. Specifically, in support of
“Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave To File First Amended Complaint” (Document No. 29) – seeking to
add a “Monell claim against Sheriff Reid in his official capacity and Anson County” – Plaintiff
argued that discovery had revealed facts showing that the deprivation of Mr. Kifer’s rights was
caused by a failure to train the involved officers in a key aspect of their duties. (Document No.
30, p. 2). Plaintiff explained that he was unaware of important facts and policies of the ACSO

until taking depositions in May 2022. (Document No. 30, pp. 11-13).
Plaintiff further argued:
Defendants expend considerable effort citing cases on the
relation-back principle under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
Def. Resp. pp 7-10. However, this discussion is irrelevant because,
as the Defendants acknowledge, the doctrine applies to save “a
proposed claim in an amendment [that] is barred by the statute of
limitations.” Def. Resp. p 7 (emphasis added). As thoroughly
discussed in the previous section, Plaintiff’s Monell claim is not
time barred because the limitations period for the claim began
to run at the time of Sheriff Reid’s deposition on May 25, 2022.

(Document No. 34, p. 5) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff again raises this argument in opposition to “Anson County, Estate Of Landric
Reid, David Spencer, Kyle Beam, Josh Beam, And Jimmy Williams’ Motion For Summary
Judgment” (Document 51). Plaintiff argues in part, as follows:
Plaintiff did not know sufficient facts at the time of the filing of
the original complaint to allege a Monell claim. What Plaintiff only
learned in discovery was that Sheriff Landric Reid (a) did not require
his employees to read the policy and procedure manual (as his
predecessor had required), (b) did not train his employees on the
need to read the policy and procedure manual, and (c) did not train
his employees on how to enforce or act upon the policies included
in the policy and procedure manual. These latter, operative facts
were not learned until the depositions of Mario El Kobersy on April
20, 2022, Jimmy Williams on May 18, 2022, and Sheriff Landric
Reid on May 25, 2022. . . .

Moreover, during the depositions of Josh Beam and Jimmy
Williams, Plaintiff learned of specific facts concerning how they
failed to intervene to stop Burroughs’ scheme to violate Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. These depositions revealed that the Sheriff’s
failure to train was the root cause of Beam’s and Williams’ inaction,
and thus was “the moving force behind the particular constitutional
violation.” Jones v. Chapman, No. ELH–14–2627, 2015 WL
4509871, at *12 (D.Md. July 24, 2015). It would have been
sanctionable to allege a Monell failure to train claim at the outset of
this case without these crucial facts, and only with “naked
assertions.” Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557
(2007).

(Document No. 57, pp. 23-24) (internal citations omitted).
The undersigned finds Plaintiff’s position that the statute of limitations for his Monell claim
began to run in May 2022, to be convincing. See Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d
178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Under federal law a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses
sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of
action.”). A more recent decision by this Court, authored by the Honorable Richard L. Voorhees,
is also instructive.
A Court determines the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim by
looking to the law of the State in which the action arose. Owens v.
Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th
Cir.2014). Specifically, a Court looks to the state law statute of
limitation for personal injury suits. Id. This suit arose in North
Carolina. In North Carolina, the statute of limitation for personal
injury torts is three years. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–52.

. . .

“Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations
for § 1983 claims, federal law governs the date on which that
limitations period begins to run.” Owens, 767 F.3d at 388. Federal
law looks to the common law to determine accrual, which in turn
provides “that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and
present cause of action[,]” id. at 389 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 388 (2007)), namely, “when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of his injury[,]” id.
Grimes v. City of Hickory, No. 5:14-CV-160-RLV, 2015 WL 3649106, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June
11, 2015).
As noted above, the likelihood that the claims and Defendants in this case might evolve
through the discovery process was presciently anticipated by counsel for the parties, early in this
case, as indicated in their “Joint Proposed Discovery Plan” filed on March 19, 2021.

The parties determined 30 days after the close of fact discovery
to be the appropriate deadline for amending the pleadings based on
previous experience in similar 1983 matters. Often, during the
course of discovery and as facts become known, the parties
become aware of the need to add or remove named parties or
claims. This is particularly true in this case, as the specific roles
played by the various law enforcement officers involved in Mr.
Kifer’s arrest are currently unknown and will require document and
deposition discovery.

(Document No. 14, p. 3) (emphasis added).
The Court adopted the parties’ proposal and set January 15, 2022, as “[t]he deadline to join
additional parties and/or otherwise amend the pleadings.” (Document No. 15, p. 2). That deadline
was later extended, at the parties’ joint request, to July 15, 2022. (Document Nos. 26 and 27). As
noted above, the Court then allowed Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint (Document No.
36) that included a Monell claim. See (Document No. 35). Plaintiff persuasively argues, as
counsel for both sides had forecast, that support for a new claim against a new Defendant became
apparent during the discovery process that the parties, or at least Plaintiff, were not aware of before
certain deposition testimony. Plaintiff timely moved to amend this action when he learned of a
viable claim against Sheriff Reid in his official capacity and the ACSO. As such, the undersigned
agrees that Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Sheriff Howell in his official capacity is not time-
barred.
Even if the Court agreed with Defendant Howell’s view on when the statute of limitations
accrued, it appears likely that the relation back doctrine would apply in this instance and
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment would still be denied.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that “Defendant Scott Howell’s Motion For
Summary Judgment” should be denied.
CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that “Defendant Scott Howell’s Motion For Summary
Judgment” (Document No. 99) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the parties shall confer via some form of
“live” communication to discuss the status of the case, possible settlement, and potential trial dates,
on or before January 10, 2025.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel shall file a Joint Notice identifying all
available dates for trial in February and March 2025, on or before January 14, 2025.
SO ORDERED.

Signed: December 30, 2024

David C. Keesler “y
United States Magistrate Judge et

16

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10773131. Public record. Not legal advice.