# NEIMEISTER v. THE COUNTY OF SALEM

> District Court, D. New Jersey · December 30, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10772585

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** December 30, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating “substance abuse, obesity, breast cancer, and other conditions that are ‘demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques’ have been accepted as disabilities under the LAD” (additional citations omitted)

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL NEIMEISTER,
MATTHEW BRANGAN,
KENNETH ROMALINO,
On behalf of all similarly
situated individuals
Civil Action No. 24-411 (ZNQ) (JBD)
Plaintiffs,
OPINION
v.

THE COUNTY OF SALEM,
JOHN S. CUZZUPE,
JOHN DOES 1–50,
Defendants.

QURAISHI, District Judge
Plaintiffs brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act, N.J. Stat. § 10:6-2, as a class action on behalf of all similarly situated pretrial detainees
in the Salem County Correctional Facility (“SCCF”) who were classified as “at-risk” pursuant to
SCCF’s suicide identification and prevention policy. (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ECF
No. 5.)1 Before the Court is Defendants John S. Cuzzupe and the County of Salem (collectively
“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Motion
to Dismiss” ECF No. 12); Brief in Support of Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

1 Plaintiff Michael Neimeister also asserts claims solely on his own behalf in Counts Five and
Six of the SAC, which are mislabeled as Counts Four and Five after two counts are identified as
Count Three. The Court will refer to the second Count Three as Count Four and correct the
subsequent counts accordingly.
12(b)(6) of Defendants, the County of Salem and John S. Cuzzupe (“Defs’ Br., ECF No. 12-2);
Plaintiffs[’] Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Pls’ Opp. Br.” ECF
No. 18) and Reply Brief in Further Support of Motion Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
of Defendants, the County of Salem and John S. Cuzzupe (“Defs’ Reply Br.” ECF No. 19).

The Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1367. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 24, 2024, Plaintiff Michael Neimeister (“Neimeister”) filed a complaint as the
sole lead plaintiff and a member of a class of similarly situated individuals in this putative class
action that alleges pretrial detainees were unlawfully admitted to SCCF’s “at-risk” unit. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff Robert Strauss, III was added as a lead plaintiff in the Amended Class Action
Complaint, filed on February 16, 2024. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 3.) On March 12, 2024, Plaintiffs
Neimeister, Matthew Brangan (“Brangan”), and Kenneth Romalino (“Romalino”),2 filed the SAC
against John S. Cuzzupe (“Cuzzupe”), John Does 1–50 (“John Does”), and the County of Salem
(“Salem County”) (ECF No. 5.) Defendants Cuzzupe and John Does were sued in their official
and individual capacities. (Id.) The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and
decides the Motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and
Local Civil Rule 78.1.

2 Robert Strauss is not a named plaintiff in the SAC. (ECF No. 5.)
2
II. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs allege the following facts in the SAC. Neimeister and Brangan were class
members in a predecessor class action, Nedrick v. Salem County, et al., No. 1:22-cv-05153 (D.N.J.)

(“Nedrick) and unsuccessfully attempted to intervene. (SAC, Parties, at ¶¶ 1-2, Class Allegations,
at ¶ 8(a).) They filed this action to preserve their rights and those of the class members, alleging
“The Class Period begins two years prior to the filing of the Complaint in Nedrick v. Salem County
or two years prior to the filing of the motion to amend filed November 13, 2023 in that matter and
until such time as Salem County complies with the law.” (Id., Class Allegations, at ¶ 8(a).)
Plaintiffs Neimeister, Brangan and Romalino seek to represent three classes of pretrial detainees
who were designated “at-risk” upon admission to SCCF during the class period. (Id., ¶ 8.)
In Counts One through Three of the SAC, Plaintiffs allege that SCCF’s strip-search policy
violates the United States Constitution, New Jersey Constitution and New Jersey statutes and
regulations pertaining to strip searches. (SAC, at ¶¶ 207–231.) In Count Four of the SAC,3

Plaintiffs allege SCCF’s suicide identification and prevention policy arbitrarily overclassifies
pretrial detainees as “at-risk,” resulting in punishment that violates the Fourteenth Amendment, in
contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, N.J. Stat. § 10:6-2,4 and Article I, ¶ 1 of the New Jersey State

3 See supra n. 1. The Court will refer to the second “Count Three” “Unlawful Punishment of
Pretrial Detainees Based Upon An Arbitrary Classification. . .” as “Count Four” of the SAC.
4The NJCRA “was modeled after 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and creates a private cause of action for
violations of civil rights secured under the New Jersey Constitution. Trafton v. City of
Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. 2011). “Because § 1983 claims and NJCRA claims
are analyzed nearly identically,” district courts may analyze the claims together. Telzer v.

3
Constitution. (SAC, at ¶¶ 22, 226–231.) The at-risk classification is arbitrary because SCCF’s
policy is not approved by a mental health professional. (Id., at ¶¶ 23, 35.) Although SCCF has a
contract with the Center for Family Guidance (“CFG”) to provide mental health services, CFG
does not have authority to alter the terms of SCCF’s suicide identification and prevention policy

(“the policy”). (Id., at ¶¶ 46-47.)
The policy requires corrections officers (“COs”) to administer a questionnaire to pretrial
detainees when they are admitted to SCCF. (Id., at ¶ 27.) The questionnaire is comprised of
mostly objective “yes/no” questions. (Id., at ¶ 26.) Cuzzupe assigns a numerical value to each
questionnaire response by using an answer key. (Id., at ¶ 40.) A score of 50 points or above
qualifies an individual as “at-risk” for self-harm. (Id., at ¶¶ 44–45.) Plaintiffs allege Cuzzupe is
not qualified to perform this function. (Id., at ¶ 42.) They further allege COs are unqualified to
make assessments of detainees based on subjective considerations of suicide or homicide risk. (Id.,
at ¶ 27.) CFG expressed concerns to Cuzzupe that the questionnaire overclassifies. (Id., at ¶ 48.)
A pretrial detainee’s “at-risk” classification results in punishment because conditions in the

at-risk unit are substantially different from those in the general population. (Id., at ¶¶ 226–28.) In
the at-risk unit, pretrial detainees are stigmatized, subjected to constant electronic surveillance,
cross-gender observation of all daily life, routine strip searches, squalid conditions, and they are
denied clothing except a suicide vest.5 (Id., ¶ 32(a–f).)

Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 783 F. App'x 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citations
omitted).
5 Plaintiffs variously describe the suicide garment as a vest, gown, smock or jacket. (SAC, at ¶¶
32(d), 75, 108, 109, 139, 142, 149, 177.) The Court assumes these terms are describing the
same type of garment, which the Court will refer to as a vest, for the sake of consistency.
4
The at-risk unit cells for men were designed for four but were overcrowded, with five to
fifteen men sharing one toilet. (Id., at ¶ 84.) Plaintiffs were housed with others who were suffering
from substance withdrawal, with symptoms of vomiting and diarrhea. (Id., at ¶ 85.) They were
not allowed access to cleaning materials. (Id., at ¶¶ 86–87.) Plaintiffs had to eat in these cells

without tables or chairs. (Id., at ¶ 89.) The lights were always on, depriving Plaintiffs of sleep.
(Id., at ¶¶ 90, 92.) The temperatures were inordinately low. (Id., at ¶ 91.) In contrast, detainees in
the general population were housed in sanitary cells with tables and chairs. (Id., at ¶¶ 84–85, 89.)
Upon escort to the “at-risk” unit, each Plaintiff was directed to a shower room where they
were strip searched by COs outfitted with body worn cameras. (Id., at ¶¶ 72–73.) These strip
searches were subsequent to strip searches conducted upon Plaintiffs’ admission to SCCF. (Id., at
¶ 74.) The subsequent searches were unnecessary because Plaintiffs had no intervening
opportunity to obtain contraband. (Id.) It is also SCCF’s policy to strip search detainees when
they leave the cell. (Id., at ¶ 80.) However, they are often not permitted to leave their cells for
days at a time. (Id., at 82.)

In the at-risk unit, Plaintiffs were required to wear a suicide vest with no undergarments.
(Id., at ¶ 75.) Neimeister complains that his suicide vest was uncomfortable, too small, lacked
functional fasteners, and was immodest. (Id., at ¶ 109.) Brangan was also given a suicide vest
upon his admission. (Id., at ¶ 146.) He was escorted to the at-risk unit wearing a suicide vest
without functional fasteners or undergarments, leaving him exposed. (Id., at ¶¶ 147–48, 151-53.)
His complaints were disregarded by the CO who escorted him. (Id., at ¶¶ 149–50.) Plaintiff
Romalino was also given a suicide vest without undergarments or functional fasteners. (Id., at ¶¶
184-85.)
5
Plaintiffs allege detainees who are charged with non-indictable offenses are protected
under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:161(a) against strip searches performed in the presence of someone
who is not authorized to conduct the search (Count Three). (Id., at ¶ 221.) SCCF violated this law
by strip searching detainees in the presence of other detainees and on live-feed CCTV cameras,

where video footage was accessible to individuals of the opposite gender, who were not involved
in the strip-searches. (Id., at ¶¶ 96–97, 221-22.)
Upon admission to SCCF around February 2022, Plaintiff Neimeister was subjected to a
body image scan and strip search. (Id., at ¶¶ 98–99.) He was first detained alone in a cell and
classified “at-risk” pursuant to SCCF’s suicide identification and prevention policy. (Id., at ¶¶
100–01.) He was then escorted to a shower room in the “at-risk” unit, where he was strip searched
again. (Id., at ¶¶ 104–07.)
Neimeister, who was chemically dependent, suffered from seizures at SCCF. (Id., at ¶¶
119–122). [John Doe] Defendants denied him medical treatment for his known chemical
dependence, but they eventually transported him to Salem Hospital. (Id., at ¶¶ 121, 123–24.) After

discharge from the hospital, Plaintiff was returned to SCCF’s at-risk unit, where he again suffered
from seizures and was returned to the hospital. (Id., at ¶¶ 125–27.) Neimeister asserts an individual
cause of action under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§
10:5-1 et seq., alleging Defendants had a duty to treat his chemical dependence because it is a
disability. (Id., at ¶¶ 232–36.)
Brangan alleges there was fecal matter throughout the cell he shared with approximately
fifteen other detainees in SCCF’s at-risk unit. (Id., at ¶ 156, 159.) He repeatedly complained about
the condition of the cell when the COs did their rounds. (Id., at ¶ 160.) Brangan was sleep-
6
deprived from constant illumination in his cell. (Id., at ¶¶ 164–65.) After three days in the at-risk
unit, Brangan was evaluated by a mental health professional who determined that he was not at-
risk for self-harm. (Id., at ¶ 166.) Nonetheless, Brangan remained in the at-risk unit because he
was suffering from withdrawal, with symptoms of cold sweats, diarrhea and vomiting. (Id., at ¶¶

167, 169.) Brangan was “arbitrarily denied his medication.” (Id., at ¶ 168.)
Romalino was admitted to SCCF around September 2023. (Id., at ¶ 170.) Upon
information and belief, Romalino’s suicide questionnaire results exceeded 50 points, which led to
his at-risk classification. (Id., at ¶ 173.) Romalino was held in isolation in a cell in SCCF’s
admissions unit. (Id., at ¶ 174.) He was later detained in the “at-risk” unit for approximately three
days. (Id., at ¶ 179.) Romalino shared an unsanitary cell with inadequate toilet facilities with as
many as fifteen other detainees (Id., at ¶¶ 188, 192.) He was generally denied the opportunity to
leave the cell, with the exception of two short intervals. (Id., at ¶ 197.) Romalino suffered from
withdrawal because he was denied his prescription for suboxone. (Id., at ¶ 191.) He suffered from
anxiety and distress from the conditions of confinement. (Id., at ¶ 198.) Romalino was seen by a

mental health professional on his second day of confinement at SCCF, and he was transferred to a
different facility on the third day. (Id., at ¶¶ 203-04.) Romalino was not classified at-risk in the
new facility. (Id., at ¶ 205.)
III. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 560 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
7
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility is
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not akin to a
‘probability requirement.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations”
are not required, but “more than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation” must be

pled; it must include “factual enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of
the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal., 556 U.S. at 678. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’
—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id., at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, a district court is “required to accept as true all factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable
to the [plaintiff].” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228. “[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. However, the
Plaintiff’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, assuming the factual
allegations in the complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Id.
8
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Class Allegations and Definitions

Defendants seek to strike all references in the SAC to a predecessor class action, Nedrick,
in which Neimeister and Brangan unsuccessfully attempted to intervene. (Defs’ Brief, at 5.)
Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ allegations on behalf of the Nedrick class members are improper
because Plaintiffs were not permitted to file a Second or Third Amended Complaint in Nedrick.
(Id.) Defendants further allege “Plaintiffs are not permitted to latch onto the alleged class period
in Nedrick to attempt to wind the clock back on this litigation by two years.” (Id., at 6.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue “the Order dismissing Nedrick without prejudice expressly
preserved the rights of the putative class—collateral estoppel.” (Pls’ Opp. Brief, at 32–35).6
Second, Plaintiffs argue they “had the right to relation back under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(c) prior to
the dismissal without prejudice [in Nedrick].” (Id., at 35–40.) In reply, Defendants contend: (1)
“Plaintiffs should not be permitted to consolidate this matter with Nedrick”; (2) “Plaintiffs are not
entitled to collateral estoppel”; and (3) Plaintiffs Misapply Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.” (Defs’ Reply Br.

at 1–5.)
“In this District, ‘dismissal of class allegations at [the pleading] stage should be done rarely
and [] the better course is to deny such motion because the shape and form of a class action evolves
only through the process of discovery.’” In re Allergan Biocell Textured Breast Implant Prods.
Liab. Litig., 537 F. Supp. 3d 679, 752 (D.N.J. 2021) (quoting Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., Civ. No.

6 Plaintiffs’ Opposition Brief is unpaginated. (ECF No. 18.) Therefore, pinpoint cites are to the
page numbers assigned to the brief by the Court’s electronic case management system, CM/ECF.
9
3:17-cv-4827, 2018 WL 1942525, at *17 (D.N.J. April 25, 2018)). “It is only when no amount of
discovery or time will allow for plaintiffs to resolve deficiencies in class definitions under Rule
23, that a motion to strike class allegations should be granted.” Id. (quoting McPeak v. S-L Distrib.
Co., Civ. No. 12-348, 2014 WL 4388562, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2014) (citations omitted)).

Accordingly, the Court will deny without prejudice Defendants’ motion to strike references to
Nedrick in the class allegations.
B. Fourth Amendment Claim of Unreasonable Strip Search Policy or Practice

In Count One of the SAC, Plaintiffs allege Salem County’s strip search policy or practice
violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, ¶ 7 of the New
Jersey Constitution because detainees are routinely strip searched “after they were already strip
searched with no intervening opportunity to obtain contraband.” (SAC, at ¶ 212.) Defendants
argue Plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts regarding the frequency of strip searches or details
concerning the inability to obtain contraband between strip searches. (Defs’ Br., at 7.) Plaintiffs
alleged they were detained in overcrowded cells with five to fifteen people; thus, Defendants
submit there was a potential to obtain contraband from others in the cell. (Id.)
In opposition to dismissal of their Fourth Amendment unreasonable strip search policy or
practice claim, Plaintiffs allege they were detained in a closed custody unit under constant
surveillance, where everyone is strip searched. (Pls’ Opp. Br., at 40.) Defendants can infer from
the SAC that Plaintiffs were strip searched at least twice daily. (Id., at 40–41.) Plaintiffs further
contend, if the Court finds their allegations insufficient, they can allege additional facts about their
strip searches. (Id., at 42 n. 7.) Defendants do not address Count One of the SAC in their reply
brief. (Defs’ Reply Br., ECF 19.)
10
Inmates have a limited right of bodily privacy under the Fourth Amendment, subject to
reasonable intrusions necessary in the prison setting. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d
Cir. 2016). The contours of the right are very narrow. Id. at 326. “The test of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment . . . requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against

the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559 (1979). “Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id. at 326
(citing Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, et al. (“Florence
II”) 566 U.S. 318 (2012)).7 If a search policy strikes a reasonable balance, it is constitutional. Id.
“[C]orrectional officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect
and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities.” Id. (quoting Florence II, 566 U.S. at
328). Because “[t]he task of determining whether a policy is reasonably related to legitimate
security interests is peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections
officials . . . courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters” in the absence

of “substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response
to these considerations.” Parkell, 833 F.3d at 326 (quoting Florence II, 566 U.S. at 328).
Under this deferential standard, the Third Circuit in Parkell denied summary judgment to
the defendants because they were “unable to articulate a single plausible theory as to how inmates
. . . would have thrice-daily opportunities to smuggle in contraband from outside their cells or use

7 Affirming Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 311 (3d
Cir. 2010) (“Florence I”).
11
unsupervised time in their locked cells to transform a harmless object into something dangerous.”
Id. at 327. In other words, there was substantial evidence in the record to indicate the officials
exaggerated the dangers posed by contraband.
Here, Neimeister, Brangan and Romalino alleged they were strip searched upon admission

to SCCF and strip searched again upon admission to SCCF’s at-risk unit, without an opportunity
to obtain contraband between the searches. (SAC, ¶¶ 98-176.) This is sufficient to state a Fourth
Amendment claim. Plaintiffs further allege routine strip searches in the at-risk unit were conducted
under electronic surveillance, the CCTV system. (Id.) It is reasonable to infer electronic
surveillance of the strip searches serves no purpose because the strip searches by staff would reveal
any hidden contraband. Therefore, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Count
One of the SAC, regarding strip searches conducted without an opportunity to obtain contraband
between searches. Insofar as Plaintiffs allege other “routine strip searches” in the at-risk unit
violated the Fourth Amendment, they have not pled sufficient facts to establish they had no
opportunity to obtain contraband prior to those strip searches. The Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’

Fourth Amendment claim regarding “routine strip searches” without prejudice, with leave granted
for Plaintiffs to file a Third Amended Complaint to cure the deficiencies in this claim by pleading
additional facts.
C. Prospective Injunctive Relief

In Count Two of the SAC, Plaintiffs assert a claim under the NJCRA against Salem County
because its strip search policy permits strip searching detainees who were “arrested for commission
of an offense other than a crime” without reasonable suspicion they possess contraband in violation
of N.J.S.A. § 2A:161A-1(c) and § 2A:161A-8. (SAC, ¶¶ 215-19.) In Count Three of the SAC,
12
Plaintiffs allege Salem County’s strip search policy, which permits strip searching non-indictable
detainees in the presence of other detainees and/or under CCTV cameras, violates N.J.S.A. §
2A:161A-4 and § 2A:161A-8. (Id., at ¶¶ 220-23.)
In support of their Motion to Dismiss Count Two, Defendants assert Plaintiffs have not

pled they were detained at SCCF on non-indictable offenses, and therefore, they did not suffer an
injury. (Defs’ Br., at 8.) Plaintiffs concede they are not adequate class representatives under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).8 (Pls’ Opp. Br., at 42.) However, they seek prospective injunctive relief based
on their fear that future admission to SCCF on non-indictable charges would subject them to
SCCF’s strip search policy. (Id., at 43.) On this basis, Plaintiffs contend they are adequate class
representatives under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).9 (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue this issue is properly
deferred until class certification. (Id.)
Defendants view Plaintiffs’ concession that they are not adequate class representatives
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) as a basis to dismiss Counts Two and Three of the SAC with
prejudice. (Defs’ Reply Br., at 8.) Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ fear of future arrest on non-

indictable charges is an admission Plaintiffs were arrested on indictable charges. (Id.) Defendants

8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) describes types of class actions, and subsection (3) pertains to actions
where, in pertinent part, “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.”
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) provides that a class action satisfying subsection (a) may be maintained
“if the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole.

13
further contend permitting Counts Two and Three to go forward would be akin to allowing
Plaintiffs to proceed on a slip and fall case, although they did not slip or fall. (Id. at 9.)
The Court agrees class determinations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) are
premature. Nevertheless, the Court is required to satisfy itself of Plaintiffs’ Article III standing to

assert claims for prospective injunctive relief. See, e.g., Finkelman v. NFL, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“we must determine on our own whether standing exists.”) There are three elements
requisite to standing:
(1) the invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected
interest and resulting injury in fact that is actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of, meaning that the injury must
be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3)
it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he has
Article III standing for each type of relief sought.” ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254,
301 (3d Cir. 2012). “[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes
the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself
or any other member of the class.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); see also
Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 195.
“When . . . prospective relief is sought, the plaintiff must show that he is ‘likely to suffer
future injury’ from the defendant's conduct.” McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 223 (3d
Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)). “The threat of injury
must be sufficiently real and immediate[.]” Id. (quoting Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857,
14
864 (3d Cir. 1990) (cleaned up)). “Allegations of ‘possible future injury’ are not sufficient to
satisfy Article III’s standing requirement.” Goode v. Gioria, 590 F. App'x 120, 121 (3d Cir. 2014)
(per curiam) (quoting Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011)). Relevant here,
courts assume the litigants will abide by the law in the future and not subject themselves to the

challenged conduct. See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ fear of future arrest
on non-indictable offenses and readmission to SCCF is too speculative to support standing for
prospective injunctive relief. The Court will dismiss Counts Two and Three of the SAC for lack
of jurisdiction.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claims

In Count Four of the SAC, Plaintiffs allege their arbitrary classification to the at-risk unit
in SCCF constituted punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the New Jersey Constitution and the NJCRA. (SAC, at ¶¶ 224-31.) Defendants
seek dismissal of Count Four for failure to state a claim of unconstitutional punishment because
the allegations in the SAC are too general, and in some instances, not relevant. (Defs’ Br., at 10-
15.)
With respect to Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment strip search claims, the “more specific
provision rule” applies. The “more specific provision rule[,]” requires that constitutional claims
governed by a specific constitutional provision—for example, a Fourth Amendment unreasonable
search claim—must be analyzed under the more specific provision, rather than as a substantive
due process claim. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7 (1997)). Therefore, the Court will grant

15
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Four, as to Plaintiffs’ claims that the strip searches in
SCCF’s at-risk unit violated their substantive due process rights.
Defendants further contend Plaintiffs have not alleged the conditions in the at-risk unit
were sufficiently serious to be excessive in relation to the purpose assigned, to protect at-risk

detainees from harming themselves or others. (Id., at 12–14.) Furthermore, Defendants assert
Plaintiffs’ comparison of conditions at SCCF with other facilities is not relevant to the substantive
due process claim. (Id., at 14.)
Plaintiffs maintain the Due Process Clause prohibits “punishment” of a pretrial detainee
prior to adjudication of guilt. (Pls’ Opp. Br., at 44.) The test is met under three possible conditions:
(1) a showing of Defendants’ express intent to punish; (2) the condition is not rationally related to
a legitimate non-punitive government purpose; or (3) the restriction is excessive in light of its
purpose. (Id. at 45, quoting Autery v. Moore, No. 22-CV-4105, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2023)
(additional citation omitted).
In this regard, Plaintiffs view is that being forced to wear a suicide vest without

undergarments while under CCTV surveillance has no penological purpose. (Id., at 50.) Also,
constant illumination deprives them of sleep, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. (Pls’ Opp. Br., at 51.) Further, the overcrowding conditions in the
at-risk unit, with five to fifteen detainees in a cell designed for four people, sharing one toilet with
others suffering from diarrhea and vomiting, without access to cleaning supplies, also constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. (Id., at 51-52.) Plaintiffs contend the conditions, separately and in
totality, constitute punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Id., at 48-52.)

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In reply, Defendants argue Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled Defendants’ express intent
to punish. (Defs’ Reply Br, at 7.) Therefore the Due Process claim in Count Four should be
dismissed. (Id.)
Plaintiffs are not required to allege Defendants had an express intent to punish. It is

sufficient if the allegations plausibly allege the conditions were excessive in light of the legitimate
government purpose. Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true at the pleading stage, they were
arbitrarily classified as at-risk, and therefore, their exposure to the harsher conditions in the at-risk
unit to protect them from self-harm or harming others was arguably purposeless. The Court will
deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to this substantive due process claim in Count Four of the
SAC.
E. New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Claim
In Count Five of the SAC, Neimeister alleges he was arbitrarily classified as at-risk based
on his disability of chemical dependence, in violation of the NJLAD [N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-
12(f)(1)] (SAC, ¶¶ 232-237.) Defendants assert this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs

do not define chemical dependence. (Defs’ Br., at 18.) Plaintiffs do not specifically address
Defendants’ challenge to Neimeister’s NJLAD claim. (Pls’ Opp. Br. at 52.)
“To state a claim under the public accommodation theory of the NJLAD, a plaintiff must
allege, (1) defendant operates a place of public accommodation, (2) the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, and (3) he or she was denied equal treatment on the basis of his or her membership
in a protected class.” K.J. v. J.P.D., 659 F. Supp. 3d 471, 477 (D.N.J. 2023) (cleaned up). The
Court will dismiss Count Five because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged Neimeister is a
member of a protected class by reason of a demonstrable substance abuse disability. See Fitzgerald
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v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 92 F. Supp. 3d 214, 236 (D.N.J. 2015) (quoting Olson v. Gen. Elec.
Astrospace, 966 F. Supp. 312, 315 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating “substance abuse, obesity, breast cancer,
and other conditions that are ‘demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques’ have been accepted as disabilities under the LAD” (additional

citations omitted)). Dismissal of Count Five will be without prejudice, with leave granted for
Plaintiffs to file a Third Amended Complaint to cure the deficiencies in this claim by pleading
additional facts.
F. Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Medical Need Claim
In Count Six of the SAC, Neimeister’s individual claim, Plaintiffs allege John Doe
Corrections Officers, on two occasions, knew or should have known Neimeister was suffering
seizures and willfully disregarded his medical condition, causing him to suffer serious harm. (see
generally SAC, ¶¶ 238-46.) Plaintiffs further alleged “Defendant fails to adequately train its
employees to address known medical problems” (id., ¶ 238), and “Defendants according to policy
and practice disregarded Plaintiff’s known need for medical supervision at Plaintiff’s peril under

the custody and control of Defendants” (id., ¶ 241.)
Defendants maintain that Count Six, willful disregard of a known medical condition,
should be dismissed for several reasons. (Defs’ Br., at 16.) First, Defendants, as a State entity and
State official, are immune. (Id.) Second, under the heading “Facts Unique to Plaintiffs Unique
Claims[,]” the SAC does not specify to whom this claim applies. (Id., at 16-17.) Finally, the SAC
does not allege how Defendants knew or should have known of Plaintiff’s chemical dependence
or seizures. (Id., at 18.) The SAC does not allege how Salem County or Cuzzupe, a non-medical
defendant, were involved with Plaintiff’s medical care or decisions. (Id., at 18-19.) Plaintiffs only
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offer conclusory allegations that “Defendants” failed to adequately train and supervise. (Id., at
19.)
In opposition to dismissal of Count Six, Plaintiffs argue Neimeister has sufficiently alleged
John Doe Corrections Officers willfully disregarded his medical condition because they watched

him having seizures and did nothing. (Pls’ Opp. Br, at 52.) Defendants do not discuss Counts
Five and Six of the SAC in their reply brief, but they argue the SAC should be dismissed with
prejudice because amendment of the deficient claims would be futile. (Defs’ Reply Br., at 9.)
Defendants are not State entities and employees who are immune from suit under § 1983
and the NJCRA. Salem County and John Cuzzupe, a Salem County employee sued in his official
capacity, are “persons” who are subject to suit under § 1983 and the NJCRA. See Monell v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 and n. 55 (1978) (“Local governing bodies”
and local officials in their official capacities “can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,
declaratory, or injunctive relief.”) Liability may be found
where acts of a government employee may be deemed to be the
result of a policy or custom of the governmental entity for whom the
employee works, thereby rendering the entity liable under § 1983.
Relevant here, liability may attach to the County where “the
appropriate officer or entity promulgates a generally applicable
statement of policy and the subsequent act complained of is simply
an implementation of that policy[,]” Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 417,
117 S. Ct. 1382 (Souter, J., dissenting) and/or where “the
policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, [though] the need
to take some action to control the agents of the government ‘is so
obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely to result
in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker can
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need.’” Id. at 417–18, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (quoting City of Canton, Ohio
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412
(1989)); see also Berg, 219 F.3d at 276 (holding that plaintiff must
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“demonstrat[e] that the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate
indifference’ to its known or obvious consequences”).

Tucker v. City of Philadelphia, 679 F. Supp. 3d 127, 141 (D.N.J. 2023) (alterations in original).
Failure to train claims “are generally considered a subcategory of policy or practice liability.”
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. granted, judgment rev'd
sub nom. on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015) (citation omitted). “Where
the policy concerns a failure to train or supervise municipal employees, liability under section
1983 requires a showing that the failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom those employees will come into contact.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217,
222 (3d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). A plaintiff must identify a “deficiency in a [local government’s]
training program that “actually caused” the constitutional violation. Id. quoting Canton, 489 U.S.
at 391. Plaintiff’s bare allegation of Salem County’s failure to train employees “to address known
medical problems” does not sufficiently identify how Salem County’s training program caused the
alleged constitutional violation, particularly in light of Plaintiffs’ allegation that he was transported
to Salem Hospital twice for seizures. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Count Six
of the SAC will be granted. Dismissal of Count Six will be without prejudice, with leave granted
for Plaintiffs to file a Third Amended Complaint to cure the deficiencies in this claim by pleading
additional facts.

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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss and grant Plaintiffs leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, within 30 days,
to cure deficiencies in the claims that will be dismissed without prejudice. An appropriate order
follows.

Date: December 27, 2024
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Z4RZID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10772585. Public record. Not legal advice.