# Siddiqui v. Keating

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · December 23, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10770343

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** December 23, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RAZA SIDDIQUI,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 24 CV 564

PATRICK KEATING, CHARLIE BRAICO, Judge Manish S. Shah
NABET-CWA, and COMMUNICATIONS
WORKERS OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Raza Siddiqui was elected president of his local union in 2022. Shortly
after, defendant NABET-CWA placed the local under trusteeship on the petition of
defendant Patrick Keating, another union member and Siddiqui’s political opponent.
Siddiqui successfully challenged the trusteeship, and he was reinstated as the local
president in August 2023. Less than two months later, Keating petitioned defendant
Communications Workers of America to place the local under a second trusteeship.
The CWA executive board, including defendant Charlie Braico, unanimously voted in
favor of a trusteeship. Siddiqui challenges the propriety of the second trusteeship and
seeks damages stemming from both trusteeships under Title I and Title III of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. He also brings claims of tortious
interference and civil conspiracy against Braico and Keating. Defendants move to
dismiss Siddiqui’s claims.
I. Legal Standard
When reviewing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
a court accepts all well-pled allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences

in favor of the plaintiff. Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 41 F.4th 873, 881 (7th Cir.
2022). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead ‘only enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
II. Facts
Plaintiff Raza Siddiqui was elected president of his local union, NABET-CWA
Local 54041, in March 2022. [1] ¶¶ 1, 14.1 Siddiqui was part of a slate that opposed
the existing leadership, including defendant Patrick Keating and defendant Charlie

Braico, called Team Solidarity. [1] ¶¶ 15–17. Braico, along with other past local
presidents, endorsed Keating, who ran for treasurer, and campaigned against
Siddiqui. [1] ¶¶ 16–17. Siddiqui and his slate defeated the Team Solidarity slate. [1]
¶ 17.
The defendants and their allies refused to accept the outcome of the election
and waged a campaign to oust Siddiqui. [1] ¶¶ 3, 18. Keating and others in the old

guard obstructed Siddiqui’s transition to power. [1] ¶ 43. Keating tried to extort

1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers
are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings. When a document has
numbered paragraphs, I cite to the paragraph, for example [1] ¶ 1. The facts are taken from
Siddiqui’s complaint, [1]. The parties attach evidence outside of the pleadings to their briefs.
I do not consider this evidence here. See Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 263 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“Generally, a district court cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings to decide a motion
to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary judgment.”)
conditions from Siddiqui as part of the transition for his own personal benefit. [1]
¶ 44. For example, Keating tried to keep a paid position within the local, to pick who
could hold certain roles, and to fix the line of pre-ordained succession on the

bargaining committee and as grievance chair. [1] ¶ 46. Keating tried to extract
promises that Siddiqui would not run or support another candidate in upcoming
NABET-CWA elections, in which Keating was planning to run. [1] ¶ 47.
When defendant Communications Workers of America sought to audit the local
under Siddiqui, the local’s lawyer documented the extent of the obstructionism faced
by Siddiqui’s administration. [1] ¶ 49. Keating refused to give access to the local’s

accounts, and the local’s prior attorney and defendant NABET-CWA refused to assist.
[1] ¶ 50. The local’s former president, who had been Keating’s running mate, kept a
laptop belonging to the local and when he returned it, the hard drive had been wiped,
making the data likely unretrievable. [1] ¶¶ 51–53. It took two months for Siddiqui
to gain access to important accounts because of this interference. [1] ¶ 50.
Upon a petition signed by Keating and others, NABET-CWA, led by Braico,
placed the local into a trusteeship in September 2022. [1] ¶ 54. Keating and a former

administrator were brought back to run the local. [1] ¶ 55. During the trusteeship,
changes were made to the local’s membership database, some of which were contrary
to past practice under the local’s constitution and bylaws. [1] ¶¶ 56–57. These
changes affected the eligibility of members to vote—Siddiqui believes that these
changes were made to gerrymander future elections by removing members supportive
of Siddiqui from the voter rolls and adding members favorable to the Team Solidarity
slate. [1] ¶¶ 56, 58.
Siddiqui and other union members brought a lawsuit against NABET-CWA

and Braico, in his official capacity, to challenge the trusteeship under Title III of the
LMRDA. 22-cv-5732, [9]. In December 2022, a federal court entered a temporary
restraining order dissolving the trusteeship, on the basis that it was imposed in bad
faith. 22-cv-5732, [40]. The court dissolved the trusteeship by a permanent injunction
on August 30, 2023. 22-cv-5732, [80].
The pattern of intentional actions to undermine Siddiqui’s ability to govern the

local continued after the termination of the first trusteeship. [1] ¶¶ 61–62. Upon
Siddiqui’s reinstatement, the administrator returned the local’s laptop with deleted
and corrupted files and data. [1] ¶ 60. Keating, Braico, and their allies waged a non-
stop campaign of charges and appeals against Siddiqui and sought to disqualify him
from office by any means. [1] ¶ 63. They also used NABET-CWA’s procedural
mechanisms to stop Siddiqui from implementing his leadership and to override the
actions of the local’s executive board when they were against Keating and Braico’s

interests. [1] ¶ 64.
Less than two months after the dissolution of the first trusteeship, Keating
petitioned the CWA to place the local under trusteeship. [1] ¶ 25. Keating said that a
second trusteeship was necessary because the local posted a net lost of $162,753.45
for the period March 2023–September 2023. [1] ¶ 27. The expenditures causing that
loss were due to a historic number of contract negotiations and were taken while the
first trusteeship was preliminarily enjoined. [1] ¶ 28. Running a deficit in a year that
has multiple contract negotiations is not uncommon for a labor union. [1] ¶ 29. Other
CWA locals have run similar deficits without being trusteed. Id. The deficit was also

caused by costs related to defendants’ own conduct bringing and maintaining an
unlawful trusteeship. [1] ¶ 31.
Keating’s petition also said that the local had inappropriately approved to pay
Siddiqui’s legal fees from the first lawsuit. [1] ¶ 32. Siddiqui alleges this act was
legitimate—the board’s decision was by majority vote, without Siddiqui’s
participation, and in furtherance of the local’s welfare as the lawsuit provided a

common benefit to all the local’s members by restoring its democratic leadership. [1]
¶¶ 32–33. At the time of this decision, a petition remained pending in the lawsuit
over the first trusteeship for the full amount of fees, with the expectation that those
fees would be reimbursed to the local. [1] ¶ 34.
Keating also said that the local failed to complete audit reviews when its
treasurers resigned in April 2022 and December 2022. [1] ¶ 35. Keating complained
that the local’s treasurer ran a QuickBooks report instead of including the required

itemized list of expenditures. [1] ¶ 36.
The CWA executive board approved Keating’s trusteeship petition one week
after receipt. [1] ¶ 39. The CWA imposed the trusteeship by unanimous vote without
any written reasoning or a prior hearing, so it is unclear what weight or importance
the CWA gave to any of Keating’s complaints. [1] ¶ 38. Siddiqui objected to the
trusteeship and a hearing was held beginning January 23, 2024. [1] ¶¶ 40–41.
Defendants also attempted to paper over the trusteeship by holding new elections
and disqualifying Siddiqui from running in those elections. [1] ¶ 67.
III. Analysis

A. Title III Claim
Siddiqui challenges the second trusteeship as unlawful under Title III of the
LMRDA. “Congress passed the LMRDA out of concern with widespread abuses of
power by union leadership.” Vought v. Wisconsin Teamsters Joint Council No. 39, 558
F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435 (1982)). The
Act’s primary objective is to “ensur[e] that unions [are] democratically governed and
responsive to the will of their memberships.” Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 436.
Title III provides that a labor organization can establish and administer a

trusteeship “over a subordinate body” only in certain, enumerated circumstances,
such as to “correct[ ] corruption or financial malpractice.” 29 U.S.C. § 462. A properly
imposed trusteeship “shall be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months from
the date of its establishment and shall not be subject to attack during such period
except upon clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship was not established or
maintained in good faith.” 29 U.S.C. § 464(c).

A trusteeship is invalid when it was not established or administered in
accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the union; or when it was not
established or administered for one of the enumerated statutory purposes. Boardman
v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 89 F.4th 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.
2564 (2024). A claim that a trusteeship was retaliatory fails if there was at least one
valid statutory purpose for imposing the trusteeship, even if the union which imposed
the trusteeship also had an impermissible motive. Id. (citing Serafinn v. Local 722,
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A mixed-motive theory of
liability is never proper in a suit brought under the [Act].”)).

Siddiqui alleges that the CWA imposed and maintained the trusteeship in bad
faith and for an improper purpose—to oust Siddiqui and end his political career
within the CWA and to preserve the power of Keating and Braico’s political machine.
[1] ¶ 76. He alleges that this was part of a retaliatory campaign against him for
political speech he made during his campaign for the local’s presidency. [1] ¶¶ 1, 18–
19, 72.

The CWA argues that Siddiqui has pled himself out of court because he alleges
that the CWA executive board had at least one permissible ground for establishing
the trusteeship—financial mismanagement. [20] at 13–14; see 29 U.S.C. § 462
(“financial malpractice” is a permissible purpose for imposing a trusteeship). Keating
supported his petition for trusteeship by citing to the local’s net loss for the period
March 2023–September 2023, the local’s approval of paying Siddiqui’s legal fees
associated with the first trusteeship, and the failure to properly audit the local’s

finances. [1] ¶¶ 26–27, 32, 35–36. Siddiqui alleges that it was “unclear what weight or
importance the CWA gave any of Keating’s complaints, because it imposed and
maintained a trusteeship by unanimous vote without any written reasoning or a prior
hearing.” [1] ¶ 38. The trusteeship notice to the Local, attached to the complaint,
stated that: “The CWA Executive Board took this action upon receipt of a petition
signed by 56 Local 54041 members . . . [which] set forth examples of gross financial
mismanagement and other violations of the Local By-Laws, Sector By-Laws, and the
CWA Constitution.” [1-6] at 1.
But also, according to the complaint, Keating’s reasons to seek the

trusteeship—financial mismanagement—were pretextual. For example, the net loss
was due to unprecedented numbers of contract negotiations, and it is common for
local unions to run deficits during periods with multiple negotiations. [1] ¶¶ 28–30.
Some of the deficit can be attributed to costs associated with the first trusteeship. [1]
¶ 31. As for the reimbursement of Siddiqui’s legal fees, Siddiqui alleges that this was
a legitimate decision of the local’s board. [1] ¶ 33. Siddiqui was not involved in the

local’s decision, and his challenge of the first trusteeship provided a common benefit
to all local members by restoring its democratic leadership. [1] ¶¶ 32–33. Siddiqui
alleges that Keating’s objection to the audits is illusory and that proper reports were
supplied. [1] ¶¶ 35–36.
Siddiqui also alleges that Braico and Keating both held retaliatory animus
against him. [1] ¶¶ 61–64, 72, 95–98. Braico and Keating allegedly waged a non-stop
campaign of charges and appeals against Siddiqui, seeking to disqualify him from

office by any means. [1] ¶¶ 63–67. But while Siddiqui alleges that Keating petitioned
and Braico voted for the trusteeship with retaliatory motives, he has not alleged facts
that support an inference that the CWA’s other executive board members also voted
for the trusteeship in bad faith. He does not allege that the other board members
knew that Keating’s allegations of financial mismanagement were pretextual, were
aware that Keating and Braico sought the trusteeship for retaliatory purposes, nor
harbored retaliatory intent themselves. Siddiqui argues that Braico, the current head
of NABET-CWA, inherently exercised power over the CWA board and that it is
reasonable to infer that he convinced other board members to retaliate against

Siddiqui. [28] at 3–4. But Siddiqui’s allegations do not support that Braico swayed
other members, affected their decision-making, or conspired with them to retaliate
against Siddiqui through imposing the trusteeship.
Out of eighteen board members, Siddiqui only alleges one had retaliatory
intent when voting on the second trusteeship. This is not enough to reasonably infer
that the trusteeship was imposed in bad faith. Siddiqui alleges that the CWA board

voted to impose the trusteeship based on Keating’s petition which laid out financial
mismanagement. Without any facts to support that the other seventeen board
members held retaliatory intent, it is reasonable to infer that these members took
Keating’s petition at face value and imposed a trusteeship to correct financial
mismanagement. Siddiqui does not argue that a trusteeship imposed to correct
financial mismanagement violates the local’s constitution or bylaws. See [28] at 10–
12. Even where improper motives may be present, “one proper purpose suffices to

uphold the trusteeship.” Boardman, 89 F.4th at 602. Siddiqui’s Title III claim is
dismissed without prejudice.2
B. Title I Claims
Title I of the LMRDA “provides union members with an exhaustive ‘Bill of
Rights’ enforceable in federal court.” Loc. No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving,

2 See Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015).
Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526,
536 (1984). “Title I is designed to guarantee every union member . . . freedom from
unreasonable restrictions on speech and assembly, and protection from improper

discipline.” Id. at 536–37; see also Vought, 558 F.3d at 621.
Siddiqui alleges that defendants twice placed the local in trusteeship and
terminated his elected position as the president in retaliation for opposing Braico and
Keating’s slate. [1] ¶¶ 3, 18–21, 25, 39. He seeks damages for removal from office
under Title I related to both trusteeships. [1] ¶¶ 69–73. Section 101(a)(2) of LMRDA
provides:

Every member of any labor right organization shall have the right
to . . . express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at
meetings of the labor organization his views . . . upon candidates in an
election of the labor organization . . . subject to the organization’s
established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). To succeed under Title I, Siddiqui “must establish: (1) he
engaged in protected expression; (2) he was subjected to an adverse action reasonably
likely to deter future expression; and (3) that action was caused by the protected
expression.” Marshall v. Loc. 701 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 387 F.App’x 623, 627–
28 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l. Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 354
(1989)).
When a violation of rights protected by Title I is alleged to have resulted from
the establishment of a trusteeship, a plaintiff must first adequately plead that the
trusteeship was unlawfully established. See Boardman, 89 F.4th at 602 (“And
because Boardman’s Title I claims rest on the assertion that the trusteeship was
invalid, her remaining claims fail as well.”). As discussed above, Siddiqui has failed
to allege that the trusteeship was improperly imposed or imposed in retaliation for
Siddiqui’s protected activities. Because Siddiqui’s Title I claims derive from the
assertion that the second trusteeship was improper, and he has not stated a claim

under Title III, his Title I claim fails. Siddiqui’s Title I claims based on the second
trusteeship are dismissed without prejudice.
Siddiqui also brings Title I claims based on the first trusteeship against
NABET-CWA and Braico.3 Defendants argue that claim preclusion bars Siddiqui’s
claims against them. [14] at 10. In federal court, claim preclusion has “three
elements: (1) an identity of parties; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) an

identity of the cause of action (as determined by comparing the suits’ operative facts).”
Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2011). When it applies, the
doctrine prevents relitigating claims already litigated and claims that could have
been litigated but were not. Id. Claim preclusion is an affirmative defense and best
addressed on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Walczak v. Chicago
Bd. of Educ., 739 F.3d 1013, 1016 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014). But when the complaint and
judicially noticed record establish the facts to prove preclusion, dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id.; Berry v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 865 F.3d 880, 882–83
(7th Cir. 2017) (upholding Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on preclusion because “the
district court [had] everything it needed in order to be able to rule on the defense.”).

3 Siddiqui’s complaint is unclear whether he brings his Title I claim against the CWA based
on the first trusteeship. According to his allegations, the first trusteeship was imposed by
NABET-CWA, and he does not allege any facts the create a plausible inference that CWA
was involved in the first trusteeship. See [1] ¶¶ 5, 19. Nor did Siddiqui name the CWA as a
party in the first litigation. See 22-cv-5732, [9], [9-1]. To the extent that Siddiqui’s Title I
claim against the CWA is based on the first trusteeship, it is dismissed without prejudice.
Siddiqui does not contest that there was a final judgment on the merits in the
previous case nor that the suits’ operative facts overlap, instead he argues that the
identity of parties is not present. See [29] at 6–8. NABET-CWA and Braico, in his

capacity as Sector President of NABET-CWA, were both named in the prior lawsuit.
22-cv-5732, [9]. Siddiqui asserts that he brought his prior Title III claim “in a
derivative capacity on behalf of the Local.” [29] at 6–7. There is no cause of action for
individual damages under Title III, and “[a]ny right of action pursuant to [Title III]
belongs to the subordinate union, and while a union member may sue to enforce the
act’s provisions, such suits should be limited to relief on behalf of the union.” Gesink

v. Grand Lodge, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 831 F.2d 214, 216
(10th Cir. 1987). According to Siddiqui, this means that Title III claims are not
brought in an individual capacity, but in a representative capacity on behalf of the
local. [29] at 6–7. Here, Siddiqui brings his Title I claim as an individual, and
therefore, so the argument goes, he is present in a different legal capacity and is a
different party than he was in the earlier case. [29] at 7–8.
Siddiqui offers no case law to support that a union member bringing a Title III

claim does not do so in their individual capacity. Even if he is correct, Siddiqui did
appear in his individual capacity in the first lawsuit. Siddiqui sought to recover
personal damages for himself in the first lawsuit, which are not available under Title
III. 22-cv-5732, [9] at 23 (seeking reinstatement with full back pay, seniority, and
benefits lost due to his removal from office); Ross v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l
Union, 266 F.3d 236, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding individual relief cannot be sought
under Title III); Scott-Anderman v. Martinez, 60 F.4th 680, 683 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(“The reinstatement of a union officer is not available relief under Title III.”). Even if
Siddiqui brought his Title III claim in a representative capacity, he sought individual

damages against NABET-CWA and Braico in his individual capacity. Here, he is the
same plaintiff seeking individual relief from the same defendants again.
Siddiqui’s claim for individual damages in the first lawsuit and his Title I claim
here arise out of the same set of facts. Siddiqui could have brought a Title I claim for
damages resulting from the first trusteeship against NABET-CWA and Braico in the
first lawsuit. But he did not. Claim preclusion “bars not only those issues which were

actually decided in a prior suit, but also all issues which could have been raised in
that action.” Kratville v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 195, 197–98 (7th Cir. 1996). Siddiqui’s Title
I claims based on the first trusteeship are dismissed with prejudice.4
C. State Law Claims
Siddiqui brings state law claims against Keating and Braico in their individual
capacities for tortious interference with prospective economic gain and civil
conspiracy. [1] ¶¶ 77–99. The basis for jurisdiction over these claims is supplemental

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). [1] ¶ 13. Section 1367(c) provides that “courts
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)
if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When all federal claims are dismissed before

4 Because Siddiqui’s Title I claims based on the first trusteeship are precluded, amendment
would be futile.
trial, especially at early stages, federal courts generally relinquish jurisdiction over
any remaining supplemental state law claims. Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622,
631 (7th Cir. 2016); see Phillips v. Baxter, 768 F.App’x 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2019) (“As
to the state-law claims, after dismissing [plaintiffs] federal claims at such an early
stage of litigation, the district court should have followed the presumption of
relinquishing jurisdiction over them.”).
Siddiqui’s tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims are dismissed
without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
IV. Conclusion
Defendants’ motions to dismiss, [13], [15], [19], are granted. Plaintiffs Title III
claim, Title I claims based on the second trusteeship, and state law claims are
dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs Title I claims based on the first trusteeship
are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff has leave to file an amended complaint by
January 21, 2025. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the dismissal of the
federal claims without prejudice will convert to a dismissal with prejudice and the
clerk will enter a final judgment terminating the case. If plaintiff files an amended
complaint, the parties shall file a joint status report by January 28, 2025, proposing
a schedule for responsive pleadings and discovery.

ENTER:
fs. © Ade
Manish 8. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: December 23, 2024

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10770343. Public record. Not legal advice.