# F & W Lawn Care and Landscaping, Inc. v. Cozart

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 23, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10770183

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 23, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10770183

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that conspiracy to violate FUFTA is not a “tort giving rise to long-arm jurisdiction,” and noting that fraudulent transfers have been held not to be “tort[s] for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

F & W LAWN CARE AND
LANDSCAPING, INC., an
Illinois corporation,

Plaintiff and Counter
Defendant,

v. Case No: 2:23-cv-549-JES-KCD

ROBERT A. COZART,

Defendant and Counter
Claimant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Robert A.
Cozart’s (“Robert” or “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #46)
filed on September 27, 2024. Plaintiff F & W Lawn Care &
Landscaping, Inc. (“F&W” or “Plaintiff”) filed a Response in
Opposition (Doc. #47) on October 8, 2024. Defendant filed a Reply
(Doc. #51) with leave of the Court on October 29, 2024. Plaintiff
filed a Sur-Reply (Doc. #58) with leave of Court on November 7,
2024. Defendant seeks to have Count I of Plaintiff’s four-count
Complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
I.
The relevant material facts alleged in the Complaint (Doc.
# 1) are summarized as follows: F&W is a family-owned Illinois
landscaping corporation. Tina Cozart (“Tina”), Defendant’s ex-
wife, worked as F&W’s office manager from 2006 until 2015.
Beginning in 2008, Tina engaged in a scheme of fraudulently using

F&W’s credit cards for her own personal gain, accumulating over
$1.5 million in charges and cash advances. Once the scheme was
uncovered in 2015, Tina’s employment with F&W was terminated.
A few months later, Robert was laid off from his job. Robert
soon secured another in Alameda County, California, where Tina and
Robert moved sometime between late 2015 and early 2016.
In August 2016, federal prosecutors in Illinois filed a
twelve-count criminal indictment against Tina, charging her with
fraud and tax violations. Robert was not charged. In May 2017,
while Tina’s criminal prosecution was pending, F&W filed a civil
suit against Tina and Robert in state court in McLean County,
Illinois (the “Illinois Case”).

In June 2017, Tina pleaded guilty to a fraud charge and a tax
charge. In December 2017, Tina was sentenced to 42 months
imprisonment plus three years of supervised release and was ordered
to pay F&W just over $1.4 million in restitution. In February
2018, Tina began serving her prison sentence at the Dublin
Correctional Facility in California.
At the time of Tina’s sentencing, Tina and Robert had been
living in California for almost two years. Under California
community property law, Tina had a 50% interest in all their
assets, notwithstanding any titled ownership in Robert’s name.
F&W alleges that immediately after Tina was sentenced, she and
Robert embarked on a scheme to place their combined assets beyond

F&W’s reach. The alleged scheme had many parts, but the most
important component was obtaining a sham divorce that would make
Robert the sole owner of all their community property.
In July 2018, Robert filed a pro se petition for divorce in
state court in Alameda County, California (the “California Divorce
Case”).
Tina was released to a halfway house in California in August
2019, after serving eighteen months.
On September 20, 2019, Tina and Robert executed a marital
settlement agreement (“MSA”). Pursuant to the MSA, Tina assigned
her entire 50% interest in certain “Identified Assets” to Robert
(the “MSA Transfer”). The Identified Assets consisted of: (a) all

personal property in Robert’s possession and control, including
furniture, furnishings, jewelry, and other items; (b) a 2010 Jeep
Wrangler; (c) a State Farm life insurance policy; (d) a Charles
Schwab IRA account; and (e) a Tesla 401(k) account. In exchange,
Tina received the personal property in her possession. F&W alleges
that through the MSA Transfer, Robert received roughly $650,000 in
assets, while Tina received $500 in assets.
In February 2020 the judge in the California Divorce Case
entered a judgment of dissolution, which incorporated the MSA.
After the marriage was dissolved, Robert left California and
eventually took up residency in Florida. While the date Robert
became a Florida resident is disputed, it was clearly after the

February 2020 resolution of the California Divorce Case.
In October 2020, F&W obtained a judgment for $1.467 million
against Tina in the Illinois Case. Apparently three counts remain
pending against Robert in that case, but the Illinois state court
dismissed a fraudulent transfer claim against him for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, F&W filed the instant federal
case, alleging in Count I that the MSA Transfer to Robert was a
voidable transfer under California law.
Robert now moves to dismiss Count I for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
II.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). This obligation “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual
allegations must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555; see
also Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir.
2010). This requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). A claim is facially plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court may
consider the factual allegations in the complaint and exhibits
attached to the complaint. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v.
Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 40 F.4th 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2022)
(citation omitted); Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228,
1231 (11th Cir. 2000). A court may also consider evidence outside
the complaint if it satisfies the incorporation-by-reference
doctrine or is properly subject to judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Swinford

v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 187 (11th Cir. 2024). Under the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine, extrinsic material
referenced in the operative complaint and attached to a motion to
dismiss may be considered if it is central to the plaintiff’s claim
and its authenticity is not challenged. Horsley v. Feldt, 304
F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. City of Atlanta,
Georgia, 97 F.4th 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 2024). A court may also
consider exhibits not mentioned in nor attached to a complaint
under the same standard. Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005).
A court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true and take them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions
without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of
truth,” Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations that are
merely consistent with a defendant’s liability fall short of being
facially plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, a court engages
in a two-step approach: “When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
III.
F&W’s current federal Complaint sets out four counts against
Robert, but only Count I is the subject of this motion to dismiss.
Count I sets forth a claim for “AVOIDANCE AND RECOVERY OF AVOIDABLE
TRANSFERS: The MSA Transfer (CA CIVIL §3439 et seq. and California
Common Law).” (Doc. #1, p. 30.) Count I alleges that Tina effected
the MSA Transfer to hinder, delay and defraud her creditors,
including F&W, and that she was insolvent at the time of the
transfer. F&W alleges that the MSA Transfer was both actually and
constructively fraudulent. F&W further asserts that it is entitled
to void the MSA Transfer to Robert under the California Uniform
Voidable Transfer Act and to recover the transfer’s value, i.e.

50% of the value of the Identified Assets. F&W also asserts that
under California common law, it is entitled to the same relief, as
well as to compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 118-
128.)
A. California Uniform Voidable Transactions Act
Since Count I purports to set forth a claim under California
law, the Court looks to California law for the elements of the
cause of action.
California has a long history of allowing creditors to bring
an action in equity to reach assets that a debtor has conveyed to
a third party. California has also had various statutory

frameworks addressing voidable transfers. The California Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) was enacted in 1986, and with
minor changes, was retitled in 2016 as the Uniform Voidable
Transactions Act (“UVTA”). See MACH-1 RSMH, LLC v. Darras, 324
Cal. Rptr. 3d 160, 167–68 (Ct. App. 2024).
As it applies to an existing creditor such as F&W, a transfer
may be voidable either because of actual fraud or constructive
fraud. Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 168 (Cal. 2003). A transfer
of an asset by a debtor is voidable if the debtor made the transfer
“[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of
the debtor.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(a)(1). The UVTA lists
eleven non-exclusive characteristics or “badges of fraud” to help

determine a debtor’s actual intent. Id. § 3439.04(b).
A transfer of an asset by a debtor may also be voidable if
there was constructive fraud. A transfer is constructively
fraudulent under the UVTA where a debtor makes the transfer
[w]ithout receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer . . . and the debtor either:
(A) [w]as engaged or was about to engage in a business
or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the
debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the
business or transaction[; or] (B) [i]ntended to incur,
or believed or reasonably should have believed that the
debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to
pay as they became due.
Id. § 3439.04(a)(2). Additionally, a transfer is constructively
fraudulent when a debtor makes a transfer “without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange . . . and the debtor was
insolvent at that time or . . . became insolvent as a result of
the transfer . . . .” Id. § 3439.05(a).
A successful creditor may obtain a variety of statutory
remedies, including voiding the transfer of assets, attachment of
assets, and an array of equitable relief. Id. § 3439.07(a)-(d).
A creditor may also supplement the UVTA’s remedies with any others
available at law or in equity. Id. § 3439.12. This includes a
common law claim for fraudulent transfer, which allows recovery of
consequential and punitive damages. Berger v. Varum, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 51 (Ct. App. 2019).
Of particular relevance here, for a fraudulent transfer to
take place, there must be a “transfer” of an “asset” as defined in

the UVTA. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Schroeder, 101 Cal. Rptr.
3d 854, 858 (Ct. App. 2009).1
“Transfer” is broadly defined under the UVTA as “every
mode . . . of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest
in an asset . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.01(m). The California
Supreme Court has noted that “[o]n its face, the U[V]TA applies to
all transfers” and has concluded “that when a couple enters into
a marital settlement agreement to divide their property in a
dissolution action, that agreement can be challenged as an
avoidable transaction under the UVTA.” Bijan Boutiques, LLC v.
Isong, 324 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 395 (Ct. App. 2024) (citing Mejia,
74 P.3d at 170). It is clear that the MSA Transfer between Tina

and Robert was a “transfer” within the UVTA’s meaning.
“[A]sset” is broadly defined under the UVTA to mean the
“property of a debtor,” but that definition contains two relevant
exceptions. An asset does not include property (1) “to the extent

1 In addition, a potentially voidable transfer may be challenged
only by one who is injured by the transfer. Schroeder, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 862 (“injury-in-fact is an essential element of a claim
under the U[V]TA”). “It cannot be said that a creditor has been
injured unless the transfer puts beyond [her] reach property [she]
otherwise would be able to subject to the payment of [her] debt.’”
Id. at 859. This injury requirement is built into the UVTA’s
express terms. Id. at 862.
it is encumbered by a valid lien,” or (2) “to the extent it is
generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law.” Cal. Civ. Code §
3439.01(a). In short, there can be no voidable transfer if a

creditor could not have reached an asset in the first place.
B. Robert’s Ground For Dismissal
Robert’s motion to dismiss argues that the Identified Assets
are exempt under California law and therefore cannot be the subject
of an UVTA action. (Doc. #46, pp. 1–2.) Relying solely on
California law, his motion asserts that each Identifiable Asset is
exempt from F&W’s reach either completely or partially. (Id. at
6–7.) In particular, Robert asserts that California law exempts
the IRA and 401(k) “retirement” accounts, which form the “lion’s
share” of the alleged voidable transfer. (Id. at 8.) In a
footnote, Robert avers that the result would be no different under
the laws of Florida or Illinois. (Id. at 9 n.1.) Since “[e]xempt

property is categorically excluded from the definition of an asset
that can be the subject of a fraudulent transfer action,” Robert
seeks a dismissal with prejudice. (Id. at 9.)
Not surprisingly, F&W opposes the motion. (Doc. #47.) F&W
asserts that while the Court will eventually need to determine
whether California or Florida exemption laws apply, now is not the
proper time. Rather, F&W asserts that the motion must be denied
because Robert has included multiple facts outside the four corners
of the Complaint that cannot be considered by the Court. (Doc.
#47, pp. 1–2.) F&W argues further that even if those facts were
considered, the motion would fail because Robert’s view of
California exemption law is simply wrong as to the alleged

retirement funds, and the allegations in the Complaint do not bring
either of the two major assets within the actual California
exemption. (Id. at 2–3, 12–16.)
* * * * *
Under California law, a transfer of property which is fully
exempt cannot be voided since the creditor could never have reached
that property. A transfer of property which is exempt up to a
certain dollar limit is voidable only if the debt exceeds the
exempted amount, and then only to the amount in excess of the
exemption. California law also recognizes, however, “that all
exemptions are subject to exceptions.” Schroeder, 101 Cal. Rptr.
3d 854, 862 n.7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing West’s Ann. Cal. Civ. Code

§ 3439.01, legislative committee’s comments to 1986 Addition).
The Complaint does not provide a basis to determine which, if
any, of the Identified Assets are exempt or the amount of the
applicable exemptions. Nothing else that the Court may properly
consider establishes that all portions of all Identified Assets
cannot be an “asset” within the UVTA’s meaning. Therefore,
applying California law, the motion to dismiss is due to be denied.
IV.
In his Reply Brief, (Doc. #51), Robert argues for the first
time that Florida law, not California law, determines whether the
assets are exempt. This is so, he asserts, because he is and was
a Florida resident when this federal case was filed and during

prior “iterations” of the Illinois Case. Robert asserts that he
“made a legal mistake in arguing that California law defined [the]
exempt property.” (Id. at 3.) He now argues that the IRA and
401(k) accounts and the State Farm life insurance policy are fully
exempt, without limitations, under Florida law. (Id. at 1-2, 4.)
Thus, Robert argues, the fraudulent transfer claim is barred under
the rule that exempt property cannot be the subject of a fraudulent
transfer. (Id. at 2, 4.) Without the retirement accounts and the
life insurance policy, Robert argues further, the value of the
remaining Identified Assets falls below the $75,000 jurisdictional
threshold. (Id. at 4.)2
A. “Governing Law” Under California UVTA

The UVTA contains a section describing the “governing law”
for voidable transfer claims. This section provides that “[a]
claim . . . is governed by the local law of the jurisdiction
[where] the debtor is located when the transfer is made . . . .”
Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.10(b). An individual debtor’s location is
determined by their “principal residence.” Id. at § 3439.10(a)(1).

2 This argument is a non-starter. Even if the value of the claim
in Count I were reduced to near zero, the Court would retain
jurisdiction since the alleged values of the claims in Counts II–
IV suffice under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The time that a “transfer is made” depends on the nature of the
item being transferred. Id. § 3439.06(a)–(d).
In this case the debtor is Tina, and the transfer was made no

later than when the California court incorporated the MSA into the
divorce judgment on or about September 20, 2019. (Doc. #1, ¶ 58.)
The Complaint alleges that at that time, Tina’s principal residence
was in California. Thus, California law would direct that
California laws of exemption apply in this case.
B. Choice-of-Law Principles
Robert’s belated argument requires the Court to at least begin
assessing the choice-of-law issue(s) in this case. Unless federal
constitutional or statutory law provides otherwise, Travelers
Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Talcon Group LLC, 88 F.4th 1371, 1377 n.4
(11th Cir. 2023), a federal court sitting in diversity must apply
the substantive law of the forum state, including its choice-of-

law rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941); Calderon v. Sixt Rent a Car, LLC, 114 F.4th 1190, 1200
(11th Cir. 2024).
The question of which state’s substantive law applies is a
question of law. American Family Life Assur. Co. v. United States
Fire Co., 885 F.2d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 1989); Schippers v. United
States, 715 F.3d 879, 888 (11th Cir. 2013). A district court may
determine the governing law at the dismissal stage of the
proceedings. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium
Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d 1197, 1209 (11th Cir. 2018). F&W has invoked
diversity jurisdiction, this Court sits within Florida, and no
federal provisions preclude the Court’s application of Florida

choice-of-law rules.
Under Florida law, a court need not resolve a choice-of-law
dispute if there is a “false conflict,” i.e., if the laws of
different, interested states point to the same outcome on an issue.
In re January 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litig., 76 F.4th 1335,
1346 (11th Cir. 2023). If there is a conflict, “the court must
characterize the legal issue and determine whether it sounds in
torts, contracts, property law, etc. Once it has characterized the
legal issue, it determines the choice of law rule that the forum
state applies to that particular type of issue.” Grupo Televisa,
S.A. v. Telemundo Communications Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 1233, 1240
(11th Cir. 2007).

A “court makes a separate choice of law determination with
respect to each particular issue under consideration.” Trumpet
Vine Investments, N.V. v. Union Capital Partners I, Inc., 92 F.3d
1110, 1115 (11th Cir. 1996). “[D]ifferent substantive issues in
a single case may have to be resolved under the laws of different
states where the choices influencing decisions differ.” Foster v.
United States, 768 F.2d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1985).
Florida resolves choice-of-law questions involving torts
through the “most significant relationship” test of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Grupo Televisa, 485
F.3d at 1240, citing Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389
So.2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980). For choice-of-law questions in
contract cases, Florida applies the rule of lex loci contractus.

Calderon v. Sixt Rent a Car, LLC, 114 F.4th 1190, 1200 (11th Cir.
2024) (citing Goodman v. Olsen, 305 So. 2d 753, 755 (Fla. 1974)).
(1) Issue in Dispute
The motion to dismiss addresses only F&W’s claim challenging
the MSA Transfer as a voidable transfer. The Court must determine
whether the exemption laws of California or Florida apply in order
to assess whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief
may be granted. In other words, are the elements of this cause of
action determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the
transferee and transferor resided and where the transfer occurred
or by the law of the jurisdiction to which the transferee

thereafter relocated?
(2) Actual Conflict
The parties do not dispute the existence of an actual conflict
between the laws of California and Florida on this issue. The
laws of both states differ on the applicability and extent of many
relevant exemptions.3 Thus, there is an actual conflict of laws

3 For example, as to the cash value of an insurance policy,
California law exempts $13,975 for each spouse, Cal. Code Civ. P.
§ 704.100, whereas Florida law exempts the entire amount, Fla.
Stat. § 222.14. As to a vehicle, California law exempts up to
on the issue now before the Court.
(3) Characterization of Claim
While it seems intuitive that a fraudulent transfer claim

would sound in tort, that has not been the experience in Florida.
Brown v. Nova Info. Sys., Inc., 903 So. 2d 968, 969 (Fla. 5th DCA
2005) (holding that conspiracy to violate FUFTA is not a “tort
giving rise to long-arm jurisdiction,” and noting that fraudulent
transfers have been held not to be “tort[s] for purposes of
establishing personal jurisdiction”); Clement v. Lipson, 999 So.
2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (same); Edwards v. Airline
Support Group, Inc., 138 So. 3d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
(same). The Court therefore applies Florida choice-of-law
principles for both contracts and torts, which ultimately leads to
the same result.
C. Application of Florida Choice-of-Law Principles

Robert’s only basis to assert that Florida law governs the
definition of exempt property is that he was a resident of Florida
when (1) the instant federal suit was filed against him, and (2)
the prior fraudulent transfer claim was brought against him in the
Illinois Case. The latter argument is demonstrably wrong. Robert

$7,500, Cal. Code Civ. P. § 704.010, whereas Florida law only
exempts $5,000, Fla. Stat. § 222.25(1). As to retirement accounts,
Robert concedes that California provides a “qualified” exemption
but argues that Florida provides an “unlimited” exemption. (Doc.
#51, p. 5 (citing Fla. Stat. § 222.21(2)(a)).
and Tina were residents of California when the complaint in the
Illinois Case was filed in May 2017 and amended in April 2019,
(Doc. #1, ¶ 52); they established residency in Florida no earlier

than 2020. Robert was a resident of Florida when this federal
lawsuit was filed in 2023, and while that may be important to some
issues, it is not significant to the issue presently before the
Court.
The exemptions at issue belong to Tina, the transferor, not
Robert, the transferee. The transfer was “made” in California,
regardless of whether it occurred when the MSA was executed on
September 20, 2019, or incorporated into the dissolution judgment
on February 26, 2020. Nothing that Robert did thereafter can
affect Tina’s exemptions. Nothing in the Complaint or the
arguments of Robert’s counsel suggests that Tina’s exemptions are
defined by Florida law. But even when focusing solely on Robert’s

conduct, regardless of whether Florida choice-of-law rules for
contract or tort actions are applied, the extensive contacts with
California make clear that California law governs the present
issue.
The MSA was negotiated, executed, and performed in
California. Tina and Robert were residents of California before
and during the negotiation and execution of the MSA. The place
where the conduct causing injury to F&W took place was California,
where the MSA Transfer occurred. California has a paramount
interest here, as Tina and Robert utilized its state court system
to initiate and further the allegedly voidable transfer “through
[the] MSA,” and California recognizes that such “transfer[s] ...
can be avoided.” In re Beverly, 374 B.R. 221, 233 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2007), aff’d in relevant part, dismissed in part, 551 F.3d
1092 (9th Cir. 2008). That a transferee moves to another state
after a transfer occurs can neither enlarge nor diminish the scope
of an exemption.
As discussed above, applying California law, as directed by
Florida choice-of-law principles, results in a finding that the
Complaint plausibly states a cause of action.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED :
Defendant Robert A. Cozart’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #46) is
DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 23rd day of
December 2024,

ox
: le hy ) Z. A, Gob
adi EF. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies: Parties of record

=_ 18 =_

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10770183. Public record. Not legal advice.