# Santiago v. Fisher

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 20, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10768943

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 20, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10768943

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.”
- acknowledging “pepper-spray” may be used to subdue an inmate when penologically necessary

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

BENITO A. SANTIAGO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-484-MMH-MCR

SERGEANT JACKSON, et al.,

Defendants.
_________________________________

ORDER

I. Status
Plaintiff Benito Santiago, an inmate in the custody of the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDC), initiated this action on April 27, 2022, by
mailing a pro se Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 1) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (mailbox rule). He is
proceeding on an Amended Complaint (Amended Complaint; Doc. 13) against
four Defendants: Sergeant Jackson; Lieutenant Burns; Lieutenant Levai; and
Officer Dean.1 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Motion; Doc. 52), with exhibits.

1 Santiago sued five Defendants, but he voluntarily dismissed his claims
against the fifth one, Defendant Fisher, after Fisher’s death, because he was unable
to identify a “proper party” for substitution. See Order (Doc. 95).
The Court advised Santiago of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, notified him that the granting of a motion to dismiss or a motion

for summary judgment would represent a final adjudication of this case which
may foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter, and gave him an
opportunity to respond to the Motion. See Orders (Docs. 5, 20); Summary
Judgment Notice (Doc. 55). Santiago opposes Defendants’ Motion (Response;

Doc. 78), with exhibits.2 Defendants filed a Reply (Reply; Doc. 79). As such,
Defendants’ Motion is ripe for review.
II. Santiago’s Allegations
In the Amended Complaint, Santiago asserts all Defendants used

excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See
Amended Complaint at 5. The events that form the basis of his claims occurred
at Union Correctional Institution (UCI) on December 7, 2021. Id. at 10. The
sequence of events is a bit unclear, but Santiago describes what sounds like a

reactionary use of force due to his noncompliance or disruption. See id. at 7–9.
Santiago alleges Defendants Levai and Burns sprayed him with chemical

2 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the
document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing
System.
2
agents three times, only the first of which was justified.3 He asserts that, after
Defendant Burns administered the first application of chemical agents, “[he]

was refused the chance to comply and submit to hand restraints.” Id. at 8. He
contends he was willing to comply with Defendant Levai’s orders to submit to
a strip search and restraints, but Defendant Levai lied “on camera,” saying
that he was refusing to take off his socks. Id. at 7.

After the third application of chemical agents, a cell extraction team,
which included Defendants Jackson and Dean, arrived. Id. Santiago asserts
that Defendant Levai ordered him to submit to a strip search, which he did,
but then Defendant Levai had Defendant Jackson conduct “another strip

search on [him].” Id. Santiago says that he “followed all orders given to him
[but Defendant] Jackson . . . lied stating on camera that [he] would not strip
…. as a tactic to force the extraction team in[to] [his] cell.” Id. at 7–8. He claims
to have done “everything ordered” of him, including taking off his socks and

explains that he tried to bring his feet into view of the handheld camera as
proof that he was complying. Id.
Finally, Santiago asserts that, after the cell extraction team entered his
cell, Defendant Jackson punched him in the mouth and slammed his face into

3 Santiago implies he was engaged in conduct that justified the first application
of chemical agents but does not specify what that conduct was. See Amended
Complaint at 7–8.
3
the ground, and Defendant Dean punched him in the ribs and legs. Id. at 8–9.
He claims the incident resulted in two chipped/fractured teeth. Id. at 10.

III. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be considered on a
motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).4 An

4 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and
deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010
Amends.
The standard for granting summary judgment remains
unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to
require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing
development of the decisional law construing and applying
these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not
binding, they are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3
(11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review
remains viable.
4
issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,

93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381

F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &
Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has
discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the
pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that

In citing to Campbell, the Court notes that it does not rely on unpublished
opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the
Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th
1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2
(“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited
as persuasive authority.”).
5
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d
590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must

view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th
Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38
F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however,

if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th
Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV. Summary of the Arguments

A. Defendants’ Arguments & Evidence
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants contend they are
entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that their use of force was
reasonable under the circumstances, and their conduct did not cause

Santiago’s claimed injuries. See Motion at 2; Reply at 5–6. Arguing that
Santiago cannot establish a constitutional violation, they invoke the doctrine

6
of qualified immunity. See Motion at 2. Additionally, Defendants invoke
Eleventh Amendment immunity and argue that, to the extent Santiago’s

Eighth Amendment claims proceed, he cannot recover compensatory or
punitive damages under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id.
In support of the Motion, Defendants rely on the following exhibits to
demonstrate that their uses of force were not excessive: video footage from a

handheld camera (Def. Ex. A1–3 (filed under seal));5 an incident report (Def.
Ex. D; Doc. 52-3); and disciplinary reports (Def. Exs. E, F; Docs. 52-4, 52-5).6
These exhibits shed light on the circumstances surrounding the use of force on
Santiago on December 7, 2021. According to disciplinary report log # 213-

211425, Santiago broke the sprinkler head in his cell, causing it and nearby
cells to flood. See Def. Ex. E at 2.7 In an incident report, Defendant Levai
explained as follows:
Inmate Santiago had utilized an unknown object to
break his sprinkler head. Additionally, Inmate
Santiago had his state issue linen, mattress fold,
personal property and state issue [c]lothing on the cell

5 The video footage is on three DVDs, which the Court will cite as “Def. Ex. A1,”
for the first DVD; “Def. Ex. A2,” for the second; and “Def. Ex. A3,” for the third.
6 Defendants provide other exhibits, but those are relevant solely to the issues
of injuries and causation (Def. Exs. B, C; Docs. 60-1, 52-2). For reasons discussed
later, the Court can adjudicate the Motion on the issue of liability. As such, the Court
need not summarize the evidence related to Santiago’s injuries or causation.
7 A second disciplinary report, log # 213-211423, reflects that Santiago
disobeyed an order by refusing to relinquish his hand restraints. See Def. Ex. F at 2.
7
floor. Inmate Santiago refused all verbal orders to get
his cell into compliance.

See Def. Ex. D at 2 (capitalization omitted). Santiago was placed on 72-hour
property restriction “due to the misuse of his personal [p]roperty.” Id. at 2, 4.
The video evidence depicts what happened after Santiago broke the
sprinkler head. As the officer in charge, Defendant Levai gave the lead-in
statement, explaining that Santiago was “creating a disturbance by breaking
the sprinkler head and yelling out of [his] cell . . . [and he a]lso refus[ed] to
submit to hand restraint procedures to be placed on property restriction.” See

Def. Ex. A1. Defendant Levai reported that he had “counseled with Inmate
Santiago about his behavior and ordered him to cease his actions to no avail.”
Id. Defendant Levai further stated, “I have contacted Duty Warden Norman,
advised him of the actions of Santiago, who is a psych-grade 1, and chemical

agents have been authorized. Non-involved security CIT-trained staff,
Lieutenant [Defendant] Burns, has attempted to counsel Inmate Santiago to
no avail.” Id.
Following the lead-in statement, the video evidence chronicles the

sequence of events. Defendant Levai, followed by the camera operator, enters
Santiago’s dorm at about 22:44. Id. Water is visible on the floor outside his and
nearby cells. Id. Defendant Levai approaches Santiago’s cell door and gives
him a “final order” to submit to hand restraint procedures to be placed on

8
property restriction. Id. Santiago asks why he is being placed on property
restriction. Id. Defendant Levai walks out of view of the camera, but the

camera operator remains. Id. Santiago can be seen and heard communicating
with other inmates about being placed on property restriction. Id. With solid
doors on the cells, the inmates speak loudly to communicate. See id.
When Defendant Levai returns about four minutes later, he again asks

Santiago if he is ready to submit to hand restraints. Id. Santiago refuses. Id.
Defendant Levai advises that chemical agents will be administered to gain
Santiago’s compliance. Id. Defendant Burns administers a first round of
chemical agents at about 22:53. Id. Immediately thereafter, Defendant Levai

reports to the camera, “[Santiago] used his property to cover up and block the
effects of the chemical agents.” Id. Defendant Levai walks out of the view of
the camera, but the camera operator remains. Id. Santiago can be seen
covering his mouth and nose with an article of clothing or bedding. Id. He

eventually starts banging on his cell door in a rhythmic way and asks other
inmates to join him in chanting along, which they do. Id. What they are saying
is unclear, but it becomes quite loud inside the dorm. Id.
After about ten minutes, Defendant Levai returns and asks Santiago for

a third time if he will submit to “restraint procedures.” Id. Santiago’s response
is indecipherable, but it appears he agrees to comply because Defendant Levai

9
orders Santiago to “strip out.” Id. Santiago partially complies as evidenced by
the fact that he is no longer wearing a shirt. Id. However, Defendant Levai

tells him repeatedly to remove all of his clothing, including those on the parts
of his body not visible through the cell window (boxers and socks). Id.
Defendant Levai tells Santiago twice to remove his boxers and five times to
remove his socks or whatever he has on his feet. Id. To demonstrate his

compliance, Santiago lifts his left foot up to the cell window. Id. His left foot is
bare. Id. He never shows his right foot. Id. Defendant Burns administers a
second round of chemical agents at about 23:06. Id. Defendant Levai again
walks out of the view of the camera. Id.

With the camera still trained on Santiago’s cell, Santiago starts talking
to the camera operator and holds “paperwork” up to his cell window, saying,
“You see that. Lawsuits [indecipherable]. . . . I specialize in that.” Id. (He later
slides the “paperwork” through the flap in his cell door and leaves it there for

some time. Id.) Santiago says, “Hey officer, I’m willing to comply and cuff up.”
Id. He repeats that multiple times, and tells the camera operator, “Hey officer,
you need to get on your walkie talkie and call the LT [lieutenant] and let him
know I’m willing to comply.” Id. He says, “You’re refusing to let me comply.”

Id. Other inmates can be heard yelling in apparent reaction to the disturbance
involving Santiago. Id. One inmate yells to Santiago, “Do what the guy/guard

10
[inaudible] say. . . . [inaudible] . . . Take your spray like a man.” Id. Santiago
later raises both of his feet to his cell window so the camera can document that

he is not wearing socks. Id.
When Defendant Levai returns, he again asks Santiago if he will submit
to “hand restraint procedures.” Id. Santiago replies, “Yes, sir.” Id. Defendant
Levai instructs Santiago to “strip out” for a visual strip search, telling him to

step back so his entire body can be seen, including his feet. Id. Defendant Levai
attempts to complete the full hand restraint procedures, ordering Santiago to
“run [his] fingers through [his] mouth” and “turn around and squat.” Id. It
appears Santiago does not comply with the latter order (to turn around and

squat) because Defendant Levai repeats the order three times. Id. Defendant
Levai reports to the camera, “[Santiago] is refusing to submit to proper hand
restraint procedures, so a third round of chemical agents will be administered.”
Id. Before Defendant Burns administers the third round of chemical agents,

Santiago tells the officers, “Look at that paperwork,” referring to the papers he
pushed through the flap in his cell door. Id. Defendant Burns administers a
third round of chemical agents at about 23:19. Id.
After the third spraying, Santiago taps on his cell window to get the

camera operator’s attention, and he holds something up to the window that
looks like a cell phone. See Def. Ex. A2. Santiago holds the object up to his ear

11
as if talking on a phone. Id. Loud banging can be heard inside the dorm, and
other inmates start yelling, “Let him cuff up.” Id. A few minutes later, Santiago

yells, “I’m trying to cuff up . . . . Let me cuff up.” Id. Santiago then yells to
another inmate, saying he will pay that inmate $50 to make a phone call for
him. The other inmate tells Santiago it is too late to make a phone call. Id.
Santiago repeats that he is ready to comply and is not wearing socks,

and he holds his feet up to the cell window again. Id. Both feet are visible and
bare. Id. Other inmates can be heard yelling about the situation: one says, “Let
him cuff up,” and another responds, “If he don’t want to cuff up, he ain’t have
to cuff up.” Id. Santiago yells to an officer outside of the camera’s view, “Hey

officer, anytime I want to comply, you got to let me comply. I’m telling you, I
want to cuff up.” Id. The unknown officer responds to him in a calm manner,
seemingly asking if he is ready to come out of his cell, although what the officer
says is not clear. Id. Other inmates start yelling again. One of them says, “LT

man, the man said he want to cuff up. . . . Let the man out of the fu*king room,
man.” Id. Other inmates continue yelling to one another while Santiago waits
for Defendant Levai to return. Id.
When Defendant Levai and other officers return to the dorm, but before

they walk into view of the camera, Santiago repeatedly tells them, “I’m willing
to cuff up and comply.” Id. At Santiago’s cell door, Defendant Levai asks

12
Santiago if he is ready to comply, and Santiago replies, “Yes, sir.” Id. Defendant
Levai tells him multiple times to “strip out all the way.” Id. Defendant Levai

indicates Santiago is not complying and asks another officer to try to get
Santiago to “strip out properly.” Id. That officer, Defendant Jackson,
approaches Santiago’s cell window and orders Santiago (twice) to “bend at the
waist” for a visual strip search. Id. Defendant Jackson reports, “He’s refusing

to bend.” Id. Accordingly, Defendant Levai directs the cell extraction team to
enter Santiago’s cell to forcibly cuff and remove him. Id. Before Defendant
Levai removes the chain from the door, Santiago lifts his entire body into view
of the cell window to show he is naked, including his mid-section and feet. Id.

No clothing is visible on his body. Id.
The cell extraction team enters Santiago’s cell about one minute after
Santiago showed the camera he was naked. Id. Defendant Levai and other
officers can be heard yelling, “Inmate Santiago, stop resisting.” Id. Santiago’s

body cannot be seen because of the number of officers surrounding him, but
the camera operator has a clear view inside the cell. Id. Despite the noise from
other inmates and officers yelling directives (“stop resisting”), the scene is
orderly and efficient. Id. No officer is seen making punching-like or violent

motions. Id. At one point, the officer on the far right (as depicted in the video)
lifts his arm and appears to push down on something, but it does not appear to

13
have been a punch. About two minutes after officers enter the cell, an officer
reports, “All restraints are on.” Id. Officers assist Santiago to his feet and escort

him out of his cell. Id. His face is not bloody or bruised. Id. His eyes are watery,
and one is partially closed from the effects of the chemical agents. Id. He is
wearing boxers. Id.
The officers immediately escort Santiago to a decontamination shower.

Id. While officers are removing his shackles, Santiago can be heard telling the
officers that they violated chapter 33 (of the Florida Administrative Code
(FAC)) by spraying him even after he said he was willing to comply. Id. He tells
the officers, “Look at the paperwork on my bed. I specialize in those kinds of

lawsuits.” Id. He also sarcastically thanks the officers for spraying him after
he said he wanted to comply, telling them, “That’s free money. I appreciate it
LT.” Id. Santiago repeatedly complains that the officers improperly sprayed
him after he said he was willing to comply, but he never complains that any

officer punched him during the cell extraction. Id. In fact, it sounds as if
Santiago tells the officers they should have said he was unwilling to “bend at
the waist,” instead of saying he was unwilling to strip out. See id. While
showering, Santiago does not complain of or appear to be in pain other than

from the burning caused by the chemical agents. See Def. Ex. A3.

14
Following the decontamination shower, officers take Santiago for a post-
use-of-force physical examination. Id. Per policy, the camera operator does not

enter the medical room, but some of what Santiago says to Defendant Levai,
who is in the room with him, can be heard. He tells Defendant Levai, “Once an
inmate says he wants to comply, chapter 33, you got to let him comply. You
can’t have me sittin’ there in that spray for like five minutes after I say I want

to comply.” Id. He also repeats that he “specializ[es]” in lawsuits. Id. The nurse
begins an examination (blood pressure and temperature check) and completes
it within two minutes. Id. Santiago does not appear to ask the nurse to check
his mouth or teeth. Id. He never points to his face in a way that would indicate

he had an injury or issue. Id. At Defendant Levai’s instruction, the camera
operator scans Santiago’s body with the camera after Santiago leaves the
medical room. No wounds or physical injuries are observable. Id. Officers
return Santiago to his decontaminated cell at 00:02 on December 8, 2021. Id.

The dorm is noticeably quieter and far less chaotic at that time. See id.
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments & Evidence
In opposition to Defendants’ Motion, Santiago argues Defendants used
more force than necessary under the circumstances because “he was willing to

comply” after the first application of chemical agents, and he “did everything
ordered,” including stripping completely. See Response at 2, 5. He notes that

15
he “even placed his body [and feet] to the door to show the handheld video
recording.” Id. As to the cell extraction, Santiago asserts the camera operator

did not “have a clear view of what[] [was] happening inside [his] cell,” and the
fact that the officers were only in his cell for two minutes does not mean they
did not use excessive force against him.8 Id. at 6–7.
Santiago relies on the following exhibits: his own declaration (Pl. Ex. A;

Doc. 78-1); a copy of chapter 33-602.210 of the FAC, titled, “Use of Force” (Pl.
Ex. B; Doc. 78-2); UCI dental records and a sick-call request (Pl. Ex. C; Doc.
78-3); and grievance records (Pl. Ex. D; Doc. 78-4). In his declaration, Santiago
concedes that he broke the sprinkler head in his cell and caused a disturbance,

justifying the first use of chemical agents. See Pl. Ex. A ¶ 3. Nevertheless, he
contends the subsequent sprayings were unjustified because he told Defendant
Levai he “was willing to comply and follow[] all orders[,] . . . . [but Defendant
Levai] refused to allow [him] to submit to hand restraints[, instead] stating

[Santiago would not] take [his] socks off as a tactic to force the use of chemical
agents.” Id.

8 In his Response, Santiago references only Defendant Jackson’s alleged
“excessive force,” not Defendant Dean’s. See Response at 7. He also says the cell
extraction itself, not individual actions by extraction team members, resulted in him
fracturing or chipping his teeth. Id. at 2.
16
As he does in his Amended Complaint, Santiago alleges that, after the
second spraying, he held his “feet to the cell window to show that [he] had no

socks on [and that Defendant] Levai was lying.” Id. Santiago states he was
“refused the chance to comply.” Id. With respect to Defendant Levai’s orders to
“strip out” and the cell extraction, Santiago asserts the following:
Defendant Lt. Levai . . . gave me an order to submit to
a strip search which I did. I followed all orders. He act
[sic] as I didn’t. Then Defendant Sgt. Jackson did the
same thing acting like I wasn’t following orders as a
tactic to force the Extraction Team in my cell. I placed
my body to the cell glass so the use of force camera can
show I was completely naked to show they was lying
as a tactic to force the Extractio[n] Team . . . . Once
inside my cell Defendant[] Sgt. Jackson[] punched me
in the mouth two times and pick[ed] my head up and
slam[med] it to the floor chipping and fracturing my
front tooth, while Defendant Dean hit me in the ribs
and legs.

Id. (emphasis added). Santiago says that when the nurse examined him, his
“injury [chipped/fractured teeth] was reported and documented.” Id. ¶ 4. He
avers the FDC form documenting his post-use-of-force examination is missing
from his medical file. Id. He surmises that “[m]edical is covering up for the
staff.” Id.
In an informal grievance Santiago authored the day of the incident,9 he
complained that Defendant Levai refused to let him comply with orders, which

9 According to the video and other evidence, the relevant events occurred very
late at night on December 7, 2021, and Santiago was returned to his cell just after
17
resulted in him being sprayed with chemical agents two times without
justification. See Pl. Ex. D at 2–3. He stated that “chemical[l] agents [were]

used . . . as a form of punishment,” in violation of chapter 33, which Santiago
summarized as providing, “[A]ny time an inmate state[s] he is willing to
comply[,] the use of force should stop.” Id. at 3. He reported that Defendants
Levai and Jackson claimed he refused to “strip down,” but he had done so and

tried to prove it by “put[ting] [his] whole body [up to the] cell window.” Id. He
said they lied to “forc[e] the extraction team in [his] cell[,] denying [him] the
chance to cuff up using excessive force on [sic] causing bodily harm.” Id.
In his formal grievance, authored on December 19, 2021, Santiago

repeated much of the same as he did in the informal grievance, but he added,
“[O]nce the cell extraction team entered my cell they used excessive force on
me causing bod[i]ly harm chip[p]ing my front tooth.” Id. at 5. He did not specify
how any member of the cell extraction team used “excessive force” against him,

nor did he accuse anyone of punching him. Id. In his grievance appeal to the
Office of the Secretary, authored on January 7, 2022, Santiago repeated his
allegations, again without specifying how any member of the cell extraction
team used “excessive force” against him. See id. at 7.

midnight. See Pl. Ex. D at 3; see also Def. Ex. A3. An FDC stamp reflects that
Santiago’s grievance was received on December 13, 2021. Pl. Ex. D at 2.
18
V. Applicable Law
A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force

The Eighth Amendment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain, or the infliction of pain totally without penological
justification.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987). However, it is
well understood that prison guards, who are charged with maintaining order

and security, may use force when necessary to bring unruly inmates into
compliance. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986); Williams v.
Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991).
In Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020), the

Eleventh Circuit reviewed “the principles applicable to Eighth Amendment
excessive-force” claims:
The Eighth Amendment, among other things,
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. As the Supreme Court has
explained, “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain” qualifies under the Eighth Amendment as
proscribed “cruel and unusual punishment.” Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has instructed that what rises to the
level of an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”
differs based on the type of Eighth Amendment
violation alleged. Id.

. . . “[T]he core judicial inquiry” requires [the
Court] to consider “whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins,
19
559 U.S. at 37.[10] This standard requires a prisoner to
establish two elements – one subjective and one
objective: the official must have both “acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind” (the subjective
element), and the conduct must have been “objectively
harmful enough to establish a constitutional
violation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8.

With respect to the subjective element, “to have
a valid claim . . . the excessive force must have been
sadistically and maliciously applied for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280
F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Thomas v.
Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010).

As for the objective component of an excessive-
force violation, it focuses on whether the official’s
actions were “harmful enough,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8,
or “sufficiently serious,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991), to violate the Constitution. “Not every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a
federal cause of action.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. “The
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and
unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from
constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical
force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort
repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 37–38.
Instead, the Eighth Amendment prohibits force that
offends “contemporary standards of decency,”
regardless of whether “significant injury is evident,”
though the extent of injury may shed light on the
amount of force applied or “whether the use of force
could plausibly have been thought necessary.”
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37.

Id. at 1265–66 (internal citations cleaned up).

10 Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam).
20
Officers may use chemical agents to quell a disturbance so long as a valid
penological reason supports its use and it is not used in “quantities greater

than necessary or for the sole purpose of punishment or the infliction of pain.”
Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1310–11 (“[I]t is well-established that the use of chemical
agents on recalcitrant prisoners is not per se unconstitutional.” (quoting in part
Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984))); see also Sconiers, 946

F.3d at 1264 (acknowledging “pepper-spray” may be used to subdue an inmate
when penologically necessary); Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir.
2008), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d
701, 709–10 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Pepper spray is an accepted non-lethal means

of controlling unruly inmates.”).
Regardless of the type of force involved, courts consider five distinct
factors when determining whether an officer applied force maliciously and
sadistically for the purpose of causing harm:

(1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of
force; (3) the relationship between that need and the
amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent
of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the
basis of facts known to them.

21
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whitley, 475
U.S. at 321; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). Notably, a lack of serious injury, while not

dispositive, is relevant to the inquiry:
“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one
factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could
plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular
situation.” Ibid.[11] (quoting Whitley, supra, at 321,
106 S.Ct. 1078). The extent of injury may also provide
some indication of the amount of force applied. . . . An
inmate who complains of a “‘push or shove’” that
causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to
state a valid excessive force claim. Id. at 9 (quoting
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973)).[12]

Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly
correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.
An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does
not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim
merely because he has the good fortune to escape
without serious injury.

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37–38. Nevertheless, a prisoner’s injuries or lack thereof
may be “evidence of the kind or degree of force that was used by [an] officer.”
Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 700 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Crocker v.
Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021)).

11 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
12 See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later
seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s
constitutional rights.”).
22
In considering the Whitley factors, courts must “give a ‘wide range of
deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security,’

including when considering ‘[d]ecisions made at the scene of a disturbance.’”
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v.
Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990)). Moreover, corrections officials
are not required to “convince every inmate that their orders are reasonable and

well-thought out,” and “[c]ertainly . . . are not required to do so where an
inmate repeatedly fails to follow those orders.” Danley, 540 F.3d at 1307. As
such, “courts must determine whether the evidence goes beyond a mere dispute
over the reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguably

superior alternatives.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. A case should not go to the
jury “[u]nless it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction
of pain.” Id.

B. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects from civil liability government officials
who perform discretionary functions if the conduct of the officials does not
violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255
(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). As a

23
result, the qualified immunity defense protects from suit “‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Carr v. Tatangelo, 338

F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Indeed, as “‘government
officials are not required to err on the side of caution,’ qualified immunity is
appropriate in close cases where a reasonable officer could have believed that
his actions were lawful.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1200 (11th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1031 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001)).
To be entitled to qualified immunity, an official bears the initial burden
of establishing that his conduct fell within his discretionary authority. See
Webster v. Beary, 228 F. App’x 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2007). If the defendant does

so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is
not appropriate using the two-prong test established by the Supreme Court in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In accordance with Saucier, the
Court must ask whether the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff “show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Id.; see also
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260,
1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)). The
court must also ask whether the right allegedly violated was clearly

established at the time of the violation. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Saucier, 533
U.S. at 201; Scott, 550 U.S. at 377; Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th

24
1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e ask two questions: (1) whether the facts that
a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right,

and (2) if so, whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of
the defendant’s alleged misconduct.”) (internal quotations omitted). The Court
may consider these questions in whichever order it chooses, and qualified
immunity will protect the defendant if the answer to either question is “no.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009); Underwood, 11 F.4th at
1328. Notably, “[b]ecause § 1983 ‘requires proof of an affirmative causal
connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged
constitutional deprivation,’ each defendant is entitled to an independent

qualified-immunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and omissions.”
Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Zatler v.
Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)).
VI. Analysis13

Santiago contends that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in the following ways:

13 In determining whether a Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the
Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to Santiago to the extent supported by the record and then
considers “the legal issue of whether [those] ‘facts’, if proven, show that the defendant
violated clearly established law.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919,
925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000); Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8. The facts viewed in this manner
may differ from those that ultimately can be proved.
25
spraying him twice with chemical agents and forcing a cell extraction without
justification (Defendants Burns, Levai, and Jackson); and punching him in the

face and ribs/legs (Defendants Jackson and Dean, respectively). See Amended
Complaint at 7–9. Santiago does not dispute that Defendants were acting
within their discretionary duties at the relevant times. See Response at 8. As
such, the burden shifts to Santiago to show that Defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity. See Charles, 18 F.4th at 698.
It is undisputed that Santiago engaged in conduct that justified a
reactionary use of force, and Santiago concedes the first round of chemical
agents was reasonable under the circumstances. See Response at 4–5. He

disputes the reasonableness of the additional two rounds of chemical agents
and the cell extraction, all of which were captured on video. Id. at 5.
A. Chemical Agents
In his declaration, Santiago avers, “[A]fter the first application of

chemical agents[s] . . . I was willing to comply and followed all orders.” See Pl.
Ex. A ¶ 3. However, the video evidence contradicts his contention. See Def. Ex.
A1, A2. For instance, after the first application of chemical agents, when
Defendant Levai ordered Santiago to “strip out” completely, he did not. See

Def. Ex. A1. According to Defendant Levai, Santiago did not remove his boxers
or socks (or whatever he had on his feet). Id. Santiago claims to have raised his

26
feet to the cell window to show that Defendant Levai was not truthfully
reporting his conduct, see Pl. Ex. A ¶ 3, but the video evidence—which is clear

and unobstructed—shows that he brought only his left foot up to the window,
see Def. Ex. A1. Santiago also did not show his mid-section, where his boxers
would have been. Id. As such, the Court accepts as undisputed that Santiago
did not completely “strip out” when Defendant Levai ordered him to do so.

After the second application of chemical agents, Defendant Levai again
attempted to gain Santiago’s compliance with “proper” hand restraint
procedures, but Santiago only partially complied: he “[ran] [his] fingers
through [his] mouth,” but he did not “turn around and squat.” Id. Defendant

Levai reported to the camera that Santiago was “refusing to submit to proper
hand restraint procedures.” Id. The video evidence does not show whether
Santiago indeed ran his fingers through his mouth or refused to turn and
squat. See id. However, Santiago points to no evidence disputing Defendants’

representations on the video that Santiago did not comply with Defendant
Levai’s order to “turn around and squat.” See Pl. Ex. A ¶ 3. And, in his
declaration, Santiago does not even reference the directive to squat, focusing
solely on the directive to strip completely. See id. As such, based on Defendant

Levai’s clear instructions and same-time reports to the camera of Santiago’s

27
conduct, the Court accepts as undisputed that Santiago did not comply with
the order to “turn around and squat.”

With respect to the use of chemical agents, affording Defendants Levai
and Burns “a wide range of deference” in maintaining prison security, the
Whitley factors balance in their favor. First, there was a need for force because
Santiago refused to comply with lawful orders, despite his statements to the

camera operator that he was willing to comply and his partial compliance with
Defendant Levai’s orders. Second, the force used was minimal, consisting of
three bursts of chemical agents each time. Third, Santiago presented a threat
of harm to himself and others given that he broke the sprinkler head inside his

cell, causing it to flood, and was inciting other inmates in the dorm to engage
in disruptive behavior. Throughout the incident, other inmates can be heard
yelling to both Santiago and officers about the incident itself. The dorm became
noticeably quieter after Santiago was successfully removed from his cell.

Fourth, Defendants Levai and Burns tried to temper the severity of a forceful
response. Both tried to “counsel” Santiago before resorting to force, as
explained during Defendant Levai’s lead-in statement, and Defendants
afforded Santiago multiple opportunities and plenty of time to comply. See Def.

Ex. A1, A2. Defendants also permitted Santiago to take a decontamination
shower after the third application of chemical agents. See Def. Ex. A3. Finally,

28
the use of chemical agents caused minimal, temporary injuries (skin and eye
burning or irritation), which the shower appeared to have helped. See id.

Applying the Whitley factors, the Court concludes that “force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, [not] maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” See Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1265.
Santiago appears to complain about the time that elapsed between each

spraying (roughly thirteen minutes each), implying the length of time he sat
in his cell with chemical agents in the air constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. See Pl. Ex. A ¶ 3. Santiago offers no evidence showing that, by
spraying him three times over a roughly thirty-minute period, he suffered more

than the expected temporary pain or discomfort that chemical agents can
cause. Indeed, based on the video evidence, Santiago appears to have been
minimally affected by the chemical agents. See Def. Ex. A1, A2. Between each
spraying, he communicated with other inmates and the camera operator, and

after the third spraying, he no longer used a cloth to cover his mouth and nose.
Id. At no time did Santiago appear to be suffering the effects of the chemical
agents to such a degree that Defendants should have removed him from his
cell any sooner than they did.

For the reasons stated, the Court finds Santiago does not present
evidence to show that there is a genuine issue for trial with respect to the use

29
of chemical agents. As such, Defendants Levai and Burns are entitled to
qualified immunity on the claim that they unnecessarily sprayed Santiago

with chemical agents.
B. Cell Extraction
In addition to asserting that Defendants Jackson and Dean gratuitously
punched him during the cell extraction, Santiago appears to contend the cell

extraction itself constituted excessive force because, according to him, he
“followed all orders.” See Amended Complaint at 8; Pl. Ex. A ¶ 3; Response at
5–6. Defendant Levai stated on camera that a cell extraction was warranted
because Santiago did not comply with all orders related to hand restraint

procedures. See Def. Ex. A2. Both Defendants Levai and Jackson ordered
Santiago to bend over, and both reported that Santiago refused. Id.
In his declaration, Santiago does not dispute that he failed to comply
with the directive to bend at the waist. See Pl. Ex. A ¶ 3. In fact, he never

addresses this directive. See id. Although he claims that both Defendants were
lying or “acting like [he was not] following orders,” he disputes solely
Defendants’ representations that he refused to strip completely, emphasizing
in his Amended Complaint, declaration, and grievances that he attempted to

bring his entire body into view of the camera to prove he was in fact wearing
no clothes. See Amended Complaint at 7; Pl. Ex. A ¶ 3; Pl. Ex. D at 3, 5.

30
Accepting that Santiago had completely “strip[ped] out” after the third
application of chemical agents, as he maintains, his refusal to bend at the waist

is undisputed.14
Upon review of the evidence and affording Defendants Levai and
Jackson “a wide range of deference” in maintaining prison security, the Court
concludes the Whitley factors balance in their favor with respect to the cell

extraction: (1) there was a need for force because Santiago refused to comply
with a lawful order to bend at the waist; (2) the force used was minimal—
officers efficiently and calmly cuffed and shackled Santiago in about two
minutes, and helped him to his feet immediately thereafter; (3) Santiago

presented a threat of harm to himself and others for reasons previously stated;
(4) Defendants tried to temper the severity of a forceful response as
demonstrated by their efforts to “counsel” Santiago before resorting to force
and by first attempting to gain Santiago’s compliance through less forceful

means (chemical agents); and (5) the cell extraction caused allegedly minor
injuries (chipped teeth).

14 At some point before the cell extraction team breached his cell, Santiago was
fully naked, as evidenced on the video. However, the video evidence also shows that,
when Santiago exited his cell, he was wearing boxers. See Def. Ex. A2. It is unclear
whether he put his boxers back on after he exposed his body to the camera, but he
did step out of view from the camera for a bit after he exposed his body, during which
he would have had ample time to pull on his boxers. See id.
31
With respect to the injuries Santiago allegedly sustained, a minor injury
from a cell extraction does not, by itself, indicate excessive force was used. A

cell extraction necessarily involves force, the kind of which carries the inherent
risk that an inmate or officer may sustain an injury. See Thomas, 614 F.3d at
1301 n.13 (“In a cell extraction, a team of five correctional officers enter an
inmate’s cell and forcibly restrain and remove him.” (emphasis added)). A

chipped tooth is “entirely consistent” with a forceful “takedown.” See Charles,
18 F.4th at 700 (noting that “small scrapes, bumps, and bruises . . . are entirely
consistent with a routine takedown,” which the arresting officer reasonably
deemed was necessary after the arrestee refused to comply with multiple

orders and was engaging in behavior that caused other arrestees to become
“agitated”).
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes the cell extraction itself was
a reasonable use of force under the circumstances, and Defendants Levai and

Jackson are entitled to qualified immunity on Santiago’s claim that they lied
to justify the cell extraction.
Finally, to Santiago’s assertion that Defendants Jackson and Dean
punched him, the video evidence, the authenticity of which Santiago does not

dispute (and in fact relies on himself), along with other evidence, belies his
claim. Despite the chaos that can be heard inside the dorm, the video evidence

32
shows an organized, efficient effort by the cell extraction team to cuff Santiago
as quickly as possible, within two minutes. See Def. Ex. A2. The camera

operator had an unobstructed view inside the cell, and he kept the camera
trained on the members of the cell extraction team at all times. Id. Although
the individual movements or actions of all five officers cannot clearly be
discerned, the situation appears as calm as a cell extraction can be, and no

officer can be seen making unnecessarily violent or punching-like motions. See
id.
Not only can no punching-like motions be seen on the video, but
Santiago’s physical condition and statements immediately after the cell

extraction undercut his after-the-fact assertion that officers gratuitously
punched him. First, even though Santiago asserts he was punched in the face
so hard that his teeth chipped, he had no blood on his face when he was
removed from his cell. Id. Moreover, when Santiago was showering and being

evaluated by the nurse, he complained vociferously about the officers’ non-
compliance with chapter 33 of the FAC with respect to the use of chemical
agents. He never complained that officers punched him or engaged in conduct
outside of what would be expected when five officers wearing riot gear forcibly

enter a cell to subdue an unruly inmate. See Def. Ex. A3. He also did not ask

33
the nurse to evaluate his mouth during the post-use-of-force examination. See
id.

Finally, in the grievance Santiago authored the day of the incident, he
did not mention having been punched. See Pl. Ex. D at 3. Instead, he
complained solely about the successive use of chemical agents even after he
said he was willing to comply. Id. He suggested that the cell extraction itself

amounted to excessive force, claiming Defendants lied about his failure to
comply with orders to “strip down.” Id. And, he claimed to have sustained
“bod[i]ly harm,” but he did not identify any specific injuries, nor did he say any
member of the cell extraction team punched him. See id.

While the video evidence does not permit the Court to “pinpoint with
precision” the extent of force used by each member of the cell extraction team,
given there was a legitimate security purpose for the cell extraction, Santiago
suffered minimal injuries, and the video evidence documents an organized,

seemingly non-violent cell extraction, the Court concludes “that the evidence
in this case raises only a ‘mere dispute over the reasonableness of the
particular use of force’ and could not support ‘a reliable inference of
wantonness in the infliction of pain.’” See Brown, 813 F.2d at 1189–90 (quoting

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322); see also Oliver v. Warden, 761 F. App’x 960, 965
(11th Cir. 2019) (holding that bending an inmate’s fingers or “ramm[ing] [him]

34
in the back with a baton during [a] cell extraction” was not “out of proportion
to the legitimate need for force,” even though the officers’ alleged conduct was

not “obviously” contradicted by the video evidence).
On this point, the Court finds persuasive the summary judgment order
issued by another jurist of this Court based on similar allegations and
evidence. Gomez v. Lister, No. 3:20-cv-253-BJD-MCR, 2022 WL 562266, at *10,

14 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-10808, 2022 WL 16776248 (11th Cir.
Nov. 8, 2022) (granting the defendant-officers’ motion for summary judgment
on an excessive force claim in which the plaintiff alleged officers punched and
kicked him during a cell extraction even though “the individual movements or

actions of each officer” could not be discerned on the video, where the cell
extraction was justified given the plaintiff’s behavior, it “appeared calm and
professional,” was completed within minutes, and “no kicking or punching
motions [were] visible”).15 Here, as in Gomez, the video evidence “document[s]

the scenario sufficiently to give an objective view of what happened.” See id. at
*18. The video evidence is reliable and chronicles all relevant events, capturing

15 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not
binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union
Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court
would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision
would have significant persuasive effects.”).
35
the calm demeanor of the officers involved and Santiago’s own statements and
physical condition after he was removed from his cell.

Upon review, the Court finds Santiago does not present evidence
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact for trial on his claim that
Defendants Jackson or Dean punched him. The evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to Santiago, does not “support a reliable inference of

wantonness in the infliction of pain.” See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. If this case
were to proceed to trial, Santiago would have only his own testimony that
Defendants Jackson and Dean punched him for the sole purpose of inflicting
pain. His unsubstantiated, after-the-fact assertion constitutes no more than a

“mere scintilla of evidence” upon which no reasonable jury could find in his
favor. See Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A mere
‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice;
there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that

party.”).
Focusing on “the core judicial inquiry” of “whether force was applied in
a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm,” and considering all the evidence, the Court

concludes that Santiago does not point to evidence reasonably suggesting
Defendants Jackson and Dean used force maliciously or sadistically to cause

36
him harm. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. As such, they are entitled to qualified
immunity. !6
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 52) is
GRANTED to the extent Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on
Santiago’s Eighth Amendment claims.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants, terminate any
pending motions, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 19th day of
December, 2024.

United States District Judge

Jax-6
C: Benito A. Santiago, #M83000
Counsel of Record

16 Finding Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Santiago’s Eighth
Amendment claims, the Court will not address Defendants’ remaining arguments.
37

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10768943. Public record. Not legal advice.