# Mack v. State > Court of Appeals of Tennessee · March 24, 1999 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1076868 ## Case - **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee - **Decided:** March 24, 1999 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1076868 ## Opinion text IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE FILED AT KNOXVILLE March 24, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk GARY LYNN MACK, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9806-CV-00215 ) Plaintiff-A ppellant, ) MOR GAN CIRCU IT ) v. ) RUS SELL E. SIM MO NS, JR ., ) JUDGE CHA RLIE JON ES, et a l., ) ) AFFIRMED AND Defendants-Appellees. ) REMANDED GAR Y LY NN M ACK , pro se. PAUL SUM MERS, Attorney General and Reporter, MICHAEL E. M OORE, Solicitor General, and ABIGAIL TURNER, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, for Appellees Jones, Armes, Newberry & Elmore. O P I N IO N Franks, J. In this action, plaintiff a prisoner, named Charlie Jones, the warden of the Morgan County Regional Correction Facility, Rick Elmore, Regina Armes and Carey Newberry as defendants, alleging a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 . The com plaint alleges th at on Janu ary 9, 1996, pla intiff was in volved in a fight with another inmate, Randy Hill, who was white, and on January 9, 1996, the disciplinary boa rd of the M organ C ounty Regio nal Correc tional Facility fou nd him guilty of an infraction and placed him on maximum security status. He further alleges this action w as racially discrimin atory because he was d isciplined an d the wh ite inmate was not. He also avers that he was denied due process of law because the disciplinary board members denied him the right to call witnesses on his behalf. The complaint states that Jones is the warden of the prison and Rick Elmore is identified as chairman, with more, and there is no identity of the involvement of any of the other parties. In a memorandum in support of defendants’ motion to dismiss, defen dants explain that Elmo re, Newberry and A rmes are mem bers of the disciplinary board wh ich found plaintiff guilty of an assa ult in a disciplinary proceeding. Responding to defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to T.R.C.P. §12.02, the Trial Judge dismissed th e compla int on the gro und that pla intiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Te nnessee S upreme C ourt has “es tablished tha t a compla int ‘should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim tha t would en title him to relief’”. Fuerst v. M ethodist H osp. South , 588 S.W.2d 84 7, 848 (Tenn. 197 8), (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed . 80 (1957)). In making its determination, the court should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plain tiff. Id. at 84 8-84 9. Co mplaints filed by pro se plaintiffs sho uld be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 52 0, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1 972). Howe ver, as one court has said, the court “need no argue a pro se litigant’s case nor create a case for the pro se which does not exist.” Molina v. Kaye, 956 F.Supp. 261 , 263 (E.D.N.Y . 1996). 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other p roper p roceed ing for redress . . . . 2 In order to establish a claim for liability under this statute, “a plaintiff must plead and prove . . . two elements: (1) that he has been deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States; and (2) that the defendant deprived him of this right while acting under color of law.” Coffy v. Multi-County Narcotics Bureau, 600 F .2d 570 , 576 (6 th Cir. 1 979). Also see Dunn v. State of Tenn., 697 F.2d 121, 125 (6th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 460 U .S. 108 6, 103 S .Ct. 177 8, 76 L .Ed.2d 349 (1 983). To state a §1983 claim, a plaintiff must set forth specific facts that establish such claim. “It is not enoug h for a complaint un der §1983 to con tain mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons acting under color of state law. Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the pleadings.” Chapm an v. City o f Detroit, 808 F .2d 456 9, 465 ( 6th Cir . 1986) . A plaintiff must also allege personal involvement by the persons charged. Liability cannot be established under a respondeat superior theory. The mere rig ht to con trol, with out mo re, does not esta blish liab ility. Monell v. Dept. Of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 , 694 n.58, 98 S.Ct. 201 8, 2036-2037 (1 978). “There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a §1983 plaintiff must show tha t a superviso ry official at least im plicitly authorized , approved or know ingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 42 1 (6th Cir. 1984). The complaint in this case does not state a claim of racial discrimination in the disciplinary proceedings at the correctional facility. The plaintiff alleged that he was involved in a fight with another inmate, Randy Hill, who was white, and that he was found guilty of assault and placed on maximum security status, and that Randy Hill was found not guilty. Taking these facts as true, no claim of racial discrimination has been alleged. 3 A claim o f racial discrim ination und er §1983 is a claim of “disparate treatme nt”. See Daniels v. Board of Educ. Of Ravenna City Sch., 805 F.2d 203, 207 (6th Cir. 1986). “To prevail under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must show that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 206. To establish a prima fac ie case of dis parate treatm ent, a plaintiff m ust at least plead facts “from w hich one c an infer, if su ch actions re main une xplained, tha t it is more likely than not that such actions were ‘based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the act.’”. Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949 (1978). H ere there is no allegation of intentional dis crimination . Plaintiff only established that he was disciplined and that the white inmate involved in the fight was not. He then conc luded that this action was d ue to racial discrimination. How ever, the com plaint m ust be b ased on more th an con clusory al legation s. Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F .2d 459 , 465 (6 th Cir. 1 986). The complaint does not state a claim of denial of due process of the disciplinary proc eeding, be cause plain tiff did not h ave a liberty intere st in his security status protected by the Constitution of the United States. Since plaintiff did not have a liberty interest, he could not establish the first element of a §1983 claim, “that he has been deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” The leading case setting forth due process requirements in prison disciplinary proceedings is Wolff v. M cdonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2 d 935 ( 1974) . (A libe rty interest m ust be in volved ). In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), the Supreme Court held that there was no liberty interest created by the Constitution of the State of Massachusetts requiring a hearing before a prisoner was transfe rred to a differe nt prison where the con ditions w ere sub stantially les s favo rable. In that case, several inmates were transferred to a maximum security facility from a 4 medium security facility due to the suspicion that they were involved in nine arson fires at the medium security facility. In finding no liberty interest, the Meachum Court stated: . . . we cannot agree that any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. . . . [G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the con ditions o f conf ineme nt do no t otherw ise viola te the C onstitutio n. The Constitution does not require that the State have more than one prison for convicted felons; nor does it guarantee that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular prison. . . . The initial decision to assign the convict to a particular institutio n is not subje ct to audit under the D ue Proce ss Clause, a lthough the degree of confinem ent in one prison may be quite different from that in another. The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant’s liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons. Neither, in o ur view, do es the Du e Process C lause in and of itself protect a du ly convicted p risoner aga inst transfer fr om one in stitution to another within the state prison system. Confinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose. That life in one prison is mu ch more d isagreeable than in ano ther does n ot in itself signify that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is transferred to the institution with the more severe rules. Id. At 224-225. Based o n the foreg oing, a transf er to a more severe priso n facility wou ld not be the type of “atypical and significant hardship” that would implicate the Due Process Clause. This Court addressed this situation in Comp ton v. Cam pbell, No. 01A01 -9710-C H-0053 9, 1998 L EXIS 2 59 (Tenn . App. 199 8). We he ld that a reclassification to a medium custody facility from a minimum custody facility is not such a h ardship and it is th erefore not sub ject to du e proce ss prote ction. (Quoting Sandin v. Conner, 115 S .Ct. 229 3 at 230 0.) Since there was no lib erty interest involv ed in this case , plaintiff cou ld not establish the first element of a §1983 claim. 5 We con clude, theref ore, that the co mplaint fails to state a §198 3 claim against any of the defendants and affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand with the co st of the app eal assessed to the appe llant. __________________________ Herschel P. Franks, J. CONCUR: ___________________________ Houston M. Godd ard, P.J. ___________________________ Charles D. Susano, Jr., J. 6 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1076868. Public record. Not legal advice.