# Jordan v. Harris County Court

> District Court, S.D. Texas · November 12, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10768024

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** November 12, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10768024

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the random, unauthorized, and even negligent deprivation of a property or liberty interest does not violate procedural due process if the State furnishes an adequate post-deprivation remedy

## Opinion text

□ Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 18, 2024
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CHARLES JORDAN, a/k/a CHARLES §
ARTHUR THOMAS JORDAN, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
Vv. § Civil Action No. H-22-1402
§
HARRIS COUNTY COURT, e¢ al., §
§
Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff a Bastrop County pretrial detainee awaiting trial on charges for assaulting
a police officer. He filed a second amended pro se civil complaint under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983
against various named and unnamed defendants. (Docket Entry No. 16.) As judicial relief,
he requests “punitive, compensative, and exculpatory damages.’ Id., p. 5. He seeks leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. Although plaintiff a “three strikes” litigant under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g), he incurred his third strike after filing the instant lawsuit.
Having screened the second amended complaint as required by 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e),
the Court DISMISSES this lawsuit for the reasons shown below.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

'The Court construes “compensative” damages as meaning compensatory damages, but is
unfamiliar with the term, “exculpatory damages.”

When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must evaluate the
complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds that the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which
clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Sth Cir. 1998). A claim has no
arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional
facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211,
213 (Sth Cir. 1998).
To determine whether a complaint fails to state a claim under section 1915(e), courts
apply the same standard used for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”). Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (Sth Cir. 1998). To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Jd. All well-pleaded facts are accepted as true and viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (Sth Cir. 1996). Pleadings must

show specific, well-pleaded facts, not conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v.
Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). Conclusory assertions are not accepted
as true.
A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). In short, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
at 570. When a plaintiff “ha[s] not nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.” Jd.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When reviewing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the courts must construe the factual
allegations as liberally as possible. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). However, a
plaintiff’ s pro se status does not offer him “an impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has
no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation and abuse
already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston, NA., 808 F.2d 358, 359
(Sth Cir. 1986). Even under the liberal standards afforded by Haines, pro se litigants must
still “abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.” E.£.0.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d
475, 484 (Sth Cir. 2014). They must properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally
construed, state a plausible claim to relief. Id.
Plaintiffs second amended complaint, as were his original and amended complaints,
is difficult to follow, and asserts various unrelated and conclusory claims against multiple
named and unnamed defendants. The Court has made every reasonable effort to understand

and liberally construe the pleadings. However, having provided plaintiff three opportunities
to plead viable claims against the defendants through an original, amended, and second
amended complaint, the Court finds that no viable claims have been raised. The Court is of
the opinion that plaintiff has pleaded his best case, and that further leave to amend would
be futile. See Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (Sth Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
Consequently, plaintiff's claims will be dismissed with prejudice.’
Il. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not create any
substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for violations of statutory
and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v. Texas Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759 (Sth Cir.
1997) (per curiam). To state a valid claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a
violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and demonstrate
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a state actor — a person acting under color of
state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (Sth
Cir. 2021) (per curiam). When the facts alleged by a plaintiff, taken as true, do not show a
violation of a constitutional right, the complaint is properly dismissed for failure to state a
viable claim. See, e.g., Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (Sth Cir. 2009) (per curiam);
Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 421 (Sth Cir. 2006).

°The Court acknowledges that plaintiffs parties and claims have been improperly joined
under FRCP 18 and 20, and are subject to dismissal under FRCP 21. However, because the claims
are frivolous and/or fail to state a viable claim for relief under section 1983 and state law, they will
be dismissed pursuant to section 1915(e).

Plaintiffs claims appear to fall into three overlapping categories: racial/political
discrimination, religious discrimination, and mental health discrimination. His overarching
claim is that all of his interactions with defendant law enforcement officials, mental health
officials, and prosecutory officials have been the result of discrimination against him because
of his race (white) and political views (Republican and Confederate).
A. State Actors
Plaintiff asserts that an unidentified person at an undisclosed location on an
undisclosed date called 911 after hearing plaintiff s political views. He argues that this “cop
caller” violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech, “the Texas Partisapation [sic]
Act,” and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Plaintiff pleads no factual allegations sufficient
to support a claim for violation of his rights under any of these provisions. Moreover, absent
any factual allegations showing that the “cop caller” was a state actor and not a private
citizen, plaintiff fails to state a viable claim under section 1983. Plaintiff's claims against
the “cop caller” are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a viable claim for
relief under section 1983 or state law.
Plaintiff further complains that his unnamed court-appointed attorney in an
unidentified court proceeding never questioned him about his aggravated assault case. This
allegation fails to raise an issue of constitutional dimension under section 1983 or state law.
Moreover, attorneys serving as defense counsel, even if appointed by the court, are not state
actors and cannot be sued under section 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 US. 312, 318,
324-25 (1981); Mills v. Criminal District Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (Sth Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff's claim against his defense counsel is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for
failure to state a viable claim for relief under section 1983 or state law.
Plaintiff also appears to bring section 1983 claims against President Joe Biden for
“voter fraud in Atlanta” at an undisclosed time “via voting machines & HAVA of ties to
China by voting machine company in GA.” (Docket Entry No. 16, pp. 3-4.) He pleads no
supporting factual allegations. President Biden is a federal actor, not a state actor. Federal
actors can have limited liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), but they cannot be sued under section 1983. Even so, plaintiffs conclusory claims
are unsupported by any factual allegations sufficient to raise a viable Bivens claim for
violation of plaintiffs constitutional or other federal rights, and his claims against President
Joe Biden are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Claims for Racial/Political/Religious Discrimination
Plaintiffclaims that his Harris County arrest, detention, prosecution, and/or conviction
were motivated by racial and political discrimination by “Harris County Sherriff [sic] Ed
Gonzales 2022 Democrat.” (Docket Entry No. 16, p. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he was a
“White man” arrested by “latino and other Black” police officers and denied an examining
trial due to “the Sheriff's policy of discriminating on Whites, Republicans, and
Confederates.”’ (Docket Entry No.16, p. 1.) Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions are

*Plaintiff raised similar political discrimination claims in a pro se civil lawsuit
contemporaneously filed in Jordan v. Democrats of Dalton, C.A. No. 22-CV-03278-JPB (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 16, 2022). The court in that case dismissed the claims as frivolous, finding that “The notion
that Plaintiff is being falsely imprisoned in a Texas jail by groups of Democrats in Georgia and
elsewhere is wildly implausible, and nothing in Plaintiffs complaint has an arguable basis in either

insufficient to raise a viable claim for unlawful discrimination or show the existence of an
unlawful discriminatory policy under section 1983. Moreover, his claim that Republican
votes were suppressed through interstate commerce violations is wholly conclusory and
unsupported by any factual allegations sufficient to raise a viable claim under section 1983.
Plaintiffs claims for racial and political discrimination and/or suppression of Republican
votes are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to raise a viable claim for relief.
Plaintiff further alleges that “Harris County DA Kim Ogg Democrat” discriminated
against him as a homeless white man at an undisclosed time, and that his criminal
prosecution was racially and politically motivated because he and his defense attorney were
not present at grand jury proceedings. (Docket Entry No. 16, p. 2.) No supporting factual
allegations as to unlawful discrimination are pleaded. Moreover, plaintiff and his defense
counsel had no constitutional or statutory right to be present during grand jury proceedings.
TEX. CODE CRIM. Proc. Art. 20A.102. Plaintiffs claims are wholly conclusory and
unsupported by factual allegations sufficient to raise a viable claim under section 1983.
Plaintiff's claims against Harris County District Attorney Kim Ogg are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to raise a viable claim for relief under section 1983 or state law.
Plaintiff also alleges that Sylvester Turner “violated interstate commerce” at an
undisclosed time. It is unclear whether this is related to a claim for racial discrimination or
political discrimination. Plaintiff pleads no factual allegations supporting his claim that

law or fact.”

Turner violated interstate commerce, nor does he show that any such violation impinged on
his constitutional or other federal rights. Plaintiffs conclusory assertion is insufficient to
raise a viable claim for relief under section 1983, and his claim against Sylvester Turner is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff twice states in his second amended complaint that his arrest was the result
of religious discrimination, and that police officers stole or abandoned his “religious rose
quartz crystal” in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause.
(Docket Entry No. 16, pp. 2, 4.) He pleads no factual allegations supporting his conclusory
assertion of religious discrimination, a Fourth Amendment violation, or an Interstate
Commerce Clause violation, and no viable claim is raised under section 1983. To the extent
plaintiffis complaining ofa loss of personal property by police officers, no issue of a federal
constitutional dimension is raised. Plaintiff's property claim is barred by the Parratt/Hudson
doctrine, which requires him to pursue his loss in the state courts through the tort of
conversion. See Caine v. Hardy, 943 F.2d 1406, 1412 (Sth Cir. 1991) (holding that the
random, unauthorized, and even negligent deprivation of a property or liberty interest does
not violate procedural due process if the State furnishes an adequate post-deprivation
remedy); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 541-44 (1981). The state law tort of conversion is generally recognized as an adequate
post-deprivation remedy. Murphy Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543-44 (Sth Cir. 1994), Plaintiffs
claims for religious discrimination and property loss are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
for failure to state a claim under section 1983.

Plaintiff asks as additional judicial relief that the Court prohibit his transfer to the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice “because of [sic] my religious long hair will be cut or
I will fight the guards or be taken to solitary.” (Docket Entry No. 1, p. 5.) At this juncture,
it is unknown whether plaintiff will be sentenced to prison in his pending Bastrop County
criminal proceedings, and the Court has no authorization or jurisdiction to grant speculative
relief or enter an advisory ruling as to potential future events. Regardless, no judicial relief
is warranted, as the Court is dismissing plaintiffs claims for relief.
C. Mental Health Discrimination
Plaintiff alleges that at an undisclosed point in time, Harris County Jail physician
“Miss Wilson” prevented him from voting for Trump via mail in Colorado because she gave
him medication which left him unable to think clearly to assert his right to vote. (Docket
Entry No. 18, p. 1.) Plaintiffs claim is unsupported by factual allegations sufficient to raise
an issue of constitutional dimension. Plaintiff's claim against Miss Wilson is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE for failure to raise a viable claim for relief under section 1983.
Plaintiff further asserts that the Harris County Sheriffs Office and officers
discriminated against him as a mental health inmate because “the attorney visit phone” was
broken. Plaintiff claims that he was forced to communicate with counsel through letters, jail
visits, and court hearings. No supporting factual allegations as to discrimination are pleaded,
and his allegations show that he was not denied access to counsel or the courts. Plaintiffs
claims are wholly conclusory and unsupported by factual allegations sufficient to raise a
viable claim under section 1983. Plaintiffs claims as to mental health discrimination based

on a broken telephone are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to raise a viable
claim for relief under section 1983.
Plaintiff also alleges that, at an undisclosed time and location, an unnamed “Black Dr.
& black behavior tech” put him in a safety cell for singing due to plaintiffs political views.
It is unclear whether plaintiff alleges this action as political discrimination or mental health
discrimination. In either event, his claims are wholly conclusory and unsupported by factual
allegations sufficient to raise a viable claim under section 1983. Plaintiffs claims against
the unnamed “Black Dr. & black behavior tech” are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for
failure to raise a viable claim for relief under section 1983.
Plaintiff argues that he should not be detained in “mental health rehab” because “I am
sane and have a right not to live with crazy people.” (Docket Entry No. 16, p. 5.) He argues
that he was placed in mental health housing due to the Harris County Sheriff's policy of
discriminating against white defendants holding Republican and Confederate political views.
That is, plaintiff asserts that the only reason he was placed in mental health housing was
because of his white race and political views.’ Plaintiff does not state when and where this
incident took place, nor does he support his conclusory claim of discrimination with factual
allegations sufficient to raise a viable claim under section 1983. No viable claim for relief
under section 1983 is raised, and the claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

“Although plaintiff denies having mental health issues, he alleged in a pro se civil lawsuit
contemporaneously filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia that
“I am schizophrenic & get court ordered medication.” Jordan v. Georgia, C.A. No.
22-cv-00069-HLM (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2022) (dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim).
10

D. Claims Barred by Heck
Plaintiff fares no better in seeking monetary compensation for his Harris County
arrest, detention, prosecution, and/or conviction. He claims that ten unnamed Houston police
officers arrested him at Whole Foods on an undisclosed date solely due to his white race,
and that they violated interstate commerce by suppressing Republican votes. According to
plaintiff, the officers violated “Terry v. Ohio.”” He further claims that Harris County Sheriff
Ed Gonzales and five unnamed “booking” deputies prevented him from giving evidence at
pretrial examining trial due to a policy of discriminating against white defendants. In short,
plaintiff contends that he was arrested, detained, and charged with a criminal offense solely
due to racial discrimination against white defendants and in violation of his constitutional
rights.
Because a judgment in plaintiffs favor as to these claims would call into question the
validity of his arrest, detention, prosecution, and/or conviction, his claims are barred by Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See Richards v. Hearn, No. 21-20358, 2022 WL
996416, at *1 (Sth Cir. Apr. 4, 2022) (“[B]ecause Richards’s claims [c]all into question the
validity of his state conviction, and because he has not established that this conviction has
already been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid, he may not obtain monetary
damages.”). Plaintiff does not state that the Harris County criminal proceedings were

°The Court presumes plaintiff is referring to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), regarding a
police officer’s right to temporarily stop and frisk an individual for weapons under certain
circumstances.
11

terminated in his favor — that is, reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive process,
set aside by a state court of competent jurisdiction, or set aside by a federal habeas court. See
Wilson v. Midland County, Texas, 116 F.4th 384, 390 (Sth Cir. Sept. 13, 2024).
Consequently, his claims seeking monetary damages for an allegedly unlawful arrest,
detention, prosecution, and/or conviction do not raise colorable claims for which relief can
be granted under section 1983.°
Plaintiff's civil claims challenging the validity of his arrest, detention, prosecution,
and/or conviction are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to their being asserted again until
the Heck conditions are met.

I. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this lawsuit is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous
and/or for failure to state a viable claim for relief under section 1983 or state law. Any and
all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
The dismissal of plaintiff's clams CONSTITUTES A STRIKE for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g), and stands as plaintiffs ninth strike under that provision. See Jordan v.
Georgia, C.A. No. 22-cv-00069-HLM (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2022) (dismissed as frivolous and

®Plaintiff provides no information as to the arrest, detention, and/or conviction at issue, and
the Court is unable to take judicial notice of any applicable public state court records that might be
available online.
12

for failure to state a claim); Jordan v. North Dakota, C.A. No. 17-cv-00169-CSM (D. N.D.
Oct. 10, 2017) (dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim); Jordan v. Bastrop
County District Attorney, C.A. No. A-22-CV-248-LY (W.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2022) (dismissed
as malicious); Jordan v. University of Texas at Austin, C.A. No. 22-cv-00243-LY (W.D. Tex.
June 27, 2022) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Jordan v. Democrats of Dalton, C.A.
No. 22-CV-03278-JPB (N.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 2022) judgment dismissing case a frivolous);
Jordan v. Bastrop County District Attorney, C.A. No. A-21-CV-1135-LY (W.D. Tex. Oct.
7, 2022) (claims dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim; final judgment entered
September 3, 2024); Jordan v. City of Ashville, C.A. No. 1:22-cv-00062-MR (W.D. N.C.
May 11, 2022) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Jordan v. Equifax, C.A. No.
1:22-CV-03277-JPB (N.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2023) (dismissed as malicious and for false
disclosures to court).
Pursuant to the provisions of section 1915(g), plaintiffis BARRED from proceeding
in forma pauperis in any future federal district court case or appeal, including any appeal
from the dismissal in the instant case, unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical
injury at the time of filing. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiffpleaded no allegations of imminent
danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed the instant lawsuit.
Signed at Houston, Texas, on this the Se ‘day of ona,

Kew Pete
KEITH P. ELLISON
_UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10768024. Public record. Not legal advice.