# TISDALE v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · November 1, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767514

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 1, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767514

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating “a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION

NAISHA TISDALE, as Administratrix ) Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-01972
of the Estate of Christopher Tisdale, )

Deceased, )
) Chief United States District Judge

) Mark R. Hornak
Plaintiff,
)

)
vs. ) United States Magistrate Judge
) Christopher B. Brown
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTIONS, et al.. )
)
Defendants,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON MOTION TO DISMISS ECF No. 12

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Recommendation
Christopher Tisdale (“Mr. Tisdale”) was a state prisoner in custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at the State Correctional Institution
(“SCI”) Pine Grove when he committed suicide on November 19, 2021. His mother,
Naisha Tisdale (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil rights survival and wrongful death
action as the Administratrix of Mr. Tisdale’s Estate. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 340-47.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Theresa Mason (“Mason”) and Gina
Harrison (“Harrison”) (together, the “Psychiatry Defendants”) were deliberately
indifferent under the Eighth Amendment to Mr. Tisdale’s serious medical needs by
failing to provide adequate medical care (Count I), by allowing him to remain in
prolonged isolation (Count I), and to his particular vulnerability to suicide (Count
II), violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and raised
corresponding claims of wrongful death and survival actions in both respects.

Plaintiff also alleges various violations against the Psychiatry Defendants under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132 (“ADA”) (Count V).1
This court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Presently pending before the Court is the Psychiatry Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim.2 ECF No. 12. Plaintiff has responded in

Opposition and the Psychiatry Defendants have filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 28, 32.
The motion is now ripe for review.
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended the Motion to
Dismiss be denied as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, granted in part and
denied in part as to the Fourteenth Amendment claims, denied as to the Wrongful
Death and Survival Claims (Counts I-II), and granted as to the ADA claim (Count
V). ECF No. 12.

1 There are five counts in the Complaint, however, only Counts I, II, and V
relate to the Psychiatry Defendants and are the subject of the instant Motion to
Dismiss.

2 Defendants Mason and Harrison are not the only defendants in this action
who are psychiatrists, but they are the only psychiatric defendants moving to
dismiss.
II. Report
a. Factual Background
The following allegations are in the Complaint and are accepted as true with

all reasonable inferences drawn in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. Phillips v.
Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
Mr. Tisdale, an inmate confined in the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, committed suicide on November 19, 2021, after his parole had been
denied for the third time. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 17-18. At the time of his suicide, he had
been in solitary confinement for 171 days, and had been in and out of solitary
confinement for much of the prior four years. Id. at ¶ 230. He had just finished his

third hunger strike since 2020. Id. at ¶ 256. Ten days before his suicide, Mr.
Tisdale removed his family and other contacts from his DOC contact list. Id. at ¶
297. Mr. Tisdale committed suicide by hanging himself from his bunk-bed. Id. at ¶
309.
Defendant Mason evaluated Mr. Tisdale approximately eight times between
2019 and 2021 with the last appointment being three months before Mr. Tisdale’s

suicide. Id. at ¶¶ 100; 114-15; 123; 195; 211; 218; 240. These appointments were
telemedicine appointments, which Plaintiff alleges was “directly in contrast with
accepted practices in the correctional setting.” Id. at ¶ 116.
Plaintiff claims that Mr. Tisdale demonstrated suicidal behaviors or warning
signs in front of Defendant Mason, including when she evaluated him after he sliced
open his shoulder and side with a spoon. Id. at ¶¶ 187; 195-197. After that
incident, she noted her disbelief that he was “truly suicidal” and that “he [did] not
qualify for a higher mental health treatment placement.” Id. at ¶ 197. In June,
2021, Defendant Mason also noted Mr. Tisdale “still endorse[d] feeling suicidal with
a plan to hang himself. He claim[ed] he cannot hang himself since there is no place

for him to create the noose.” Id. at ¶ 211. In July 2021, Defendant Mason opined
that Mr. Tisdale was not suicidal but was instead using this as a “maladaptive
coping skill” to be removed from the RHU. Id. at ¶ 240.
Defendant Harrison evaluated Mr. Tisdale approximately seven times
between November 10, 2020 and October 19, 2021, with her last session less than
one month before his suicide. Id. at ¶¶ 170; 181; 216; 225; 244; 258; 262. In June

2021, Defendant Harrison wrote that “patient is likely maintaining SI [suicidal
ideation] for secondary gain as a maladaptive coping skill”; however, she also
acknowledged “his safety cannot be ensured due to potential of impulsivity.” Id. at
¶ 216. Defendant Harrison apparently stopped Mr. Tisdale’s depression medication
during his last hunger strike in August 2021 before reinstating it after the strike
ended. Id. at ¶¶ 255; 257. In September 2021, Mr. Tisdale explicitly told her his
“mental health [was being] negatively effected by being in the RHU.” Id. at ¶ 260.

One month before his suicide, Mr. Tisdale “expressed suicidal ideation” and spoke
about his stress over his upcoming parole board hearing. Id. at ¶ 264-65.
Defendant Harrison wrote this was a “maladaptive coping skill to have his needs
met, patient is specifically seeking secondary gain.” Id. at ¶ 265.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Mason and Harrison contributed to Mr.
Tisdale’s suicide because their medical evaluations did not consider his mental
illness and suicidal ideation and instead cleared him to stay in solitary confinement.
Counts I-II. The Psychiatry Defendants argue they should be dismissed because
they were not his treating psychiatrists at the time of his death, had not been for

over a month, and there are no allegations linking them with Mr. Tisdale’s stay in
the RHU. ECF No. 13 at 5.
b. Standard of Review
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well
settled. A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and can be

dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A defendant bears the burden of showing that a plaintiff's
complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169,
178 (3d Cir. 2000).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must be dismissed if it merely alleges
entitlement to relief without supporting facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at
the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary elements.’”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court need not
accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant,
Inc. v. Great Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2000), nor a plaintiff's
“bald assertions or legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d

902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The court's role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is
entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims – not if they will ultimately
prevail. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
c. Discussion
i. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claims

The Psychiatry Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the
Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to Mr. Tisdale’s serious medical
needs (Count I) and for deliberate indifference to Mr. Tisdale’s particular
vulnerability to suicide (Count II). These are addressed in turn.
a) Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
The Eighth Amendment “prohibits prison officials from being deliberately
indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,
227 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Prison

officials are deliberately indifferent if they “intentionally deny[] or delay[] access to
medical care.” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97). A medical need is “serious” if “has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment or . . . is so obvious that a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff claims the Psychiatry Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
Mr. Tisdale’s serious medical needs on two fronts: (1) by failing to provide him with
adequate mental health treatment; and (2) by “repeatedly clearing him for

continued and prolonged isolation despite his mental illness.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 349.
The Psychiatry Defendants move to dismiss this claim. They argue that they
provided him with sufficient mental health treatment via numerous psychiatry
appointments. Even if their assessments of Mr. Tisdale’s suicidal ideation were
incorrect, their actions do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. ECF No. 13
at 5-6.

Plaintiff sets forth sufficient facts at this stage that that Mr. Tisdale had a
serious medical need for more robust mental health care and the Psychiatry
Defendants failed to provide it. Mr. Tisdale’s mental health problems were “so
obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention” as he repeatedly told the Psychiatry Defendants he was going to kill
himself and he had not received enough therapy or the right medication. ECF No. 1
at ¶¶ 174, 196-197, 202, 211, 216, 219, 240, 244, 265. Plaintiff further alleges

Defendant Mason only saw Mr. Tisdale through telemedicine appointments which
was “directly in contrast with accepted practices in the correctional setting.” Id. at
¶ 116. Further, when she did see him, she noted her disbelief that he was “truly
suicidal” and that “he [did] not qualify for a higher mental health treatment
placement.” Id. at ¶¶ 197, 211. Likewise, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Harrison
noted Mr. Tisdale’s “safety cannot be ensured due to potential of impulsivity,” but
also wrote that his suicidal ideation was for “secondary gain as a maladaptive
coping skill.” Id. at ¶ 216. Plaintiff further claims Defendant Harrison took Mr.
Tisdale off his medication during his hunger strike and “made no effort to identify

medications appropriate for his situation.” Id. at ¶ 255.
In light of the above, and at this stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the
Psychiatry Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Tisdale’s serious medical
need for additional mental health care. Therefore, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth
Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to Mr. Tisdale’s serious medical needs
and it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss on

this ground.
The Psychiatry Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim that they
were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Tisdale’s serious medical needs by allowing him
to remain in prolonged solitary confinement. ECF No. 13 at 5-6. The crux of their
argument is that they were not personally involved in the “clearing” of Mr. Tisdale
for solitary confinement and therefore are not liable in this respect. Id.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from being deliberately

indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs by knowing of and disregarding “an
excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Palakovic,
854 F.3d at 227 (“To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to
recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm”). Courts can “infer” an
official’s “subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm at issue is
obvious, though ignored.” Williams v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 117 F.4th 503, 517
(3d Cir. 2024). Defendants “must have personal involvement,” which a plaintiff can
show “through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence.” Sasse v. Wetzel, No. 21-3033, 2022 WL 1552994, at *2 (3d Cir. May

17, 2022) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently recognized in Williams that
“precedents leave no room for doubt that individuals with a known history of
serious mental illness have a clearly established right not to be subjected to
prolonged solitary confinement without penological justification, regardless of their
sentence.” Williams, 117 F.4th at 517. See also Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 974

F.3d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 2020) (“We have repeatedly recognized the severe effects of
prolonged solitary confinement, as have our sister circuits and Justices of the
Supreme Court”); Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 225 (“[W]e . . . acknowledge the robust
body of legal and scientific authority recognizing the devastating mental health
consequences caused by long-term isolation in solitary confinement”).
Here the Complaint sufficiently alleges the Psychiatry Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to and personally involved in keeping Mr. Tisdale in the

RHU. Beyond the Psychiatry Defendant’s evaluations where they repeatedly
opined Mr. Tisdale’s threats of suicide were “maladaptive coping responses” to get
out of the RHU, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 216, 219, 240, 244, 265, the Complaint sets forth
specific times the Defendants played a role in Mr. Tisdale’s stay in solitary
confinement. Namely, that Defendant Mason wrote in a June 2021 evaluation that
Mr. Tisdale “[did] not qualify for a higher mental health treatment placement.” Id.
at ¶ 211. Additionally, in July 2021, “in evaluating the psychiatric condition of Mr.
Tisdale to discharge him from a Psychiatric Observation Cell to a cell in the RHU,”
Defendant Mason again opined his suicidal ideations were no more than

“maladaptive coping strategies.” Id. at ¶ 240. Further, Defendant Harrison did not
advise that Mr. Tisdale be removed from the RHU after he specifically told her that
his “mental health [was being] negatively effected by being in the RHU.” Id. at ¶
260.
Whether the Psychiatry Defendants’ actions actually contributed to Mr.
Tisdale’s prolonged stay in solitary confinement is a question for discovery. But at

this stage in the proceedings, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Psychiatry
Defendants were involved in keeping Mr. Tisdale, an individual with a known
history of serious mental illness, in prolonged solitary confinement.
Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to
Mr. Tisdale’s serious medical needs and it is respectfully recommended that the
Court deny the Motion to Dismiss on those grounds.
b) Deliberate Indifference to Mr. Tisdale’s Particular
Vulnerability to Suicide
Plaintiff alleges that the Psychiatry Defendants were deliberately indifferent
to Mr. Tisdale’s vulnerability to suicide in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Count II. Defendants argue for dismissal because they were not his psychiatrists

after he transferred to a different facility from where they treated him in which he
ended his life, and because there was “no indication that [Mr. Tisdale] attempted
suicide or engaged in self-harm at or around the time he took his own life.” ECF
No. 13 at 7-9.
To bring a claim for deliberate indifference to a particular vulnerability to

suicide, the plaintiff must show: “(1) that the individual had a particular
vulnerability to suicide, meaning that there was a strong likelihood, rather than a
mere possibility, that a suicide would be attempted; (2) that the prison official knew
or should have known of the individual's particular vulnerability; and (3) that the
official acted with reckless or deliberate indifference, meaning something beyond
mere negligence, to the individual's particular vulnerability.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d

at 223–24. See also Talley v. Griesmer, No. 19-3796, 2023 WL 3002742, at *2 (3d
Cir. Apr. 19, 2023) (applying the same test).
This is an objective standard, meaning that “it is not necessary for the
[defendant] to have a subjective appreciation of the detainee’s particular
vulnerability,” only that they knew or should have known of the vulnerability.
Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, n. 11 (3d Cir. 2017). At the pleading stage, a
plaintiff does not need to demonstrate that the suicide was “temporally imminent,”

instead, an individual’s vulnerability to suicide “must be assessed based on the
totality of the facts presented.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 230.
Here, the Complaint sets forth sufficient allegations that Mr. Tisdale had a
strong likelihood he would attempt suicide. First, Mr. Tisdale spoke openly about
committing suicide, self-harmed by cutting himself, was on medication for
depression and anxiety, went on three hunger strikes, and removed his family from
his contact list right before his death. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 171-81; 187; 190; 195-97;
211; 240; 255; 257; 265; 297. Mr. Tisdale was in solitary confinement for 171 days
prior to his suicide and for much of the four years before. Id. at ¶ 230. As discussed

above, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently recognized how detrimental
prolonged solitary confinement can be for individuals with a history of serious
mental illness. See Williams, 117 F.4th at 517; Porter, 974 F.3d at 442; Palakovic,
854 F.3d at 225.
Second, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the Psychiatry Defendants should
have known about Mr. Tisdale’s particular vulnerability to suicide. The Complaint

lists each practitioners’ therapy notes where they themselves recount that Mr.
Tisdale told them he was suicidal. Defendant Mason noted that Mr. Tisdale “still
endorsed feeling suicidal with a plan to hang himself,” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 211, and
Defendant Harrison noted Mr. Tisdale’s “suicidal ideation” and that “his safety
cannot be ensured due to potential of impulsivity.” Id. at ¶ 216.
Third, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Psychiatry Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference because each time Mr. Tisdale told them he was suicidal,

they interpreted it as a “maladaptive coping skill.” Id. at ¶¶ 190; 195-197; 216; 240;
265. The Psychiatry Defendants had opportunities to help Mr. Tisdale get the
treatment he needed and yet dismissed him.
At this stage, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim as to Mr. Tisdale’s vulnerability to suicide and it is respectfully
recommended that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.
ii. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Psychiatry Defendants move for dismissal of claims Mr. Tisdale was
deprived of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by “clearing

Mr. Tisdale for isolation and allowing him to remain in the RHU without any
meaningful review of the appropriateness of his continued stay there” as duplicative
of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. ECF No. 13 at 10; ECF No. 28 at 19; ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 350, 354.
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims are not entirely clear. To the
extent that Plaintiff brings a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the same facts

supporting a lack of medical care and prolonged detention in solitary confinement
claims, these are duplicative of the Eighth Amendment claims. As such, they should
be dismissed under Albright’s “more specific constitutional provision” rule since
both concern whether the Psychiatry Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
Mr. Tisdale’s serous medical needs. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 288 (1994).
To the extent, however, that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims are based on
independent claims that Mr. Tisdale’s procedural due process rights were violated

because he was not afforded a meaningful review of the appropriateness of his
continued solitary confinement, such claims survive the Motion to Dismiss
challenge. Williams, 848 F.3d at 574. Therefore, it is respectfully recommended
that the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss to the extent the Fourteenth
Amendment claims are duplicative of the Eighth Amendment claims and deny the
Motion to Dismiss to the extent the Fourteenth Amendments claims are based on
independent procedural due process grounds.
iii. Americans with Disabilities Act

Plaintiff brings a claim against the Psychiatry Defendants under Title II of
the ADA (Count V). In her Brief in Opposition, Plaintiff agrees to voluntarily
dismiss the ADA Claim as to the Psychiatry Defendants only. ECF No. 28 at 15.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the
Psychiatry Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on this ground. See, e.g., Freeman v.
Wetzel, No. 17-1506, 2018 WL 7350485, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2018), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 17-1506, 2019 WL 652413 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2019)
(recommending dismissal of a party after Plaintiff agreed to voluntarily dismiss in
his brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss).
iv. Wrongful Death and Survival Claims
Lastly, the Psychiatry Defendants move for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s causes
of action under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes, 42 Pa.
C.S. §§8301 and 8302, respectively, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 340-347, because the

underlying § 1983 deliberate indifference claims fail.
In Pennsylvania, “wrongful death and survival actions are not substantive
causes of action; rather, they provide a vehicle through which plaintiffs can recover
for unlawful conduct that results in death.” Maldet v. Johnstown Police Dep't, No.
2:19-325, 2019 WL 2435869, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2019). To recover under these
statutes, a plaintiff “must state all the elements of a valid tort theory.” Bright v.
Westmoreland Cnty., 380 F.3d 729, 741 (3d Cir. 2004). If the “underlying tort
theory is barred” then the “wrongful death or survival claim will fail.” Id. Wrongful
death and survival claims “have often been brought alongside § 1983 claims. § 1983
is thus recognized as a sufficient underlying basis for wrongful death and survival

claims under Pennsylvania law.” Maldet, 2019 WL 2435869 at *5.
As stated above, at this stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged § 1983
deliberate indifference claims. These claims are therefore a “sufficient underlying
basis” for Plaintiff’s wrongful death and survival actions to continue as well at this
stage. Maldet, 2019 WL 2435869 at *5. Therefore, it is respectfully recommended
that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss on those grounds.

III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended the Psychiatry
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be denied as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claims, Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, and
Wrongful Death and Survival claims (Counts I-II) and be granted as to Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims and ADA claim (Count V). It
is further recommended that leave to amend the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate

indifference claims be denied as futile. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating “a district court must permit a curative amendment,
unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”).
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties
may seek review by the District Court by filing Objections to the Report and
Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and
Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days
from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of appellate rights.

See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).

Dated: November 1, 2024. Respectfully submitted,
s/ Christopher B. Brown
Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Attorneys of record
via ECF electronic notification

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767514. Public record. Not legal advice.