# Brown v. Newton

> District Court, D. South Carolina · September 18, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767364

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. South Carolina
- **Decided:** September 18, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767364

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages
- noting that when a plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against individual officers, claims 5 based upon supervisory and/or Monell liability also fail
- noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”
- holding that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”
- explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages

## Opinion text

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

Tommy Dwayne Brown, ) C/A No. 8:24-cv-04219-BHH-KFM
)
Plaintiff, ) REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
)
vs. )
)
Travis Newton, Dennis Bannister, )
South Carolina Judicial System, Mayor )
Elanor Dorn, )
)
Defendants.1 )
)
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d)
(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. The
plaintiff’s complaint was entered on the docket on July 31, 2024 (doc. 1). The case is
substantially in proper form for judicial screening. However, for the reasons that follow, it
is recommended that this matter be summarily dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Anderson County Detention Center
(“the Detention Center”), seeks injunctive relief and money damages from the defendants
(docs. 1; 1-3). The plaintiff alleges that Travis Newton, Esquire, has not defended him
appropriately (doc. 1 at 1). The plaintiff contends that he paid Mr. Newton for a tire for his
daughter’s car and that Mr. Newton never checked the surveillance footage or the evidence
1 This caption has been updated to reflect the current parties to this action, as set
forth on the plaintiff’s complaint form (doc. 1-3).
and although the charge was dropped, the plaintiff had to pay his daughter $200 for the tire
(id.). The plaintiff also asserts that Mr. Newton convinced the plaintiff to hire him because
the system would work against the plaintiff, but Mr. Newton has given the plaintiff only bad
advice (like withdrawing his complaint against the allegedly corrupt Judge Bannister) (id. at
2). Mr. Newton’s secretary also told the plaintiff that the law signed by Governor McMaster
meant he could carry a gun, but he has still been arrested multiple times for unlawful carry
of a weapon (id.).
The plaintiff also alleges that his rights have been violated because the
Mexican cartel has been given immunity (doc. 1-3 at 1). The plaintiff’s right to a fair trial,
right to information, and right to be free of excessive force have also been violated (id.).
The plaintiff also alleges violations of his rights because he has not been recognized as a
vigilante who was acting because the City of Belton refused to (id. at 4). The plaintiff also
had to act as a vigilante because of the allegedly corrupt Judge Bannister (id. at 4, 5).
The plaintiff’s injuries include being incarcerated, mental damages, and
hardship (docs. 1 at 1; 1-3 at 6). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages, to have Mr.
Newton disbarred, to have Judge Bannister removed from the bench, and for judicial reform
(docs. 1 at 1; 1-3 at 6). Of note, the plaintiff’s complaint references an attachment that was
not provided to the court (see doc. 1-3 at 5).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma
pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied
that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or
malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the
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full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff’s lawsuit to identify cognizable
claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff’s pleadings are accorded liberal construction
and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal
construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to
allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a
source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private
right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the
alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983,
seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. As outlined below, the
plaintiff’s complaint is subject to summary dismissal. As an initial matter, many of the
claims asserted in this action have also been asserted in other actions filed by the plaintiff
in this court (nine in total) – and in one of his prior cases, he has already been informed that
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his claims are subject to dismissal (and that some are frivolous in nature). See e.g., Brown
v. Anderson Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, C/A No. 8:24-cv-04392-BHH-KFM, at doc. 12 (D.S.C.
Sept. 11, 2024) (noting that the plaintiff’s various claims were subject to summary dismissal
and providing the plaintiff the opportunity to amended his allegations to correct the
deficiencies noted in the order). Some of the duplicative claims have been addressed on
the merits in this matter; however, the plaintiff is informed that continuing to file duplicative
and numerous cases in this court may lead to the imposition of prefiling restrictions. See
Noonsab v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of N.C., C/A No. 5:16-CT-3112-FL, 2016 WL
9077878, at *2 (E.D.N.C. June 27, 2016) (warning a pro se plaintiff that unnecessary and
excessive filings impede judicial efficiency and the administration of justice).
South Carolina Judicial System
The South Carolina Judicial System is subject to dismissal because it is not
a person that may be sued pursuant to § 1983 (see docs. 1; 1-3). It is well settled that only
“persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must
qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 F. App’x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). Further,
inanimate objects or groups of people, such as departments, buildings, facilities, and
grounds cannot act under color of state law. See also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”). The South Carolina Judicial System is not a
“person”; thus, it is subject to summary dismissal. See Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr.,
C/A No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that
a building – the detention center – is not amenable to suit under § 1983).
No Personal Allegations
The plaintiff’s complaint fails to make personal allegations of wrongdoing
against defendant Mayor Elanor Dorn (see docs. 1; 1-3). Indeed, it is unclear in what
capacity Mayor Dorn was involved in the plaintiff’s alleged constitutional deprivations.
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Although the plaintiff’s allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide
more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams
v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74–75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal
involvement”). As such, Mayor Dorn is entitled to summary dismissal.
Even construing the plaintiff’s complaint as asserting a claim for municipal
liability against Mayor Dorn (and presuming Mayor Dorn was a proper party for a municipal
liability claim), his claim still fails. As an initial matter, municipalities and other local
governing bodies are considered “persons” and may be sued under Section 1983. Monell
v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). However, a county or city cannot be
held liable pursuant to respondeat superior principles. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. “[N]ot every
deprivation of a constitutional right will lead to municipal liability. Only in cases where the
municipality causes the deprivation ‘through an official policy or custom’ will liability attach.”
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218
(4th Cir. 1999)). As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated:
A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable
can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as
a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of
a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an
omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that
“manifest [s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens”; or
(4) through a practice that is so “persistent and widespread” as
to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”
Id. (quoting Carter, 164 F.3d at 217). Additionally, under Monell, municipal liability arises
“only where the constitutionally offensive actions of employees are taken in furtherance of
some municipal policy or custom.” Walker v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 575 F.3d 426,
431 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, as outlined in
more detail below, the plaintiff has failed to allege any constitutionally offensive action by
an individual defendant. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654–55 (4th Cir. 2012)
(noting that when a plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against individual officers, claims
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based upon supervisory and/or Monell liability also fail). As such, the plaintiff’s claims
against Mayor Dorn are subject to summary dismissal even if considered under Monell.
Judge Bannister
The plaintiff alleges that Judge Bannister is corrupt purportedly based on his
rulings in the plaintiff’s state criminal cases (docs. 1 at 2; 1-3 at 4). It is well-settled that
judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions
unless they acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–64 (1978); Chu v. Griffith,
771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized
by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is
judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial
capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge’s acts were in
error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12–13. Absolute immunity is “an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted). The allegations as to Judge Bannister concern his
judicial actions; as such, judicial immunity squarely applies and any claims against him
should be dismissed. As such, the plaintiff’s claims against Judge Bannister are subject to
summary dismissal.
Travis Newton, Esquire
The plaintiff’s assertions that Mr. Newton has not represented him well and
gave him bad advice when representing him (docs. 1 at 1–2; 1-3 at 6) are subject to
summary dismissal because Mr. Newton does not act under color of state law. It is well-
settled that “[a]nyone whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the state’ can be sued as a
state actor under § 1983.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) (internal citation
omitted). To determine whether state action is present, no single factor is determinative
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and the “totality of the circumstances” must be evaluated. See Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge
Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 341–43 (4th Cir. 2000). However, purely private conduct,
no matter how wrongful, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States
Constitution. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); Mentavlos v.
Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001).
The law is well-established that a privately-hired, pro bono, or appointed
defense counsel, such as Mr. Newton, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 claims
because defense counsel acts not on behalf of the state; rather, defense counsel “is the
State’s adversary.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322–23 & n.13 (1981); see
Mahaffey v. Sumter Cnty. Pub. Defender’s Corp., C/A No. 3:06-3557-SB, 2007 WL
3001675, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2007) (“[T]he Sumter County Public Defender’s Corp. did not
act under color of state law and is entitled to summary dismissal.”); see also Hall v. Quillen,
631 F.2d 1154, 1155–56 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no state action under § 1983, even where
the plaintiff’s attorney was court-appointed). As such, Mr. Newton is subject to summary
dismissal.
Frivolous
Some of the plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal because they are
frivolous in nature. For example, the plaintiff’s assertions that the defendants are working
with and allowing the Mexican Cartel to sell drugs and have failed to recognize the plaintiff
as a lawful vigilante (docs. 1 at 1–2; 1-3 at 4, 6) are clearly frivolous in nature. Similarly, the
plaintiff’s allegations surrounding an incident with him, his daughter, and Mr. Newton
involving a tire, as well as assertions regarding representations made by Mr. Newton’s
secretary about the plaintiff’s entitlement to carry a weapon are likewise frivolous, meritless,
and fantastical in nature. It is well-settled that the court has the authority to dismiss claims
that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional.” Adams, 40 F.3d at 74; Raiford v. FBI, C/A No.
1:10-cv-2751-MBS-JRM, 2010 WL 6737887, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2010), Report and
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Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2020729 (D.S.C. May 23, 2011) (explaining a
finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when “the facts alleged rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible”). In reviewing a complaint for frivolousness or malice, the
court looks to see whether the complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is
founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional
scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)). The Court must accept all well-pled allegations
and review the complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari,
7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
Here, even when reviewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
amended complaint is comprised of factual allegations that are not credible, and which fail
to state a claim for relief. See Neal v. Duke Energy, No. 6:11-cv-1420-HFF-KFM, 2011 WL
5083181, at *4 (D.S.C. June 30, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL
5082193 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing action upon finding plaintiff’s factual allegations
were frivolous, fanciful, and delusional where plaintiff claimed defendants clandestinely
placed a GPS device in her car while it was in the shop for repairs and that she was being
stalked by the defendants, noting the allegations were “made without any viable factual
supporting allegations and appears to be the product of paranoid fantasy”); Feurtado v.
McNair, No. 3:05-cv-1933-SB, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jun. 15, 2006) (noting that
frivolousness encompasses inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations),
aff’d, 227 F. App’x 303 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. dismissed, 553 U.S. 1029 (2008).
As outlined above, the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants are working with the
Mexican cartel to sell drugs, that he was a lawful vigilante, that he had to pay for a tire for
his daughter twice because Mr. Newton did not investigate, and that Mr. Newton’s secretary
gave him bad information about his ability to lawfully carry a weapon, are clearly frivolous
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and lack a basis in the law. As such, the plaintiff’s claims in this action are also subject to
summary dismissal as frivolous.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects
identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that
the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without
issuance and service of process.2 See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022)
(published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without
providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge
September 18, 2024
Greenville, South Carolina

2 The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this
matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to
state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South
Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
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Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this
Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify
the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the
basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need
not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error
on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life
& Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory
committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date
of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and
Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the
District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767364. Public record. Not legal advice.